Intelligence in God, an appeal to Professional Philosophers

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Linusthe2nd

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I’m looking for help parsing S.C.G., Book 1, chaper 44 where Thomas presents " proofs " that God is intelligent. Specfically I would like a thorough parsing of the following:

" [1] From what has been said we can show that God is intelligent.

[2] We have shown above that among movers and things moved we cannot proceed to infinity, but must reduce all movable things, as is demonstrable, to one first self-moving being. The self-moving being moves itself only by appetite and knowledge, for only such beings are found to move themselves, because to be moved and not moved lies in their power. The moving part in the first self-moving being must he appetitive and apprehending. Now, in a motion that takes place through appetite and apprehension, he who has the appetite and the apprehension is a moved mover, while the appetible and apprehended is the unmoved mover. Since, therefore, the first mover of all things, whom we call God, is an absolutely unmoved mover, He must be related to the mover that is a part of the self-moving being as the appetible is to the one who has the appetite. Not, however, as something appetible by sensible appetite, since sensible appetite is not of that which is good absolutely but of this particular good, since the apprehension of the sense is likewise particular; whereas that which is good and appetible absolutely is prior to that which is good and appetible here and now. The first mover, then, must be appetible as an object of intellect, and thus the mover that desires it must be intelligent. All the more, therefore, will the first appetible be intelligent, since the one desiring it is intelligent in act by being joined to it as an intelligible. Therefore, making the supposition that the first mover moves himself, as the philosophers intended, we must say that God is intelligent. "

The conclusion seems invalid to me but I realize I do not understand the argument. I have done a lot of background research on this, backtracking the reasoning but still cannot understand it.

If you don’t have a PhD in philosophy, I don’t think there is much use in responding because the argument is quite complex, much more so than it appears at first glance.

Linus2nd
 
So we don’t have any Philosophy PhD’s following this forum? Not very encouraging.

Linus2nd
 
I wonder what Plato would have thought if he had been informed that, someday, the status of “philosopher” would be conferred by slips of paper from profit-seeking institutions. I suppose Socrates wasted his time by engaging with common simpletons on the street, eh?
 
Oreoracle said:
I wonder what Plato would have thought if he had been informed that, someday, the status of “philosopher” would be conferred by slips of paper from profit-seeking institutions. I suppose Socrates wasted his time by engaging with common simpletons on the street, eh?
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Well, we are not common " street simpletons " here but to answer the question I have requires a broad familiarity to the corpus of both Aquinas and Aristotle. And this clearly requires professional expertise. The kind that enthusiasits like us do not have.

Linus2nd
 
In chapter 7 of his online course in the Philosophy of Nature, Fr. William A. Wallace gives the best argument for the intelligence of God that I have yet seen.

Here is an excellent analysis of Thomas’ First Way by the brilliant Philosopher of Nature, Fr. William A. Wallace which he gives in an online course:
home.comcast.net/~icuweb/c02006.htm#2

All of Lecutre 6 should be studied carefully.:

6th Lecture: Nature’s First Unmoved Mover
  1. Aquinas’s Prima Via
  2. The Motor Causality Principle
  3. Validity in the Present Day
  4. Three Instances of Local Motion
  5. Efficient and Material Causality
  6. Aquinas’s Own Objection
  7. Nature’s First Unmoved Mover
In chapter 3 he gives explains how the argument has not been invalidated by either Newton’s Laws nor by the later developments of modern science, much as I have explained above. There is always an external agent which imparts an impetus which alters the nature of the moved mover so that it moves until stopped.

In chapter 4 he gives three examples.

In chapter 7 he concludes:

Therefore, the first cause is not a body, and does not have parts on which it depends for its being and acting. It is not composed of matter and form, nor of potency and act. It is not capable of being moved or having motion, either by itself or by something else, but it is the unmoved mover of other things. Because it is unmoved, it is not a temporal being but eternal. Because it is unmoved and incorporeal, it does not cause motion mechanically, as one body moves another from without, but rather as mind or intelligence moves a body with a higher order of action.

Linus2nd
 
I got the following reply from wokeupabug on Reddit:

“He’s reiterating the argument of Metaphysics XII:7. Motion is traced back to self-motion, which is taken to be an activity of soul (like in Plato’s cosmological argument in Laws X), so that motion in general is thereby traced back to a motion which is intellectual. But, on the principle that actuality precedes potentiality, any intellectual motion (i.e. a reduction from potentiality to actuality) is possible only given an actuality as its basis, i.e. which is the object (qua final cause of the intellectual act) of the act. So that if we trace motion in general back to an intellectual motion, the implication is that there is an actuality which is the condition of this motion, and so is the ultimate source of motion in general. I.e. the primordial self-motion is the first moved mover, and the actuality which is the basis of this self-motion is the unmoved mover, so that the unmoved mover moves without being moved by virtue of being an object of intellectual activity. But an object of intellectual activity is itself intellectual, but in actuality rather than as a motion (i.e. a reduction of potentiality to actuality), for otherwise it could not be the actuality of the motion. So that the unmoved mover is what is intellectual qua actuality rather than qua a motion.”

It’s a little clearer to me now, but it still hasn’t quite clicked. I too emailed philosopher professors (including Feser), but no response. I’m now determined to get a grip on this argument.

I still need to chew on this, and keep asking and thinking about it. It’s still that last sentence I don’t quite get: why should something intelligible be intelligent? The principles of physics are intelligible, and act as an “unmoved mover” to our intellects, but they are not intelligent.

