T
txsoldier94
Guest
Actually…the smartest criminals go to the internationals…the UN seems to be popular…and they can usually claim diplomatic immunity.
Mik
Mik
Theater plans are created by the combatant command. The theater plans are drawn up under directives from the JCS and approved by them. The actual strategic plans, which include mobilization, logistics, and so on, are the province of the JCS.Actually strategic war plans are created by the appropriate combatant command (such as CENTCOM, EUCOM) based on national guidance contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
And often at great cost to themselves.Me? I think the first point was written to cause controversy. No, our rights are not DERIVED from the military, but the military is what SECURES our rights.
Yes – the ultimate state will see us all with no freedom, no jobs, no responsibility, and all of us on welfare with a government health-care plan.Our Rights are endowed by our Creator. Governments exist for the purpose of protecting those Rights. At least, that’s what the Founders believed, and I agree with them.
When the people get distracted, criminals get into positions of power. They convince the people that they would be safer by giving up their rights for the security the criminals are offering. Examples of this are “gun control”, the Department of Homeland Terrorism, and such assualts on the Bill of Rights as the Patriot Act, the Military Commissions Act, the Real ID Act, the loss of habeas corpus.
Anyone who gives up freedom for security will end up with neither.
I replied:Warplans are created by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
You replied to that:Actually strategic war plans are created by the appropriate combatant command (such as CENTCOM, EUCOM) based on national guidance contained in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
JP 5-0 states (Chap 1, para 8):Theater plans are created by the combatant command. The theater plans are drawn up under directives from the JCS and approved by them. The actual strategic plans, which include mobilization, logistics, and so on, are the province of the JCS.
Who can keep track of all the acronyms and neologisms that sping into existance at echelons above reality?You said:
I replied:
You replied to that:
JP 5-0 states (Chap 1, para 8):
b. In the planning process, the President and SecDef issue policy, strategic guidance, and direction. The President, assisted by the NSC, also issues policy and strategic direction to guide the planning efforts of Federal agencies that represent other instruments of national power. The SecDef, with the
advice and assistance of the CJCS, organizes the JPEC for joint operation planning by establishing supported and supporting command relationships among the combatant commands. A supported commander is identified for each planning task, and supporting CCDRs, Services, and combat support agencies are designated as appropriate. Similarly, supported commanders establish supported and supporting command relationships among their subordinate commanders. This process provides for unity of command in the planning and execution of joint operations and facilitates unity of effort within the JPEC.
(1) The supported commander has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the JSCP, the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, the supported commander prepares operation plans (OPLANs) or operation orders (OPORDs) in response to requirements generated by the
President or the SecDef.
(2) Supporting commanders provide forces, assistance, or other resources to a supported commander in accordance with the principles set forth in JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Supporting commanders prepare supporting plans as required. Under some circumstances, a commander may be a supporting commander for one operation while being a supported commander for another.
CJCSI 3100.01 Enclosure C (Strategic Plans) states:
I was in error regarding the flippant use of the word “strategic,” when I should have said “operational.” My apologies for that error.
- Purpose. The JSCP provides guidance to the CINCs and Chiefs to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. The JSCP serves to integrate the deliberate operation and engagement planning activities of the entire joint planning and execution community with a coherent and focused framework. It provides specific theater planning tasks and objectives, delineates necessary planning assumptions, and apportions resources and forces to CINCs for planning based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions.
- Scope. Strategic plans provide the means for the Chairman to promulgate guidance to the CINCs and Chiefs to accomplish their tasks and missions. The JSCP supports and implements the objectives of the NMS through combatant command operations plans (OPLANs), operations plans in concept format (CONPLANs), functional plans (FUNCPLANs), and TEPs. In addition, the JSCP implements the NCA’s guidance forwarded in the CPG.
- Components and Guidance
a. The JSCP tasks the CINCs to develop deliberate plans for contingencies and deterrence. It also tasks CINCs to develop TEPs for peacetime engagement within their regions. The JSCP is a single instruction that covers planning guidance, objectives, tasks, assumptions, and forces. The JSCP tasks the development of all CINC-prepared OPLANs, selected CONPLANs (with or without time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD)), TEPs, and specifies which plans will be submitted to the Chairman for approval. The remaining CONPLANs and FUNCPLANs are CINC-approved.
b. All tasked plans will conform to applicable domestic and international law, including the Law of Armed Conflict and international agreements binding on the United States.
c. The JSCP provides guidance to the combatant commanders on the strategic objectives and priorities for theater engagement activities, which are intended to shape the theater security environment in peacetime. Geographic combatant commanders, using reference k, use this guidance to develop TEPs. These plans provide CINC intent, priorities, tasks, and resources required to achieve the shaping objectives over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). The combatant commanders may integrate the TEP elements into overall theater strategic plans.
I used to have to live that garbage in a past life (well, a couple of past lives).Who can keep track of all the acronyms and neologisms that sping into existance at echelons above reality?![]()
The Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was supposed to keep the official dictionary – which was kept locked in a safe to keep people from fighting over acronyms.I used to have to live that garbage in a past life (well, a couple of past lives).
The ultimate nerd-dom. Getting into heated discussions minutiae that would be unfathomable to 90% of the country’s populace.
