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Bahman
Guest
But the current frame is subject to time hence any knowledge related to it is subject to time either.
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Linusthe2nd
Guest
I think the question was more than academic since, as far as I know, all his proofs for the existence of God assume, for the sake of argument, that the universe was eternal. So we should be able to take his arguments for creation in both Summas and De Potentia as applying to an either an eternal world or one which began in time.
For an eternal universe, William Carroll uses the term ’ creation of origin ’ as opposed to ’ creation in time. ’
Where did you get the diagram, that was good?
Pax
Linus2nd
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thinkandmull
Guest
You gave that think last time we had this discussion, and he doesn’t prove his case nor does he disprove St. Bonaventure. If there is an eternal world, why must there be a vertical efficient cause at all? That’s just the contingency argument, of which an eternal world contradicts. Were the First and Second way formulations of the contingency argument? And yet he says in the Summa Contra Gentiles that there can’t be an eternity of intermediate causes because there would be a first. To mention another eternal line going parallel to the other, sustaining it, is NOT positing a **first **mover
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thinkandmull
Guest
Saying an eternal creation would have a beginning is a contradiction in terms. Its not as if God in His timelessness one day decided in an eternal world (hypothetically). No. You are arguing that in that timelessness he had always sustained a world. That’s impossible, because it not like the necessary relations of the Trinity. God could never have had a world from all eternity, always having held it in His hand. If God is necessary, the world is contingent. If it’s eternal, its necessary. And how can something be from nothing if it never had a beginning?
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thinkandmull
Guest
Can you quote from his commentary on Metaphysics for me? The link I gave you said “A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude. This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental.”I am sorry if I upset you; that was not my intention.
And your view is not unorthodox. Plenty of people have subscribed to it, including most famously St. Bonaventure.
As I tried to show in our previous posts, I think that St. Thomas’ intention in Summa I, q. 7, a. 4, is to deny that an infinitude can be counted, not its raw possibility for existing. That is the technical sense in which he takes the term infinite multitude. If you compare this text, as I said in that post, to Aquinas’ commentary of the Metaphysics of Aristotle, then that becomes quite clear, it seems to me. Moreover, Aquinas takes a very clear position in favor of the possibility of an “eternal” world in his De aeternitate mundi (On the Eternity of the World), the link to which Linus2nd kindly provided.
Since you mention Summa, q. 46, a. 2 ad 7, I would highlight the following argument made by St. Thomas:
There cannot be an infinity of direct (“per se”) causes. But there could (at least in theorinfinity of circumstantial (“per accidens”) causes.
You don’t have to agree with St. Thomas, obviously. I happen to think that Aquinas’ argument makes the most sense, that is ally) by an .
And yet he believes there can be a infinitude of days…
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Linusthe2nd
Guest
It is time bound only for us, we have to experience it. God, if we may say so, experiences the whole movie in his eternal Now. It is we who have to relate to God, he does not have to relate to us.
Linus2nd
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thinkandmull
Guest
Hey lmelahn, it’s possible that Thomas Aquinas has a different opinion on this in his Metaphysics, because he has another opinion in his very Summa! Reply to Objection 4, in answer to the objection says “Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable and ‘vice versa,…’” And Reply to Objection 7 “Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity”
so this
newadvent.org/summa/1046.htm#article2
clearly contradicts this
newadvent.org/summa/1007.htm#article4
I’m just frustrated with finding these contradictions in Aquinas
Further, here is his argument against the kalam cosmological argument:
Objection 6. Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.
Reply to Objection 6. Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms.
He set up a straw man. The kalam argument is what he says in the First and Second way. God is not part of the supposed infinite line of causes and effects, so when they start with the world, they are not sliding into the vertical and making God a cause in the infinite chain. Therefore in the first and second way, Aquinas agrees with me: there can’t be no first cause, because then all the past would be effects without a cause!
so this
newadvent.org/summa/1046.htm#article2
clearly contradicts this
newadvent.org/summa/1007.htm#article4
I’m just frustrated with finding these contradictions in Aquinas
Further, here is his argument against the kalam cosmological argument:
Objection 6. Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.
Reply to Objection 6. Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms.
He set up a straw man. The kalam argument is what he says in the First and Second way. God is not part of the supposed infinite line of causes and effects, so when they start with the world, they are not sliding into the vertical and making God a cause in the infinite chain. Therefore in the first and second way, Aquinas agrees with me: there can’t be no first cause, because then all the past would be effects without a cause!
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thinkandmull
Guest
Aquinas uses Hebrews 11:1 as his proof that we cannot demonstrate the world is not eternal because matters of faith cannot be demonstrated. But that is not true of everything by faith, because we know by history that Jesus existed, that, along with the book of Romans, it can be demonstrated that God exists,… He says “Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science.” So are his supporters in agreement that science can never prove that the world had a beginning?
