Issue with understanding substance and accident and how they pertain to the Eucharist

[JuanFlorencio]

So, according to Aristotle, matter is unknowable by itself. And if we say that it is one of the parts of a substance, we say it improperly. Nevertheless, a substance is, i a certain sense, a compound of matter and form, and substance is knowable; but if matter does not contribute to its knowability, it must then come from the form. Actually, among the four causes identified by Aristotle, the knowledge of the formal cause seems to be the one that most properly deserves to be called “Wisdom”.

Metaphysics Book III, Chapter 2:

*"To judge from our previous discussion of the question which of the sciences should be called Wisdom, there is reason for applying the name to each of them. For inasmuch as it is most architectonic and authoritative and the other sciences, like slave-women, may not even contradict it, the science of the end and of the good is of the nature of Wisdom (for the other things are for the sake of the end). **But inasmuch as it was described’ as dealing with the first causes and that which is in the highest sense object of knowledge, the science of substance must be of the nature of Wisdom. For since men may know the same thing in many ways, we say that he who recognizes what a thing is *by its being so and so knows more fully than he who recognizes it by its not being so and so, and in the former class itself one knows more fully than another, and he knows most fully who knows what a thing is, not he who knows its quantity or quality or what it can by nature do or have done to it. And further in all cases also we think that the knowledge of each even of the things of which demonstration is possible is present only when we know what the thing is, e.g. what squaring a rectangle is, viz. that it is the finding of a mean; and similarly in all other cases. And we know about becomings and actions and about every change when we know the source of the movement; and this is other than and opposed to the end. Therefore it would seem to belong to different sciences to investigate these causes severally."

Aristotle did not mention the knowledge of the material cause as a candidate for the title of “Wisdom”.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

But, is there any intelligibility in artificial things? Here is what Aristotle says:

Metaphysics Book III, Chapter 2.

*"But if there are several sciences of the causes, and a different science for each different principle, which of these sciences should be said to be that which we seek or which of the people who possess them has the most scientific knowledge of the object in question? The same thing may have all the kinds of causes, e.g. **the moving cause of a house *is the art or the builder, the final cause is the function it fulfils, the matter is earth and stones, and the form is the definition."

 

[Richca]

Okay so I know the classical understanding of how the bread and wine becomes Christ is that their substances are transformed. That is, the bread and wine undergo transubstantiation. I’m having a hard time, however, understanding *what * is meant by substance. For instance, I know that Aristotle said the accidents are the non-essential properties of a thing and the substance describes the essential properties. So the essential properties of a ball is its sphereness, whereas its color is non-essential. But the essential property (its substance) is a physical thing which I can see. Now when we come to the Eucharist, shouldn’t we see the substance of Christ?

The substance in itself of a material thing before taking into account the accidents is not something that is sense perceptible, it is only known by the intellect. The essential components of a material substance are the substantial form which is perceived only by the intellect and matter which is made sensible by the accidents and firstly by the accident of quantity or extension. For example, human beings are composed of a soul or spirit (the substantial form) and matter (our bodies). Our souls are not something that is sense percepitible. However, our bodies which are made out of matter are obviously sense perceptible, but philosophically, this is the effect of the first accident of material substances which is quantity or extension which pertains to the matter of material substances. Quantity or extension extends the matter of material substances into three dimensional space and thus the material part of substances is made sensible, for example, our bodies. Without the effect of the accident of extension being realized, the substance, the substantial form and matter, will be invisible. And this is what takes place in the eucharist, in the Church’s doctrine of transubstantiation.

In transubstantiation, the substances of the bread and wine, i.e., the substantial form and matter of the bread and wine, change into the substances of the body and blood of Christ; the accidents of the bread and wine remaining. The whole material body of Christ is under the appearances or accidents of the bread without his body being extended or effected by the accident of quantity or extension which is a divine miracle. Without the effect of the accident of extension of Christ’s body being realized in the eucharist, which God by his Almighty power performs in the eucharist, the whole material body of Christ is under the accidents of the bread in a ‘spirit - mode’ (invisible) like manner. Not that the body of Christ is a spirit. Christ’s soul is a spirit like ours, but his body is made out of matter like ours. But his material body in the eucharist is outside the order of spatial dimensions (which spatial dimensions is the natural effect of the accident of quantity or extension which God withholds from being realized in the natural order of things in the eucharist). The miracle of Christ’s body and blood in the eucharist and the doctrine of transubstantiation is unlike anything we naturally observe in the created world; far, far above anything we naturally observe in the created order of things and unless Jesus who is God had told us so, this miracle would probably had not had even entered our imagination. However, who is going to place limits on God’s omnipotent power and what He can do with created substances and natures!

