Issue with understanding substance and accident and how they pertain to the Eucharist

[MPat]

You need to read the rest of my comment, MPat. I did never said that the properties of oxygen in water are not detectable. I said just the opposite. I have been suggesting that substances can be systems of other substances.

And yet, strangely enough, what you have said is equivalent to what you deny saying (just regroup “properties of oxygen” and “properties of water”).

OK, let’s imagine a program:

public class Oxygen
{
  // ...
  public double FreezingTempC = −218.79;
}

public class Water
{
  // ...
  private Oxygen o;
  private Hydrogen h1;
  private Hydrogen h2;
  public double FreezingTempC = 0;
}

// ...

Water w;
// ...
w.FreezingTempC // ==0; !=−218.79

I hope that explanation will be clear enough.

It is known that societies have peculiar characteristics which do not pertain to individuals. If there is certain intelligibility in societies, it means that they are substances. But the individuals who constitute them are substances as well, for there is a peculiar intelligibility in them too. Isolation is not necessary for a human being to be a substance: just the opposite, an important aspect of his humanity becomes apparent when he is in society with others.

That is somewhat close to truth, although we already know that humans are separate substances, leaving society to be what (if I understand correctly) would be called an aggregate of such substances, having “accidental form”…

If by “common sense” you mean “penetrating intelligence in action”, I say yes: Both Aristotle and St. Thomas were remarkably intelligent. But if “common sense” denotes the same as “triviality” to you, I say “absolutely not”.

OK, let’s look at the same analogy with abstract algebra.

“Closure” (“when we add two numbers, we get a number”) or “associativity” (“we can add in any order”) are simple concepts, easy to understand (unless one mistakenly expects them to be hard to understand). A child can do it - if he can notice that they are worth thinking about. Yet it took a group (pun semi-intended) of geniuses to notice that they really are worth thinking about, to formalise all that by giving special names to those concepts, and to work out the theorems.

Likewise, “substance” (“a thing”) or “accident” (“a property of a thing”) are simple concepts, easy to understand (unless one mistakenly expects them to be hard to understand). A child can do it - if he can notice that they are worth thinking about. Yet it took some geniuses to notice that they are worth thinking about, to formalise all that by giving special names to those concepts, and to work out the “theorems”.

Also, abstract algebra starts with basic arithmetic - in a sense, it it “basic arithmetic formalised”. Likewise, philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas starts with “common sense” (since there isn’t anything else to assign those observations to) - and ends up being “common sense formalised”.

Besides Aristotle, there have been many other penetrating intelligences in action who have developed human episteme over the centuries. You cannot ignore that, especially when some results appear to fall outside of the scope of aristotelian doctrine.

Others have counterexamples, but that doesn’t worry me. To me, the situation is more like the improvement that relativistic physics represents over classical physics. Many could say: “well, relativistic physics addresses very rare situations, and classical physics has proved to be very useful in numerous applications so far. So, let’s ignore those new guys. Besides, relativistic physics do not provide counterexamples to classical physics”. It could be understood that way, but the point is that there are real situations which classical physics do not cover. Similarly with the aristotelian notion of substance (or perhaps what some posters have written in this thread is not consistent with the aristotelian notion, but perhaps with Democritus’ or with Descartes’? I am in doubt): Possibly it needs a revision.

That doesn’t seem to be a good analogy.

First, we really do ignore relativistic physics in almost all cases. We do not care about relativistic increase of mass while building bridges or houses. Thus, if your analogy would work, it would indicate that in most cases we should use Aristotelian philosophy.

Second, relativistic physics are equivalent to Newtonian physics under the common conditions. Thus, by analogy, you’d have to find philosophy that would become equivalent to Aristotelian philosophy under common conditions. I’m afraid in this case there isn’t much to choose from… Unless, of course, you are going to count all the kinds of Scholasticism…

 

[JuanFlorencio]

That is somewhat close to truth, although we already know that humans are separate substances, leaving society to be what (if I understand correctly) would be called an aggregate of such substances, having “accidental form”…

Is it supposed, according to the aristotelian doctrine of substances, that a mere aggregate of substances will display a peculiar intelligibility?

Besides, it is substances which are supposed to “possess” forms -either substantial or accidental-, not mere aggregates of substances.

OK, let’s look at the same analogy with abstract algebra.

“Closure” (“when we add two numbers, we get a number”) or “associativity” (“we can add in any order”) are simple concepts, easy to understand (unless one mistakenly expects them to be hard to understand). A child can do it - if he can notice that they are worth thinking about. Yet it took a group (pun semi-intended) of geniuses to notice that they really are worth thinking about, to formalise all that by giving special names to those concepts, and to work out the theorems.

