Is Freewill compatible with Determinism?

[preferanonymous]

Well, you said ‘all scientific laws’ and I don’t think it’s true. For ‘small - quantum’ world I agree but there are scientific laws for ‘big’ that are certain/deterministic otherwise we would not be able to build anything (bridges, cars, …).

I believe what I said holds for all laws. You might check out the book “Quantum Metaphysics” by Peter Forrest if you want a perhaps more in depth analysis on these issues. I might also mention a quote from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: “Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus.”

The difficulty, I think you might consider, is whether or not it is possible when proceeding empirically to come to any objective or causal law. One is drawing inductively from a finite set of data which could be irrelevant to the actual conditions of the universe the second after the conclusion is drawn (things might change such that the ‘law’ is no longer valid). The possibility of hidden variables makes it impossible, it might seem, to state on empirical grounds alone any causal fact. Who is to say that some other thing not accounted for, if it changed, would invalidate the idea the ‘law’ you mentioned? The strength of the No Hidden Variable argument, it seems to me, is that even if you could take this sort of thing into account, you still would not get the causality you are looking for. This is to say that the universe has this indeterminacy when looked at using modern science. Now, I do think that one can make both arguments for God’s existence and natural law without this sort of physical causality. Furthermore, I think these arguments are all the more stronger because they do not rely on these sorts of premises. To get a flavor of what these might look like, you might check out the work of Barry Miller, a late Catholic priest, and the writings of Elizabeth Anscombe, John Finnis, and Germain Grisez.

 

[Jaaanosik]

I believe what I said holds for all laws. You might check out the book “Quantum Metaphysics” by Peter Forrest if you want a perhaps more in depth analysis on these issues. I might also mention a quote from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: “Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus.”

The difficulty, I think you might consider, is whether or not it is possible when proceeding empirically to come to any objective or causal law. One is drawing inductively from a finite set of data which could be irrelevant to the actual conditions of the universe the second after the conclusion is drawn (things might change such that the ‘law’ is no longer valid). The possibility of hidden variables makes it impossible, it might seem, to state on empirical grounds alone any causal fact. Who is to say that some other thing not accounted for, if it changed, would invalidate the idea the ‘law’ you mentioned? The strength of the No Hidden Variable argument, it seems to me, is that even if you could take this sort of thing into account, you still would not get the causality you are looking for. This is to say that the universe has this indeterminacy when looked at using modern science. Now, I do think that one can make both arguments for God’s existence and natural law without this sort of physical causality. Furthermore, I think these arguments are all the more stronger because they do not rely on these sorts of premises. To get a flavor of what these might look like, you might check out the work of Barry Miller, a late Catholic priest, and the writings of Elizabeth Anscombe, John Finnis, and Germain Grisez.

Where do the Newton’s laws fit here? They are scientific laws that describe physics around us?

 

[preferanonymous]

Where do the Newton’s laws fit here? They are scientific laws that describe physics around us?

There are two ways I think I can go. I can reaffirm what I said above and say something like, it is possible that tomorrow we could wake up and they do not hold. You might consider whether or not modern science is betrayed by philosophical principles that one need not accept for the sake of getting to objectivity without God. Furthermore, you might consider how many ‘theists’ make use of these very principles in trying to prove the existence of God and in so doing do not do justice, I might say, to the arguments for his existence and might open up theological problems down the road. I do think what I said before might be right in the end. Newton’s ‘laws’ are generalities which can only be called objective or causal on pain of being nonsense.

But, let me take this other route which I think might be more in line with the scientific consensus at this point and more relevant to the determinism question. Suppose we agreed all quantum laws are not causal and not all ‘macro’ laws are either, but perhaps some of the latter are. What I want to say is the point about the quantum laws being not causal is sufficient to undermine determinism. If the whole quantum structure could go at a moment, I do not know how we can say that determinism can hold. Hence, macro laws can be causal, not considering quantum laws. But, since quantum laws are not causal, these macro laws, in that the structure upon which they depend is based on quantum laws, are not really in fact causal at all, though they are when considered in themselves in non quantum contexts. This, I think, might have been how Newton was looking at it such that it he did not see a problem in calling his findings ‘laws’ that seemed causal.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

There are two ways I think I can go. I can reaffirm what I said above and say something like, it is possible that tomorrow we could wake up and they do not hold. You might consider whether or not modern science is betrayed by philosophical principles that one need not accept for the sake of getting to objectivity without God. Furthermore, you might consider how many ‘theists’ make use of these very principles in trying to prove the existence of God and in so doing do not do justice, I might say, to the arguments for his existence and might open up theological problems down the road. I do think what I said before might be right in the end. Newton’s ‘laws’ are generalities which can only be called objective or causal on pain of being nonsense.