 

[JuanFlorencio]

But, is there a methodical effort or enterprise to reveal or find out the principles that render everything knowable, or intelligible? Aristotle says this:

Metaphysics Book IV, Chapter 1:

“THERE is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others treats universally of being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the attribute of this part; this is what the mathematical sciences for instance do. Now since we are seeking the first principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be something to which these belong in virtue of its own nature. If then those who sought the elements of existing things were seeking these same principles, it is necessary that the elements must be elements of being not by accident but just because it is being. Therefore it is of being as being that we also must grasp the first causes.”

And being as being is most properly said of substance:

Metaphysics Book IV, Chapter 2:

“There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but all that ‘is’ is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to ‘be’ by a mere ambiguity. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another because it is a function of the medical art. And we shall find other words used similarly to these. So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these thing of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is nonbeing. As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion. It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to study the things that are, qua being.-But everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names. If, then, this is substance, it will be of substances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and the causes.”

 

[JuanFlorencio]

And, in case further clarification is needed…

Metaphysics Book VII, Chapter 1:

"And indeed the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always, and is always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance? For it is this that some assert to be one, others more than one, and that some assert to be limited in number, others unlimited. And so we also must consider chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what that is which is in this sense.”

 

[JuanFlorencio]

And the sense which most properly deserves the name of being is “the what” (in other words, the intelligibility of the thing):

Metaphysics Book VII, Chapter 1:

*“THERE are several senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, as we pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words;’ for in one sense the ‘being’ meant is ‘what a thing is’ or a ‘this’, and in another sense it means a quality or quantity or one of the other things that are predicated as these are. While ‘being’ has all these senses, obviously that which ‘is’ primarily is the ‘what’, which indicates the substance of the thing. For when we say of what quality a thing is, we say that it is good or bad, not that it is three cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say what it is, we do not say ‘white’ or ‘hot’ or ‘three cubits long’, but ‘a man’ or ‘a god’. And all other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some other determination of it. And so one might even raise the question whether the words ‘to walk’, ‘to be healthy’, ‘to sit’ imply that each of these things is existent, and similarly in any other case of this sort; for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks or sits or is healthy that is an existent thing. Now these are seen to be more real because there is something definite which underlies them (i.e. the substance or individual), which is implied in such a predicate; for we never use the word ‘good’ or ‘sitting’ without implying this. Clearly then it is in virtue of this category that each of the others also is.” *

 

[MPat]

Sure, if that pleases you: it is the way in which you evade to respond to my observations in a proper way. Instead of presenting the interpretation which in your view is the correct one, based on the available aristotelian texts, you prefer to say that I don’t know them. If you yourself knew the texts you would use them; and that would leave me no option but to accept what it is. But you don’t do that; and it is my impression that the reason is that you know only a little bit of Edward Feser, but not Aristotle.

“Aristotelian philosophy” is not merely “Aristotle’s philosophy” - it includes other philosophers who are followers of Aristotle. And yes, Edward Feser is one of them.

Also, even if not citing Aristotle might be a proof of not having read (enough) of his works, it is certainly not a proof of not being in the process (perhaps the very beginning of the process) of reading them… But, of course, that’s just a minor point.

Now, I accept your challenge: I will use some of my spare time to show that behind the aristotelian doctrine of substance, there was the problem of the intelligibility of the real. Please be patient, because I don’t have a lot of spare time.

That’s very nice to hear. And, I guess, given "And, in case further clarification is needed… " in your last post, I can start to answer all that (now I see it is not last; but I already wrote the answer).