Likewise, “substance” (“a thing”) or “accident” (“a property of a thing”) are simple concepts, easy to understand (unless one mistakenly expects them to be hard to understand). A child can do it - if he can notice that they are worth thinking about. Yet it took some geniuses to notice that they are worth thinking about, to formalise all that by giving special names to those concepts, and to work out the “theorems”.

Also, abstract algebra starts with basic arithmetic - in a sense, it it “basic arithmetic formalised”. Likewise, philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas starts with “common sense” (since there isn’t anything else to assign those observations to) - and ends up being “common sense formalised”.

It seems to me that your comment above (about the accidental forms of an aggregate of substances) is a good example that shows how the notions of substance, forms, accidents and others are not “simple concepts” that can be understood easily; and if you have a close look at the history of those notions you might be confirmed about its complexity. Further, YosefYosep would have no doubts about it, don’t you think?

That doesn’t seem to be a good analogy.

First, we really do ignore relativistic physics in almost all cases. We do not care about relativistic increase of mass while building bridges or houses. Thus, if your analogy would work, it would indicate that in most cases we should use Aristotelian philosophy.

Second, relativistic physics are equivalent to Newtonian physics under the common conditions. Thus, by analogy, you’d have to find philosophy that would become equivalent to Aristotelian philosophy under common conditions. I’m afraid in this case there isn’t much to choose from… Unless, of course, you are going to count all the kinds of Scholasticism…

We do ignore aristotelian philosophy as well. Even in his time, just a very few people knew about it. The kind of problems that Aristotle was interested in were strange to most of the people. So, how familiar is relativistic physics to most of us, doesn’t make my analogy a bad one.

Second, yes, if the aristotelian doctrine of substance is good in some cases, a new doctrine should describe those cases as well as it does. And if there is no such improved doctrine nowadays, then we should develop one. Therefore, even if it was the case that presently we don’t have much to choose from, this hypothetical fact would not make my analogy a bad one either.

And yet, strangely enough, what you have said is equivalent to what you deny saying (just regroup “properties of oxygen” and “properties of water”).

OK, let’s imagine a program:

public class Oxygen
{
  // ...
  public double FreezingTempC = −218.79;
}

public class Water
{
  // ...
  private Oxygen o;
  private Hydrogen h1;
  private Hydrogen h2;
  public double FreezingTempC = 0;
}

// ...

Water w;
// ...
w.FreezingTempC // ==0; !=−218.79

I hope that explanation will be clear enough.

It is clear, MPat. Thank you.

When a musician is playing the violin like a master, he cannot play the piano like a master, and vice versa. It doesn’t mean that when he is playing anyone of these instruments he becomes a different substance together with it, while keeping his previous substantiality in a virtual fashion. It just means that playing the violin or the piano like a master makes apparent how dexterous he is with that instrument. Analogously, oxygen displays one of its interaction modes when it is bound to hydrogen, but it does not mean that it is no more the same substance it was before. Can we say that water is a new substance anyway, I would say “yes, absolutely; there is a peculiar intelligibility in it that deserves to acknowledged as a substance”. Nevertheless, oxygen and hydrogen have not lost their own intelligibility.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

All human knowledge begins with sense perception. The senses are the means by which we perceive the outside world, either through direct sense perception, or sense perception as magnified by scientific instruments. And we can never perceive any object directly. All we perceive are the sense perceptions from that object.

All that we perceive is ‘accidents’ in the Aristotelian sense. All that I perceive is the appearances or accidents of a thing that are perceptible to my senses. I can never touch the substance of anything directly. Nor can anyone.

All of physics, all of chemistry, consists in the study of the accidents of things. It is how we know the outside world. It is simply not within our nature to perceive substance (in the Aristotelian sense) directly.

So if substance changes but the accidents remain the same, our sense perception of the object remains the same. Transubstantiation is the only instance I know of in which this can happen.

Don’t we perceive order, Jim? Is order an accident?

 

[MPat]

Is it supposed, according to the aristotelian doctrine of substances, that a mere aggregate of substances will display a peculiar intelligibility?

OK, where exactly did you get this idea that substances must display “peculiar intelligibility”? It is not the first time you mention something like that (thus that is likely to be an important part of your position), and I am not sure I have seen it as a definition of a substance anywhere else.

Besides, it is substances which are supposed to “possess” forms -either substantial or accidental-, not mere aggregates of substances.

