Inherent Value of life (secular)

[PRmerger]

I disagree. Just because morality may fundamentally be subjective does not mean one cannot work to see one’s own morality take sway over society.

This is ridiculous. If morality is subjective…like, say, whether turnips taste better mashed or fried (Hi @Bradskii!), then it’s ABSURD to go around trying to make people think turnips taste better mashed.

But if morality is objective…like, say, Djibouti is a country, then it makes absolute sense to go around correcting people who have the wrong idea about this.

 

[niceatheist]

That’s an argument ad absurdum. That morals are subjective doesn’t mean we don’t need morals. Obviously we do. As I said, we’re social animals. We need rules, and in the absence of them, we’ll make rules. Even in the Communist countries where Atheism was, shall we say, the official “creed”, there were still morals (though whether the leadership practiced them or not is another question, but hardly one limited to those countries). In fact, Communist states are almost peculiar in just how conservative their societies tend to be.

Claiming an objective moral code is little more than an attempt to do an end run around having to justify your position. However you deem your morals the objective standard (whether “God says so” or because of your formulation of Natural Law), the fact that you appeal at the end of the day to the claim that you hold the objective moral standard really is a means to shut down the debate. After all, if there is an objective moral standard, then there is no debate at all, I either agree with your every precept, or I am defending immorality.

Let’s take a slightly less heated issue than, say, abortion. Let’s talk about divorce. Most conservative Christians are quite anti-divorce, to the point where only the most egregious acts by a spouse could ever justify it (i.e. physical abuse or extreme emotional abuse). And yet, while I see a divorce as a sad state of affairs, where a couple can no longer find any accommodation, I think divorce should be an option open to any couple, or even one spouse, should they, for whatever reason they deem important, seek to end the marriage. I don’t see a role for any government to limit divorce. That view would, at least in some circles, be viewed as a violation of the sacred nature of marriage, so I guess I’d be an advocate of an immoral act; the severing of a marital bond for anything but the most extreme reasons.

 

[HarryStotle]

For nearly two thousand years Jews were persecuted to one degree or another by Christians. There were pogroms throughout Europe, and I’d say anti semitism was in Christendom’s dna. I’m sure most Christians of previous eras would have found the Holocaust horrific, but not all historical Christians. If Ferdinand and Isabella had had Zyklon B at their disposal, the Reconquista might have had a very different history. So even the murder of Jews for the crime of being Jewish is not a stain pre-Nazi Europe was free of. Which goes to show you just how fluid morals are.

Actually, you haven’t shown “just how fluid” morality is, you have shown just how fluid the morality of individuals has been.

You pick an abiding anti-Semitism present (even persistent) among some Christians through time as proof Christians as a whole have been anti-Semitic.

The problem is your “proof” is that it is actually based upon the composition fallacy. Even if what you say were true of some (even many) Christians, throughout time does not establish that Christianity itself is anti-Semitic.

You could just as well claim that because Christians through time have been guilty of adultery, theft, deception, etc., that Christianity is an adulterous, thieving and deceptive belief system.

Sorry, what is true of some or some parts is not necessarily true of the whole. This is especially true when you have a highly developed moral and religious system that is very demanding of adherents and holds them to standards that are not easily attained.

That is by no means a demonstration that the ethical standards of Christianity are faulty, nor that they ought to be abandoned.

The alternative is to espouse NO morality or immorality simply because more individuals can meet those standards (or lack of them.)

So because more people, in fact, lie or deceive others quite frequently in their lives, does that mean the “fluidity” of truth-telling should convince us that honesty is optional since everyone lies some of the time? It is therefore okay to tell lies because everyone does it?

 

[HarryStotle]

Social norms are what society say they are. It’s that simple. If enough people decide some action is moral, then that becomes moral.

That would be an example of inferring an ought from an is, and based on the general invalidity of the is-ought fallacy, would be a false conclusion. Put another way, is-ought is a specific instance of inferring evaluative conclusions (morality) from purely factual premises (social norms) in violation of the fact–value distinction.