But, let me take this other route which I think might be more in line with the scientific consensus at this point and more relevant to the determinism question. Suppose we agreed all quantum laws are not causal and not all ‘macro’ laws are either, but perhaps some of the latter are. What I want to say is the point about the quantum laws being not causal is sufficient to undermine determinism. If the whole quantum structure could go at a moment, I do not know how we can say that determinism can hold. Hence, macro laws can be causal, not considering quantum laws. But, since quantum laws are not causal, these macro laws, in that the structure upon which they depend is based on quantum laws, are not really in fact causal at all, though they are when considered in themselves in non quantum contexts. This, I think, might have been how Newton was looking at it such that it he did not see a problem in calling his findings ‘laws’ that seemed causal.

Its true that quantum events defy a certain kind of causality, mechanistic causality does not apply in a classical sense, but that doesn’t mean that the outcome of an event is not deterministic in different sense. If I cannot do anything apart from the outcome of a quantum event, then my will is still determined by quantum processes.
Quantum events still have causality in the sense of being relational, they occur in relation to each-other. They are not arbitrary, but rather they are expressions of other particular events that are occurring. True, it is not the same kind of causality that we are use to, but I think it is a fundamental error to think that quantum events removes any valid notion of determinism or causality.

 

[Jaaanosik]

There are two ways I think I can go. I can reaffirm what I said above and say something like, it is possible that tomorrow we could wake up and they do not hold. You might consider whether or not modern science is betrayed by philosophical principles that one need not accept for the sake of getting to objectivity without God. Furthermore, you might consider how many ‘theists’ make use of these very principles in trying to prove the existence of God and in so doing do not do justice, I might say, to the arguments for his existence and might open up theological problems down the road. I do think what I said before might be right in the end. Newton’s ‘laws’ are generalities which can only be called objective or causal on pain of being nonsense.

But, let me take this other route which I think might be more in line with the scientific consensus at this point and more relevant to the determinism question. Suppose we agreed all quantum laws are not causal and not all ‘macro’ laws are either, but perhaps some of the latter are. What I want to say is the point about the quantum laws being not causal is sufficient to undermine determinism. If the whole quantum structure could go at a moment, I do not know how we can say that determinism can hold. Hence, macro laws can be causal, not considering quantum laws. But, since quantum laws are not causal, these macro laws, in that the structure upon which they depend is based on quantum laws, are not really in fact causal at all, though they are when considered in themselves in non quantum contexts. This, I think, might have been how Newton was looking at it such that it he did not see a problem in calling his findings ‘laws’ that seemed causal.

Let me ask you a question. If we freeze time at one moment what happens to the smallest particles? Are they moving?

 

[preferanonymous]

Let me ask you a question. If we freeze time at one moment what happens to the smallest particles? Are they moving?

I am not sure if I know the answer. Nor am I sure that the question is a legitimate one- namely, the idea of answering a scientific question based on the notion of freezing time. Would you mind elaborating a bit such that I might see where you mean to go with such a question?

 

[preferanonymous]

Its true that quantum events defy a certain kind of causality, mechanistic causality does not apply in a classical sense, but that doesn’t mean that the outcome of an event is not deterministic in different sense. If I cannot do anything apart from the outcome of a quantum event, then my will is still determined by quantum processes.
Quantum events still have causality in the sense of being relational, they occur in relation to each-other. They are not arbitrary, but rather they are expressions of other particular events that are occurring. True, it is not the same kind of causality that we are use to, but I think it is a fundamental error to think that quantum events removes any valid notion of determinism or causality.

Suppose I agreed, which I am not sure I do, that quantum events are causal in so far as they proceed from a relation between other quantum events. If this is what you mean to get at, I might ask whether these relations themselves are causal. If they are not, then the underlying fabric, so to speak, of the universe would be indeterminate and without causality. This, I might say, would be sufficient to undermine determinism.