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John_Martin
Guest
Hey lmelahn, it’s possible that Thomas Aquinas has a different opinion on this in his Metaphysics, because he has another opinion in his very Summa! Reply to Objection 4, in answer to the objection says “Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable and ‘vice versa,…’” And Reply to Objection 7 “Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity”
so this
newadvent.org/summa/1046.htm#article2
clearly contradicts this
newadvent.org/summa/1007.htm#article4
I’m just frustrated with finding these contradictions in Aquinas
Further, here is his argument against the kalam cosmological argument:
Objection 6. Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.
Reply to Objection 6. Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms.
He set up a straw man. The kalam argument is what he says in the First and Second way. God is not part of the supposed infinite line of causes and effects, so when they start with the world, they are not sliding into the vertical and making God a cause in the infinite chain. Therefore in the first and second way, Aquinas agrees with me: there can’t be no first cause, because then all the past would be effects without a cause!
Thomas has said in the link you provided that there should never be an attempt to show or prove via reason that what is an article of faith is demonstrable (such as, that Jesus is the Son of God and Son of Man and one Person or that the world “began”). "And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith. "
It is instead only necessary to show error in arguments contrary to this faith, not that the arguments are fully false. Demonstration proceeds from observation and reason about the observation. But a non-believer will always have suppositions that he brings to his reason about observation, and those are what can be counteracted with reason.
Science can neither prove that caused reality goes infinitely back nor that it had a beginning. And it cannot prove that there is an uncaused cause (God) either. Science seeks truth, and here it will fail to know or discover. As believers, it is our work to provide that truth with the propagation of Revelation, or to keep science honest by showing defects in reasons that claim to have demonstrated either an infinite line of causation or a creation or that there is no first cause, etc…
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Linusthe2nd
Guest
I don’t see any inconsistency. God’s timelessness does not exclude his creating time bound creatures. That which is greater can always cause that which is less perfect. It is the less perfect which cannot cause the more perfect.
Linus2nd
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Linusthe2nd
Guest
What I say is just my interpretation, but I think what he is saying is that whether we are speaking of an eternally existing world or one beginning in time we cannot have a ’ vertical ’ or per se causality unless it ends in a creation by God out of nothing. I would say the argument holds for all his proofs. In other words the universe, whether eternal or bound by time is still a contingent universe, it has to be caused. Whatever may be or may not be must be caused.
Thomas says that a sustaining cause is the same as a creating cause. I don’t quite agree because there is something very different about bringing something into existence from nothing than sustaining the existence of what is already there. But whatever the case, a sustaining cause does not do away with the necessity of a creating cause - at least the way I see it.
Linus2nd
Linus2nd
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thinkandmull
Guest
you didn’t specifically deny it, but Aquinas makes clear his position “The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things ‘that appear not’ (Hebrews 11:1).” And yet, it is an article of faith that God can be know from his creation (Romans 1!)
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thinkandmull
Guest
You haven’t made the case for the necessity of an eternal creator if the world is eternal. Aquinas says “it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always.” So he is looking at a stone that way, how does he know it is not necessary, that it had to always had to exist? Why is necessity attached to the simple and not to matter?
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thinkandmull
Guest
Necessity is even necessary for my argument. Perhaps matter can be or not be, that is is insignificant, but maybe just always was. Once you deny the creation in time, you close all doors to knowing God by reason
J
John_Martin
Guest
I believe the “article of Faith” is “I believe in God the Father Almighty”, not “I believe in the existence of God and that he rewards those who seek him”.
Aristotle arrived at the existence of God, but he did not arrive at the Person of the Father.
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lmelahn
Guest
Here is the problem that I see: it is misleading to say that the current “frame” is subject to time, because the present (the “frame”) is a kind of abstraction.
In reality, what we have is a series of beings (or in Thomas’ language, substances) that are constantly undergoing changes. There is no unified thing called the “present,” at least not in the same way that there are planets, dogs, trees, or human beings.
Look at it this way: if we could halt all of the physical changes in the universe, we would also halt time. (And this position was held by Aristotle, by the way, 2300 years before Einstein, although it dovetails quite nicely with special relativity.)
I think that some people think of time as if it were a film advancing, without regard for the changes taking place in the universe. But that cannot be the case: time is always measured relative to real changes that take place (the ticks of a watch; the motions of the moon and sun, or their apparent motion; the resonance of cesium atoms; or what have you).
Certainly, God knows what His creatures are doing, but it is not a knowledge that depends on time.
We don’t know exactly how that works, but perhaps an analogy would help us to see it. Suppose I am driving down a city street, and I come up to a traffic jam. From my vantage point, I cannot possibly tell how long the traffic jam extends. All I can see (for all practical purposes) are the cars immediately near me: what is going on at my “point” along the street.
