Modal Ontological Argument

[erroniusmonk]

Ateista, you state: “1) The set of all the epistemically possible worlds contains the “null-world” which is empty.”

Now, I’m not sure exactly what is meant by “epistemically possible,” but the notion of a possible world (which is a metaphysical notion) is that of a maximal state of affairs, or, to put it less technically, a total way things could be. A state of affairs necessarily involves the instantiation of a property or a property’s being instantiated. Thus, your first premise is mistaken: there is no possible world that is “empty”.

 

[erroniusmonk]

Just one more comment to further clarify my criticism…

There may be a confusion here between possible world language and set theory. There is, in set theory, what is called the “null set” which is a set with no members. A possible world, however, is quite a different animal. Unfortunately, the notion of a possible world can be misconstrued as “containing” things (and therefore, possibly containing nothing), but that is to misunderstand the concept of a possible world - go back and read Leibnitz, who coined this language. “Possible world” is a short-hand way of talking about the possible total situations that could obtain.

 

[Miles_Mariae]

You guys are good at making stuff up, or the amount of intellect in this thread is stunning. I’m beginning to think it’s the latter.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Miles,

What Westley said in The Princess Bride is certainly true of everyone who joins this thread: “Truly you have a dizzying intellect.”

cordially

Frank

 

[ateista]

Ateista, you state: “1) The set of all the epistemically possible worlds contains the “null-world” which is empty.”

Now, I’m not sure exactly what is meant by “epistemically possible,” but the notion of a possible world (which is a metaphysical notion) is that of a maximal state of affairs, or, to put it less technically, a total way things could be. A state of affairs necessarily involves the instantiation of a property or a property’s being instantiated. Thus, your first premise is mistaken: there is no possible world that is “empty”.

Just one more comment to further clarify my criticism…

There may be a confusion here between possible world language and set theory. There is, in set theory, what is called the “null set” which is a set with no members. A possible world, however, is quite a different animal. Unfortunately, the notion of a possible world can be misconstrued as “containing” things (and therefore, possibly containing nothing), but that is to misunderstand the concept of a possible world - go back and read Leibnitz, who coined this language. “Possible world” is a short-hand way of talking about the possible total situations that could obtain.

Combined reply to the two posts.

We are talking about hypothetical worlds, with a bunch of “what ifs”. The only not permissible “what ifs” are the ones which actually (not just verbally) introduce a logical contradiction.

The concept of a world with different ontological entities is the aim of the “game”.

The MOA was construed the prove that in all the logically possible world there must exist one specific “being”. That is to prove that there must be a being which always exists and postulate that this being is “god”. (Not necessarily the God of Christianlity, but some kind of special being.)

I questioned this argument based upon the hypothetical existence of “null world” with no ontological entities in it. It is a simple logical construct, without any possibility of a contradiction in it, lacking any ontological entities. As far as I am concerned that invalidates the MOA. This hypothetical construct obviously can not be “actualized”. The very concept of “actualization” is meaningless.

The other posters have objected precisely on this ground. Even though the possibility of actualization was not part of their postulated premises, they now want to restrict the “logically possible wolrds” to a subset of them, which can be physically actualized. This is a very significant changing of the “goalposts”, but I am willing to compromise.

Right now we are in the middle of defining the concept of a “world”. So your criticisms are directed to a stage which has been superceded or abandoned.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Ateista:

But greatness is not a simple attribute, it is a compostite attribute. It has many components. Which ones of simple attributes will be part of the composite is the question.

For Anselm/Hartshorne, these become known as we contemplate the meaning and implications of unsurpassability or greatness. “Necessarily existing” is one, of course. Another would “all-inclusive”. Hartshorne in A Natural Theology for Our Time suggests “all-loving.”

[Cautionary Note for Christians: Hartshorne is a theist but not a Christian. His theology promotes a form of panentheism which is incompatible with the Christian dogmatic understanding of God.]

Anyway, as I’ve said before, I think the attribute of all-inclusiveness disposes of your objection.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Ateista, Erronius and SC,

I questioned this argument based upon the hypothetical existence of “null world” with no ontological entities in it. It is a simple logical construct, without any possibility of a contradiction in it, lacking any ontological entities. As far as I am concerned that invalidates the MOA. This hypothetical construct obviously can not be “actualized”. The very concept of “actualization” is meaningless.

Ateista, as I’ve asked before way back, does the category of null world refer to a state of absolute nothingness? If so, it is indeed nonsensical, for if there is a “world” at all suggests at least some kind of environment, which is something.

If absolutely nuttin’ existing is an inconceivable state of affairs, then we have to conclude that there’s always gotta be sumptin or udder existing. Wouldn’t you say?

And if sumptin’s always gotta exist, then the whole of that sumptin’ would have to be the greatest existing being (God).

 

[ateista]

Ateista:

For Anselm/Hartshorne, these become known as we contemplate the meaning and implications of unsurpassability or greatness. “Necessarily existing” is one, of course. Another would “all-inclusive”. Hartshorne in A Natural Theology for Our Time suggests “all-loving.”

