Issue with understanding substance and accident and how they pertain to the Eucharist

[YosefYosep]

Okay so I know the classical understanding of how the bread and wine becomes Christ is that their substances are transformed. That is, the bread and wine undergo transubstantiation. I’m having a hard time, however, understanding *what * is meant by substance. For instance, I know that Aristotle said the accidents are the non-essential properties of a thing and the substance describes the essential properties. So the essential properties of a ball is its sphereness, whereas its color is non-essential. But the essential property (its substance) is a physical thing which I can see. Now when we come to the Eucharist, shouldn’t we see the substance of Christ?

 

[grannymh]

Okay so I know the classical understanding of how the bread and wine becomes Christ is that their substances are transformed. That is, the bread and wine undergo transubstantiation. I’m having a hard time, however, understanding *what *is meant by substance. For instance, I know that Aristotle said the accidents are the non-essential properties of a thing and the substance describes the essential properties. So the essential properties of a ball is its sphereness, whereas its color is non-essential. But the essential property (its substance) is a physical thing which I can see. Now when we come to the Eucharist, shouldn’t we see the substance of Christ?

“Now when we come to the Eucharist, shouldn’t we see the substance of Christ?”

We see the same substance which the Apostles saw. The difference between then and now is that Jesus lost His hair.

 

[Latinitas]

Okay so I know the classical understanding of how the bread and wine becomes Christ is that their substances are transformed. That is, the bread and wine undergo transubstantiation. I’m having a hard time, however, understanding *what * is meant by substance. For instance, I know that Aristotle said the accidents are the non-essential properties of a thing and the substance describes the essential properties. So the essential properties of a ball is its sphereness, whereas its color is non-essential. But the essential property (its substance) is a physical thing which I can see. Now when we come to the Eucharist, shouldn’t we see the substance of Christ?

To be very technical, substance is the essence of a suppositum. The accidents follow on the substance. It’s a miracle of omnipotence that the substance and accidents can be separated, but this is a mystery of faith, after all. A suppositum is the individual subsisting in an essence. A Person is an intellectual suppositum. Thus everything about me is predicated to me, that predicate is the suppositum, which since I’m intellectual, is a Person. But for example, Fluffy the cat, is a suppositum, but not a Person. Thus in God there are Three Persons, three supposita, but only one substance or essence. In transubstantiation, the substance is converted really and truly, but the accidents of the bread and wine remain (really, they’re not merely illusory as Descartes thought). It follows that the accidents of Christ’s body and blood are there too, but not by extension, that is, they take up no space. In the traditional words, Christ is present per modum substantiae.

I hope this was helpful,
Benedicat Deus,
Latinitas

 

[JuanFlorencio]

To be very technical, substance is the essence of a suppositum. The accidents follow on the substance. It’s a miracle of omnipotence that the substance and accidents can be separated, but this is a mystery of faith, after all. A suppositum is the individual subsisting in an essence. A Person is an intellectual suppositum. Thus everything about me is predicated to me, that predicate is the suppositum, which since I’m intellectual, is a Person. But for example, Fluffy the cat, is a suppositum, but not a Person. Thus in God there are Three Persons, three supposita, but only one substance or essence. In transubstantiation, the substance is converted really and truly, but the accidents of the bread and wine remain (really, they’re not merely illusory as Descartes thought). It follows that the accidents of Christ’s body and blood are there too, but not by extension, that is, they take up no space. In the traditional words, Christ is present per modum substantiae.

I hope this was helpful,
Benedicat Deus,
Latinitas

I think you were excessively technical, Latinitas. When Aristotle invented his terminology his intention was to describe a reality which is accessible to everybody. Perhaps you could start pointing out to a physical entity and say how the word “substance” is relevant and even necessary to understand reality. For example, take a beautiful sculpture, made out of fine wood. One day it is attacked by fire and reduced to a bunch of ashes and a lot of smoke and heat. In terms of substances, essences and accidents how would you describe the process?

