Modal Ontological Argument

[SeekingCatholic]

That is not true. We certainly do not know “everything” about the existing world, and still we know that it is without logical contradictions, since it physically exists…

Sorry. I forgot to include my two original exceptions to this: our world (and this can also include other worlds which can be derived from ours) and a world with an evident logical contradiction.

In the case of a hypothetical world we can rely on the definition of the world. In the case of a “one”-world with one object in it, which object has only one attribute, we know everything about that world - because we define it in a certain manner.

But you see, you’ve said you could rely on the definition of the world without actually getting around to defining anything. Define your “one-world”. Define your object and its attribute. Specifically, define why your object doesn’t change into another, or disappear altogether. Define why its attribute never changes. Define how your object came into existence (or, if it existed eternally).

Exactly the same way as we speak of the null-world. Since there are no ontological objects in it, there can be no contradiction.

Define your null-world. Define what could potentially exist. Define why it actually doesn’t.

As I said, that is just an assumption. Nothing more.

But if we do not know the truth of the assumption, then we do not know the logical possibility of your null-world or one-world. And this is my only contention: we do not know.

And further, just because something possible does not exist in any particular world, it does not follow that it was “prevented” (what an anthropomorphic view!) or that it is impossible. In this world we do not have “unicorns” and that does not mean that “unicorns” are logically impossible or that some deity “prevented” them from coming into existence.

Then again, maybe it does. What knowledge do you have with which you can prove otherwise?

Except that there are infinitely many possible “one”-worlds and that makes your “necessary” being rather incoherent. Also there is no need to speak of “preventing” something else.

That’s begging the question. If the necessary being exists there is only one possible one-world.

Please do not try to appeal to authority. An assumption is just that… and it does not even speak of a logical null-world, only about a physical one. And many times we agreed that a logical world does not have to be actualized.

An appeal to authority is invalid as proof. It is valid as a supporting argument to show plausibility. A logical world need not be actualized, but it must be potentially actualizable.

If something is physically impossible, it is also logically impossible.

Just what I was trying to say all along. If your null-world or one-worlds are physically impossible, they are also logically impossible.

The whole point is this: If there is a “B” and a “C” which are logically contingent (in some way) in this world, and we remove either one of them, we are talking about a brand new world. If that new world is logically coherent, there is no problem. If it is not logically coherent, adding the missing component will not “fix” it.

If we add the missing component back in again, the world will be “fixed” by definition, because we will be back to where we started (this world), which is logically possible by definition.

The definition of logically possible world is that it cannot contain a logical contradiction. This was your definition, too. Why do you deviate from it?

I don’t deviate from it. You’ve redefined “contain a logical contradiction” as “containing a logically contradictory ontological entity”. So in your definition, a world with X but not Y, where the existence of X necessarily implies the existence of Y, would be logically possible, because X is not, in itself, a contradictory entity; not, in itself, having two contradictory attributes or existing and not existing at the same time. In my definition such a world is logically contradictory, because there are the two contradictory propositions “Y must exist” and “Y does not exist”. I suppose we won’t get much further until we can actually agree on precisely what “logically possible world” means.

 

[ateista]

Sorry. I forgot to include my two original exceptions to this: our world (and this can also include other worlds which can be derived from ours) and a world with an evident logical contradiction.

So you take the stance that we cannot know if there are other logically possible worlds beside our world (and its logical equivalents).

Let’s analyze this:

1. There are no other logically possible worlds.
2. There are other epistemically possible worlds, but we cannot know if they are logically possible.
3. There are other epistemically possible worlds and we can know that they are logically possible.

You take position 2) - which is total agnosticism (in this respect).
I take position 3) - which is pretty obvious from my posts.

A question: how do you know if an epistemically possible world does contain an evident logical contradiction, since you said that we cannot know if they do not contain a logical contradiction? Both of these require some knowledge about ths world.

The fun thing is that 1) and 2) are functionally equivalent. I saw once a great slogan in a bookstore: “Those who do not read are not better off than those who cannot read”. Of couse it does not apply 100% to our conversation, but it does shed some light on it.

If there are no other logically possible worlds, then this whole discussion was futile. If there are other epistemically possible worlds, but we cannot decide if they are logically possible or not, then this whole conversation was also futile. (Like two blind persons arguing about the color of the sky.)