I think extending the use of hypothetical and categorical might be helpful here. By determinism I mean either 1) a categorical statement of causality or 2) a hypothetical formulation where the antecedent is a necessary scientific truth (a scientific condition that always holds). An example would be ‘If X obtains, Y causes Z’. For the reasons I gave above, and I think you might agree, I don’t think science can get us something like 1). Nor am I sure that there is any necessary scientific condition such that we could get a sense of determinism expressed hypothetically: it seems that no fact about or condition of the universe must necessarily obtain such that a state of affairs might come about when it does not. Hence, no notion of determinism predicated on it can really be said to be deterministic in so far as it is a part of the ‘fabric of the universe’ in that this fabric could change. Either way, it might be said that determinism seems to be nonsense.

 

[Jaaanosik]

I am not sure if I know the answer. Nor am I sure that the question is a legitimate one- namely, the idea of answering a scientific question based on the notion of freezing time. Would you mind elaborating a bit such that I might see where you mean to go with such a question?

I am trying to make a simple point. If the time was frozen then there would not be any motion. We would be able to assign a position (x, y, z) to each particle.
It is possible from philosophical point of view and we believe from God’s point of view as well.

If this was a case and we would know vectors of four forces in a point (x, y, z) then what would stop us from determining the next position of the particle after Planck time interval?

 

[preferanonymous]

I have a feeling that you might know some things about science that I do not. But, to try and answer your question, isn’t Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle relevant at all here? The more precisely the position is known, the less we know about velocity. Hence, it might be said that if we know the position exactly, we know nothing about where it is going.

Another way to say this might be that even after the Planck time interval, the conditions in the universe could have changed such that it is no longer possible to predict the next position. Again, at the quantum level, there is no causality. Therefore, I suppose I don’t see how we can be sure of the next position of the particle.

 

[Jaaanosik]

I have a feeling that you might know some things about science that I do not. But, to try and answer your question, isn’t Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle relevant at all here? The more precisely the position is known, the less we know about velocity. Hence, it might be said that if we know the position exactly, we know nothing about where it is going.

Another way to say this might be that even after the Planck time interval, the conditions in the universe could have changed such that it is no longer possible to predict the next position. Again, at the quantum level, there is no causality. Therefore, I suppose I don’t see how we can be sure of the next position of the particle.

Well, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle states that more we know about position, the less we know about momentum of a physical particle.
Does it say that the momentum is not there? No, it says it’s unknown. Unknown to whom? Us? Is it unknown to God?

Is it reasonable to assume that God knows position and momentum?
Is it reasonable to assume that God controls the momentum?
… of one particle, of all the particles in the universe?

Now these are the tough questions.

 

[preferanonymous]

Well, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle states that more we know about position, the less we know about momentum of a physical particle.
Does it say that the momentum is not there? No, it says it’s unknown. Unknown to whom? Us? Is it unknown to God?

Is it reasonable to assume that God knows position and momentum?
Is it reasonable to assume that God controls the momentum?
… of one particle, of all the particles in the universe?

Now these are the tough questions.

Well, if the universe we inherently indeterminate, I suppose am not sure if God could know the future position and momentum. I think that the no hidden variable argument is the key here such that we can say that the universe is by its nature indeterminate: in short the move made from saying lack of knowledge is impossible for us, to say that lack of knowledge is impossible in principle. Unless the force behind the no hidden variable argument can be removed, I think the notion of causality/teleology might face very serious issues.

 

[Jaaanosik]

Well, if the universe we inherently indeterminate, I suppose am not sure if God could know the future position and momentum. I think that the no hidden variable argument is the key here such that we can say that the universe is by its nature indeterminate: in short the move made from saying lack of knowledge is impossible for us, to say that lack of knowledge is impossible in principle. Unless the force behind the no hidden variable argument can be removed, I think the notion of causality/teleology might face very serious issues.

Are you saying that God does not know His particles?

 

[preferanonymous]

Are you saying that God does not know His particles?

I am saying that God made his particles, so to speak, such that they could not be known. That it is what it means to say that it is logical nonsense to speak of absolute scientific knowledge or physical causality. Not even God could do that which it is logically impossible to do. Truth cannot contradict Truth.

 

[Jaaanosik]

I am saying that God made his particles, so to speak, such that they could not be known. That it is what it means to say that it is logical nonsense to speak of absolute scientific knowledge or physical causality. Not even God could do that which it is logically impossible to do. Truth cannot contradict Truth.