[Cautionary Note for Christians: Hartshorne is a theist but not a Christian. His theology promotes a form of panentheism which is incompatible with the Christian dogmatic understanding of God.]

Anyway, as I’ve said before, I think the attribute of all-inclusiveness disposes of your objection.

I don’t think so. “All” inclusiveness brings in a “dangerous” concept of mutually contradictory features: for example: very good and very evil. As soon as you deny that “all inclusiveness” incorporates “very evil”, you engage in cherry-picking, and that is the subjective part of the definition. This is the problem with trying to make too broad categories.

This is why I am asking you to enumerate all the simple attributes of what you think comprises “great”. Do not try just to make another synonym for “greatness”. It would have the same problem, being a composite concept.

I am not even concerned with the concept of “greatest”… that is just a superlative of “great”. Without a coherent definition of “great” it is nonsensical to speak of “greatest”.

 

[ateista]

Ateista, as I’ve asked before way back, does the category of null world refer to a state of absolute nothingness? If so, it is indeed nonsensical, for if there is a “world” at all suggests at least some kind of environment, which is something.

It is not “more” nonsensical than the concept of zero - which is absolute nothingness. Or the concept of negative numbers.

Obviously there is no such physical “thing” as “zero” apples, or “minus 2” apples. Moreover, “zero apples” cannot be distinguished from “zero oranges”, and that is why there is only one zero, indicating the perfect, absolute nothingness.

It is very sensible to speak of these entities as abstract constructs, and do not try to “instantiate” them in the real world.

The null world is not something that can physically exist. No one suggested otherwise. But the whole original MOA is not concerned with actual, physical existence, it is concerned with logically non-contradictory state of affairs. Only when I brought up the concept of the “null-world” was the premise changed (moving goalposts, anyone?) because the argument could not be attacked on a purely logical ground.

Also obviously, something that physically exists is also logically consistent. For example you cannot have a living, breathing “married bachelor”. But the opposite is not true, something that is logically non-contradictory, like “zero apples”, cannot necessarily be instantiated as a physical object. That fact, however, does not make these abstractions nonsensical.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Hi Ateista

I don’t think so. “All” inclusiveness brings in a “dangerous” concept of mutually contradictory features: for example: very good and very evil. As soon as you deny that “all inclusiveness” incorporates “very evil”, you engage in cherry-picking, and that is the subjective part of the definition. This is the problem with trying to make too broad categories.

I agree all-inclusiveness is a dangerous concept for traditional theism. And if you are going to define God as the all-inclusive being He necessarily will include good stuff and bad stuff and even evil beings. Once this is admitted, howver, then what about traditional attributes such as being all-good? That is a problem that has to be thought through. Hartshorne’s response is that just because a part (fragment) of the whole of reality has a certain attribute, that doesn’t mean that such must therefore be attributed to the whole (God) which is inclusive of it.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

The Schnobster sed:
Ateista, as I’ve asked before way back, does the category of null world refer to a state of absolute nothingness? If so, it is indeed nonsensical, for if there is a “world” at all suggests at least some kind of environment, which is something.

Ateister replieth: It is not “more” nonsensical than the concept of zero - which is absolute nothingness. Or the concept of negative numbers.

Zero is the absence of any quantity of something. Absolute nothingness is absence of anything whatsoever, no matter, no space, no time, no being, no happening, etc., which truly is an inconceivable, impossible state of affairs.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Ateista sed to EM on the previous page:

I questioned this argument based upon the hypothetical existence of “null world” with no ontological entities in it. It is a simple logical construct, without any possibility of a contradiction in it, lacking any ontological entities. As far as I am concerned that invalidates the MOA. This hypothetical construct obviously can not be “actualized”. The very concept of “actualization” is meaningless.

As Mirdath pointed out in the beginning of the thread, SC is working with an inadequate concept of Deity if it is posited there could be a universe/world/environment outside of Him. Conceding that, you rightfully introduce the idea of a null world and destroy the argument.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

But my point is that there is a contradiction built into your null world if you define it as absolute nothingness. A null world is necessarily a something, i.e. a world/environment. A null world can’t be something and nothing at the same time.

 

[ateista]

But my point is that there is a contradiction built into your null world if you define it as absolute nothingness. A null world is necessarily a something, i.e. a world/environment. A null world can’t be something and nothing at the same time.

Well, let’s approach the problem from a different angle. We know that our universe has at least 3 spatial dimensions (could be more), at least 1 temporal dimension (could be more), and a huge number of physical entities.

Let’s consider a subset of this universe. There could be a sub-world with only 2 spatial dimensions, 1 temporal dimension and some physical entities in it. Usually referred to as “Flatworld”. Since it is part of our universe, it is certainly physically possible.

Now, let’s consider another sub-world, with 3 spatial dimensions, no temporal dimension amd some physical entities. Lacking a temporal dimension it would be a “frozen” world, without changes. It would also be part of this universe, therefore it is physically possible.