**After all the whole point of the MOA is to establish the concept of a “necessary being”. **

If you deny that we can establish at least a few other logically possible worlds, and analyze their contents, then of course you can never establish the existence of any hypothetical entities, let alone the existence of a necessary being.

In order to establish the existence of a necessary being, you need to take the position that we can know all the logically possible worlds to a certain extent:

1. we can know which ones they are (among the epistemically possible worlds) and
2. we can know at least something about their content, namely the existence of one being (ontological entity).

You, by explicitely taking position 2) above simply say that the MOA is unable to establish its own goal, because we cannot say anything about the logically possible worlds.

You yourself refuted the usefulness of the MOA.

I also want to point out a logical problem: You said that if a possible necessary being does not exist in a logically possible world, then its existence is impossible in any logically possible world. That does not follow.

You can only say that this being is either impossible or it is not necessary. The formal negation of “possible necessary” is either not possible or not necessary. It is not a very important question, but worth to point out. And another remark: the phrase “possible necessary” is redundant. If something is necessary, then it is also possible.

The idea of “necessary but impossible” is an oxymoron. The idea of “possible but not necessary” is meaningful.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Ateista,

Before we go any further, I need to clarify a few things. This is probably my fault for not making it clearer in the OP. Once you realize what I mean by “logically possible universe”, you’ll see why I find it absurd to posit a logically possible null-universe if the actual universe is eternal (infinite regress). Also, I need to clarify some things regarding the concept of “nothing”.

First, I need to define “universe”. My definition of universe+ is “the set of everything that exists, including a necessary being, if he exists”. My definition of universe- is “the set of everything that exists, excluding a necessary being, if he exists”. “Exists” is a term which encompasses past, present, and future, and outside of time (if a being exists outside of time). I’ll use the term “universe” as a substitute for “universe+”, only using “universe-” when it is necessary to distinguish. It therefore makes no sense to talk about “logically possible universe” in the sense of a universe existing only in some theoretical realm, or in the sense of more than one universe existing, as I have defined the term.

As far as we can tell, our universe contains contingent events (events which could have been otherwise). These contingent events are quantum events, and acts of beings with free will, such as humans (if you believe in free will). What I mean by “logically possible universe” is a universe which could have happened, had these contingent events been different. A being not actually existent is “logically possible” if a different series of contingent events could have resulted in its existence. A unicorn could be logically possible; in fact, it’s not hard to imagine a few mutations in Hox genes that would have changed the evolutionary progression of horses and we would have ended up with unicorns. On the other hand, we’re only guessing that these contingent events were actually possible. We don’t know this for an absolute fact. A being which is actually existent is “contingent” if a different series of possible contingent events would have resulted in its non-existence. An actually existent being is “necessary” if it exists, no matter what series of contingent events take place. You may ask why I am using the terms “logically possible” or “logically impossible”; the answer is that (according to me) it is logically impossible that something arise out of an impossible event.

But if the universe is eternal, it exists necessarily, not contingently. If the universe exists contingently in the future, then there is a finite probability that over a finite period of time the universe just “pops” out of existence, with the right combination of contingent events. The probability therefore that the universe exists eternally in the future is zero. The only possibility for future-eternal existence is if there is no possible combination of contingent events which would result in the universe’s popping out of existence. But in that case the universe exists necessarily, by definition. The same argument applies to a past-eternal universe, simply by running the quantum mechanical arrow of time backwards. Therefore, by my definition of the term, if the universe is eternal, a null-universe is “logically impossible” by definition. It is impossible that it not exist.

Also, I need to clarify some concepts regarding “nothing”. “Nothing” is a paradoxical term because “nothing” can in fact only be defined in reference to “something”. “Nothing” has no ontological component properly its own. Or, in formal logic using set theory, the “empty set” can only be defined in reference to the specific superset (e.g. the set of cars, the set of boxes containing fruit, etc.). And the “empty set” is defined as the intersection operation of all the members in the set. We can then define “creation” and “destruction” operators with which we can get from one member of the superset to any other one. However,
the “destruction” operator on the empty set results in “null” - undefined. So, it is legitimate to ask, in the superset of logically possible universes, could the actually existent one have been the “empty set”. The “empty sets” differ in what they could potentially contain, in formal logic what creation operators are defined on them.

