Is an eternally created universe possible?

[Linusthe2nd]

As a purely philosophical position, Thomas Aquinas thought so. He argued that the existence of the universe and all that happens in it depended on the causality of God, which entailed an eternal creation and an eternal guidance and support. I have discussed this before in the thread " The First Way Explained. " Professor William Carroll is now discussing the same point in China.

thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/12/14165/

What do you thilnk?

The article is published in on of Edward Feser’s recent blogs. edwardfeser.blogspot.com/

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[Bahman]

As a purely philosophical position, Thomas Aquinas thought so. He argued that the existence of the universe and all that happens in it depended on the causality of God, which entailed an eternal creation and an eternal guidance and support. I have discussed this before in the thread " The First Way Explained. " Professor William Carroll is now discussing the same point in China.

thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/12/14165/

What do you thilnk?

The article is published in on of Edward Feser’s recent blogs. edwardfeser.blogspot.com/

Pax
Linus2nd

Could you please explain how we all can only experience very now if universe is created eternally?

 

[lmelahn]

As a purely philosophical position, Thomas Aquinas thought so. He argued that the existence of the universe and all that happens in it depended on the causality of God, which entailed an eternal creation and an eternal guidance and support. I have discussed this before in the thread " The First Way Explained. " Professor William Carroll is now discussing the same point in China.

thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/12/14165/

What do you thilnk?

The article is published in on of Edward Feser’s recent blogs. edwardfeser.blogspot.com/

Pax
Linus2nd

I am sure that Linus2nd knows that I agree with St. Thomas on this point, but I will add by two cents’ worth, in case people find it interesting.

The first thing to clarify is that an “eternal” universe would not be “eternal” in the strict, technical sense of the term. “Eternal” means “without beginning or end of any kind,” and that applies strictly only to God. Even an “eternal” universe would have a kind of beginning, because it is created by God. (Spiritual creatures, such as men and angels, in technical terms, enjoy “aeviterinity:” they have a beginning, but no end.)

So it would be better, in my opinion, to speak of a (hypothetical) universe that is indefinitely extended in time (in particular, into the past). But these are details of terminology.

In any event, to understand why Thomas holds the position that God could create an universe that is indefinitely extended into the past, the key is to understand exactly what he means by cause.

For Aquinas, something is the cause of an effect, if the effect depends on the cause for its existence (whether that “existence” is the very act of being, or some state of being). For Aquinas, every effect depends on a cause (and, frankly, this principle is corroborated by common sense).

They key notion here is dependence: we can’t speak properly of a cause, if there is no effect that depends on it. In particular, causality cannot be reduced to mere temporal succession: it is not enough to established that event B occurred after event A, but that event B depends on event A for its existence.

Now, I should point out that, strictly speaking, a cause is always present and simultaneous with its effect. When I apply a match to a candle, the lit match is the cause of the candle’s being lit, here and now, but not later, when I have removed the match and blown it out. (The candle still burns, and no longer needs the match in order to be lit.)

This simultaneous action and receiving of action is the kind of phenomenon that truly deserves the name of “cause,” and Aquinas gives it the designation causa per se. I have thought a lot about how to translate that into English, and for now I have settled on “direct cause.”

On the other hand, there are other phenomena which, when we speak more loosely, we commonly call “causes” that are not the “direct” kind. Aquinas calls them causae per accidens; I have settled on “circumstantial cause” to convey the idea. For example, the match that I have blown out after lighting the candle is, strictly speaking, not the (direct) cause of the candle flame, at least not anymore. The candle flame no longer depends on it. If we take the term “cause” in a broader sense, however, we can say that the match is a circumstantial cause, since the match no longer actively produces its effect.

Similarly, my mother and father are not the direct causes of my existence, although they once were, at the moment of my conception. Now, I no longer depend on them for my existence; therefore, they are (in the technical sense) circumstantial causes.

The difference between direct and circumstantial causes can also be seen by applying the maxim sublata causa, tollitur effectus: if you take away the cause, you take away the effect. The maxim applies only to direct causes. (Unless I strike the match and hold it to the wick, I can’t light the candle; if my parents had died, or had never married, at the time of my conception, I would not exist either.)

