Modal Ontological Argument

[Riley259]

Well of course it does. And it proves a necessary being, in fact, necessary.

True.

False. The world may have no ontological entities (beings) in it but we are still assuming the existence of logic. Therefore an empty universe may still contain a logical contradiction. Therefore it is possible an empty universe contains a logical contradiction and is therefore logically impossible.

Unless your empty universe is empty of even logic, in which case you can’t prove it empty, without the law of non-contradiction. Denying that logic has been successful in proving God by denying logic itself is really silly.

As shown above, your argument is fallacious.

Conclusion: the argument still stands.

Since causation can be defined for individual objects or events, a first cause can be so defined for those objects and events as the first cause in the causal chain leading up to them. Therefore “first cause” has been defined in a manner which should be to your satisfaction.

Bingo…good post, I was going to cite the same fallacy in his argument.

 

[Riley259]

Unlike the cosmological arguments, which I find cannot offer 100% proof of the existence of God, the modal ontological argument is rock-solid.

To avoid a certain confusion which sometimes comes in, I need to carefully define various meanings of the term “possibility”.
Epistemic possibility: something is epistemically possible if we can conceive of it. The set of epistemic possibilities may expand or contract with new knowledge.
Logical possibility: something is logically possible if its existence does not contravene the rules of logic. If something is logically possible, there will be at least one logically possible universe in which it exists. If something is logically impossible, it cannot exist in any logically possible universe.
Actual possibility: This only has relation to a given universe - it describes a logically possible entity actualized in that universe.

The epistemically and logically possible sets overlap, but are not identical. Before a beginning calculus student learns the rules for derivatives, it is epistemically possible for him that that d/dx (x^2) = x. But it isn’t logically possible. Once the calculus student learns derivatives, the above equation also becomes epistemically impossible. Likewise, the actually possible set is a subset of the logically possible set. It is logically possible that there exist three types of charged particles, but actually impossible in this universe.

So:

1. We define God as a necessary being who is omnipotent and first cause. The definition of “necessary being” = it must exist in all logically possible universes.
2. The set of epistemically possible universes includes, a priori, both those with God and those without Him. However, the set of logically possible universes must either consist only of those with God or those without Him, from the definition of God.
3. Therefore, either God exists (as a necessary being), if the true set of logically possible universes is those with Him; or His existence is logically impossible, if the true set of logically possible universes is those without Him.

Up to this point, the logic is absolutely iron-clad. It does not, as yet, prove the existence of God, but it does significantly shift the burden of proof for atheists: they must show God to be a logically impossible being.

Now the question comes: how to choose between the two epistemic possibilities. It is not enough, as some versions of the argument seem to have it, to merely state that one can conceive of the existence of God, proving His possibility and therefore existence. This is confusing epistemic with logical possibility. Otherwise the atheist could reply that one can conceive of a universe without God, proving His lack of necessity and therefore non-existence, and therefore we would have both proved God’s existence and His non-existence. Again epistemic possibility is confused with logical possibility. There could be something we as yet don’t know about God which in fact renders His existence logically impossible (just as the beginning calculus student). On the other hand, there could be something we as yet don’t know about the universe which renders His existence in fact necessary.

Moreover, arguing about the actual possibility of God in this universe misses the mark. Even if a first cause of this universe could be proved, that would only prove a first cause in this universe; e.g., a contingent first cause which might not exist in other logically possible universes. It wouldn’t prove the same being as necessary first cause for the other universes.

The right question to ask is: is it logically possible that God’s existence be a necessity? Is the presumed set of logically possible universes itself a logical possibility? In other words, assuming His existence, what is the reason rendering the existence of universes without Him a logical impossibility? A rational reason can easily be found for God’s necessity. God can simply, by His power, prevent such universes from coming into existence. It is logically impossible for Him to act otherwise; since otherwise He by definition would not be God, and logically possible for Him to so act, since He is omnipotent by definition.

Now, if it is logically possible that God’s existence be a necessity (e.g. necessary in all logically possible universes), it is logically impossible that God’s existence be logically impossible (e.g. impossible in all logically possible universes), since the sets of logically possible universes don’t overlap, as shown in step 2). Put another way, if the set of universes with God is logically possible, then the set of universes without God must be logically impossible. Thus, God exists by logical necessity. (Cont.)

Very intriguing proof for the existence of God.

 

[ateista]

Very intriguing proof for the existence of God.

Don’t bother. He is long gone from this thread.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Mornin Ateista:

I asked the materialist: Well, if matter is the only reality, where did it come from?

You responded: This is not a meaningful question.

I agree, given the premise of materialism that matter is all there is, ever was and always will be.