Does God know what’s happening in your brain or not? Does he know what you think?
If yes then how?

 

[preferanonymous]

Does God know what’s happening in your brain or not? Does he know what you think?
If yes then how?

Knowing what I think now is different knowing than what I will think later. I do not deny that God knows all present events. It is those that haven’t happened yet- those things to which one cannot logically refer- that no one can know.

 

[mrbrionesn]

I think freewill and determinism are not only compatible but also complementary. Determinism deals with static end points which can be reached by a series of decision which is basically freewill. We can even chose which point to reach. It is like going from Los Angeles in the west coast to New York in the east coast overland. We have to make a series of decisions which points to pass (cities and towns) to finally reach NewYork. Life is similar to this in the sense that we have several choices to decide on in order to attain eternal life.

 

[Jaaanosik]

Knowing what I think now is different knowing than what I will think later. I do not deny that God knows all present events. It is those that haven’t happened yet- those things to which one cannot logically refer- that no one can know.

God is not limited by time. He knows what happened yesterday in the same way as what will happen tomorrow. God does not have to wait in order to know. There is no time from His point of view, He just knows the past, the present, and the future.

The time is relevant only from our point of view. We do not know the future because we are limited by time.
It’s essential to understand and separate God’s point of view and ours (human) point of view.
We have a limited free will from our point of view but God knows what we call the past, the present time, and the future.

 

[mrbrionesn]

I assume the determinism that we are referring here is the theological one that is the future is pre-ordained or pre-destined by a mono-theistic God. And our religion tells us that God created man to be in union with Him in love just like the Trinity. This then is our ultimate goal which God revealed to us and which we have the option to ignore or reject. To this end God sent Jesus Christ as a visible sign and as the source of overflowing grace channeled through the sacraments. The grace conferred to us is a gift which we are free to accept or reject. The grace conferred is an imposing influence of God’s presence short of jeopardizing free will. In this context I see the compatibility of free will and determinism.

 

[preferanonymous]

God is not limited by time. He knows what happened yesterday in the same way as what will happen tomorrow. God does not have to wait in order to know. There is no time from His point of view, He just knows the past, the present, and the future.

The time is relevant only from our point of view. We do not know the future because we are limited by time.
It’s essential to understand and separate God’s point of view and ours (human) point of view.
We have a limited free will from our point of view but God knows what we call the past, the present time, and the future.

The claim seems to be that God can know all things that happen in time, because he is beyond time. Because we are in time, we face limitations.

1. I do not think it follows that because God is not limited by time, that he can know things that have not happened yet. It might be true that ‘if X is in time, then X cannot know the future’ but further argument is required to affirm the converse claim that ‘if X is beyond time, then X can know the future’.
2. If it is a logically necessary truth for us, it is a logically necessary truth for God. If it is logically impossible, it is logically impossible for God as well. I do not think we wish to reject this thought. If we do, I think we might be reduced to fideism.

I think there are two ways to proceed. If we affirm that what is logically impossible for us is impossible for God, we can proceed to answer this question by looking at whether it is logically impossible to reference individuals before their conception such that the future events might be inherently indeterminate. However, if we disagree about the power of logic, we might consider whether what is logically impossible for us must also be impossible for God.

 

[DCNBILL]

The claim seems to be that God can know all things that happen in time, because he is beyond time. Because we are in time, we face limitations.

1. I do not think it follows that because God is not limited by time, that he can know things that have not happened yet. It might be true that ‘if X is in time, then X cannot know the future’ but further argument is required to affirm the converse claim that ‘if X is beyond time, then X can know the future’.
2. If it is a logically necessary truth for us, it is a logically necessary truth for God. If it is logically impossible, it is logically impossible for God as well. I do not think we wish to reject this thought. If we do, I think we might be reduced to fideism.

I think there are two ways to proceed. If we affirm that what is logically impossible for us is impossible for God, we can proceed to answer this question by looking at whether it is logically impossible to reference individuals before their conception such that the future events might be inherently indeterminate. However, if we disagree about the power of logic, we might consider whether what is logically impossible for us must also be impossible for God.

If you look at the concept of being “outside of time” in a different perspective one may get a better view.

Imagine God viewing all of time like one would look at a diorama, past present and future for us, is eternally before Him. God does not create a beginning and then then watch as things take their course. God creates everything including all of time and holds it before Him.