Unfortunately, “behind the aristotelian doctrine of substance, there was the problem of the intelligibility of the real” is somewhat unclear, and I am not sure it is equivalent to what you were supposed to prove. For you had to prove that “substance” can be defined as something that is “intelligible” (in other words, you had to prove that anything that is a substance is intelligible and anything that is intelligible is a substance). Anything less would not be enough to support your previous statements.

But anyway, let’s see what you got.

So…

I will be gathering some texts and will put them here to provide my interpretation later (if that is still necessary). The first one that I will use is this, from the Metaphysics, Book VII, part 3:

"The word ‘substance’ is applied, if not in more senses, still at
least to four main objects; for both the essence and the universal
and the genus, are thought to be the substance of each thing, and
fourthly the substratum.

"If we adopt this point of view, then, it follows that matter is substance.
But this is impossible; for both separability and ‘thisness’ are thought
to belong chiefly to substance.

For while the rest are affections, products, and
potencies of bodies, length, breadth, and depth are quantities and
not substances (for a quantity is not a substance), but the substance
is rather that to which these belong primarily.

Let’s now continue with the next chapter, Metaphysics Book VII, Chapter 4, where Aristotle discusses Substance understood as essence:

For the essence
is precisely what something is; but when an attribute is asserted
of a subject other than itself, the complex is not precisely what
some ‘this’ is, e.g. white man is not precisely what some ‘this’ is,
since thisness belongs only to substances. Therefore there is an essence
only of those things whose formula is a definition.

Let’s read now Metaphysics, Book VII, chapter 10:

"Perhaps we should rather say that ‘part’ is used in several senses.
One of these is ‘that which measures another thing in respect of quantity’.
But let this sense be set aside; let us inquire about the parts of
which substance consists.

And since the soul of animals (for this is the substance
of a living being) is their substance according to the formula, i.e.
the form and the essence of a body of a certain kind (at least we
shall define each part, if we define it well, not without reference
to its function, and this cannot belong to it without perception),
so that the parts of soul are prior, either all or some of them, to
the concrete ‘animal’, and so too with each individual animal; and
the body and parts are posterior to this, the essential substance,
and it is not the substance but the concrete thing that is divided
into these parts as its matter:-this being so, to the concrete thing
these are in a sense prior, but in a sense they are not. For they
cannot even exist if severed from the whole; for it is not a finger
in any and every state that is the finger of a living thing, but a
dead finger is a finger only in name.

So, after looking at all that, I do not see anything that would demonstrate that “substance” was supposed to be defined as “whatever is knowable”, but I do see that it was supposed to be “a thing” (with definition made more exact in a less basic version). I’d like to note that “quantity” was specifically mentioned as something that was not a substance, but yet, quantities seem to be knowable in at least some sense…

Also, the last part that I have cited mentions that a part of the “concrete thing” (for example, a finger) is not a “concrete thing” itself…

For that matter, just as you have given me a recommendation to read Aristotle himself, I’d like to give you a recommendation to read him with a commentary. For example, the one by St. Thomas Aquinas:

dhspriory.org/thomas/Metaphysics7.htm#2
dhspriory.org/thomas/Metaphysics7.htm#10

For example, this commentary does explain the difference between “first substance” and “second substance”…

 

[MPat]

And the sense which most properly deserves the name of being is “the what” (in other words, the intelligibility of the thing):

You are just begging the question here. You have to demonstrate, show, prove that “the what” is supposed to be “the intelligibility of the thing”, just in other words. And you merely assert that.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

“Aristotelian philosophy” is not merely “Aristotle’s philosophy” - it includes other philosophers who are followers of Aristotle. And yes, Edward Feser is one of them.

What do those followers of Aristotle do? Do they find their happiness in commenting Aristotle, or do they apply his doctrines to new situations, or modify or correct those doctrines? What do they do?

Also, even if not citing Aristotle might be a proof of not having read (enough) of his works, it is certainly not a proof of not being in the process (perhaps the very beginning of the process) of reading them… But, of course, that’s just a minor point.

You are the judge of yourself; so, the point is as minor as you wish.

I have no proofs that you don’t know Aristotle, just impressions. Isn’t it strange at least that you don’t cite him? If his doctrine is “common sense”, reading it should be like eating cake for you.

That’s very nice to hear. And, I guess, given "And, in case further clarification is needed… " in your last post, I can start to answer all that (now I see it is not last; but I already wrote the answer).