(edited to remove an unacceptable term that was previously believed to be in common parlance)
But the odds are not evenly spread. Over 47 months of deployment the 1/9 sustained tremendous casualties, well over 90% KIA (the highest in USMC history). Casualities were sustained throughout the war, but my 23 months in country wholly overlapped the 13 deadliest.Joe, odds were that if you went to Vietnam, you would have come home alive. 2,700,000 members of the military served in Vietnam over the course of the conflict. 58,193 were killed by all causes. 313,616 were injured.
The company I commanded on my second tour (A-1/61 INF, serving with the 3rd MarDiv) had 16 different company commanders while in Viet Nam. Seven were killed, and eight were wounded. Of the wounded, one (Ed Vernon) lost an arm. The others went back and were wounded at least once more. That’s 22 Purple Hearts amongst 16 men, a casualty rate of 137%.But the odds are not evenly spread. Over 47 months of deployment the 1/9 sustained tremendous casualties, well over 90% KIA (the highest in USMC history). Casualities were sustained throughout the war, but my 23 months in country wholly overlapped the 13 deadliest.
I realize that you are not intentionlly being dismissive of my comrades risks and sacrifices, but bear in mind that the risks were not nec. trivial. In other words, if the President’s and Vice President’s dodging service in a war they both supported was cowardly, the reaction was at least with foundation.
Look out! The CFR may come up through your toilet and grab you when you least expect it!Does anyone actually believe that a president who needs a bug in his ear to answer reporters’ question, and who is unable to contruct a grammatically correct sentence is capable of issuing policy, startegic guidance and direction? Cheney is in charge. Bush is just a figurehead.
The real source of policy is the Council on Foreign Relations. That’s why nothing ever changes, no matter which party is in power. They are both adjuncts of the CFR.
It certainly wasn’t my intent to diminish the risks of any other units. I was simply making the point that when you consider that a battalion was about 800 men, including attached navco’s, 749 fatalities is hardly trivial. It was a very deadly place. I was wounded twice, once pretty seriously (I still carry some bone and metal fragments from the marine I was treating).The company I commanded on my second tour (A-1/61 INF, serving with the 3rd MarDiv) had 16 different company commanders while in Viet Nam. Seven were killed, and eight were wounded. Of the wounded, one (Ed Vernon) lost an arm. The others went back and were wounded at least once more. That’s 22 Purple Hearts amongst 16 men, a casualty rate of 137%.
Well, I certainly cannot speak for Baghdad or anywhere in Iraq, but I certainly felt safer in Afghanistan than I did/do in many major metro areas here in the states.And I actually get pretty annoyed when people try to downplay the very real risks our solidiers face in Iraq. Although better body armor and field medical advances have cut down fatalities, serious injuries have not been trivial. Comparing Bagdad for US soldiers with live for Americans in a US city seems utterly clueless to me about the realities of a war zone.
Sometimes I wonder – it is possible to autopsy a body and tell that the man was killed by a bullet. It is not possible to tell if he got that bullet because he was exhausted, overloaded, and too slow. Nor is it possible to determine if the man who shot him should have been shot by our troops the day before but escaped because they were exhausted, overloaded, and too slow.It certainly wasn’t my intent to diminish the risks of any other units. I was simply making the point that when you consider that a battalion was about 800 men, including attached navco’s, 749 fatalities is hardly trivial. It was a very deadly place. I was wounded twice, once pretty seriously (I still carry some bone and metal fragments from the marine I was treating).
And I actually get pretty annoyed when people try to downplay the very real risks our solidiers face in Iraq. Although better body armor and field medical advances have cut down fatalities, serious injuries have not been trivial. Comparing Bagdad for US soldiers with live for Americans in a US city seems utterly clueless to me about the realities of a war zone.
During WWII the 36th Division in which my cousin served sustained more than 200 percent. casualties.But the odds are not evenly spread. Over 47 months of deployment the 1/9 sustained tremendous casualties, well over 90% KIA (the highest in USMC history). Casualities were sustained throughout the war, but my 23 months in country wholly overlapped the 13 deadliest.
I realize that you are not intentionlly being dismissive of my comrades risks and sacrifices, but bear in mind that the risks were not nec. trivial. In other words, if the President’s and Vice President’s dodging service in a war they both supported was cowardly, the reaction was at least with foundation.
Ah, the Ma Deuce is on of the great loves of my life. I commanded a Mechanized Rifle Company in Viet Nam, and getting the .50s into action would settle any fight.Well, I certainly cannot speak for Baghdad or anywhere in Iraq, but I certainly felt safer in Afghanistan than I did/do in many major metro areas here in the states.
Of course, the fact that I was manning a .50 cal machine gun might have something to do with that. I hate traffic…
Mik
It certainly does not help to have extended deployments and re-deploying troops who are not 100% fit. We are now filling support roles with some troops who are unable to wear body armor because of their existing injuries. Again, I don’t think people have any real clue at just how much is being asked of a very small number of Americans, so it irritates me when people compare their efforts to, say, dinner in Phillie…Sometimes I wonder – it is possible to autopsy a body and tell that the man was killed by a bullet. It is not possible to tell if he got that bullet because he was exhausted, overloaded, and too slow. Nor is it possible to determine if the man who shot him should have been shot by our troops the day before but escaped because they were exhausted, overloaded, and too slow.
I know from personal experiece that carrying 80+ pounds in 100-degree heat is not something that contributes to ability.