Actually, “property” here is little more than another word for “accident”, “category” here is little more than another word for “essence”, and “matter” in Aristotelian philosophy is that from which “substance” is made. Just add “form”.
That is exactly why “Are we talking about substance or about accident?” is ambiguous and “Is X substance or accident?” would be preferable.
Now that results in unnecessary confusion. Yes, one can use the same word “mass” to refer to somewhat different quantities. But it is not a good idea to do so without indicating which of them is being referred to.
I guess that is close enough…
Snow is white. Paper is white. Flour is white. Milk is white. Yes, they are different substances, and in each case “white” is an accident of a specific substance; we do not get separate “whiteness” with no substance. But they are all white.
Yes, you are right.
Though the context indicates which quantity we are referring to, I agree with you that it would be better if we use a different term for each one of them.
The joke is funny, but your comparison isn’t good: the white paper is not transformed into white snow, nor into white milk, nor into white flour. Your comment would apply if I were just saying that coexisting substances A, B and C have a similar mass of X pounds; but that was not what I said. I was describing a situation in which a series of Aristotelian substantial changes happen while an “accident” is preserved. The body could even become so amorphous and heterogenous that we could hardly say it still is a substance in the Aristotelian sense; but the mass of the aggregate would remain constant. If it is an accident which inheres in something, it is not in an Aristotelian substance.Snow is white. Paper is white. Flour is white. Milk is white. Yes, they are different substances, and in each case “white” is an accident of a specific substance; we do not get separate “whiteness” with no substance. But they are all white.
Thus, just because the accident is the same, we do not have to conclude that the substances cannot be different.
I guess there might be a use for one joke (as an illustration): “Why are you drunk? Didn’t you promise to become a new man?” - “I did become a new man. It’s just that he also started to drink.”.
Is there any point in your example where the accident existed apart from a substance? So there was a substantial change? That’s accounted for.
I do not see the problem. The substance consists of matter and form. Here matter (in this case - atoms) stays the same during the substantial change. Naturally, the new substance keeps the accidents that are mostly connected to the matter in question.
That depends on what you understand by substance. MPat is suggesting above that atoms and molecules are substances. Aristotle rejected the atomistic theory of Democritus. What would have him said about MPat’s suggestion? It would imply that some substances (for example a plant) are made up of a multitude of other substances (molecules and atoms); and I think that this would be an important modification to the original aristotelian notion. With this modification, mass would always be associated to a substance; but without it, certainly there could be a moment (for example, when an organic body is suffering decomposition) when there is no aristotelian substance, but there is mass. And it would not be surprising, at least for us, because we are used to the practice of measuring the mass even of amorphous aggregates: it would just indicate us that our philosophical language needs some adjustments.
To me, it would make some sense to think that atoms are substances, and not simply prime matter, because it is possible to know them through reason; therefore, it makes sense to me to say there is a form in them. And of course I would say that mass can be predicated of them. You would have dissipated the problem related to the persistence of mass during the corruption of a substance. But from the epistemological point of view, it is supposed that substance is what we know first; and…, which substance would it be that we know first when we see, for example, a human being? Each atom which constitutes him, or the human being?
Not quite. I am saying that atoms and molecules can be substances when isolated. They are not separate substances when they are, um, not separate.
Yes, in my example atoms are matter, but not prime matter.
Good…
Human being. Once again, I’m afraid that atoms are only going to be substances when isolated (in, let’s say, particle accelerator).
In other words, when atoms are separate substances, they have no accident of type “colour”, but if we add form to group of atoms, we get a substance that might have such an accident.
Why not? “Form” means more than crystalline structure. Liquid differs from gas by specific “average” distances between molecules. Is there some reason why that shouldn’t count as form?
I’m not the OP but thank you.
I think you have to make up your mind: gases and liquids are nothing else but aggregates of atoms or molecules. If you think they are substances, then you should think as well that atoms and molecules are substances when they are not separated as well as when they are separated. How many atoms or molecules do you need to constitute an “aristotelian” gaseous substance?
You have yet to prove that.
I don’t think you will get much progress in such way. I can afford to give you just about any “limit” and you won’t be able to prove it is not the right one (unless I’ll make a frivolous choice, like “you need minus one molecule”). I can also afford to give “substantiality rights” to any number of intermediate states.
Yes, if they were not parts of another substance. If I understand it correctly, Thomistic philosophers would say that in that case they would only exist “virtually”.
I do? Where? I’m afraid you are reading a bit too much into my example…
How many do you want?
Well, I didn’t have high pretensions: solids are aggregates of particles as well. There is not much to prove here. It is conventional to say that solid, liquid and gas are three states of aggregation of matter. However, crystals have certain regularities, specially when they are very pure.
Of course, but if you do that, it will not be the result of a discovery. It will be just an arbitrary election, but I don’t think you want to associate the term “substance” to an arbitrary election, do you?
Virtually as substances. However, when they are in another substance, they preserve their individual properties. For example, the oxygen that we breath oxidizes the iron in our blood just as it does when purified iron and purified oxygen are put together. To me this indicates that they are still substances when they participate in the constitution of another substance. I really wonder why Thomistic philosophers have the need that when a substance like water or oxygen is assimilated into a living being it loses its real character of substance, and adopts a virtual one. What is the problem they want to avoid with this notion?