In the case of circumstantial causes, however, the maxim does not apply. Now that I exist, if my parents were to die, or to separate, then I would not by that fact cease to exist. Once the candle is lit, it will keep on burning even when I remove the match and blow it out.

So the key thing to take home from this is that events that follow earlier events in time do not depend on the earlier events for their existence. The earlier events are merely circumstantial causes.

God is a direct cause (indeed the principle direct cause) of all His creatures. Moreover, God could easily create an infinitude of creatures, since His power is infinite. Because successive events do not depend on each other but rather on their direct causes, it follows that God could create (i.e., be the principle direct cause of) an infinitude of events stretching back indefinitely into the past. And this would precisely fit the description of our hypothetical “eternal” universe.

 

[Bahman]

I am sure that Linus2nd knows that I agree with St. Thomas on this point, but I will add by two cents’ worth, in case people find it interesting.

The first thing to clarify is that an “eternal” universe would not be “eternal” in the strict, technical sense of the term. “Eternal” means “without beginning or end of any kind,” and that applies strictly only to God. Even an “eternal” universe would have a kind of beginning, because it is created by God. (Spiritual creatures, such as men and angels, in technical terms, enjoy “aeviterinity:” they have a beginning, but no end.)

So it would be better, in my opinion, to speak of a (hypothetical) universe that is indefinitely extended in time (in particular, into the past). But these are details of terminology.

In any event, to understand why Thomas holds the position that God could create an universe that is indefinitely extended into the past, the key is to understand exactly what he means by cause.

For Aquinas, something is the cause of an effect, if the effect depends on the cause for its existence (whether that “existence” is the very act of being, or some state of being). For Aquinas, every effect depends on a cause (and, frankly, this principle is corroborated by common sense).

They key notion here is dependence: we can’t speak properly of a cause, if there is no effect that depends on it. In particular, causality cannot be reduced to mere temporal succession: it is not enough to established that event B occurred after event A, but that event B depends on event A for its existence.

Now, I should point out that, strictly speaking, a cause is always present and simultaneous with its effect. When I apply a match to a candle, the lit match is the cause of the candle’s being lit, here and now, but not later, when I have removed the match and blown it out. (The candle still burns, and no longer needs the match in order to be lit.)

This simultaneous action and receiving of action is the kind of phenomenon that truly deserves the name of “cause,” and Aquinas gives it the designation causa per se. I have thought a lot about how to translate that into English, and for now I have settled on “direct cause.”

On the other hand, there are other phenomena which, when we speak more loosely, we commonly call “causes” that are not the “direct” kind. Aquinas calls them causae per accidens; I have settled on “circumstantial cause” to convey the idea. For example, the match that I have blown out after lighting the candle is, strictly speaking, not the (direct) cause of the candle flame, at least not anymore. The candle flame no longer depends on it. If we take the term “cause” in a broader sense, however, we can say that the match is a circumstantial cause, since the match no longer actively produces its effect.

Similarly, my mother and father are not the direct causes of my existence, although they once were, at the moment of my conception. Now, I no longer depend on them for my existence; therefore, they are (in the technical sense) circumstantial causes.

The difference between direct and circumstantial causes can also be seen by applying the maxim sublata causa, tollitur effectus: if you take away the cause, you take away the effect. The maxim applies only to direct causes. (Unless I strike the match and hold it to the wick, I can’t light the candle; if my parents had died, or had never married, at the time of my conception, I would not exist either.)

In the case of circumstantial causes, however, the maxim does not apply. Now that I exist, if my parents were to die, or to separate, then I would not by that fact cease to exist. Once the candle is lit, it will keep on burning even when I remove the match and blow it out.

So the key thing to take home from this is that events that follow earlier events in time do not depend on the earlier events for their existence. The earlier events are merely circumstantial causes.

God is a direct cause (indeed the principle direct cause) of all His creatures. Moreover, God could easily create an infinitude of creatures, since His power is infinite. Because successive events do not depend on each other but rather on their direct causes, it follows that God could create (i.e., be the principle direct cause of) an infinitude of events stretching back indefinitely into the past. And this would precisely fit the description of our hypothetical “eternal” universe.

There is a problem here: If God is timeless and can create eternally then all creation must actually exists in its eternal now. The question is then why we do simply experience what is there at now?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Could you please explain how we all can only experience very now if universe is created eternally?