At the very least, that does not seem to be the position of Edward Feser: “Metaphysically speaking, only “natural” objects, i.e. those with substantial forms, are true substances.” (edwardfeser.blogspot.lt/2014/04/welcome-to-machine.html)…

It seems to me that your comment above (about the accidental forms of an aggregate of substances) is a good example that shows how the notions of substance, forms, accidents and others are not “simple concepts” that can be understood easily; and if you have a close look at the history of those notions you might be confirmed about its complexity. Further, YosefYosep would have no doubts about it, don’t you think?

Sure, there are more complex aspects just around the corner. But in this case the problem is that you are hurrying there too fast and seem to end up with concepts of “Aristotelian substance” and the like that have little to do with actual Aristotelian philosophy.

And then, of course, the discussions about those more complex aspects become rather pointless.

Thus, just as one should make sure to understand the very basic things about arithmetic operations before getting to question if the remainder should be positive or negative while dividing two negative numbers (even if, in a sense, definition of division will not be perfectly precise without taking such discussion into account), one should make sure to understand what is meant by “substance” or “accident” in a basic way (“a thing”; “a property of a thing”) before going further, even if that further discussion will improve those first definitions.

 

[JimG]

Don’t we perceive order, Jim? Is order an accident?

Yes, we perceive order as an attribute of reality. We perceive it through sense perception. And every thing that we perceive through sense perception is by definition an accident. Now, if we had angelic minds, we might perceive order, and other things, by direct intuition. But our minds must begin with sense perception–i.e., accidents.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Yes, we perceive order as an attribute of reality. We perceive it through sense perception. And every thing that we perceive through sense perception is by definition an accident. Now, if we had angelic minds, we might perceive order, and other things, by direct intuition. But our minds must begin with sense perception–i.e., accidents.

With which one of our senses do we perceive order?

 

[JimG]

With which one of our senses do we perceive order?

All of them. When one sees an eye chart, there is a certain order apparent to the sense of vision. But sense perception is only the beginning of knowledge. Sense perceptions are accumulated in the senses, integrated by the brain, and abstracted by the mind–the intellectual faculty of the soul. Ultimately, it is the intellect which perceives the order as well as all of reality. But the intellect does not “perceive” directly. Knowledge begins in the senses, with sense perception, and ends in the intellect with rational thought.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

All of them. When one sees an eye chart, there is a certain order apparent to the sense of vision. But sense perception is only the beginning of knowledge. Sense perceptions are accumulated in the senses, integrated by the brain, and abstracted by the mind–the intellectual faculty of the soul. Ultimately, it is the intellect which perceives the order as well as all of reality. But the intellect does not “perceive” directly. Knowledge begins in the senses, with sense perception, and ends in the intellect with rational thought.

It is an old tradition that knowledge begins with sense perception. Even Kant said that; but he claimed that we don’t know the noumena, but only the phenomena. And concerning the order that we perceive he understood that it was produced by our own faculties, without us being conscious of our ordering act. You seem to say that the order we know is something independent of our faculties, but that it is not directly accessible to our intellect, but through our senses, and that besides it there is a reality (the substance, very much like the kantian noumenon) which is absolutely beyond our reach. I would say that our sensory experience is ordered, and that we certainly might not perceive its order (or its orders) immediately nor necessarily, but that when we do it, we perceive it directly. I would say with the phenomenologists that “we are in the world”, not in a kind of copy or representation of the world, or in a manifestation of a noumenical reality otherwise unknown and inaccessible to us. I would say that our perception becomes sophisticated in such a way that our senses themselves become intellectual, or that our intellect is sensitive.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

OK, where exactly did you get this idea that substances must display “peculiar intelligibility”? It is not the first time you mention something like that (thus that is likely to be an important part of your position), and I am not sure I have seen it as a definition of a substance anywhere else.

Aristotle introduced an important modification into Plato’s doctrine of forms: he said that forms are not located in a separate realm, but in the individuals which constitute this world. Now, both for Plato and for Aristotle, “form” is a concept correlated to knowledge. “Form” expresses the intelligibility of reality. That is the context in which this concept acquires its importance. On the other hand, for Aristotle, a substance is an individual entity composed of matter and form; and the “form” is for him too the metaphysical principle which explains whatever intelligibility you can find in such substance, and which your intellect abstracts from the substance.

At the very least, that does not seem to be the position of Edward Feser: “Metaphysically speaking, only “natural” objects, i.e. those with substantial forms, are true substances.” (edwardfeser.blogspot.lt/2014/04/welcome-to-machine.html)…

I am sorry, I don’t know Edward Feser. I read the article and some of his other own articles that he cites, but I found nothing more than what you have already quoted: Just an arbitrary affirmation. He does not provide a non-circular characterization to distinguish between substantial and accidental forms. If only a thing which is natural is a real substance, and a thing which just has an accidental form is a pseudo-substance, then accidents inhere in pseudo-substances as well. And bread (like the one we use for consecration), which is not a natural thing as such, would not be a substance.