Unfortunately, “behind the aristotelian doctrine of substance, there was the problem of the intelligibility of the real” is somewhat unclear, and I am not sure it is equivalent to what you were supposed to prove. For you had to prove that “substance” can be defined as something that is “intelligible” (in other words, you had to prove that anything that is a substance is intelligible and anything that is intelligible is a substance). Anything less would not be enough to support your previous statements.

I haven’t finished my labor yet. But what you say here is correct: I have to show that all which is intelligible, according to Aristotle, is “substance”; and that if something is “substance” then it is intelligible.

So, after looking at all that, I do not see anything that would demonstrate that “substance” was supposed to be defined as “whatever is knowable”, but I do see that it was supposed to be “a thing” (with definition made more exact in a less basic version). I’d like to note that “quantity” was specifically mentioned as something that was not a substance, but yet, quantities seem to be knowable in at least some sense…

Also, the last part that I have cited mentions that a part of the “concrete thing” (for example, a finger) is not a “concrete thing” itself…

So far, MPat, I have just written some texts from Aristotle. I have to gather other texts and then I have to develop my argument. Still, you can read the first book of the Metaphysics to understand about the levels of “knowledge” according to Aristotle, and among them the description of what he understands as wisdom. What is the origin of all knowability in his philosophy if it is not “form”? And “form”, according to him, is itself substance or one of the principles of substance (precisely the one that provides determination and intelligibility to it). You certainly might say that there are things which are knowable to us, though they were not considered to be knowable by Aristotle. At any rate, that would not be my problem, but Aristotle’s; or it would require a clarification of what Aristotle understood by “to know”.

Concerning your interpretation of the “finger” you need to read the text again. Actually, you need to read Aristotle’s Metaphysics from the very beginning. The dead finger is a concrete thing, but such concrete thing is a finger only in name.

For that matter, just as you have given me a recommendation to read Aristotle himself, I’d like to give you a recommendation to read him with a commentary. For example, the one by St. Thomas Aquinas:

dhspriory.org/thomas/Metaphysics7.htm#2
dhspriory.org/thomas/Metaphysics7.htm#10

For example, this commentary does explain the difference between “first substance” and “second substance”…

Yes, thank you. I will use St. Thomas’ commentaries as well.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

These texts in which Aristotle states that there cannot be a science of “accidents” (quantity included) should help you understand, at least, that his notion of “to know” is different from yours:

Metaphysics Book VI, Chapter 2:

*"But since the unqualified term ‘being’ has several meanings, of which one was seen’ to be the accidental, and another the true (‘non-being’ being the false), while besides these there are the figures of predication (e.g. the ‘what’, quality, quantity, place, time, and any similar meanings which ‘being’ may have), and again besides all these there is that which ‘is’ potentially or actually: -since ‘being’ has many meanings, we must say regarding the accidental, that there can be no scientific treatment of it. This is confirmed by the fact that no science practical, productive, or theoretical troubles itself about it. For on the one hand he who produces a house does not produce all the attributes that come into being along with the house; for these are innumerable; the house that has been made may quite well be pleasant for some people, hurtful for some, and useful to others, and different -to put it shortly from all things that are; and the science of building does not aim at producing any of these attributes. And in the same way the geometer does not consider the attributes which attach thus to figures, nor whether ‘triangle’ is different from ‘triangle whose angles are equal to two right angles’.-And this happens naturally enough; for the accidental is practically a mere name. And so, Plato was in a sense not wrong in ranking sophistic as dealing with that which is not. For the arguments of the sophists deal, we may say, above all with the accidental; e.g. the question whether ‘musical’ and ‘lettered’ are different or the same, and whether ‘musical Coriscus’ and ‘Coriscus’ are the same, and whether ‘everything which is, but is not eternal, has come to be’, with the paradoxical conclusion that if one who was musical has come to be lettered, he must also have been lettered and have come to be musical, and all the other arguments of this sort; **the accidental is obviously **akin to non-being. And this is clear also from arguments such as the following: things which are in another sense come into being and pass out of being by a process, but things which are accidentally do not. But still we must, as far as we can, say further, regarding the accidental, what its nature is and from what cause it proceeds; for it will perhaps at the same time become clear why **there is no science of it. **