An eternally created universe would not mean that that there was no past and no future. We would not every " now " as it occurred. It does not mean that we and other things had no beginning and no future. I think what Thomas means is that God is creating what exists now. Thomas often pointed out that God’s sustaining causality is nothing but a continuation of God’s creating act. But Thomas did not speculate on how the details of an eternal creation would work. I like to think of it as something similar to his eternal begetting of his Son.

The point Thomas is making is that we cannot escape the creating causality of God just by postulating an eternally existing universe. Either way God is always the ultimate generating cause of all that exists. Neither we nor the universe can do without God, that is the point…

And this is one of the things Thomas does not mention when he is giving his proofs for the existence of God. So when we are contemplating these proofs, we always need to keep in mind that Thomas is always assuming the creative causality of God behind each proof. For without that, none of the proofs would mean much. For if anything escapes God’s creative causality that would mean God was not God for it would mean that something had escaped his causality.

Linus2nd

 

[Bahman]

An eternally created universe would not mean that that there was no past and no future.

I agree that from God’s perspective future does exist as now and past in his eternal now. The problem is why do we experience only now if past and future does exist.

We would not every " now " as it occurred. It does not mean that we and other things had no beginning and no future. I think what Thomas means is that God is creating what exists now.

No. A timeless God can only have one eternal act otherwise is not timeless.

**Thomas often pointed out that God’s sustaining causality is nothing but a continuation of God’s creating act. But Thomas did not speculate on how the details of an eternal creation would work. **I like to think of it as something similar to his eternal begetting of his Son.

And that is a very serious problem. That is why his philosophy is wrong because he couldn’t realize that a eternal universe cannot have a dynamic.

The point Thomas is making is that we cannot escape the creating causality of God just by postulating an eternally existing universe. Either way God is always the ultimate generating cause of all that exists. Neither we nor the universe can do without God, that is the point…

Linus2nd

How he could make a claim when he present an incomplete philosophy which does not even address the dynamic of creation?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I am sure that Linus2nd knows that I agree with St. Thomas on this point, but I will add by two cents’ worth, in case people find it interesting.

The first thing to clarify is that an “eternal” universe would not be “eternal” in the strict, technical sense of the term. “Eternal” means “without beginning or end of any kind,” and that applies strictly only to God. Even an “eternal” universe would have a kind of beginning, because it is created by God. (Spiritual creatures, such as men and angels, in technical terms, enjoy “aeviterinity:” they have a beginning, but no end.)

So it would be better, in my opinion, to speak of a (hypothetical) universe that is indefinitely extended in time (in particular, into the past). But these are details of terminology.

In any event, to understand why Thomas holds the position that God could create an universe that is indefinitely extended into the past, the key is to understand exactly what he means by cause.

For Aquinas, something is the cause of an effect, if the effect depends on the cause for its existence (whether that “existence” is the very act of being, or some state of being). For Aquinas, every effect depends on a cause (and, frankly, this principle is corroborated by common sense).

They key notion here is dependence: we can’t speak properly of a cause, if there is no effect that depends on it. In particular, causality cannot be reduced to mere temporal succession: it is not enough to established that event B occurred after event A, but that event B depends on event A for its existence.

Now, I should point out that, strictly speaking, a cause is always present and simultaneous with its effect. When I apply a match to a candle, the lit match is the cause of the candle’s being lit, here and now, but not later, when I have removed the match and blown it out. (The candle still burns, and no longer needs the match in order to be lit.)

This simultaneous action and receiving of action is the kind of phenomenon that truly deserves the name of “cause,” and Aquinas gives it the designation causa per se. I have thought a lot about how to translate that into English, and for now I have settled on “direct cause.”

On the other hand, there are other phenomena which, when we speak more loosely, we commonly call “causes” that are not the “direct” kind. Aquinas calls them causae per accidens; I have settled on “circumstantial cause” to convey the idea. For example, the match that I have blown out after lighting the candle is, strictly speaking, not the (direct) cause of the candle flame, at least not anymore. The candle flame no longer depends on it. If we take the term “cause” in a broader sense, however, we can say that the match is a circumstantial cause, since the match no longer actively produces its effect.