If morality is simply what “enough people decide” then Hitler’s actions were moral while he held power in Germany, because he convinced most of the people of that country to comply with his morality.

The best objective standard there is really boils down to Bentham’s utilitarianism.

That would be a bald assertion, one that I doubt even you believe.

And you certainly don’t even try to demonstrate the assertion to be true, by what follows:

If we start from a basic premise (admittedly subjective itself) that everyone has certain essential and inalieable rights and an essential dignity, then we can hope to construct a productive and lasting society.

You have now thrown in a “basic premise” which you don’t even attempt to show to be true. You just assert it.

Where do these “certain essential and inalie[n]able rights and … essential dignity” of an individual come from? How are they underwritten?

Now it might be true – based upon your subjective views of morality – that if I happen to believe your assertion, then I will accord others those rights and if enough people do so around me, they will become the de facto “rights” of everyone. That, however, does not mean these meet the standard of moral rights in the sense of showing that each individual “ought” to have such rights.

Since there is no morally imperative ought, according to you, then someone could just as legitimately claim the alternative view that people, no matter who they are, can be tortured and killed for the fun of it. Basically, you are allowing that such a view is no less “moral” than yours, and could (in fact) become the moral standard in the community if the propagator of that view were successful in convincing most of the community (at least those belligerent enough to survive his perspective) to side with him.

Might could then be right, according to your perspective, provided it is convincing enough to change public opinion.

 

[HarryStotle]

Since their ethical system is different, they may be moral in their eyes, but not in others. You still operate under the misconception that there is some “objective and absolute” morality.

So if thinking an ethical system is “objective and absolute” is a misconception, and moral systems are not subjective, like a preference for turnips, what is left?

Let’s be clear here:

1. Objective means the truth or validity of a thing is found in the object, independent of subjects.
2. Subjective means the truth or validity of a thing is found within the subject, upon whom the thing depends.

The truth of the statement a triangle has three sides is determined by the object triangles, it isn’t subject dependent.

The truth of the statement, “I like turnips,” is found in the subject, the I or me that likes turnips. Subjective statements can be true or false since they are about subjects and not objects, but depend entirely upon the subject qua subject.

BUT if morality is not objective and it is not subjective, what is it?

Let me propose a “middle way”…

The truth of the moral statement, Human beings have “certain essential and inalie[n]able rights and … essential dignity,” is to be found in the objective nature of human subjects. It is objectively true about human beings BECAUSE they are subjects, and subjects have an inherent value.

How is that?

 

[Bradskii]

Being caused by the chemistry of your brain to “know” something is no assurance that you have any logical grounds for thinking that ‘something’ to be true.

And neither does being caused by the chemistry of your brain to value something entail that that something has any real value on its own accord. So value becomes completely unmoored from any objective grounding.

Your claim that for something to be valued it must be valued by someone, if taken to its logical conclusion – together with the materialism implied by your atheism – means that value is merely something endowed by human brains.

If human brains are mere biochemistry, then beliefs about value are causally derived from brain chemistry and say nothing about what is or is not valuable in reality.

The Euthyphro dilemma applies in spades here, since according to atheist belief human beings are the “gods” of reality (there is no higher order) and only humans ascribe “value” upon things. There is no other sense of “value” to be had, according to the atheist.

So what is “good,” is good because humans say it is good (value it). It isn’t the case that humans value something because it is good because there is no other objective determiner for value (or what is good.) The dilemma must be answered by the atheist as: It is good BECAUSE humans value it. Period.

So the attendant questions naturally arise: Which humans? Any humans? Or only the ‘good’ humans? How do we know which are the ‘good’ humans without some standard by which to determine that?

Unless I’m mistaken, the chemistry of your brain is pretty much the same as mine. So I think that we both start with the same abilities to determine that which is true and what is not. Is there something that you posess that I don’t that gives you some insight into existence?