That is why I brushed it aside and answered: Matter is uncreated and eternal, say materialists. Udderwise, there would be something more than matter to account for it. So matter, in its basic and fundamental units, must be uncreated, unchanging and eternal. All that exists are the basic units and the void between them.

Is that a fair understanding of materialism?
.

 

[ateista]

That is why I brushed it aside and answered: Matter is uncreated and eternal, say materialists. Udderwise, there would be something more than matter to account for it. So matter, in its basic and fundamental units, must be uncreated, unchanging and eternal. All that exists are the basic units and the void between them.

Is that a fair understanding of materialism?

No, it is not.

The universe is not “like” a huge pool table, with the balls representing “matter”, which stay inert until a non-material entity uses a cue-stick and sends them into motion. (This is a crude analogy.)

Matter, energy, space, time, motion, change are not separate entities, existing in and by themselves. They are all part of what we call “physical existence”.

The currently accepted cosmological model is the “Big Bang” theory. It may be valid, it may not be. Our current level of knowledge seems to be quite consistent with it. We can be fairly certain that it is not the “final” word, but for the time being, we can accept it as a good working model - while being open to the possibility that our understanding of reality will change and this model will be as obsolete as the other cosmological models are today.

According to this model the current form of the universe “started” with a singularity. Within the singularity there is no valid way of speaking of “time”. It would be a meaningless question to ask: “How long did the singularity exist?” or to ask: “What caused the singularity to happen?” or maybe: “What was before the singularity?”. None of these or similar questions can be asked, because they assume a “time” which is independent of the singularity - therefore they are meaningless questions.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Mornin ATeista,

So materialists would say that the singularity contained all the “stuff” of the present universe and no thing has been added since the Big Bang. Whatever existed before the singularity went kerblooie is still here, just in a different form.

But I think that particle physicists still try and conceive of the universe in terms of its fundamental unit, whether call it a Higgs Boson, superstring, or Basic Unit. From it we get energy, matter, space, time, everything.

So before the Big Bank there was just a singularity, just One. At the moment of the Big Bang, for some tiny fraction of trillionth of a second, the singularity turned into a profusion of BU’s. Brazillions, upon brazillions upon brazillions of them, but still a finite number of them. At no time since, according to materialists, were any added. They’ve just reorganized.

Is this not the materialst view?

 

[john_doran]

According to this model the current form of the universe “started” with a singularity. Within the singularity there is no valid way of speaking of “time”. It would be a meaningless question to ask: “How long did the singularity exist?” or to ask: “What caused the singularity to happen?” or maybe: “What was before the singularity?”. None of these or similar questions can be asked, because they assume a “time” which is independent of the singularity - therefore they are meaningless questions.

this doesn’t follow, i’m afraid…

if asking a question about the duration of some physical object entails asking a question about an independently existing “time”; and if asking about an independently existing “time” is meaningless, then asking about the duration of*** anything*** will be meaningless.

why is it meaningless to ask how long the initial singularity existed, but not meaningless to ask how long i have existed?

look, time, matter, energy, and space are all inextricably linked (according to General Relativity, anyway), so if the matter/energy of the initial singularity has always existed, then so has time. which means asking how many points of time have elapsed prior to the first moment of the rapid (inflationary?) expansion of the initial singularity is anything but meaningless.

incidentally, it’s hardly meaningless to speak of an independent spatio-temporal manifold: the standard model (and string theory) are both background independent physical theories - does that mean that they’re meaningless, too?

 

[ateista]

if asking a question about the duration of some physical object entails asking a question about an independently existing “time”; and if asking about an independently existing “time” is meaningless, then asking about the duration of*** anything*** will be meaningless.

In a strict sense it is correct. Since time and space are not separable, the only invariant is x^2 + y^2 + z^2 - c^2*t^2 (where x, y and z are the spatial coordinates and t is the temporal coordinate). At non-relaticistic conditions the difference is negligible (though not exactly zero), that is why we can speak meaningfully about “time”.

why is it meaningless to ask how long the initial singularity existed, but not meaningless to ask how long i have existed?

Because you live in a non-relativistic world, and the singularity is a relativistic world.

look, time, matter, energy, and space are all inextricably linked (according to General Relativity, anyway), so if the matter/energy of the initial singularity has always existed, then so has time. which means asking how many points of time have elapsed prior to the first moment of the rapid (inflationary?) expansion of the initial singularity is anything but meaningless.