"Since, among things which are, some are always in the same state and are of necessity (not necessity in the sense of compulsion but that which we assert of things because they cannot be otherwise), and some are not of necessity nor always, but for the most part, this is the principle and this the cause of the existence of the accidental; for that which is neither always nor for the most part, we call accidental. For instance, if in the dog-days there is wintry and cold weather, we say this is an accident, but not if there is sultry heat, because the latter is always or for the most part so, but not the former. And it is an accident that a man is pale (for this is neither always nor for the most part so), but it is not by accident that he is an animal. And that the builder produces health is an accident, because it is the nature not of the builder but of the doctor to do this,-but the builder happened to be a doctor. Again, a confectioner, aiming at giving pleasure, may make something wholesome, but not in virtue of the confectioner’s art; and therefore we say ‘it was an accident’, and while there is a sense in which he makes it, in the unqualified sense he does not. For to other things answer faculties productive of them, but to accidental results there corresponds no determinate art nor faculty; for of things which are or come to be by accident, the cause also is accidental. Therefore, since not all things either are or come to be of necessity and always, but, the majority of things are for the most part, the accidental must exist; for instance a pale man is not always nor for the most part musical, but since this sometimes happens, it must be accidental (if not, everything will be of necessity). The matter, therefore, which is capable of being otherwise than as it usually is, must be the cause of the accidental. And we must take as our starting-point the question whether there is nothing that is neither always nor for the most part. Surely this is impossible. There is, then, besides this something which is fortuitous and accidental. But while the usual exists, can nothing be said to be always, or are there eternal things? This must be considered later,’ but that there is no science of the accidental is obvious; for all science is either of that which is always or of that which is for the most part. (For how else is one to learn or to teach another? The thing must be determined as occurring either always or for the most part, e.g. that honey-water is useful for a patient in a fever is true for the most part.) But that which is contrary to the usual law science will be unable to state, i.e. when the thing does not happen, e.g.‘on the day of new moon’; for even that which happens on the day of new moon happens then either always or for the most part; but the accidental is contrary to such laws. We have stated, then, what the accidental is, and from what cause it arises, and that there is no science which deals with it.”*

 

[MPat]

I haven’t finished my labor yet.

Oh. In that case - sorry about that, I’ll wait.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

So, what is there in the aristotelian Reality besides substances and accidents? And, what is there in substances besides prime matter and form?

For both questions the answer is the same: “There is nothing else besides these”.

But accidents are not the object of science, and matter is unknowable. On the other side, substances are the object of a science (the noblest of all), and it is “form” the “aspect” of substances which is knowable.

Therefore, it seems that Substances are intelligible, and if something is intelligible, then it is a substance.

But…

 

[JuanFlorencio]

We need to take into account that Aristotle says this at the beginning of his Metaphysics, as we have it today:

Metaphysics Book I, Chapters 1:

*"ALL men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight
we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are
loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For
not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to
do anything, we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else.
The reason is that this, **most of all the senses, makes us know **and
brings to light many differences between things.

"By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and from
sensation memory is produced in some of them, though not in others.
And therefore the former are more intelligent and apt at learning
than those which cannot remember; those which are incapable of hearing
sounds are intelligent though they cannot be taught, e.g. the bee,
and any other race of animals that may be like it; and those which
besides memory have this sense of hearing can be taught.

"The animals other than man live by appearances and memories, and
have but little of connected experience; but the human race lives
also by art and reasonings. Now from memory experience is produced
in men; for the several memories of the same thing produce finally
the capacity for a single experience. And experience seems pretty
much like science and art, but really science and art come to men
through experience; for ‘experience made art’, as Polus says, ‘but
inexperience luck.’, Now art arises when from many notions gained by
experience one universal judgement about a class of objects is produced.
For to have a judgement that when Callias was ill of this disease
this did him good, and similarly in the case of Socrates and in many
individual cases, is a matter of experience; but to judge that it
has done good to all persons of a certain constitution, marked off
in one class, when they were ill of this disease, e.g. to phlegmatic
or bilious people when burning with fevers-this is a matter of art.