Similarly, my mother and father are not the direct causes of my existence, although they once were, at the moment of my conception. Now, I no longer depend on them for my existence; therefore, they are (in the technical sense) circumstantial causes.

The difference between direct and circumstantial causes can also be seen by applying the maxim sublata causa, tollitur effectus: if you take away the cause, you take away the effect. The maxim applies only to direct causes. (Unless I strike the match and hold it to the wick, I can’t light the candle; if my parents had died, or had never married, at the time of my conception, I would not exist either.)

In the case of circumstantial causes, however, the maxim does not apply. Now that I exist, if my parents were to die, or to separate, then I would not by that fact cease to exist. Once the candle is lit, it will keep on burning even when I remove the match and blow it out.

So the key thing to take home from this is that events that follow earlier events in time do not depend on the earlier events for their existence. The earlier events are merely circumstantial causes.

God is a direct cause (indeed the principle direct cause) of all His creatures. Moreover, God could easily create an infinitude of creatures, since His power is infinite. Because successive events do not depend on each other but rather on their direct causes, it follows that God could create (i.e., be the principle direct cause of) an infinitude of events stretching back indefinitely into the past. And this would precisely fit the description of our hypothetical “eternal” universe.

William Carroll also discusses the fact that Thomas Aquinas is seriously studied in the graduate departments of China’s leading universities and that students are even studing Greek and Latiin so that they can study Aristotle and Thomas in the original languages!
thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/12/14165/

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[thinkandmull]

I am sure that Linus2nd knows that I agree with St. Thomas on this point, but I will add by two cents’ worth, in case people find it interesting.

The first thing to clarify is that an “eternal” universe would not be “eternal” in the strict, technical sense of the term. “Eternal” means “without beginning or end of any kind,” and that applies strictly only to God. Even an “eternal” universe would have a kind of beginning, because it is created by God. (Spiritual creatures, such as men and angels, in technical terms, enjoy “aeviterinity:” they have a beginning, but no end.)

So it would be better, in my opinion, to speak of a (hypothetical) universe that is indefinitely extended in time (in particular, into the past). But these are details of terminology.

In any event, to understand why Thomas holds the position that God could create an universe that is indefinitely extended into the past, the key is to understand exactly what he means by cause.

For Aquinas, something is the cause of an effect, if the effect depends on the cause for its existence (whether that “existence” is the very act of being, or some state of being). For Aquinas, every effect depends on a cause (and, frankly, this principle is corroborated by common sense).

They key notion here is dependence: we can’t speak properly of a cause, if there is no effect that depends on it. In particular, causality cannot be reduced to mere temporal succession: it is not enough to established that event B occurred after event A, but that event B depends on event A for its existence.

Now, I should point out that, strictly speaking, a cause is always present and simultaneous with its effect. When I apply a match to a candle, the lit match is the cause of the candle’s being lit, here and now, but not later, when I have removed the match and blown it out. (The candle still burns, and no longer needs the match in order to be lit.)

This simultaneous action and receiving of action is the kind of phenomenon that truly deserves the name of “cause,” and Aquinas gives it the designation causa per se. I have thought a lot about how to translate that into English, and for now I have settled on “direct cause.”

On the other hand, there are other phenomena which, when we speak more loosely, we commonly call “causes” that are not the “direct” kind. Aquinas calls them causae per accidens; I have settled on “circumstantial cause” to convey the idea. For example, the match that I have blown out after lighting the candle is, strictly speaking, not the (direct) cause of the candle flame, at least not anymore. The candle flame no longer depends on it. If we take the term “cause” in a broader sense, however, we can say that the match is a circumstantial cause, since the match no longer actively produces its effect.

Similarly, my mother and father are not the direct causes of my existence, although they once were, at the moment of my conception. Now, I no longer depend on them for my existence; therefore, they are (in the technical sense) circumstantial causes.

The difference between direct and circumstantial causes can also be seen by applying the maxim sublata causa, tollitur effectus: if you take away the cause, you take away the effect. The maxim applies only to direct causes. (Unless I strike the match and hold it to the wick, I can’t light the candle; if my parents had died, or had never married, at the time of my conception, I would not exist either.)

In the case of circumstantial causes, however, the maxim does not apply. Now that I exist, if my parents were to die, or to separate, then I would not by that fact cease to exist. Once the candle is lit, it will keep on burning even when I remove the match and blow it out.