What “points of time”? Consider the twin “paradox” (which is not really a paradox). One of two twins embarks of a trip at near relativistic speed, the other one stays stationary. When the traveling twin returns, biologically he aged a few months. The stationary one aged many years. The duration as measured by the aging process of the bodies (and the clocks on the spaceship and the Earth) is totally different. Which one is the “real” duration? The question is meaningless. However the value of x^2 + y^2 + z^2 - c^2*t^2 is the same for both of them.

incidentally, it’s hardly meaningless to speak of an independent spatio-temporal manifold: the standard model (and string theory) are both background independent physical theories - does that mean that they’re meaningless, too?

They are theories and as all theories, they will change as our knowledge of the real world grows.

 

[ateista]

Mornin ATeista,

So materialists would say that the singularity contained all the “stuff” of the present universe and no thing has been added since the Big Bang. Whatever existed before the singularity went kerblooie is still here, just in a different form.

But I think that particle physicists still try and conceive of the universe in terms of its fundamental unit, whether call it a Higgs Boson, superstring, or Basic Unit. From it we get energy, matter, space, time, everything.

So before the Big Bank there was just a singularity, just One. At the moment of the Big Bang, for some tiny fraction of trillionth of a second, the singularity turned into a profusion of BU’s. Brazillions, upon brazillions upon brazillions of them, but still a finite number of them. At no time since, according to materialists, were any added. They’ve just reorganized.

Is this not the materialst view?

Let’s not go into the current cosmological model and the current particle physics. Philosophically speaking materialism is the assertion that the physical world is matter / energy / space / time. Its inalianable attribute is change and movement.

 

[Hastrman]

Its inalianable attribute is change and movement.

Or in other words, “Panta rhei” (everything is in flux).

Why Heraclitus, how well you’ve aged!

You were right, though, about the meaninglessness of saying “before” the Big Bang, because there’s no time dimension, and I’m glad you saved me the trouble. I would still argue that knowing all of space is knowing all of time, if they’re comparable at any level; but that somewhat begs the question of a real thing that exists outside space-time. Which, of course, no materialist will concede.

I, actually, think the Ontological Argument is as weak as British coffee (or American tea), because of all the question-begging involved right out of the gate.

“I choose to define God as something that has to exist, therefore God must exist.”

:ehh:

Um…no, you know what, Anselm, Descartes, Plantinga? It’s okay. You go take a nap or something. You’ve obviously been working too hard.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Hey Hastrman,

Welcome.

You sed:

I, actually, think the Ontological Argument is as weak as British coffee (or American tea), because of all the question-begging involved right out of the gate.

“I choose to define God as something that has to exist, therefore God must exist.”

Which is why I prefer the classic form of the argument from Anselm’s Proslogium III: God is the greatest conceivable being. From that we deduce necessary existence. The only question begging here is whether “greatest conceivable being” makes sense.

Earlier Ateista and I went back and forth on that point, and I don’t think we did it much justice, on either side of it.

But here is the key thing: Anselm discovered that the question of God’s existence (not presupposing anything about his attributes) boils down to only two choices. Either He exists or the very idea of God as the GCB is nonsense. Looking at the OA this way, one realizes that Anselm really made great progress in the Great Debate. There really are only two positions that make any sense. Empirical atheism and empirical theism are nonsensical positions.

 

[ateista]

Or in other words, “Panta rhei” (everything is in flux).

Why Heraclitus, how well you’ve aged!

Thank you for your kind assessment.

You were right, though, about the meaninglessness of saying “before” the Big Bang, because there’s no time dimension, and I’m glad you saved me the trouble. I would still argue that knowing all of space is knowing all of time, if they’re comparable at any level; but that somewhat begs the question of a real thing that exists outside space-time. Which, of course, no materialist will concede.

How do you define a “real thing”? And how do you define “existence”?

I, actually, think the Ontological Argument is as weak as British coffee (or American tea), because of all the question-begging involved right out of the gate.

“I choose to define God as something that has to exist, therefore God must exist.”

:ehh:

Um…no, you know what, Anselm, Descartes, Plantinga? It’s okay. You go take a nap or something. You’ve obviously been working too hard.

I sure agree with you. The belief in God (or any god) is not founded on reason, if is founded on faith. If God’s existence could be established on a rational basis, faith would no longer be necessary. In a sense it would drag God down into the sordid swamp of materialism.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Our discussion on materialism arose because we were trying to clarify what the word “exist” means. We quite easily agreed that things can exist conceptually (C-existence) and physically (P-existence). We posited something we called X-existence because I, as a theist, was unwilling to say things only existed conceptually or physically.

My point along these lines is that philosophical materialism is dead, and that present day materialist just haven’t woken up to that fact.

 

[ateista]

Which is why I prefer the classic form of the argument from Anselm’s Proslogium III: God is the greatest conceivable being. From that we deduce necessary existence. The only question begging here is whether “greatest conceivable being” makes sense.