 

[Wesrock]

Accidents are what exist in a thing but not in their own right. Take, for example, color. Can red exist on its own, and not as a feature of something else? What of taste? Does that also exist on its own? Substance, then, is what exists in its own right, the nature of a thing. A dog, a tree, that is, what is essential to it, that which it ultimately is, regardless of what accidents exist in it. This is not a reference to chemical properties, and it cannot be conceived in a strictly material conception of existence.

Ack. Gotta go. Hope that helps as a starter.

 

[Ad_Orientem]

… the essential property (its substance) is a physical thing which I can see.

What you see are accidents. No one actually sees roundness; it is suggested by light, texture, and so on, and known by mental abstraction, which are not the substance itself.

Now when we come to the Eucharist, shouldn’t we see the substance of Christ?

Again, substance is not sense-perceptible, but as Latinitas points out, the accidents of Christ’s human nature are present also. So we might indeed ask, why are not *those *accidents visible? The answer is that it is a suspension of the laws of nature, along with the existence of the accidents of bread and wine without their substance.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Accidents are what exist in a thing but not in their own right. Take, for example, color. Can red exist on its own, and not as a feature of something else? What of taste? Does that also exist on its own? Substance, then, is what exists in its own right, the nature of a thing. A dog, a tree, that is, what is essential to it, that which it ultimately is, regardless of what accidents exist in it. This is not a reference to chemical properties, and it cannot be conceived in a strictly material conception of existence.

Ack. Gotta go. Hope that helps as a starter.

Nor color nor taste exist in a thing. Color depends on the atomic or molecular structure of a body, the wavelength impinging on it, and the disposition of your visual system. Similarly with taste. I do not have a material conception of existence, but nor color nor taste are attributable to immaterial entities.

 

[Usagi]

As I understand it, substance is literally and solely the “thingness” of a thing. The dogness of a dog, the ballness of a ball, and so forth. It is not shape or color or anything else that can be detected by the senses.

This is obviously a worldview we don’t much embrace in the modern day. We don’t normally think of a dog having “dogness” independent of every visible or otherwise sensible trait, but that idea is at the center of the substance/accidents worldview.

So when transubstantiation occurs, the “breadness” and “wineness” of the elements are replaced with “Jesus-ness,” but by a miraculous intervention of God, everything else about the bread and wine – look, smell, taste, even molecular structure and effects on the human body – remain in place.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

As I understand it, substance is literally and solely the “thingness” of a thing. The dogness of a dog, the ballness of a ball, and so forth. It is not shape or color or anything else that can be detected by the senses.

This is obviously a worldview we don’t much embrace in the modern day. We don’t normally think of a dog having “dogness” independent of every visible or otherwise sensible trait, but that idea is at the center of the substance/accidents worldview.

So when transubstantiation occurs, the “breadness” and “wineness” of the elements are replaced with “Jesus-ness,” but by a miraculous intervention of God, everything else about the bread and wine – look, smell, taste, even molecular structure and effects on the human body – remain in place.

Actually, that wasn’t the worldview of the apostles either, who taught about the real presence. But if it is valid, strong and necessary, then it should be possible to explain it today. The dogness of the dog is the dog itself, or what the dog is. It is not precise to say that the dog has dogness, as if besides having dogness the dog was something else. But if the doctrine about the substance consists just in saying that a substance is the individual thing, then when we talk about transubstantiation, we are just saying that the bread is no longer bread but the real presence of our Lord, and we don’t need aristotelian metaphysics for that.

 

[1Lord1Faith]

Bread is, most basically, made of wheat, water and yeast. But it’s essence is that of a nutritive food. It’s essence, or, it’s nutrients cannot be seen without the help of a microscope. For example iron, calcium etc… The molecular structure of the host remains bread but it’s essence changes from being physical sustenance to spiritual sustenance by the presence of Christ in it. This changed essence, like the physical essence of the bread, cannot be seen by our eyes alone. We will not see Christ in the Eucharist unless we look at it through the eyes of the Church.