I wouldn’t try to prove that you are wrong, MPat. I just would ask you to teach me how to count those substances. All I want is to make apparent that the idea of substance has become problematic. And I don’t think this is new. I think that it would be necessary to work again on it from the beginning, considering our new scientific comprehension of nature. This is basically what I was asking Latinitas when he responded to YosefYosep.How many do you want?
Once again, I don’t see how that is supposed to prove what you want. I can give you just about any number, just about any quantity, just about any function. And you won’t be able to prove that I’m wrong. I’m afraid that all you have is an argument from incredulity.
And, of course, in some cases we have an easy answer - for example, we get a molecule from, let’s say, two atoms of hydrogen, when the covalent bond forms.
But is it problematic? And in what way do you expect it to be problematic?
So, what problem is supposed to be shown here? That we do not know much about individual molecules? Sure, but is that a problem with Thomism? I’d say it is more of a “problem” with science.
Perhaps. But you haven’t given any reason to think that it cannot. At most, you have given a reason to think that we do not know how to apply Thomism in those rare cases. And I am pointing out that in the more common cases we can find a way to apply it rather easily.
Let’s look at your example again. Isn’t there more oxygen in the blood? For example, in the water molecules? That are pretty common in blood? How comes that this oxygen doesn’t do the oxygen’s job in breathing? The simple answer is that it doesn’t really exist as oxygen - it exists virtually in water.
What are you trying to say here? An atom of oxygen bonded to a molecule of hydrogen constitutes a molecule of water, and as it is not free it cannot react with another element or compound unless the affinity it has for it is stronger than the affinity it has for hydrogen. But we don’t say that oxygen is assimilated into the substance of water. However, oxygen can be present in water in other ways: dissolved in it, or forming micro-bubbles, or big bubbles. Available in this way, it can react with other elements or compounds, provided there is affinity between them. Similarly, the oxygen we breath is present in the blood at least in two ways: dissolved in plasma, or chemically bound to hemoglobin (for example through an atom of iron). It is transported that way to the tissues in our body, and it reacts there with other compounds to form, for example, carbon dioxide, which we breath out afterwards (but there is a complex chain of chemical processes, which I will not describe here, before we breath it out). Actually, most of the oxygen in our blood is chemically bound in the hemoglobin, but it still reacts with other compounds with which it has more affinity. If the oxygen which is forming water together with hydrogen in our body does not react with other elements or compounds present too, it is not because it became “humanized” as some dare to say, or because its actuality was lost and became virtual; it is just because its affinity with them is weaker than the affinity it has for hydrogen; but there are reactions in which oxygen moves from one molecule of water to one of another compound can take place. Virtuality explains nothing; chemical affinity does.
Science has its own problems, MPat, and they have no relation to the aristotelian notions of substance and accidents.So, what problem is supposed to be shown here? That we do not know much about individual molecules? Sure, but is that a problem with Thomism? I’d say it is more of a “problem” with science.
In this case Thomism is rather flexible. We can say that molecules are substances - and that will be consistent with Thomism. We can say that the whole Ocean is a substance - and that will also be consistent with Thomism.
Because of that it is obvious that you won’t be able to get a self-contradiction using your approach. And it is a self-contradiction that would be a problem. Having multiple competing hypotheses is not a problem. After all, if it was, P=NP problem would finish off Mathematics and Computer Science.
A particular exception is enough to refute a universal proposition. So, particular cases -rare, as you say-, represent a serious problem for any doctrine.
Certainly, I haven’t; and yes, it could be that you just don’t know how to apply Thomism here. When you do, your vision about other aspects of reality could become very powerful. You should try!
Let’s reword that: “virtuality does not explain itself, it is explained by chemical affinity”.
Yes, here you are saying that an atom of oxygen exists in molecule of water virtually (and explaining why it is so).
Sure. But in this case we do not have a counterexample to Thomism as such.
You need to read the rest of my comment, MPat. I did never said that the properties of oxygen in water are not detectable. I said just the opposite. I have been suggesting that substances can be systems of other substances.
If by “common sense” you mean “penetrating intelligence in action”, I say yes: Both Aristotle and St. Thomas were remarkably intelligent. But if “common sense” denotes the same as “triviality” to you, I say “absolutely not”. Besides Aristotle, there have been many other penetrating intelligences in action who have developed human episteme over the centuries. You cannot ignore that, especially when some results appear to fall outside of the scope of aristotelian doctrine.
Others have counterexamples, but that doesn’t worry me. To me, the situation is more like the improvement that relativistic physics represents over classical physics. Many could say: “well, relativistic physics addresses very rare situations, and classical physics has proved to be very useful in numerous applications so far. So, let’s ignore those new guys. Besides, relativistic physics do not provide counterexamples to classical physics”. It could be understood that way, but the point is that there are real situations which classical physics do not cover. Similarly with the aristotelian notion of substance (or perhaps what some posters have written in this thread is not consistent with the aristotelian notion, but perhaps with Democritus’ or with Descartes’? I am in doubt): Possibly it needs a revision.