On the other hand, concerning societies, they are more natural than individuals, and it is more appropriate to say that societies constitute individuals as human beings, than to say that individuals constitute societies.

Sure, there are more complex aspects just around the corner. But in this case the problem is that you are hurrying there too fast and seem to end up with concepts of “Aristotelian substance” and the like that have little to do with actual Aristotelian philosophy.

And then, of course, the discussions about those more complex aspects become rather pointless.

Thus, just as one should make sure to understand the very basic things about arithmetic operations before getting to question if the remainder should be positive or negative while dividing two negative numbers (even if, in a sense, definition of division will not be perfectly precise without taking such discussion into account), one should make sure to understand what is meant by “substance” or “accident” in a basic way (“a thing”; “a property of a thing”) before going further, even if that further discussion will improve those first definitions.

I could not agree more: Those who dare to fancy that they can explain the gift that our Lord gave us in the Last Supper, should study with great attention and critical mind what Aristotle wrote about substances, looking for his reasons and motives, before they try to use his doctrine to make mistakes thinking that they are doing something great.

 

[MPat]

Aristotle introduced an important modification into Plato’s doctrine of forms: he said that forms are not located in a separate realm, but in the individuals which constitute this world. Now, both for Plato and for Aristotle, “form” is a concept correlated to knowledge. “Form” expresses the intelligibility of reality. That is the context in which this concept acquires its importance. On the other hand, for Aristotle, a substance is an individual entity composed of matter and form; and the “form” is for him too the metaphysical principle which explains whatever intelligibility you can find in such substance, and which your intellect abstracts from the substance.

So, since you gave no source, I suppose I have to conclude that this “intelligibility” in definition of 'substance" is just your guess of what Aristotelian philosophy might claim?

I’m afraid that most of the things you think you know about Aristotelian philosophy are similar guesses - sometimes right, but sometimes wrong… And, of course, that makes your criticism of Aristotelian philosophy very likely to end up attacking strawmen…

I am sorry, I don’t know Edward Feser. I read the article and some of his other own articles that he cites, but I found nothing more than what you have already quoted: Just an arbitrary affirmation. He does not provide a non-circular characterization to distinguish between substantial and accidental forms. If only a thing which is natural is a real substance, and a thing which just has an accidental form is a pseudo-substance, then accidents inhere in pseudo-substances as well. And bread (like the one we use for consecration), which is not a natural thing as such, would not be a substance.

The important point here was to show that you do not know enough about Aristotelian philosophy to criticise it.

On the other hand, concerning societies, they are more natural than individuals, and it is more appropriate to say that societies constitute individuals as human beings, than to say that individuals constitute societies.

Societies are more natural than individuals? Now, of course, I see that it is a red herring, but still, I would like to see how you would argue for this proposition… If not in this thread, then in some other…

 

[JuanFlorencio]

So, since you gave no source, I suppose I have to conclude that this “intelligibility” in definition of 'substance" is just your guess of what Aristotelian philosophy might claim?

I’m afraid that most of the things you think you know about Aristotelian philosophy are similar guesses - sometimes right, but sometimes wrong… And, of course, that makes your criticism of Aristotelian philosophy very likely to end up attacking strawmen…

The important point here was to show that you do not know enough about Aristotelian philosophy to criticise it.

In one of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates asked his companion “who said that?”, and his companion responded with another question: “do you also belong to the class of men who needs to know who said something to evaluate if the thing said is true or valuable?”. If you want something like an Edward Feser’s cite because you prefer his guesses to mine, I don’t have any to present to you. However, you can read Plato’s dialogues, and later Aristotle’s works. Do it patiently. As is natural with anybody, you will have your own guesses, and the more you study them your guesses will change, which is natural too. Don’t fall into the mistake of thinking that somebody in this world does not produce guesses, but knows the truth. Therefore, when you study your Doctor Feser’s writings you will be guessing too. That is unavoidable. And when you read my comments and deduce that I am attacking Aristotle, that is your guess too. I am attacking Aristotle no more than he was attacking his master Plato when he developed his own theories.

God bless you, MPat.

 

[Vic_Taltrees_UK]

Our senses sense the sharp edge of a host, see its view, smell its smell, digest the gluten, etc. Because we are educated as to objects both in the wild and crafted, we recognise their identity from our minds.

Our central nervous system symbolises what is incoming through our senses (hence old coffee splashes on the carpet can even turn into spiders, if we have forgotten it was coffee).