But it is not legitimate to ask could the actually existent one have been the “null set”. The answer to that question is neither true nor false, but “null”. It’s outside the bounds of the logic.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

So you take the stance that we cannot know if there are other logically possible worlds beside our world (and its logical equivalents).

Please read my next post. It should become clearer. Worlds contain not only beings, but also events.

A question: how do you know if an epistemically possible world does contain an evident logical contradiction, since you said that we cannot know if they do not contain a logical contradiction? Both of these require some knowledge about ths world.

I don’t understand the question. I am saying absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence. If there is an evident logical contradiction, then that’s that. Otherwise, there could be an impossible event postulated some place we are unaware of.

If there are no other logically possible worlds, then this whole discussion was futile. If there are other epistemically possible worlds, but we cannot decide if they are logically possible or not, then this whole conversation was also futile. (Like two blind persons arguing about the color of the sky.)

This is the starting point of the argument. Not the ending point. To begin with, we assume no necessary being. Now there are possibly other logically possible worlds. As far as we can tell. We have to assume the events in it (different from our own), are possible, based on our current knowledge. We have to assume, for instance, quantum events are indeterministic. Yet this is a challengeable assumption, and some have proposed fully deterministic QM theories. Obviously if our world, including the big bang, is fully deterministic, then there simply is no other logically possible world than our own. Free will could come in here, but that again assumes free will is a reality. You cannot really “prove” logical possibility here without making some assumption. That’s why all your attempts to “prove” the logical possibility of a null-world came to nought. They all rested on some sort of unproven and unprovable assumption.

Hypothetically assuming no necessary being, the only universe whose logical possibility we can be sure of is our own. This adds no new information. In our own universe, we do not know a priori whether a necessary being exists or not, unlike an arbitrarily defined universe. You cannot prove the logical impossibility of the existence of the necessary being, which is another way of saying you cannot prove a logically possible universe in which he is known to not exist.

**After all the whole point of the MOA is to establish the concept of a “necessary being”. **

If you deny that we can establish at least a few other logically possible worlds, and analyze their contents, then of course you can never establish the existence of any hypothetical entities, let alone the existence of a necessary being.

There is only other one world we must analyze. We must analyze the logically possible existence of a “one-universe”, with the necessary being the only existent being. That’s the point I’m trying to get you to. I can, in fact, prove this universe logically possible.

In order to establish the existence of a necessary being, you need to take the position that we can know all the logically possible worlds to a certain extent:

1. we can know which ones they are (among the epistemically possible worlds) and
2. we can know at least something about their content, namely the existence of one being (ontological entity).

We do not need to know all the logically possible worlds. What we need to do is consider how we can know for sure whether a world is logically possible or not. That is where part 2 of the proof comes in.

I also want to point out a logical problem: You said that if a possible necessary being does not exist in a logically possible world, then its existence is impossible in any logically possible world. That does not follow.

Yes, it does follow. If a necessary being exists, there is no possible sequence of contingent events which would result in his non-existence. Nor can his existence be caused by a given sequence of contingent events, for then he would be a contingent being, and not a necessary being, by definition.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Hi Seeking and Ateista,

SC sed:

1. We define God as a necessary being who is omnipotent and first cause. The definition of “necessary being” = it must exist in all logically possible universes.

Anselm began by defining God as the Greatest Conceivable Being and from that deduced his necessary existence. This, to me, still seems to be the sounder appraoch, but we shall see.

Ateista thinks that Anselm’s definition is problematic because what is the Greatest is subjective and will depend on who is doing the evaluating and the criteria used. But Anselm wasn’t bothered by this apparently. The individual is just asked to imagine a being who is the “bestest” according to any measure. IOW ultimate, unsurpassed or maximal greatness.

Maybe a better definition would be “all-inclusive realty.” If a being is inclusive of all value, then it would have to be the greatest, by definition.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

So anyway, putting Seeking’s argument in my own words, Seeking is asking us to define God as a necessarily existing, omnipotent First Cause. IOW, suppose such a being exists .

Seeking wants us acknowledge that at this point we are talking epistemic possibility here. Until we have thought it through, we are even entertaining the possibility that such a being doesn’t exist.

But, we remind ourselves, the rules of logic compel us to say that God must exist if we define him as a necessary being. So contingent existence isn’t a logical possibility given our definition.

Seeking then sez:

Up to this point, the logic is absolutely iron-clad. It does not, as yet, prove the existence of God, but it does significantly shift the burden of proof for atheists: they must show God to be a logically impossible being.