In general, we can say that any sub-world of our universe is part of our universe, and as such it is physically possible.

If we remove all the physical entities in one fell swoop, we shall get another sub-universe. Since space and time are contingent upon the physical entities, it makes no sense to speak of the spatial dimensions or the temporal dimension of this “degenerate” world.

How is this sub-world different from the null-world?

 

[FrankSchnabel]

I questioned this argument based upon the hypothetical existence of “null world” with no ontological entities in it. It is a simple logical construct, without any possibility of a contradiction in it, lacking any ontological entities. As far as I am concerned that invalidates the MOA. This hypothetical construct obviously can not be “actualized”. The very concept of “actualization” is meaningless.

The other posters have objected precisely on this ground. Even though the possibility of actualization was not part of their postulated premises, they now want to restrict the “logically possible wolrds” to a subset of them, which can be physically actualized. This is a very significant changing of the “goalposts”, but I am willing to compromise.

The whole point of the OA of any kind is that you can start with an idea and demonstrate its necessary actualization. God is ___ and so he necessarily exists somehow or udder. We might toss out a definition of Deity for discussion, but proponents of the OA, even in SC’s version, have more than a hypothetical construct in mind. Demonstrated necessary actualization of the idea is always in view.

 

[ateista]

As Mirdath pointed out in the beginning of the thread, SC is working with an inadequate concept of Deity if it is posited there could be a universe/world/environment outside of Him. Conceding that, you rightfully introduce the idea of a null world and destroy the argument.

I agree with you.

But the “word” universe literally means “everything that exists” and SC explicitely used it as such. It is not restricted to the physical universe. We could invent a new word for this concept, and SC actually used the phrase “universe+” to designate the state of affairs comprised of the actual physical universe and “a god” - aka necessary being. So there was no confusion.

 

[ateista]

I agree all-inclusiveness is a dangerous concept for traditional theism. And if you are going to define God as the all-inclusive being He necessarily will include good stuff and bad stuff and even evil beings. Once this is admitted, howver, then what about traditional attributes such as being all-good? That is a problem that has to be thought through.

Indeed, and that is why I would like to see a an enumerated list of the attributes of greatness.

Hartshorne’s response is that just because a part (fragment) of the whole of reality has a certain attribute, that doesn’t mean that such must therefore be attributed to the whole (God) which is inclusive of it.

And he is absolutely correct. To say otherwise is called the fallacy of composition. Having an attribute of a part does not automatically transfer that attribute to the whole. (In some cases it does, in others it does not.) Each particular case must be investigated.

(Side note: I udderly enjoy the laddle twists of the worlds you incorporate into your posts. They make it very enjoyable to read and decipher. Keep 'em up!)

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Hi Ateista,

In general, we can say that any sub-world of our universe is part of our universe, and as such it is physically possible.

If we remove all the physical entities in one fell swoop, we shall get another sub-universe. Since space and time are contingent upon the physical entities, it makes no sense to speak of the spatial dimensions or the temporal dimension of this “degenerate” world.

How is this sub-world different from the null-world?

Let me walk thru this. The universe is all that exists. If we remove all matter, space and time, is there anything left? We have to say yes if we still want to call this “degenerate” world a part of the universe. …

sorry, not time to play this morn. have to go out and shovel snow.}

have a great day!

FS.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

back again.

And if we don’t say there is anything left, then we are talking about absolute nothingness, an impossible state of affairs, according to my way of thinking anyway.

 

[ateista]

back again.

And if we don’t say there is anything left, then we are talking about absolute nothingness, an impossible state of affairs, according to my way of thinking anyway.

I very much agree that it is nonsensical to say: “nothing” exists as a physical entity. I use “nothing” here as a noun depicting the lack of anything and everything.

I suggest we slow down for a second and contemplate the word “existence”.

We are familiar with exactly two types of existence:

1. physical existence and
2. conceptual existence.

Conceptual existence is anything and everything we can think of, or we can imagine. In this sense we can say that the concept of “married bachelor” exists. Likewise we can say that the concept of “nothingness” exists. Or the concept of an “evil god” exists. Or the concept of a “seven-headed dragon exists which uses pure mathematics to communicate and sings its propostions in perfect contralto pitch”.

None of these indicate “physical” existence, or the possibility of physical existence. That is a different ballgame.

Something physically “exists” if there is a manifestation of that entity, which is available to our senses, or the extension of our senses. Maybe we can only have indirect evidence for its existence. But, be as it may, physical existence is verifyable by our senses or measurements of reality.

Maybe we could make our conversation clearer by postulating two new words: “p-existence” and “c-existence”, indicating physical existence or conceptual existence, respectively.

Let’s stay away from propositions: “a shumgummy exists”. Let’s replace this ambiguous phrase with “a shumgummy p-exists” or “a shumgummy c-exists”, depending on our intent.

Do you agree with this line of methodology? Do you wish to postulate some other type of existence? If you do, please explain what an “x-existence” is supposed to mean.