Normally what is material coincides with its identity, like an unconsecrated host. When it is consecrated the following happens in two versions, Catholic and Anglican:

• transsubstantiation: the identity of bread is replaced by that of Christ though the material forms are of bread
• consubstantiation: the identity of Christ is there with that of bread (and bigger than it), though the material forms are of bread only

We think it is still bread (or bread only) if we have forgotten with our minds it has been consecrated.

I think this “coinciding” is something like what Juan Florencio may mean with “intelligibility”.

Neither Aristotle nor Aquinas understood these particular points very well as far as I can see. They were probably straining to overreact from some sort of airy-fairy ideology too far in the other direction.

The confusion gets further compounded by the mistranslations of Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ terminology from their languages.

For me, other words for identity here are nature and essence. For Aquinas’ “accidents” (which always sound haphazard and quaint to me) I like material form.

To me nature can of course be had by what is crafted as well as what is in the wild.

Away from the forum we would call the material form of the host the substance the host is made of, namely a kind of bread, just as we would call the substance of the coffee stain, coffee (plus congealed dirt). Here I defer to the alarm of forum members at my using a different dialect to what Locke uses.

Just my practical way of looking at it all!

 

[Vic_Taltrees_UK]

Words are meant to allude, and also they symbolise what is already a symbol.

There are certainly many people that claim to be Platonists, that don’t have their feet on the ground at all hence they lay it open to be sidetracked by lots of false concepts.

 

[MPat]

In one of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates asked his companion “who said that?”, and his companion responded with another question: “do you also belong to the class of men who needs to know who said something to evaluate if the thing said is true or valuable?”.

So, a citation to show that citations are worthless? Brilliant. Sure, self-contradicting, but still brilliant.

So brilliant, that it beats the contradiction with this:

If by “common sense” you mean “penetrating intelligence in action”, I say yes: Both Aristotle and St. Thomas were remarkably intelligent. But if “common sense” denotes the same as “triviality” to you, I say “absolutely not”. Besides Aristotle, there have been many other penetrating intelligences in action who have developed human episteme over the centuries. You cannot ignore that, especially when some results appear to fall outside of the scope of aristotelian doctrine.

If you want something like an Edward Feser’s cite because you prefer his guesses to mine, I don’t have any to present to you.

So, you do not… But, you see, if you want to say that Aristotelian philosophy is “obsolete” (or something like that), you’d better know what it actually says. And I’d say that an Aristotelian philosopher (like Feser) is a bit more likely to know what Aristotelian philosophers think (that is, his own position), than someone who is not an Aristotelian philosopher, and who can’t cite a single one to illustrate the supposed position that all of them should hold…

And, by the way, Aristotle did cite positions of other philosophers. For example, have a look at dhspriory.org/thomas/Physics1.htm#2.

However, you can read Plato’s dialogues, and later Aristotle’s works.

You know, it would be interesting to hear what makes you guess that I am not doing so…

 

[JuanFlorencio]

You know, it would be interesting to hear what makes you guess that I am not doing so…

Sure, if that pleases you: it is the way in which you evade to respond to my observations in a proper way. Instead of presenting the interpretation which in your view is the correct one, based on the available aristotelian texts, you prefer to say that I don’t know them. If you yourself knew the texts you would use them; and that would leave me no option but to accept what it is. But you don’t do that; and it is my impression that the reason is that you know only a little bit of Edward Feser, but not Aristotle.

Now, I accept your challenge: I will use some of my spare time to show that behind the aristotelian doctrine of substance, there was the problem of the intelligibility of the real. Please be patient, because I don’t have a lot of spare time.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

So…

I will be gathering some texts and will put them here to provide my interpretation later (if that is still necessary). The first one that I will use is this, from the Metaphysics, Book VII, part 3:

"The word ‘substance’ is applied, if not in more senses, still at
least to four main objects; for both the essence and the universal
and the genus, are thought to be the substance of each thing, and
fourthly the substratum. Now the substratum is that of which everything
else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything
else. And so we must first determine the nature of this; for that
which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense
its substance. And in one sense matter is said to be of the nature
of substratum, in another, shape, and in a third, the compound of
these. (By the matter I mean, for instance, the bronze, by the shape
the pattern of its form, and by the compound of these the statue,
the concrete whole.) Therefore if the form is prior to the matter
and more real, it will be prior also to the compound of both, for
the same reason.