The atheist must show that it is logically impossible for a being to be necessarily existing. IOW, to talk of necessary beings is like talking about round squares (i.e. speak nonsense).

I agree. That is the atheist’s burden. But I still prefer Anselm’s approach. Define God as the GCB. From that infer necessary existence. The atheist then has the burden of showing GCB doesn’t make sense.

Seeking, why is your proof mo’ betta than the original?

cordially

frank

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Seeking:

If you start by defining God as a necessary being and then end up concluding that he therefore must exist, isn’t that like saying God is necessary because he is necessary?

Whereas if you start with a definition of ultimate greatness, you avoid that problem.

Ateista,

would you agree that if you accept the definition of the GCB, then a null universe is logically impossible?

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Anselm’s argument is informed by the religious idea of God as the One Who is Worshipped. The logic of worship drives us to exalt the greatest or ultimate being. It would be quite unsatisfactory from a religious standpoint, if an object of worship were merely contingent and not necessary, merely a fragment and not the whole of reality, merely an entity within an environment and not inclusive of all environments, etc. God, by definition cannot have a rival. God must be surpassible by no one except himself.

So while initially we can posit as epistemic possibilities God’s possible nonexistence, null universes, etc., once we think through the implications of our definition, we realize these are not logical possibilities.

 

[ateista]

I do not have a lot of time today, so I will make just a short reply. I have to do some more thinking about Seeking’s posts, so I will return to them maybe today or tomorrow.

Ateista thinks that Anselm’s definition is problematic because what is the Greatest is subjective and will depend on who is doing the evaluating and the criteria used. But Anselm wasn’t bothered by this apparently. The individual is just asked to imagine a being who is the “bestest” according to any measure. IOW ultimate, unsurpassed or maximal greatness.

The trouble is that the "individual’ will make an assessment based upon his value system. We, humans, certainly have a lot of variety in our individual value-systems, but there are some common factors.

These common factors are derived from the fact that we are both individuals and social beings. Usually we value honesty, knowledge, power (with proper restraints), justice, mercy, love, and a whole lot of other things. The concept of God is therefore relies on these valued properties, “magnified”.

Larry Niven has a lot of wonderful science fiction books, and he created his own universe. In his books he created a race, the Kzinti, who are of feline descent, and the Pierson Puppeteers, who are of herbivorous origin. The Kzinti value individual bravery, honor and ferocity. The Puppeteers value cowardice over anything else. The Kzinti’s “greatest” pissible being would the most ferocious one. The Puppeteers “greatest” possible being would the most cowardly one. (Actually they call their “leaders” the “Hindmost”…)

The point is that “greatness” does not exist in vacuum, it is a reflection of the race’s origin and the individual’s value system.

But I would suggest we drop this line of reasoning from this thread. It is certainly worth to explore in another one, but this thread is devoted to one approach, the Modal Ontological Argument, and it is difficult and time-consuming enough.

One more remark: the problem of the proof of existence based upon the GCB is that it considers “existence” an attribute. It says that having all the alleged attributes of “greatness” (no matter how we define greatness) without existence is somehow “lower” than having the same attributes with existence. But existence is not an attribute by any stretch of the imagination. So this method fails.

See you guys later.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Hi Ateista,

Thanks for your response.

I have these thots:

I believe I am advancing the original Anselmian modal OA which does not treat existence as a predicate or attribute. Realize that Anselm proposed two forms of the argument. The first, from Prosl. II, goes this way:

1. God is the GCB.
2. It is better to exist than not to exist.
3. If God is the GCB, he must be what is better, that is existing.
4. Therefore God must exist.

This version treats existence as an attribute of God and is rightly criticized. But what many folks overlook is that in Proslogium III he advances the modal version:

1. God is the GCB
2. There are two ways of existing, necessarily and contingently.
3. Necessary existence is the superior mode and the only mode consistent with deity.
4. Therefore God must exist.

With this version the mode of existence is the attribute, not existence itself.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Hi guys,

Mirdath, back in the first page, makes a very good point:

The idea of defining God as a thing particular to a hypothetical universe, as if the universe possesses a deity, would seem to fly in the face of the definition of divinity. What’s with this ‘exists in’ stuff when we’re talking about something which is supposedly greater than and different from the entirety of creation?