So the key thing to take home from this is that events that follow earlier events in time do not depend on the earlier events for their existence. The earlier events are merely circumstantial causes.

God is a direct cause (indeed the principle direct cause) of all His creatures. Moreover, God could easily create an infinitude of creatures, since His power is infinite. Because successive events do not depend on each other but rather on their direct causes, it follows that God could create (i.e., be the principle direct cause of) an infinitude of events stretching back indefinitely into the past. And this would precisely fit the description of our hypothetical “eternal” universe.

Aquinas didn’t define per se and accidental that way. Parents to children would be per se, since Aquinas thought such could exist eternally. Accidental would be a supertask (plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-supertasks/), needing to complete an infinite task before one does an action. Re read Aquinas on this. I don’t have time to look it up for you. The paradox is that an infinite past SEEMS LIKE A SUPERTASK. Aquinas’s answer to it is ambiguous and unsatisfying. Besides, God could not chose to create something from all eternity unless the world was necessary.

 

[thinkandmull]

An eternally created universe would not mean that that there was no past and no future. We would not every " now " as it occurred. It does not mean that we and other things had no beginning and no future. I think what Thomas means is that God is creating what exists now. Thomas often pointed out that God’s sustaining causality is nothing but a continuation of God’s creating act. But Thomas did not speculate on how the details of an eternal creation would work. I like to think of it as something similar to his eternal begetting of his Son.

The point Thomas is making is that we cannot escape the creating causality of God just by postulating an eternally existing universe. Either way God is always the ultimate generating cause of all that exists. Neither we nor the universe can do without God, that is the point…

And this is one of the things Thomas does not mention when he is giving his proofs for the existence of God. So when we are contemplating these proofs, we always need to keep in mind that Thomas is always assuming the creative causality of God behind each proof. For without that, none of the proofs would mean much. For if anything escapes God’s creative causality that would mean God was not God for it would mean that something had escaped his causality.

Linus2nd

And how would you prove there is a God is motion always was?

 

[thinkandmull]

As a purely philosophical position, Thomas Aquinas thought so. He argued that the existence of the universe and all that happens in it depended on the causality of God, which entailed an eternal creation and an eternal guidance and support. I have discussed this before in the thread " The First Way Explained. " Professor William Carroll is now discussing the same point in China.

thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/12/14165/

What do you thilnk?

The article is published in on of Edward Feser’s recent blogs. edwardfeser.blogspot.com/

Pax
Linus2nd

The article says “Thomas distinguishes the doctrine of creation from what might be called creation myths or stories: those accounts of the world’s origin and development found in traditions of the Ancient Near East and, by extension, of related accounts in the Americas (such as the Aztec and Incan), Africa, Asia (especially Chinese and Japanese), as well as the narrative in the opening of the Book of Genesis. Various ‘creation stories,’ such as those in Genesis, may be a source for theological and philosophical reflection, but they remain distinct from theology and philosophy, properly speaking.”

Have you read Aquinas’s Treatise on Creation? He does not take it metaphorically, as people now say, trying to reconcile the age of the sun with the Bible

 

[Linusthe2nd]

You don’t know what you are talking about. Aquinas didn’t define per se and accidental that way. Parents to children would be per se, since Aquinas thought such could exist eternally. Accidental would be a supertask (plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-supertasks/), needing to complete an infinite task before one does an action. Re read Aquinas on this. I don’t have time to look it up for you. The paradox is that an infinite past SEEMS LIKE A SUPERTASK. Aquinas’s answer to it is ambiguous and unsatisfying. Besides, God could not chose to create something from all eternity unless the world was necessary. Have you lost your common sense?

I serioulsy object to the insult to Imelahn. It should be obious to you that he is well versed in Thomas Aquinas. Besides, we need to be aware that all of us should be allowed to speculate a little. That does not mean that we have strayed from Orthodoxy. I could also point out that many of your own views are not exactly Orthodox from a philosophical point of view.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

The article says “Thomas distinguishes the doctrine of creation from what might be called creation myths or stories: those accounts of the world’s origin and development found in traditions of the Ancient Near East and, by extension, of related accounts in the Americas (such as the Aztec and Incan), Africa, Asia (especially Chinese and Japanese), as well as the narrative in the opening of the Book of Genesis. Various ‘creation stories,’ such as those in Genesis, may be a source for theological and philosophical reflection, but they remain distinct from theology and philosophy, properly speaking.”