"*We have now outlined the nature of substance, showing that it is
that which is not predicated of a substratum, but of which all else is
predicated. But we must not merely state the matter thus; for this
is not enough. The statement itself is obscure, and further, on this
view, matter becomes substance. For if this is not substance, it baffles
us to say what else is. When all else is stripped off evidently nothing
but matter remains. For while the rest are affections, products, and
potencies of bodies, length, breadth, and depth are quantities and
not substances (for a quantity is not a substance), but the substance
is rather that to which these belong primarily. But when length and
breadth and depth are taken away we see nothing left unless there
is something that is bounded by these; so that to those who consider
the question thus matter alone must seem to be substance. By matter
I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a
certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which
being is determined. For there is something of which each of these
is predicated, whose being is different from that of each of the predicates
(for the predicates other than substance are predicated of substance,
while substance is predicated of matter). Therefore the ultimate substratum
is of itself neither a particular thing nor of a particular quantity
nor otherwise positively characterized; nor yet is it the negations
of these, for negations also will belong to it only by accident.

"If we adopt this point of view, then, it follows that matter is substance.
But this is impossible; for both separability and ‘thisness’ are thought
to belong chiefly to substance. And so form and the compound of form
and matter would be thought to be substance, rather than matter. The
substance compounded of both, i.e. of matter and shape, may be dismissed;
for it is posterior and its nature is obvious. And matter also is
in a sense manifest. But we must inquire into the third kind of substance;
for this is the most perplexing.

“Some of the sensible substances are generally admitted to be substances,
so that we must look first among these. For it is an advantage to
advance to that which is more knowable. For learning proceeds for
all in this way-through that which is less knowable by nature to that
which is more knowable; and just as in conduct our task is to start
from what is good for each and make what is without qualification
good for each, so it is our task to start from what is more knowable
to oneself and make what is knowable by nature knowable to oneself.
Now what is knowable and primary for particular sets of people is
often knowable to a very small extent, and has little or nothing of
reality. But yet one must start from that which is barely knowable
but knowable to oneself, and try to know what is knowable without
qualification, passing, as has been said, by way of those very things
which one does know.*”

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Let’s now continue with the next chapter, Metaphysics Book VII, Chapter 4, where Aristotle discusses Substance understood as essence:

*"Since at the start we distinguished the various marks by which we
determine substance, and one of these was thought to be the essence,
we must investigate this. And first let us make some linguistic remarks
about it. **The essence of each thing is what it is said to be propter
se. **For being you is not being musical, since you are not by your
very nature musical. What, then, you are by your very nature is your
essence.

"Nor yet is the whole of this the essence of a thing; not that which
is propter se as white is to a surface, because being a surface is
not identical with being white. But again the combination of both-‘being
a white surface’-is not the essence of surface, because ‘surface’
itself is added. The formula, therefore, in which the term itself
is not present but its meaning is expressed, this is the formula of
the essence of each thing. Therefore if to be a white surface is to
be a smooth surface, to be white and to be smooth are one and the
same.

"But since there are also compounds answering to the other categories
(for there is a substratum for each category, e.g. for quality, quantity,
time, place, and motion), we must inquire whether there is a formula
of the essence of each of them, i.e. whether to these compounds also
there belongs an essence, e.g. ‘white man’. Let the compound be denoted
by ‘cloak’. What is the essence of cloak? But, it may be said, this
also is not a propter se expression. We reply that there are just
two ways in which a predicate may fail to be true of a subject propter
se, and one of these results from the addition, and the other from
the omission, of a determinant. One kind of predicate is not propter
se because the term that is being defined is combined with another
determinant, e.g. if in defining the essence of white one were to
state the formula of white man; the other because in the subject another
determinant is combined with that which is expressed in the formula,
e.g. if ‘cloak’ meant ‘white man’, and one were to define cloak as
white; white man is white indeed, but its essence is not to be white.

"But is being-a-cloak an essence at all? Probably not. For the essence
is precisely what something is; but when an attribute is asserted
of a subject other than itself, the complex is not precisely what
some ‘this’ is, e.g. white man is not precisely what some ‘this’ is,
since thisness belongs only to substances. Therefore there is an essence
only of those things whose formula is a definition. But we have a
definition not where we have a word and a formula identical in meaning
(for in that case all formulae or sets of words would be definitions;
for there will be some name for any set of words whatever, so that
even the Iliad will be a definition), but where there is a formula
of something primary; and primary things are those which do not imply
the predication of one element in them of another element. Nothing,
then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence-only
species will have it, for these are thought to imply not merely that
the subject participates in the attribute and has it as an affection,
or has it by accident; but for ever thing else as well, if it has
a name, there be a formula of its meaning-viz. that this attribute
belongs to this subject; or instead of a simple formula we shall be
able to give a more accurate one; but there will be no definition
nor essence. *