"With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to
art, and men of experience succeed even better than those who have
theory without experience. (The reason is that experience is knowledge
of individuals, art of universals, and actions and productions are
all concerned with the individual; for the physician does not cure
man, except in an incidental way, but Callias or Socrates or some
other called by some such individual name, who happens to be a man.
If, then, a man has the theory without the experience, and recognizes
the universal but does not know the individual included in this, he
will often fail to cure; for it is the individual that is to be cured.)
But yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather
than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of
experience (which implies that Wisdom depends in all cases rather
on knowledge); and this because the former know the cause, but the
latter do not. For men of experience know that the thing is so, but
do not know why, while the others know the ‘why’ and the cause. Hence
we think also that the masterworkers in each craft are more honourable
and know in a truer sense and are wiser than the manual workers, because
they know the causes of the things that are done (we think the manual
workers are like certain lifeless things which act indeed, but act
without knowing what they do, as fire burns,-but while the lifeless
things perform each of their functions by a natural tendency, the
labourers perform them through habit); thus we view them as being
wiser not in virtue of being able to act, but of having the theory
for themselves and knowing the causes. And in general it is a sign
of the man who knows and of the man who does not know, that the former
can teach, and therefore we think art more truly knowledge than experience
is; for artists can teach, and men of mere experience cannot.

"Again, we do not regard any of the senses as Wisdom; yet surely these
give the most authoritative knowledge of particulars. But they do
not tell us the ‘why’ of anything-e.g. why fire is hot; they only
say that it is hot.

"At first he who invented any art whatever that went beyond the common
perceptions of man was naturally admired by men, not only because
there was something useful in the inventions, but because he was thought
wise and superior to the rest. But as more arts were invented, and
some were directed to the necessities of life, others to recreation,
the inventors of the latter were naturally always regarded as wiser
than the inventors of the former, because their branches of knowledge
did not aim at utility. Hence when all such inventions were already
established, the sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or at
the necessities of life were discovered, and first in the places where
men first began to have leisure. This is why the mathematical arts
were founded in Egypt; for there the priestly caste was allowed to
be at leisure.

“We have said in the Ethics what the difference is between art and
science and the other kindred faculties; but the point of our present
discussion is this, that all men suppose what is called Wisdom to
deal with the first causes and the principles of things; so that,
as has been said before, the man of experience is thought to be wiser
than the possessors of any sense-perception whatever, the artist wiser
than the men of experience, the masterworker than the mechanic, and
the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom
than the productive. Clearly then Wisdom is knowledge about certain
principles and causes.” *

 

[MPat]

These texts in which Aristotle states that there cannot be a science of “accidents” (quantity included) should help you understand, at least, that his notion of “to know” is different from yours:

Metaphysics Book VI, Chapter 2:

"But since the unqualified term ‘being’ has several meanings, of which one was seen’ to be the accidental, and another the true (‘non-being’ being the false), while besides these there are the figures of predication (e.g. the ‘what’, quality, quantity, place, time, and any similar meanings which ‘being’ may have), and again besides all these there is that which ‘is’ potentially or actually: -since ‘being’ has many meanings, we must say regarding the accidental, that there can be no scientific treatment of it.

Looking at the commentary (dhspriory.org/thomas/Metaphysics6.htm#2) I see that St. Thomas Aquinas is careful to keep naming the thing being discussed here “accidental being” (“ente per accidens”) instead of “an accident” (“accidentia”)… I guess there is a reason for that…

And it can be seen in the part of the commentary dhspriory.org/thomas/Metaphysics5.htm#9, specifically: “He says, then, that while things are said to be both essentially and accidentally, it should be noted that this division of being is not the same as that whereby being is divided into substance and accident.”…

Come to think of it…

I have no proofs that you don’t know Aristotle, just impressions. Isn’t it strange at least that you don’t cite him? If his doctrine is “common sense”, reading it should be like eating cake for you.

No, I was not saying that Aristotle’s writings are easy to read. I was saying that at the “beginner’s level” the most basic terms that Aristotle or his followers use (like “substance” or “accident”) are easy to understand and are covered by common sense (“substance has accidents” at the “beginner’s level” means just “things have properties” - and I think it should be fair to say “That’s just common sense.”).