And yes, value is not objective. It is purely subjctive. And yes, humans determine value themselves. Nothing has an inherrent value outside of what we personally determine. It really is the case that something is good because someone values it as such.There you go…answered.

And that is all humans. Each of us determines value. What you determine might be different to me, but that’s the way it works. Which is going to lead to you asking ‘well, what if someone determines a person’s life to have no value?’.

Then they’d be quite correct as far as they are concerned. We can’t tell someone what they must value and to what extent. But if they then respond ‘well, I can kill her then because her life has no value to me’, then we are free to call that person a psycopath because they posess no empathy (remember I mentioned that earlier?). And you and I both posessing empathy would think it would be a very bad idea indeed so we’d advise him against it.

 

[Bradskii]

So what would any secularist’s grounds for the truth be, exactly?

At least you didn’t capitalise it. But what exactly do you mean by ‘the truth’? It’s a bit wooly. Tie it down a little.

 

[Bradskii]

Using context, would you say a human stranger has more value or is worth saving more than a beloved pet, or the reverse?

I think the answer is obvious to both of us. We would save our child in a heartbeat over a random stranger. I can go further and suggest that we would buy our child a nice dress rather than sending the money to a charity. Or we would go on a reasonably expensive holiday rather than travelling to third world country to help people in need.

That’s the way the world works. You cannot spend every waking moment and every cent you earn trying to right all wrongs. You are built to care for those closest to you over all else. You can’t change that.

But why is change and fluidity a “good” thing? Why not just retain the status quo and keep slavery if neither slavery nor the abolition of it is in any real terms better than the other?

Sorry to keep mentioning this but you need to incorporate empathy into your thinking. Always ask: ‘What would I feel if I were in this person’s position’. If you would prefer not to be in said position, then it’s a good bet that the other guy feels the same.

Then you bring in a pinch of reciprocal altruism, aka The Golden Rule - which I’m sure you agree with (Luke :31) and you hasve a solution.

 

[HarryStotle]

HarryStotle:

How is that?

Incorrect. Not all propositions are “ethical” in nature. So references to “turnips” and the like are immediately disqualified. Value is always subjective in nature. To call some action to be moral simply means that you strongly agree with it. Such agreement rests on two “legs”. One is the ethical system you subscribe to. The other one is the evaluation of the act within that ethical system.

I see.

Congratulations for kicking that can down the street just a bit. Stills gets us nowhere.

And the ethical system you “subscribe to” is subscribed to as a function of what, exactly?

Your subjective preferences or something else?

If something else, then values are not merely (always?) subjective in nature.

 

[HarryStotle]

And yes, value is not objective. It is purely subjctive. And yes, humans determine value themselves. Nothing has an inherrent value outside of what we personally determine. It really is the case that something is good because someone values it as such.There you go…answered.

And all of these assertions of yours…

• value is not objective
• It is purely subjctive
• humans determine value themselves
• Nothing has an inherrent value outside of what we personally determine
• something is [only?] good because someone values it as such

… are they statements of truth or merely your subjective views about morality?

If the latter, then you have told us nothing except what you think. If the former then you have made statements you purport to be true while pretending you haven’t made any true (or valuable, to us) statements.

So which is it?

Nothing has an inherent value outside of what we personally determine… certainly sounds like an absolute truth claim. Good thing you didn’t capitalize the T, or we might be lead to believe that you think your claims about morality are the last word, the (big T) Truth about morality, so to speak.

Funny how relativists transform so quickly into near absolutists and universalists regarding what they claim to be the Truth about morality: i.e., that we each personally determine it for ourselves.