Zactly. I fear SC’s definition begins with an inadequate definition of God for it assumes that God exists in some environment or other. That then suggests to Ateista an environment or universe which is completely empty, a null universe.

I’m with Mirdath in that a religiously satisfying definition of God must be that He is inclusive of all reality and does not exist in any particular environment. Absolutely nothing exists outside of God.

A null universe, in this light, therefore becomes something unthinkable. You can toss it out as an epistemic possibility, but given a proper definition of God, it turns out to be nonsensical.

 

[ateista]

Before we go any further, I need to clarify a few things.

OK, it is a very good idea to define the “playing field”. At the very least we can agree what we are talking about. I want to devote this post to further clarifications.

First, I need to define “universe”. My definition of universe+ is “the set of everything that exists, including a necessary being, if he exists”. My definition of universe- is “the set of everything that exists, excluding a necessary being, if he exists”.

I accept this. I want to clarify the term “necessary being”. It is defined as a conscious entity, which exists in all the logically possible worlds. Is this definition correct, or do you define it differently?

“Exists” is a term which encompasses past, present, and future, and outside of time (if a being exists outside of time). I’ll use the term “universe” as a substitute for “universe+”, only using “universe-” when it is necessary to distinguish.

Now here we must dig deeper. I do not see how the term “existence” can be applied to either the past, or the future. Neither the past, nor the future “exists”. The past existed, the future will exist. There is also ambiguity to the term “outside time”.

We are familiar with two types of existence.

One is material existence, which encompasses matter / energy (let’s call it “M/E”) and the accompanying space and time (let’s call it “S/T”). S/T are not independent from M/E. In the absence of M/E there is no S/T.

The other is conceptual existence. A concept does not exist as a “touchable” matter. It is the mental picture of reality (could be accurate or inaccurate). Conceptual existence does not exist in the absence of conscious entities (let’s call conscious entities: “beings”).

Neither form of these two possibilities exists “outside” time. If you wish to incorporate “outside” time, you must substantiate that such “existence” is meaningful.

It therefore makes no sense to talk about “logically possible universe” in the sense of a universe existing only in some theoretical realm, or in the sense of more than one universe existing, as I have defined the term.

I agree with the second part: it makes no sense to speak of actual existence of “multiple” universes. I disagree with the first part: the “possible universe” is a hypothetical construct, which “exists” in our minds and it is the object of this conversation. It exists as a “model” which could be actual in the place of our currently existing universe.

Continued…

 

[ateista]

Continued from above…

As far as we can tell, our universe contains contingent events (events which could have been otherwise). These contingent events are quantum events, and acts of beings with free will, such as humans (if you believe in free will).

So far agreed.

What I mean by “logically possible universe” is a universe which could have happened, had these contingent events been different. A being not actually existent is “logically possible” if a different series of contingent events could have resulted in its existence. A unicorn could be logically possible; in fact, it’s not hard to imagine a few mutations in Hox genes that would have changed the evolutionary progression of horses and we would have ended up with unicorns.

Agreed as well.

A being which is actually existent is “contingent” if a different series of possible contingent events would have resulted in its non-existence.

I agree, if you use the word “being” as a synonym for “entity”. I would suggest that we restrict the word “being” to a “conscious entity”.

An actually existent being is “necessary” if it exists, no matter what series of contingent events take place. You may ask why I am using the terms “logically possible” or “logically impossible”; the answer is that (according to me) it is logically impossible that something arise out of an impossible event.

No problem, with the same proviso: by substituting “being” with “entity”.

But if the universe is eternal, it exists necessarily, not contingently. If the universe exists contingently in the future, then there is a finite probability that over a finite period of time the universe just “pops” out of existence, with the right combination of contingent events. The probability therefore that the universe exists eternally in the future is zero. The only possibility for future-eternal existence is if there is no possible combination of contingent events which would result in the universe’s popping out of existence. But in that case the universe exists necessarily, by definition. The same argument applies to a past-eternal universe, simply by running the quantum mechanical arrow of time backwards. Therefore, by my definition of the term, if the universe is eternal, a null-universe is “logically impossible” by definition. It is impossible that it not exist.

Reg flag alert! The term “eternal” presupposes time, which presupposes matter. Maybe you wish to clarify. Not that I have a problem with it: the principle of conservation of matter / energy states that matter / energy cannot be created or destroyed.