And yes, there is an “advanced level”, where those terms will get meanings that are more precise, but there is no need to go there, since 1) it is much harder, 2) we do not need it at the moment (to answer your objections at the beginning of the thread), 3) it appears that you have yet to master that “beginner’s level” to full extent.

If you do not believe me on this third point, consider this: if you have failed to understand what I have meant, when I was available for questioning, perhaps there is a chance that you fail to understand Aristotle, who is not available in such way…?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Looking at the commentary (dhspriory.org/thomas/Metaphysics6.htm#2) I see that St. Thomas Aquinas is careful to keep naming the thing being discussed here “accidental being” (“ente per accidens”) instead of “an accident” (“accidentia”)… I guess there is a reason for that…

And it can be seen in the part of the commentary dhspriory.org/thomas/Metaphysics5.htm#9, specifically: “He says, then, that while things are said to be both essentially and accidentally, it should be noted that this division of being is not the same as that whereby being is divided into substance and accident.”…

Come to think of it…

No, I was not saying that Aristotle’s writings are easy to read. I was saying that at the “beginner’s level” the most basic terms that Aristotle or his followers use (like “substance” or “accident”) are easy to understand and are covered by common sense (“substance has accidents” at the “beginner’s level” means just “things have properties” - and I think it should be fair to say “That’s just common sense.”).

And yes, there is an “advanced level”, where those terms will get meanings that are more precise, but there is no need to go there, since 1) it is much harder, 2) we do not need it at the moment (to answer your objections at the beginning of the thread), 3) it appears that you have yet to master that “beginner’s level” to full extent.

If you do not believe me on this third point, consider this: if you have failed to understand what I have meant, when I was available for questioning, perhaps there is a chance that you fail to understand Aristotle, who is not available in such way…?

Well, then I am obliged to show that “accidental being” and “accident” are the same thing bottom line. It will be a good excercise, which is good. It is a matter of time.

Consider this: you will be available as Aristotle is available when you build a corpus similar to that of Aristotle. The fact that you are alive while Aristotle -the individual- is dead, does not make you more available than him, simply because you have not made up your mind.

 

[MPat]

Well, then I am obliged to show that “accidental being” and “accident” are the same thing bottom line. It will be a good excercise, which is good. It is a matter of time.

Consider this: you will be available as Aristotle is available when you build a corpus similar to that of Aristotle. The fact that you are alive while Aristotle -the individual- is dead, does not make you more available than him, simply because you have not made up your mind.

I see… One more series of posts rewriting lots of text with some bolding…?

Also, it is interesting to see that you didn’t even pay lip service to the possibility that you might be wrong and St. Thomas Aquinas might be right (let’s note that Aristotelian philosophy includes him, thus (to some extent) that is a “possibility” of him being right over you about his own views)… Or the idea that you might have something to learn about Aristotelian philosophy…

Oh, well… Have your “exercise”… But I am not sure I’ll care enough to actually respond to it…

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I see… One more series of posts rewriting lots of text with some bolding…?

Also, it is interesting to see that you didn’t even pay lip service to the possibility that you might be wrong and St. Thomas Aquinas might be right (let’s note that Aristotelian philosophy includes him, thus (to some extent) that is a “possibility” of him being right over you about his own views)… Or the idea that you might have something to learn about Aristotelian philosophy…

Oh, well… Have your “exercise”… But I am not sure I’ll care enough to actually respond to it…

I would not need to copy and paste lots of Aristotle’s texts if you knew Greek philosophy; but you have demanded me to cite the texts, which I have being doing. However, if you are not reading those texts, it makes no sense to go on. Good bye.

 

[MPat]

I would not need to copy and paste lots of Aristotle’s texts if you knew Greek philosophy; but you have demanded me to cite the texts, which I have being doing. However, if you are not reading those texts, it makes no sense to go on. Good bye.

When someone asks you to cite something in order to demonstrate that the author holds the specified position, the best response is to cite a sentence or two that actually say just that and give the URL where they could be seen in context. Sure, that is not always possible. Then it might be a good idea to give a bit more quotations - with an argument. Or to quote some commentator, thus reusing his argument.