Have you read Aquinas’s Treatise on Creation? He does not take it metaphorically, as people now say, trying to reconcile the age of the sun with the Bible

I am well aware that Thomas does not treat creation as a myth. I never suggested otherwise and neither did William Carroll who is a very solid Thomist.

Linsu2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

And how would you prove there is a God is motion always was?

I would use the First of Thomas’ Five Ways, which is what Thomas did.

Linus2nd.

 

[thinkandmull]

Name one view of mine that is unorthodox? I was just upset with Imelahn because I explained this to her (Imelda?) before and she is acting as if my explanation didn’t exist. And William Carroll said in that quote that Genesis is not “theology and philosophy, properly speaking”. Finally, the First Way doesn’t even make sense if motion was eternal, as I’ve also shown in a previous thread, as you know. How is it logical to leap from eternal motion to an eternal Person keeping the motion “alive”. Why cannot the motion just be explained by other motion, going back eternally? You know well enough I’ve explained this before and shown direct contradictions in Aquinas’s own words

 

[thinkandmull]

“Moreover, God could easily create an infinitude of creatures, since His power is infinite.”

Not according to your Aquinas: newadvent.org/summa/1007.htm#article4

Also, Reply to Objection 7. In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity “per se”–thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are “per se” required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity “accidentally” as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes–viz. the grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity. newadvent.org/summa/1046.htm#article2

See, Thomas Aquinas doesn’t believe that parents were once the per se cause, then now the accidental. And yet, if motion was eternal, this was dependent on that because that was dependent on that, ect ect ect. It’s hard to see how it is not a supertask

 

[thinkandmull]

“For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so manifest of what always was.” Aquinas newadvent.org/summa/1046.htm#article1

 

[Linusthe2nd]

“Moreover, God could easily create an infinitude of creatures, since His power is infinite.”

Not according to your Aquinas: newadvent.org/summa/1007.htm#article4

Also, Reply to Objection 7. In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity “per se”–thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are “per se” required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity “accidentally” as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes–viz. the grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity. newadvent.org/summa/1046.htm#article2

See, Thomas Aquinas doesn’t believe that parents were once the per se cause, then now the accidental. And yet, if motion was eternal, this was dependent on that because that was dependent on that, ect ect ect. It’s hard to see how it is not a supertask

But the parents do not generate the nature of the child, they only make it possible to be in this child. Therefore the parents are secondary causes. It is God who is the generator of the nature of the child, of the soul directly and of the body more remotely, going back via secondary causes to the original human bodies. Also, it is God who directly sustains all that exists at any time. Thomas would use the same arguments to establish an eternally created universe as on which was created in time ( S.T. 1, ques 44-49 ).

Linus2nd.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

On the Eternity of the World

dhspriory.org/thomas/english/DeEternitateMundi.htm

Linus2nd

 

[lmelahn]

There is a problem here: If God is timeless and can create eternally then all creation must actually exists in its eternal now. The question is then why we do simply experience what is there at now?

I am afraid I don’t completely understand the question or the objection .

For God, everything is present. He sees all of time at once, so to speak. He can will for something to exist from time X up to time Y, if He wants to. Obviously we, who are immersed in time, can only experience what is actually present in time.

 

[Bahman]

I am afraid I don’t completely understand the question or the objection .

For God, everything is present. He sees all of time at once, so to speak. He can will for something to exist from time X up to time Y, if He wants to. Obviously we, who are immersed in time, can only experience what is actually present in time.

Can we agree that past and future exist as real as now? God can only perform one act since he is in state of timeless and experience the whole creation meaning that the whole creation must objectively exist in his eternal now. We however only experience now. We cannot experience past as future yet they do for certainly exist as now. The question I have is that why do we only experience now if past and future exist. You said that we are the one who are immersed in time but how creation could exist eternally and we are presented to a part of it at each moment. What I claim is that an eternal universe cannot have any dynamic since past, now and future are all objectively real. You of course claim that it could. My question is how?