 

[JuanFlorencio]

*"Or has ‘definition’, like ‘what a thing is’, several meanings? ‘What
a thing is’ in one sense means substance and the ‘this’, in another
one or other of the predicates, quantity, quality, and the like. For
as ‘is’ belongs to all things, not however in the same sense, but
to one sort of thing primarily and to others in a secondary way, so
too ‘what a thing is’ belongs in the simple sense to substance, but
in a limited sense to the other categories. For even of a quality
we might ask what it is, so that quality also is a ‘what a thing is’,-not
in the simple sense, however, but just as, in the case of that which
is not, some say, emphasizing the linguistic form, that that is which
is not is-not is simply, but is non-existent; so too with quality.

"We must no doubt inquire how we should express ourselves on each
point, but certainly not more than how the facts actually stand. And
so now also, since it is evident what language we use, essence will
belong, just as ‘what a thing is’ does, primarily and in the simple
sense to substance, and in a secondary way to the other categories
also,-not essence in the simple sense, but the essence of a quality
or of a quantity. For it must be either by an equivocation that we
say these are, or by adding to and taking from the meaning of ‘are’
(in the way in which that which is not known may be said to be known),-the
truth being that we use the word neither ambiguously nor in the same
sense, but just as we apply the word ‘medical’ by virtue of a reference
to one and the same thing, not meaning one and the same thing, nor
yet speaking ambiguously; for a patient and an operation and an instrument
are called medical neither by an ambiguity nor with a single meaning,
but with reference to a common end. But it does not matter at all
in which of the two ways one likes to describe the facts; this is
evident, that definition and essence in the primary and simple sense
belong to substances. Still they belong to other things as well, only
not in the primary sense. For if we suppose this it does not follow
that there is a definition of every word which means the same as any
formula; it must mean the same as a particular kind of formula; and
this condition is satisfied if it is a formula of something which
is one, not by continuity like the Iliad or the things that are one
by being bound together, but in one of the main senses of ‘one’, which
answer to the senses of ‘is’; now ‘that which is’ in one sense denotes
a ‘this’, in another a quantity, in another a quality. And so there
can be a formula or definition even of white man, but not in the sense
in which there is a definition either of white or of a substance.*

 

[JuanFlorencio]

If a “thing” is knowable, why is it so? What is the cause of its knowability? Is matter (prime matter or perceptible matter) knowable?

Let’s read now Metaphysics, Book VII, chapter 10:

*"Since a definition is a formula, and every formula has parts, and
as the formula is to the thing, so is the part of the formula to the
part of the thing, the question is already being asked whether the
formula of the parts must be present in the formula of the whole or
not. For in some cases the formulae of the parts are seen to be present,
and in some not. The formula of the circle does not include that of
the segments, but that of the syllable includes that of the letters;
yet the circle is divided into segments as the syllable is into letters.-And
further if the parts are prior to the whole, and the acute angle is
a part of the right angle and the finger a part of the animal, the
acute angle will be prior to the right angle and finger to the man.
But the latter are thought to be prior; for in formula the parts are
explained by reference to them, and in respect also of the power of
existing apart from each other the wholes are prior to the parts.

"Perhaps we should rather say that ‘part’ is used in several senses.
One of these is ‘that which measures another thing in respect of quantity’.
But let this sense be set aside; let us inquire about the parts of
which substance consists. If then matter is one thing, form another,
the compound of these a third, and both the matter and the form and
the compound are substance even the matter is in a sense called part
of a thing, while in a sense it is not, but only the elements of which
the formula of the form consists. E.g. of concavity flesh (for this
is the matter in which it is produced) is not a part, but of snubness
it is a part; and the bronze is a part of the concrete statue, but
not of the statue when this is spoken of in the sense of the form.
(For the form, or the thing as having form, should be said to be the
thing, but the material element by itself must never be said to be
so.) And so the formula of the circle does not include that of the
segments, but the formula of the syllable includes that of the letters;
for the letters are parts of the formula of the form, and not matter,
but the segments are parts in the sense of matter on which the form
supervenes; yet they are nearer the form than the bronze is when roundness
is produced in bronze. But in a sense not even every kind of letter
will be present in the formula of the syllable, e.g. particular waxen
letters or the letters as movements in the air; for in these also
we have already something that is part of the syllable only in the
sense that it is its perceptible matter. For even if the line when
divided passes away into its halves, or the man into bones and muscles
and flesh, it does not follow that they are composed of these as parts
of their essence, but rather as matter; and these are parts of the
concrete thing, but not also of the form, i.e. of that to which the
formula refers; wherefore also they are not present in the formulae.
In one kind of formula, then, the formula of such parts will be present,
but in another it must not be present, where the formula does not
refer to the concrete object. For it is for this reason that some
things have as their constituent principles parts into which they
pass away, while some have not. Those things which are the form and
the matter taken together, e.g. the snub, or the bronze circle, pass
away into these materials, and the matter is a part of them; but those
things which do not involve matter but are without matter, and whose
formulae are formulae of the form only, do not pass away,-either not
at all or at any rate not in this way. Therefore these materials are
principles and parts of the concrete things, while of the form they
are neither parts nor principles. And therefore the clay statue is
resolved into clay and the ball into bronze and Callias into flesh
and bones, and again the circle into its segments; for there is a
sense of ‘circle’ in which involves matter. For ‘circle’ is used ambiguously,
meaning both the circle, unqualified, and the individual circle, because
there is no name peculiar to the individuals. *

