H
hatsoff
Guest
Consider the term, “existence.” This word has an informal meaning in natural language. But informal, natural linguistic meanings are not nearly precise enough in the context of a philosophical system. So, we need to construct a formal definition if we want to use that word in a rigorous metaphysical analysis.Observation (by the sense) implies that only physical objects exist. How do you know that only physical objects exist?
Usefulness from what point of view? Material success?
So, what would make a good definition for “existence”? Well, we know that material things exist. That’s pretty much a no-brainer. But what about non-material things?
Well, it turns out that all the non-material things which demonstrably exist (in the informal sense) always end up depending in some way on material interactions and operations. Now, I realize that you would disagree with this, but consider for the moment that it is true. For example, the physical organization of brains are responsible for concepts and ideas.
Suppose then we define “existence” as a descriptor automatically applicable to any real material object or objects. That would mean ideas themselves could not be said to exist. And it would mean that any physical object exists by definition.
I find that this is a very useful definition indeed. And so it is the definition I prefer.
It is possible to construct varying definitions. And if that’s what you want to do, that’s fine. But if you do choose to construct a definition whereby we can say that non-material objects “exist,” then we must be careful not to equivocate between non-material existence and material existence.
Using my narrow definition avoids that danger altogether.