Every once in a while the physical properties of the Eucharist has changed to flesh.

therealpresence.org/eucharst/mir/siena.html

 

[Wesrock]

Nor color nor taste exist in a thing. Color depends on the atomic or molecular structure of a body, the wavelength impinging on it, and the disposition of your visual system. Similarly with taste. I do not have a material conception of existence, but nor color nor taste are attributable to immaterial entities.

Yes, my third year optics course in college helped build on prior years of physics and natural science throughout my high school and college years. I’m well aware of the physical process that gives rise to EM radiation of particular frequencies detectable by the human eye. You mistake me, anyway. If there’s anything I implied a dualism for, and not necessarily an immaterial thing so much as it is a non-material co-principle of existence, it was not the accidents I referred to but the substance.

But again, redness does not exist on its own. The reaction that gives rise to it must be within something else that is substantial in its own right, and that which carries it (EM radiation) also can be said to be a thing in which the red resides, from which you cannot have “red” separate from and on its own, as its own substantial thing.

 

[Wesrock]

Actually, that wasn’t the worldview of the apostles either, who taught about the real presence. But if it is valid, strong and necessary, then it should be possible to explain it today. The dogness of the dog is the dog itself, or what the dog is. It is not precise to say that the dog has dogness, as if besides having dogness the dog was something else. But if the doctrine about the substance consists just in saying that a substance is the individual thing, then when we talk about transubstantiation, we are just saying that the bread is no longer bread but the real presence of our Lord, and we don’t need aristotelian metaphysics for that.

“Dogness” is essential to have a dog. If it doesn’t have dogness, it’s not a dog. Dogness is the essential part of it, the substance. The way you referred to dogness here is how we refer to accidents, as something that can be had in addition to that which makes a thing what it is.

 

[MPat]

But if the doctrine about the substance consists just in saying that a substance is the individual thing, then when we talk about transubstantiation, we are just saying that the bread is no longer bread but the real presence of our Lord, and we don’t need aristotelian metaphysics for that.

Sure, we can explain that without Aristotelian philosophy. But the explanation, if good, will still have to be compatible with it. That is, you cannot describe anything like that using philosophy, where, let’s say, accidents are all that exists.

Okay so I know the classical understanding of how the bread and wine becomes Christ is that their substances are transformed. That is, the bread and wine undergo transubstantiation. I’m having a hard time, however, understanding *what * is meant by substance. For instance, I know that Aristotle said the accidents are the non-essential properties of a thing and the substance describes the essential properties. So the essential properties of a ball is its sphereness, whereas its color is non-essential. But the essential property (its substance) is a physical thing which I can see. Now when we come to the Eucharist, shouldn’t we see the substance of Christ?

Perhaps it would be easier to understand all that with an analogy.

Let’s take a Soviet movie “Seventeen moments of the spring” (“Семнадцать мгновений весны”). The protagonist of the movie has some “accidents” (to be more exact, things that would be analogous to accidents), for example, personnel record or passport (and, naturally, less analogous accidents, like, let’s say, the shape of the nose). If only those would be available (as they are to Nazi authorities in the movie), the conclusion would be that the protagonist is a Nazi, “Stierlitz” - or, in other words, that his “substance” (what is analogous to substance) is “Stierlitz”. Yet there are other “accidents”, showing that in fact the protagonist is a Soviet spy, “Isaev” (or, in other words, that the “substance” is “Isaev”) - shown at the end of the first episode.

Now let’s take the analogy a bit further, and ask the question analogous to your question: do Nazi authorities in the movie see the Soviet spy? Sure, in a sense they do, but they do not recognise him, as the “accidents” that are available to them are misleading (in another sense, they only see the “accidents”, and the “substance” is only available through those “accidents”). Likewise, in a sense, we do see body of Christ when we see Eucharist, but the accidents are misleading, as if He was “undercover”. And if we didn’t have additional information, we would conclude that we are dealing with simple bread.