 

[JuanFlorencio]

*"The truth has indeed now been stated, but still let us state it yet
more clearly, taking up the question again. The parts of the formula,
into which the formula is divided, are prior to it, either all or
some of them. The formula of the right angle, however, does not include
the formula of the acute, but the formula of the acute includes that
of the right angle; for he who defines the acute uses the right angle;
for the acute is ‘less than a right angle’. The circle and the semicircle
also are in a like relation; for the semicircle is defined by the
circle; and so is the finger by the whole body, for a finger is ‘such
and such a part of a man’. Therefore the parts which are of the nature
of matter, and into which as its matter a thing is divided, are posterior;
but those which are of the nature of parts of the formula, and of
the substance according to its formula, are prior, either all or some
of them. And since the soul of animals (for this is the substance
of a living being) is their substance according to the formula, i.e.
the form and the essence of a body of a certain kind (at least we
shall define each part, if we define it well, not without reference
to its function, and this cannot belong to it without perception),
so that the parts of soul are prior, either all or some of them, to
the concrete ‘animal’, and so too with each individual animal; and
the body and parts are posterior to this, the essential substance,
and it is not the substance but the concrete thing that is divided
into these parts as its matter:-this being so, to the concrete thing
these are in a sense prior, but in a sense they are not. For they
cannot even exist if severed from the whole; for it is not a finger
in any and every state that is the finger of a living thing, but a
dead finger is a finger only in name. Some parts are neither prior
nor posterior to the whole, i.e. those which are dominant and in which
the formula, i.e. the essential substance, is immediately present,
e.g. perhaps the heart or the brain; for it does not matter in the
least which of the two has this quality. But man and horse and terms
which are thus applied to individuals, but universally, are not substance
but something composed of this particular formula and this particular
matter treated as universal; and as regards the individual, Socrates
already includes in him ultimate individual matter; and similarly
in all other cases. ‘A part’ may be a part either of the form (i.e.
of the essence), or of the compound of the form and the matter, or
of the matter itself. But only the parts of the form are parts of
the formula, and the formula is of the universal; for ‘being a circle’
is the same as the circle, and ‘being a soul’ the same as the soul.
But when we come to the concrete thing, e.g. this circle, i.e. one
of the individual circles, whether perceptible or intelligible (I
mean by intelligible circles the mathematical, and by perceptible
circles those of bronze and of wood),-of these there is no definition,
but they are known by the aid of intuitive thinking or of perception;
and when they pass out of this complete realization it is not clear
whether they exist or not; but they are always stated and recognized
by means of the universal formula. But matter is unknowable in itself.
And some matter is perceptible and some intelligible, perceptible
matter being for instance bronze and wood and all matter that is changeable,
and intelligible matter being that which is present in perceptible
things not qua perceptible, i.e. the objects of mathematics.

"We have stated, then, how matters stand with regard to whole and
part, and their priority and posteriority. But when any one asks whether
the right angle and the circle and the animal are prior, or the things
into which they are divided and of which they consist, i.e. the parts,
we must meet the inquiry by saying that the question cannot be answered
simply. For if even bare soul is the animal or the living thing, or
the soul of each individual is the individual itself, and ‘being a
circle’ is the circle, and ‘being a right angle’ and the essence of
the right angle is the right angle, then the whole in one sense must
be called posterior to the art in one sense, i.e. to the parts included
in the formula and to the parts of the individual right angle (for
both the material right angle which is made of bronze, and that which
is formed by individual lines, are posterior to their parts); while
the immaterial right angle is posterior to the parts included in the
formula, but prior to those included in the particular instance, and
the question must not be answered simply. If, however, the soul is
something different and is not identical with the animal, even so
some parts must, as we have maintained, be called prior and others
must not. *