Pretend relativists except when it comes to empathy, when the rule of reciprocal altruism becomes universal for no reason except that we MUST (Says who?) all incorporate empathy into our thinking. Apparently, that is the ONLY universal moral truth, and humans, in that case ONLY, ARE NOT permitted to “determine value themselves” because “Nothing has an inherrent value outside of what we personally determine,” except, of course, EMPATHY, because the value of EMPATHY we are NOT allowed to personally determine for ourselves (even though value is NOT objective but is PURELY subjective), for some reason that is not explained.

 

[HarryStotle]

HarryStotle:

And the ethical system you “subscribe to” is subscribed to as a function of what, exactly?

Of our behavior. of course. The parts of philosophy are

1. Metaphysics - or what exists?
2. Epistemology - or how do we know it?
3. Ethics - or how should we behave?

How should we behave is decided upon the metaphysics and epistemology. Since humans are both individuals and herd animals, we have to balance our behavior to optimize or balance both sides of our nature.

If one believes in some God, who is overseeing everything and judging all our actions, and judges them by sending them to either heaven or hell, then this person’s actions will be influenced by this belief. If someone does not believe, then only the repercussions incurred in this existence matter.

Clearly we have two very different value systems, which will create two, very different ethical sets of considerations. This is the reason that there are no “common” ethical systems. Of course there are overlaps, so the ethical systems will have some common areas.

Thanks for the tour into the philosophical aspects of morality.

The question you seem to be completely oblivious to is: How do we determine which morality is true?

Or put another way, which ethical system is most ethical?

 

[Bradskii]

Nothing has an inherent value outside of what we personally determine… certainly sounds like an absolute truth claim. Good thing you didn’t capitalize the T, or we might be lead to believe that you think your claims about morality are the last word, the (big T) Truth about morality, so to speak.

Funny how relativists transform so quickly into near absolutists and universalists regarding what they claim to be the Truth about morality: i.e., that we each personally determine it for ourselves.

Pretend relativists except when it comes to empathy, when the rule of reciprocal altruism becomes universal for no reason except that we MUST (Says who?) all incorporate empathy into our thinking. Apparently, that is the ONLY universal moral truth, and humans, in that case ONLY, ARE NOT permitted to “determine value themselves” because “Nothing has an inherrent value outside of what we personally determine,” except, of course, EMPATHY, because the value of EMPATHY we are NOT allowed to personally determine for ourselves (even though value is NOT objective but is PURELY subjective), for some reason that is not explained.

Did someone say that everything is relative? Was it posted somewhere that there is nothing objective?There is nothing wrong with saying that value is subjective and that that is an objective fact. It’s like saying that my favourite colour is blue, which is an objective fact about a relative value. I have no problem making absolute statements. Why would I?

All the statements you highlighted are, in my humble opinion, objective facts about the world in which we live. But I am not omniscient. I may be wrong. You are free to try to show that your view is the correct one.

And you can’t make a decision to incorporate empathy into your thinking. I meant that you need to incorporate the fact that it’s there into how you think. It’s inbuilt (or not as the case may be in a small proportion of society). It’s why we value other people. We empathise with what they feel and feel it ourselves. And it’s not something which you can value in the sense that you mean it. No more that you can value fear more than someone else. Or pride. They are valuable characteristics in themselves because they serve useful purposes.

And reciprocal altruism can be a conscious decision as opposed to the automatic and subconscious empathy. Although it generally happens in the subconscious.

 

[HarryStotle]

HarryStotle:

The question you seem to be completely oblivious to is: How do we determine which morality is true?

What does the word “true” mean in this context? In the objective reality, a proposition is “true” if it correctly describes the objective reality (inductive systems). In the abstract (axiomatic) systems a proposition is “true” if it can be reduced to the axioms (deductive systems).

I am not oblivious to your question, I find it incoherent. It is about as meaningless as asking "what exists on the reverse side of the Mobius strip? Or, “which food tastes best”? Or, “which music is the most beautiful”? Or, “what exists to the north of the North Pole”? Not all questions (or propositions) are meaningful, even if they are syntactically well-formed.