(Side note: I find it interesting that many theists embrace the concept of the Big Bang, and say that now science supports creation, and simply disregard the principle of conservation of matter / energy, which does not allow “creation”.)

Also, I need to clarify some concepts regarding “nothing”. “Nothing” is a paradoxical term because “nothing” can in fact only be defined in reference to “something”. “Nothing” has no ontological component properly its own.

“Nothing” is a concept, not an ontological entity, I agree with that. But there is nothing “paradoxical” about it.

Or, in formal logic using set theory, the “empty set” can only be defined in reference to the specific superset (e.g. the set of cars, the set of boxes containing fruit, etc.). And the “empty set” is defined as the intersection operation of all the members in the set. We can then define “creation” and “destruction” operators with which we can get from one member of the superset to any other one. However,
the “destruction” operator on the empty set results in “null” - undefined. So, it is legitimate to ask, in the superset of logically possible universes, could the actually existent one have been the “empty set”. The “empty sets” differ in what they could potentially contain, in formal logic what creation operators are defined on them.

No, this is incorrect. The mathematical definition of a “set” is simply a collection of members (entities). The members do not have to have any relationship among them (though of course they may; it is perfectly sensible to speak of a collection of cars, or oranges. But it is not a prerequisite, a “set” is just a collection of “stuff”). The empty set is simply a set without any members. It is a very useful mathematical concept.

Your turn. I will not respond to your other post, for two reasons. One, you explicitly directed my attention to this one, and two, I want to keep the discussion “linear” and do not wish to sidetrack it by having multiple posts. I am sure that the questions mentioned there will pop up again.

 

[ateista]

Hi Ateista,

Thanks for your response.

I have these thots:

I believe I am advancing the original Anselmian modal OA which does not treat existence as a predicate or attribute. Realize that Anselm proposed two forms of the argument. The first, from Prosl. II, goes this way:

1. God is the GCB.
2. It is better to exist than not to exist.
3. If God is the GCB, he must be what is better, that is existing.
4. Therefore God must exist.

This version treats existence as an attribute of God and is rightly criticized. But what many folks overlook is that in Proslogium III he advances the modal version:

1. God is the GCB
2. There are two ways of existing, necessarily and contingently.
3. Necessary existence is the superior mode and the only mode consistent with deity.
4. Therefore God must exist.

With this version the mode of existence is the attribute, not existence itself.

Sorry, the second one is even “worse” than the first one. It is worse, because formally it is just circular reasoning. It presupposes God’s existence and then announces that “lo and behold” God exists.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Hi Ateista:

You sed:

Sorry, the second one is even “worse” than the first one. It is worse, because formally it is just circular reasoning. It presupposes God’s existence and then announces that “lo and behold” God exists.

Well, let’s try this (following Hartshorme):

1. Begin with the idea of an individual (God) which cannot conceivably have a greater. (what I’ve been calling the GCB)
2. Such an idea is logically consistent.
3. It is also possible to conceive of an individual which could not conceivably have failed to exist. (the property of necessary existence)
4. Such an individual (from 3) must be greater than one which conceivably could have failed to exist. (This is Anselm’s principle)
5. To avoid contradiction, we have to ascribe the superior mode of existence to the GCB.
6. But once we come to the preceding conclusion, we realize that the GCB must exist. IOW, unsurpassable greatness entails necessary existence.

I don’t think this is circular.

cordially,
FS

 

[ateista]

1. Begin with the idea of an individual (God) which cannot conceivably have a greater. (what I’ve been calling the GCB)

Please, I think I already made it clear that “greatness” cannot be objectively defined. Different people or sentient beings can define “greatness” in different manner.

1. Such an idea is logically consistent.

Sure, but logical consistency does not lead to actually “meaningful”.

1. It is also possible to conceive of an individual which could not conceivably have failed to exist. (the property of necessary existence)

The word “individual” is not really applicable here. It has some connotations, which are not established (like consciousness, etc.). I would suggest to use the word “entity”.

Based upon the principle of conservation of matter / energy, I can accept that “matter / energy” is not contingent, it exists “necessarily” - though its “form” may change. The overall matter / energy however is invariant.

But how does that help you?

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Do you think SC’s modal argument is circular too?

 

[ateista]

Do you think SC’s modal argument is circular too?