 

[Wesrock]

I think I opened up some side roads to other topics in my post. To be more specific, only a dog can be a dog (deep, right?). Other things can be brown, soft, medium size, taste like chicken, etc… the accidents are the things that can be said to exist in a substance but not as substances in their own right. You don’t find “dog” as an accident of something else, something that can only exist in something else that is a substance. It is a substance in its own right.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Sure, we can explain that without Aristotelian philosophy. But the explanation, if good, will still have to be compatible with it. That is, you cannot describe anything like that using philosophy, where, let’s say, accidents are all that exists.

It is not an explanation, but certain description… But yes, and it is implicit in the statement “it looks like bread, but it is not bread”: we would always need to distinguish between “appearances” and “intimate reality”.

By the way, when we say: “its mass is 200 pounds”, are we talking about accidents or substance?

 

[Usagi]

It is not an explanation, but certain description… But yes, and it is implicit in the statement “it looks like bread, but it is not bread”: we would always need to distinguish between “appearances” and “intimate reality”.

By the way, when we say: “its mass is 200 pounds”, are we talking about accidents or substance?

Accidents, pretty sure. We can measure it, and it can change without altering the substance of the thing (you could have more or less than 200 lbs. of whatever it is).

Science does not get at substance the way it is meant in this discussion, only at accidenrts.

 

[fisherman_carl]

I was reading a book by Edward Feser and he was saying something to the effect that substance is the subject in which accidents inhere, and it is that which exists in itself and does not need to inhere in another. For example the color, weight, and length of grape vine exists in the grape vine, but the grape vine does not in the same sense exist in another thing. Since accidents inhere in another, if that in which they inhered also inhered in another, and so on, ad infinitum, we would have a vicious explanatory regress. Ending the regress requires positing something that exists independently, in itself rather than inhering in another. It is only because substance is that which exists in this independent way that it can be that in which accidents appear.

 

[MPat]

By the way, when we say: “its mass is 200 pounds”, are we talking about accidents or substance?

I’m afraid that the question is ambiguous. Mass is an accident, but it is mass of some substance. So, um, we’re talking about both?

Perhaps it would be useful to take an analogy from object-oriented programming: an object corresponds to a substance, an attribute (field, property) of an object corresponds to an accident (and the class of the object would correspond to the essence).

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I’m afraid that the question is ambiguous. Mass is an accident, but it is mass of some substance. So, um, we’re talking about both?

Perhaps it would be useful to take an analogy from object-oriented programming: an object corresponds to a substance, an attribute (field, property) of an object corresponds to an accident (and the class of the object would correspond to the essence).

I don’t think the question is ambiguous: at any rate, in the Aristotelian philosophy every accident is the accident of a substance. However, the concept of substance might need some additional precision. The notion of mass in physics is associated to inertia; and inertia is dependent on the speed of the body. So, it would be an accident. In chemistry, the notion of mass is associated to the amount of atomic particles that constitute a body at a given moment. Within indeterminate limits, the amount of those particles can vary and still the Aristotelian substance might remain the same. But, for example, if the proportion of particles of one type and particles of other types changes beyond certain limits, there will be an Aristotelian substantial change. Also, if the proportion of those particles remain the same, but certain rearrangements take place among them (chemical reactions), there will be an Aristotelian substantial change as well. This way, the mass (both physical and chemical) that supposedly was the accident of substance A is preserved while there is a substance transformation (a continuous transformation, perhaps?). How can it be? The accident is preserved while the substance is not. It seems like the accident does not belong to the substance, or we have to modify the concept.

 

[Nixbits]

When dealing with the physical universe, is there anything that can be explained in terms of substances accidents and essences that cannot be explained in terms of physical matter, properties and categories?