I suppose true statements correspond to objective reality, so the nature of reality would be the determiner or grounds for the truth of morality.

Something like: why do humans exist, i.e., for what end do humans exist?

If reality is, at ground, merely the action of subatomic particles as brute fact then morality is meaningless because there is no purpose or end good for human existence. In which case, the correct moral view would be: morality is a chimera and, in the final analysis, it doesn’t matter, in reality, what you or anyone else does.

If, however, the ground of Being is the Omnibenevolent, Omniscient, Omnipotent Pure Act of Being Itself, Overflowing with Infinite Abundance, Goodness and Love, who has created all things for a purpose that infinitely exceeds our capacities to understand, then the truth of morality would be found in the nature of the self-existent God, Who is the source of all that exists.

You might claim that we can’t know either way and, therefore, the truth about morality is unknowable, incoherent and meaningless. But is it?

Wouldn’t that be, at least in part a moral determination, since you would jump the gun on the moral determination merely by assuming the metaphysical determination?

To either …

1. treat existence as meaningless and purposeless, or to
2. treat existence as having infinite value

…would, then, devolve to a moral determination especially if full accessibility on the metaphysical front is not possible?

To say morality is up to you to decide (i.e., completely subjective) implies that it is completely up to you to decide what the nature of reality is.

Is it, though?

Shouldn’t reality and, therefore, morality depend upon the nature of reality, and for us to discover rather than to determine as we choose?

 

[Bradskii]

If reality is, at ground, merely the action of subatomic particles as brute fact then morality is meaningless because there is no purpose or end good for human existence.

This is an error. There are different levels of existence. All interelated but separate.

You have the sub nuclear, the sub atomic, individual atoms, molecules, cells, organs, individuals, groups, societies and humankind. It is not valid to determine how one level acts by considering another. You cannot tell how a person reacts by considering the actions of sub atomic particles. Just as you can’t determine what a society will do by considering the actions of one person.

So just because we are discovering ever smaller constituent parts of reality doesn’t mean their actions dictate all the levels above.

One sub nuclear particle might react in a specific way to another. Which may have some effect on the level above. But as we move up the chain of existence, the effect becomes less and less. Just as one person cannot change a society individually, but may change a group. Which then may change a tribe which then may change a town and so on.

You can work back to conclude that the kingdom was lost for want of a nail (it’s a nonsensical proposition in any case) but it most definitely doesn’t work in the opposite direction. You can’t bring down a kingdom by loosening a nail. But that is what you are proposing. That morality (the fate of the kingdom) is determined by the action of subatomic particles (loose nails).

 

[HarryStotle]

PRmerger:

Right. No one should ever be proposing “God says so” as any apologia.

But therein lies the problem. If we both agree “God says so”, or some more complex and nuanced variant, isn’t the way to convince me of an objective moral standard, then the next step will be to pull God out, and replace it with Natural Law. And then I’ll respond much the same, so we reach an impasse.

So why would something as abstract as “Natural Law” be compelling to convince anyone of an objective moral standard, when an active Creator of the universe who brings all into being will not convince you? Why would morality coming from the source of existence itself NOT be compelling, but an abstraction like Natural Moral Law would be? I am genuinely puzzled. Perhaps you have a distinct bias against Omnibenevolent Creators?

I smell a deflection here.

I also suspect neither of those will convince you primarily because your “standard” for morality isn’t permitted, in principle, by your need to control your choices. It could be that this requirement for control leads to an unwillingness to be objective because you won’t allow morality to be an imposition from an external origin onto your behaviour or actions, from the get go. The source of your control must be from within your willingness, I suspect, which is why you have to default to morality is “subjective.”

I would argue that while ultimately your position is true because moral choices are, in fact, the moral responsibility of the agent. The problem, however, is if the moral agent is a defective moral agent their choices will be immoral and irresponsible, so the only way of righting the cart, so to speak, in that case is to impose morality from outside until the agent achieves some decent moral rectitude and becomes capable of correct moral choices.