But just filling posts with extracts about as long, as the character limit allows… I’m afraid that such posts are not getting anywhere close to proving your point - they only demonstrate your ability to find the text, copy and paste… Strictly speaking, they do not even prove that you have read the text, and even if you would have been trying to get to an argument to yourself as authority, you’d also have to demonstrate that you have actually understood the text, and did so correctly (and that is generally much harder than just proving your point directly)…

Although, of course, all those posts indirectly demonstrate that Aristotle (and his followers) did not hold the position you have ascribed to him. For otherwise you would have been able to provide an actual quote or an argument - and you were not able to do so…

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Although, of course, all those posts indirectly demonstrate that Aristotle (and his followers) did not hold the position you have ascribed to him. For otherwise you would have been able to provide an actual quote or an argument - and you were not able to do so…

You remind me of one of those guys who reject the dogma of the Holy Trinity because you don’t find such an expression in our Sacred Scriptures. It is true that Aristotle’s works do not include the statements

“Substances are intelligible”, and
“If something is intelligible, then it is a substance”

But you can conclude them if you read Aristotle within his historical context.

You will not find there either your idea that the pair Substance-Accidents can be understood as the pair Object-properties. Besides, this is so wrong that I had ignored it so far: a triangle is an object, and one of its properties is that its internal angles sum two rights. It is obvious that this property is not accidental nor an accident. On the other hand, in the philosophical language, an accident is an object too.

When someone asks you to cite something in order to demonstrate that the author holds the specified position, the best response is to cite a sentence or two that actually say just that and give the URL where they could be seen in context. Sure, that is not always possible. Then it might be a good idea to give a bit more quotations - with an argument. Or to quote some commentator, thus reusing his argument.

Right, that is not always possible; and as I said, the argument would come later.

Commentators repeat what the original source said and then add something. Therefore you don’t find the addition, explicitly said, in the original source. But if the commentator is right, and he can be right, then his addition is consistent with what the original author wrote. Still today, commentators are studying Aristotle’s works and are adding new clarifying statements to his original writings. Have they finished? No, they have not. Can we say something consistent with the original source that has not been said yet by the commentators? That is a consequence of the fact that they have not finished the job. So, in order to show that an statement is consistent with a doctrine, is it strictly necessary to cite a text from the original source or from a commentator? Absolutely not.

But just filling posts with extracts about as long, as the character limit allows… I’m afraid that such posts are not getting anywhere close to proving your point - they only demonstrate your ability to find the text, copy and paste… Strictly speaking, they do not even prove that you have read the text, and even if you would have been trying to get to an argument to yourself as authority, you’d also have to demonstrate that you have actually understood the text, and did so correctly (and that is generally much harder than just proving your point directly)…

Yes, you are right, it is hard to demonstrate to someone that you understand a doctrine, especially when the other party -you in this case- do not know it well.

 

[MPat]

You will not find there either your idea that the pair Substance-Accidents can be understood as the pair Object-properties. Besides, this is so wrong that I had ignored it so far: a triangle is an object, and one of its properties is that its internal angles sum two rights. It is obvious that this property is not accidental nor an accident. On the other hand, in the philosophical language, an accident is an object too.

Yes, that’s a brilliant example. Aristotle himself used it: “And in another sense accident means whatever belongs to each thing of itself but not in its substance; for example, it is an accident of a triangle to have its angles equal to two right angles.” (“Metaphysics”, book 5, chapter 30: dhspriory.org/thomas/Metaphysics5.htm#22). The wording is almost exactly the same, with a tiny exception: that he affirms that what you claim to be “obviously” wrong.

And yes, such mistakes (and, more importantly, mistakes proclaimed with such great confidence) are a reason why I am not willing to accept “an argument to myself as authority” from you.

Yes, you are right, it is hard to demonstrate to someone that you understand a doctrine, especially when the other party -you in this case- do not know it well.

Yes, pulling off “an argument to myself as authority” is hard. Especially when you are just an anonymous user on some forum. Not to mention that such an argument is more risky than others (there is a risk of ending up looking worse than after failing to use other arguments properly). That’s why I’d say you were wrong in trying to use it.

In effect, you would need to prove your point before you can show that you are an authority suitable for such an argument…

But anyway, now I’d like to ask you something somewhat different: why do you think you are an authority on Aristotle, suitable for “an argument to myself as authority”?