Thanks for the links to Fr Wallace, in this thread and the other!
 
hammiesink said:
I got the following reply from wokeupabug on Reddit:

“He’s reiterating the argument of Metaphysics XII:7. Motion is traced back to self-motion, which is taken to be an activity of soul (like in Plato’s cosmological argument in Laws X), so that motion in general is thereby traced back to a motion which is intellectual. But, on the principle that actuality precedes potentiality, any intellectual motion (i.e. a reduction from potentiality to actuality) is possible only given an actuality as its basis, i.e. which is the object (qua final cause of the intellectual act) of the act. So that if we trace motion in general back to an intellectual motion, the implication is that there is an actuality which is the condition of this motion, and so is the ultimate source of motion in general. I.e. the primordial self-motion is the first moved mover, and the actuality which is the basis of this self-motion is the unmoved mover, so that the unmoved mover moves without being moved by virtue of being an object of intellectual activity. But an object of intellectual activity is itself intellectual, but in actuality rather than as a motion (i.e. a reduction of potentiality to actuality), for otherwise it could not be the actuality of the motion. So that the unmoved mover is what is intellectual qua actuality rather than qua a motion.”

It’s a little clearer to me now, but it still hasn’t quite clicked. I too emailed philosopher professors (including Feser), but no response. I’m now determined to get a grip on this argument.

I still need to chew on this, and keep asking and thinking about it. It’s still that last sentence I don’t quite get: why should something intelligible be intelligent? The principles of physics are intelligible, and act as an “unmoved mover” to our intellects, but they are not intelligent.

Thanks for the links to Fr Wallace, in this thread and the other!
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The problem I saw was that the final cause moves through attraction. It seems to me that without an effecient cause for the moved mover’s existence the argument falls flat. It needs to be established that Thomas allows for an eternal efficient cause. And Thomas does this but it has to be proven that he has this in mind specifically ( many would say he does not ). This is what has to be worked out.

Wallace is great. He is now 92 years young.

Linus2nd
 
I’m still stuck at why an object of intellect must itself be intelligent.
 
hammiesink said:
I’m still stuck at why an object of intellect must itself be intelligent.
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Me too. I’m not sure we are reading it right. If that really is the argument, it would not be very convincing. That is why I think we are missing something. Thomas would not present something unless it was convincing to himself. Therefore, we must be missing something. And that is why we need help. And it is possible we will not get it and will just have to accept the fact that it is one of those things we will never understand. That is why I offered the argument by Wallace.

Linus2nd
 
436 folks have now stopped to view this thread. We have been looking for a qualified Philosopher to comment on the O.P. Surely one of you knows of such a person, perhaps a professor in one of your own philosophy classes. Ask him/her if he/she would care to comment or perhaps knows of someone who would be interested. The reason is that we cannot see the logic of the argument. And we would like to be able to understand it. So if you know of anyone who might help, please pass on our request.

Linus2nd
 
I’ve been dealing with him a long time, and I’m pretty sure he is a real philosopher.

However, it would still be best to find an academic Thomist to speak with on this. I am still very frustrated that I can’t get it.
 
hammiesink said:
I’ve been dealing with him a long time, and I’m pretty sure he is a real philosopher.

However, it would still be best to find an academic Thomist to speak with on this. I am still very frustrated that I can’t get it.
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Sometimes, we just have to admit defeat. Like I said, to understand this " proof " one will have to back track through T’s commentary of Metaphysics, Physics, De Anima, and the S.C.G. at the very least.

Linus2nd
 
hammiesink said:
I got the following reply from wokeupabug on Reddit:

“He’s reiterating the argument of Metaphysics XII:7. Motion is traced back to self-motion, which is taken to be an activity of soul (like in Plato’s cosmological argument in Laws X), so that motion in general is thereby traced back to a motion which is intellectual. But, on the principle that actuality precedes potentiality, any intellectual motion (i.e. a reduction from potentiality to actuality) is possible only given an actuality as its basis, i.e. which is the object (qua final cause of the intellectual act) of the act. So that if we trace motion in general back to an intellectual motion, the implication is that there is an actuality which is the condition of this motion, and so is the ultimate source of motion in general. I.e. the primordial self-motion is the first moved mover, and the actuality which is the basis of this self-motion is the unmoved mover, so that the unmoved mover moves without being moved by virtue of being an object of intellectual activity. But an object of intellectual activity is itself intellectual, but in actuality rather than as a motion (i.e. a reduction of potentiality to actuality), for otherwise it could not be the actuality of the motion. So that the unmoved mover is what is intellectual qua actuality rather than qua a motion.”

It’s a little clearer to me now, but it still hasn’t quite clicked. I too emailed philosopher professors (including Feser), but no response. I’m now determined to get a grip on this argument.

I still need to chew on this, and keep asking and thinking about it. It’s still that last sentence I don’t quite get: why should something intelligible be intelligent? The principles of physics are intelligible, and act as an “unmoved mover” to our intellects, but they are not intelligent.

Thanks for the links to Fr Wallace, in this thread and the other!
Click to expand...
…why should something intelligible be intelligent? The principles of physics are intelligible, and act as an “unmoved mover” to our intellects, but they are not intelligent.
Click to expand...
But those principles are outside the moved mover. What is being referred to as “unmoved mover” is the same being as the “moved mover”.

Being one and the same means that the “unmoved” is the “moved” or they are in one act of being. And therefore the desirable is the object of the knower, and being one and the same being, makes the desirable also knowing or intelligent.

May God bless and keep you. May God’s face shine on you. May God be kind to you and give you peace.
 
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