This is the problem with insisting morality is purely subjective, however: it permits morally deficient and defective subjects to claim their morality is en par with the morality of certifiably good moral agents.

Is the morality of a murderer or rapist on equal standing with, say, the morality of Jesus or Gandhi? If not, how can you say morality is merely subjectively determined by the agent? If it is the rapist has the right to determine their own morality for themselves, and others have no right to interfere.

That can’t be the case, however, if we are to make any clear distinction between the morality of a rapist and the morality of a good person, and permit interfering with the actions of the rapist. The standard for morality has to be outside the defective and immoral agent. There has to be an objective standard independent of human subjects by which the morality of individual human subjects itself can be assessed.

It can still be subject based, but based upon an abstract subject, i.e., a good moral agent as an ideal to live up to worked out by moral debate and discussion, in much the same way that what makes a good triangle is determined in light of an abstraction regarding what a triangle is, objectively and conceptually speaking.

 

[HarryStotle]

Bradskii explained your error perfectly. What you forget is the existence of “emerging attributes”. The properties of atoms do NOT determine the properties of molecules. The properties of molecules do NOT determine the properties of living cells. The properties of cells do NOT determine the properties of the individuals comprised of those cells.

As interesting as this is, a materialist is constrained by his/her own premises into thinking that the properties of atoms DO determine the properties of molecules, and those DO determine the properties of living cells, and those do determine the the properties of individuals – if the material world is all that exists.

This whole idea of “emerging” is a way of avoiding explaining, i.e., explaining away, how each of those layers DON’T determine the layer above while, at the same as insisting there is nothing else that does. It squirrels in the “spiritual world” at the same time as it denies the existence of anything beside the material world.

Proponents of the “emerging” view speak like some mysterious magic is active in the world since higher levels of existence just magically “emerge” without so much as a hint of an explanation being required. If it can’t be explained, let’s just call it “emergence” and be done with it.

Uh huh.

Ergo, Bradskii didn’t “explain” anything. He certainly didn’t explain why my “error” is indeed an error. He assumed that merely asserting “emerging” is sufficient to convince some that he had actually explained something.

Apparently, some (we’ll not name names) were taken in by the supposed “explanation.”

 

[HarryStotle]

HarryStotle:

I suppose true statements correspond to objective reality, so the nature of reality would be the determiner or grounds for the truth of morality.

No, it is not a determinant. It would influence, but not determine. What is the nature of reality is a metaphysical question. But ethics is not about what “IS”, it is about “OUGHT” (or “SHOULD”) - it is an ethical problem. Given the nature of reality it does not and cannot “determine” how we ought to behave. Our subjective value system - the question: “what do we desire” combined with “what is the nature of reality” (which makes some solutions possible, and other solutions impossible) allows us to prefer one possible solution over another.

You are partially correct here. Morality is concerned with what ought to be the case.

However, you are mistaken when you insist that OUGHT is not dependent upon metaphysical questions.

What we ought to do is, indeed, determined in light of final outcomes. We OUGHT to do X because that will bring about Y.

So it is in light of the proper determination of end goods, i.e., the Summum Bonum, that what we OUGHT to do comes to light.

It wouldn’t make sense to claim this is what we OUGHT to do in an ontological vacuum. Where nothing exists there is no moral burden to be carried. Where creatures exist that have moral standing, have moral value, we can begin to discuss OUGHTS relative to those creatures.

Moral oughts are not merely pragmatic considerations. Let’s build a vehicle to get us from A to B. That carries no moral incumbency. Moral OUGHTS are obligatory on all moral agents, so it is important to get straight what those are and why.

Again, the problem with atheism is that a strictly material world, with no end or purpose, creates a rather meagre foundation for morality. Why ought we do anything if we are merely bags of chemicals (blobs of cells) with no real purpose because human existence is just a brute fact.