No, it is not circular. It merely plays on the words “necessary” and “possible”. If there is anything that exists in all possible worlds (whatever they are), then he uses the term “necessary”. That is ok. It is redundant to add the term “possible” to it. If something is “necessary” (in the meaning above) then it is also “possible”.

But, if one adds the two terms, and uses the phrase “necessary and possible” then the negation of this is “either not necessary or not possible”.

In a formal manner, ~(A and B) = ~A or ~B and from that it certainly does not follow A’s actual existence.

What he fails to do is demonstrate that there is “something” that exists in all possible worlds. (And even if there is, he fails to demonstrate that this enity is a “being”). The word-play of “if something is necessary and not impossible then it certainly exists” just does not cut it.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

I accept this. I want to clarify the term “necessary being”. It is defined as a conscious entity, which exists in all the logically possible worlds. Is this definition correct, or do you define it differently?

This is fine, if you mean by “conscious” that the necessary being is a rational being.

Now here we must dig deeper. I do not see how the term “existence” can be applied to either the past, or the future. Neither the past, nor the future “exists”. The past existed, the future will exist. There is also ambiguity to the term “outside time”.

Yes, I know this is how “existence” could be commonly understood. I’m using “exists” as short for “existed, exists, and will exist in the future”. I need some term to distinguish our universe, with its series of events which occurred in the past and events which will occur in the future, from another universe in which these events did not or will not occur. Thus I say our universe actually “exists” and the other universe actually “does not exist”, even if the verb tense isn’t correct strictly speaking.

We are familiar with two types of existence.

One is material existence, which encompasses matter / energy (let’s call it “M/E”) and the accompanying space and time (let’s call it “S/T”). S/T are not independent from M/E. In the absence of M/E there is no S/T.

The other is conceptual existence. A concept does not exist as a “touchable” matter. It is the mental picture of reality (could be accurate or inaccurate). Conceptual existence does not exist in the absence of conscious entities (let’s call conscious entities: “beings”).

Neither form of these two possibilities exists “outside” time. If you wish to incorporate “outside” time, you must substantiate that such “existence” is meaningful.

A being that exists outside time would, as you show, need to be an immaterial being. You cannot prove however, empirically or logically, that the existence of immaterial beings is impossible.

I agree with the second part: it makes no sense to speak of actual existence of “multiple” universes. I disagree with the first part: the “possible universe” is a hypothetical construct, which “exists” in our minds and it is the object of this conversation. It exists as a “model” which could be actual in the place of our currently existing universe.

Continued…

OK, I can accept that.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

I agree, if you use the word “being” as a synonym for “entity”. I would suggest that we restrict the word “being” to a “conscious entity”.

No problem with that.

Reg flag alert! The term “eternal” presupposes time, which presupposes matter. Maybe you wish to clarify. Not that I have a problem with it: the principle of conservation of matter / energy states that matter / energy cannot be created or destroyed.

Right, but in an eternity of time, there is an infinity of events. If there is any finite probability that an event, or chain of events, leads to the destruction of the universe then the probability that the universe will persist for eternity is zero. If there is zero probability that any event or chain of events could lead to the destruction of the universe then I say the universe exists “necessarily” as I have defined the term. I’m not exactly sure where your objection lies here.

(Side note: I find it interesting that many theists embrace the concept of the Big Bang, and say that now science supports creation, and simply disregard the principle of conservation of matter / energy, which does not allow “creation”.)

The total amount of matter/energy in the universe is zero, as far as we can tell. No physical laws were therefore violated at the Big Bang.

No, this is incorrect. The mathematical definition of a “set” is simply a collection of members (entities). The members do not have to have any relationship among them (though of course they may; it is perfectly sensible to speak of a collection of cars, or oranges. But it is not a prerequisite, a “set” is just a collection of “stuff”). The empty set is simply a set without any members. It is a very useful mathematical concept.

I agree, but if you want to apply set theory to formal logic, you must distinguish between an “empty set” and a “null set”. If you do not you end up in logical paradoxes. This is explained quite well here:

phy.duke.edu/~rgb/Philosophy/axioms/axioms/node18.html

Your turn. I will not respond to your other post, for two reasons. One, you explicitly directed my attention to this one, and two, I want to keep the discussion “linear” and do not wish to sidetrack it by having multiple posts. I am sure that the questions mentioned there will pop up again.

No problem.