How could I get information about the length of the traffic jam? By listening to the traffic report, and that works because radio stations have a traffic helicopter, which can get a bird’s-eye view of the traffic.
Do you see what I mean about the difference between being “immersed” in time, as we are, and being “outside” of time, as God is?
I am making analogy between the spatial journey that I take along the street, and the temporal journey we all take in time. By getting a better vantage point, I can see all the points along road. God does something similar, although much more perfect, because he has a vantage point that sees all points in time.
So, He does not have to be constantly “updating” His movie frame. He can see all of the “frames” simultaneously.
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lmelahn
Guest
It is, of course, entirely possible that Aquinas changed his mind at some point, and I think I can find examples of this when comparing early works (e.g., the commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences) and later ones (e.g., the two Summas).Hey lmelahn, it’s possible that Thomas Aquinas has a different opinion on this in his Metaphysics, because he has another opinion in his very Summa! Reply to Objection 4, in answer to the objection says “Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable and ‘vice versa,…’” And Reply to Objection 7 “Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity”
so this
newadvent.org/summa/1046.htm#article2
clearly contradicts this
newadvent.org/summa/1007.htm#article4
I’m just frustrated with finding these contradictions in Aquinas
Further, here is his argument against the kalam cosmological argument:
Objection 6. Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.
Reply to Objection 6. Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms.
He set up a straw man. The kalam argument is what he says in the First and Second way. God is not part of the supposed infinite line of causes and effects, so when they start with the world, they are not sliding into the vertical and making God a cause in the infinite chain. Therefore in the first and second way, Aquinas agrees with me: there can’t be no first cause, because then all the past would be effects without a cause!
I have to say, however, that I think Aquinas paints a pretty consistent picture on this particular point of discussion.
As John Martin pointed out, Aquinas actually did think that the world has a temporal beginning. He considered it, however, an article of faith, not something demonstrable by philosophy alone. Aquinas simply pointed out that he felt that there was no philosophical proof for the eternity of the world.
Regarding your particular examples, I suppose we will need to agree to disagree amicably
. I hold that Question 7, article 4 does not argue against the possibility of having an infinitude of creatures, just that man would be able to count them. That is his point in his reply to the sixth objection (of I, q. 46, a. 2): counting entails passing from one entity to the next, in a series, until one reaches the end. Clearly, this kind of passage is impossible with an infinitude. (Remember, this reply is intended to be a refutation of the position that philosophy alone can prove that the world is not eternal.) Hence, I see no inconsistency here.I have not really studied the Kalam argument enough to have a definitive opinion about it. What I can say is that the First and Second Ways, at least in Aquinas’ conception, hinge on that kind of causality that I called “direct” (or “per se”) cause. There must be a unique first direct and present cause. In a way, for Aquinas, the question of the past is immaterial: he feels that he can demonstrate God’s existence from the present situation of the world. I think he succeeds, but that is, of course, subject to opinion.
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Bahman
Guest
By this I meant that something objectively existed there at the moment. This means that
among all frames only one of them can be objectively present which this requires the knowledge of which frame is on show right now which this is subject to change. Hence God is subject to change.
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lmelahn
Guest
That is a very good question.
However, the stone carries with it the very sign of its contingency: its matter. Stones depend on their matter for their very existence (unlike us), and matter is by nature subject to corruption. If it can go out of existence, it follows that the stone is not “necessary;” it need not have been there in the first place.
Basically everything that is a compound of act and potency is contingent in some way, because the potential principle needs to be actuated by something (something else, obviously, because the potency all by itself is nothing). And that includes all creatures, even pure spirits (i.e., angels).
(Just a caveat: in the Third Way, which I think is by far the most difficult to interpret, Aquinas makes a slightly different use of the term “necessary being” than we are used to. From the context, it seems clear that by “necessary beings,” he mean spiritual creatures, especially angels. This is the only one of his proofs that is tied to his Aristotelian cosmology. This is in part because he has taken this Way from Avicenna, and so he uses the latter’s terminology.)
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lmelahn
Guest
I think I explained in an earlier post that an “eternal” world (if it existed) would not be “eternal” in same sense that God is eternal.
God is eternal, because He has no beginning and no end whatsoever: whether it be temporal or ontological.
However all creatures, without exception, have some kind of beginning. It need not (absolutely speaking) be a temporal beginning. It is sufficient that it be an ontological beginning (namely, that creatures receive their existence from God).
Some creatures (like us) are without end, but even we (and even the mightiest angel) have a beginning.
When we say that a (hypothetical) world is “eternal” (and I don’t really like that term), we mean that it has no temporal beginning: it extends indefinitely into the past. But even so, each moment is created by God, and so has an ontological beginning.
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