If, however, human beings are destined for eternal existence and are substantial existents with a purpose and infinite value, that provides fertile ground for the development of a compelling morality.

 

[Bradskii]

Is the morality of a murderer or rapist on equal standing with, say, the morality of Jesus or Gandhi? If not, how can you say morality is merely subjectively determined by the agent? If it is the rapist has the right to determine their own morality for themselves, and others have no right to interfere.

It is plainly obvious that there are different moralities. And we all have the right to determine our own version. What you appear to have a problem with is that some acts are morally bad as far as you are concerned and that bizarrely you seem to think that we cannot interfere. Why on earth not?

This is a refrain that I constantly hear: ‘What’s to stop someone deciding that it’s moral to rape women’ or something equally as fatuous. As if someone simply declaring an act to be his personal moral outlook gives them carte blanche to commit any act. Are we not capable of declaring such an outlook abhorrent? Can we not determine that the person is promoting an evil act without being told via scripture that it’s wrong? If that is truly the case for some people then I despair.

So we can tell what is wrong and here come the principles we use to do so: Empathy and the golden rule. You know how that person will feel being sexually assaulted and you know that you wouldn’t want to feel that way yourself. So you don’t assault women and you it is encumbant upon you to prevent others doing so. Whether that person declares it to be a moral position or not.

 

[HarryStotle]

HarryStotle:

As interesting as this is, a materialist is constrained by his/her own premises into thinking that the properties of atoms DO determine the properties of molecules, and those DO determine the properties of living cells, and those do determine the the properties of individuals – if the material world is all that exists.

Not true. The emergent attributes are not “magic” nor are they “supernatural”. Take one simple example: one oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms form one water molecule. The attributes of oxygen and hydrogen do not “explain” the wetness of water. But that does not require the assumption of a “wetness god” or some other supernatural “stuff” to explain the new emergent attributes.

Okay, so the wetness of water is not so very different from the capacity of humans to think, create, use language, write poetry, and precisely engineer structures, airliners and nanotechnology? Is that your contention?

Oxygen and hydrogen exuding wetness is just like a human mind emanating abstract thoughts and concepts? Perhaps hydrogen and oxygen molecules conceptualize the attributes of water by each putting their minuscule subatomic heads together?

In case you are missing the point, water in its liquid state still has defined physical properties, no matter how different they are from the properties of hydrogen, oxygen (or water vapour.) Are you claiming that the attributes of water vapour don’t explain the attributes of liquid water, even though water vapour just happens to be water in a different state? The properties of liquid water are latent in the properties of water vapour, so your argument tells us precisely nothing about “emerging attributes.”

Wetness, relative to the combination of hydrogen and oxygen molecules, is nothing remotely like what thinking is, relative to biochemical reactions. Merely calling both “emergent” properties doesn’t make them just different instances of the same thing.

 

[HarryStotle]

It is plainly obvious that there are different moralities. And we all have the right to determine our own version. What you appear to have a problem with is that some acts are morally bad as far as you are concerned and that bizarrely you seem to think that we cannot interfere. Why on earth not?

Actually, my contention is that morality is precisely what permits moral agents to interfere in the activities of other moral agents. That is what morality just is.

To say we each have our own morality simply muddies the water regarding what is moral and what is not.

The things which are “morally bad” are precisely those which constrain every moral agent, without exception. So there is no “my morality” and “your morality.” There is morality simpliciter, and if any moral principle does not permit interference then it isn’t a moral principle, but something else entirely.

We don’t require anyone’s agreement about the morality of rape, murder, child abuse, and assorted other heinous acts precisely because these exhibit the quality of infringing on distinctively moral principles.

Moral principles don’t have much to do with empathy, but it is preferable that well-formed human beings recognize immorality and empathize with other human beings when moral transgressions occur. Empathy is not, however, a determining feature of what counts as moral or immoral.