Actually, there are at least two problems. One is the question whether “gratest conceivable being” makes sense or not. Another one is if “existence” is an attribute or not. We already agreed that existence is not an attribute.

Earlier Ateista and I went back and forth on that point, and I don’t think we did it much justice, on either side of it.

It was my impression that we pretty much dispensed with it as being nonsensical.

But here is the key thing: Anselm discovered that the question of God’s existence (not presupposing anything about his attributes) boils down to only two choices.

The “greatest conceivable” is an attribute, albeit a very vague one on one hand, and extremely complex on the other. And it is totally subjective.

 

[ateista]

Our discussion on materialism arose because we were trying to clarify what the word “exist” means. We quite easily agreed that things can exist conceptually (C-existence) and physically (P-existence). We posited something we called X-existence because I, as a theist, was unwilling to say things only existed conceptually or physically.

Yes, and we agreed that your position is worthy to be contemplated as a hypothesis. I am still at a loss of what the properties of X-existence may be, and how to gain knowledge regarding X-existence. So far I cannot see in what manner it is different from C-existence.

My point along these lines is that philosophical materialism is dead, and that present day materialist just haven’t woken up to that fact.

Well, that is nice, but so far you only expressed your opinion. It would be better to see some evidence for it.

 

[ateista]

I would still argue that knowing all of space is knowing all of time, if they’re comparable at any level

This part requires an answer on its own. From the theory of relativity it follows that space and time are not separate entities, they are inteconnected.

Specifically, viewing an event from two coordinate systems, the value of x^2 + y^2 + z^2 - c^2*t^2 is the same, where x, y and z are the event’s spatial cooridinates and t is the temporal one - measured in either one of the coordinate systems.

That fact, however does not express an equivalence between space and time. Observe that the temporal coordinate “t”, has a multiplyer of “c” - the speed of light in vacuum - and it is not “added”, rather subtracted from the sum of the squares of the spatial coordinates. Time in a sense is an “imaginary” coordinate.

For something that has not happened yet, neither the spatial, nor the temporal cooridnates can be established. Moreover, the word “knowledge” means that one gathers “information” about an event. Information is attained via some information-bearing communication channel.

And it is nonsensical to speak of getting information about something that does not exist. One cannot obtain information about nonexistence.

This line of thought does not assume that God is resident in our space-time continuum. God may very well reside “outside” in a spaceless and timeless existence - like a mathematical point. It has no bearing on the question. If something does not exist, it does not exist, no matter from which coordinate system we “view” it.

Continued below.

 

[john_doran]

Because you live in a non-relativistic world, and the singularity is a relativistic world.

i don’t know what this means: there is still a temporal dimension at the initial singularity. we may not understand the nomology of the spatiotemporal manifold at that point, but so what? that’s not the same thing as there being “no time”.

ateista:

What “points of time”? Consider the twin “paradox” (which is not really a paradox). One of two twins embarks of a trip at near relativistic speed, the other one stays stationary. When the traveling twin returns, biologically he aged a few months. The stationary one aged many years. The duration as measured by the aging process of the bodies (and the clocks on the spaceship and the Earth) is totally different. Which one is the “real” duration? The question is meaningless. However the value of x^2 + y^2 + z^2 - c^2*t^2 is the same for both of them.

what has this got to do with anything? how is the question “how long did the initial singularity exist” even ***remotely ***like the question “which of two intertial frames is the ‘real’ one?”.

ateista:

They are theories and as all theories, they will change as our knowledge of the real world grows.

…or they may not.

my point is simply that the standard model is not meaningless simply in virtue of its being background independent. which means that your assertion that meaninglessness follows from (is entailed by) temporal independence, is false.

 

[ateista]

i don’t know what this means: there is still a temporal dimension at the initial singularity. we may not understand the nomology of the spatiotemporal manifold at that point, but so what? that’s not the same thing as there being “no time”.

The singularity is a mathematical point. The concepts of space and time cannot be defined within a singularity. The current mathematical models are only applicable to the universe starting at a fraction of a second after the singularity changed.

what has this got to do with anything? how is the question “how long did the initial singularity exist” even ***remotely ***like the question “which of two intertial frames is the ‘real’ one?”.

Since time is not an independent variable, it makes very good sense to ask, what do you mean by “points of time”? That was the phrase you used.

…or they may not.

Well, usually I am not in the business of making predictions, but I can say with absolute certainty that we are not at the point of total knowledge - therefore I predict that our explanations of reality will change.

my point is simply that the standard model is not meaningless simply in virtue of its being background independent. which means that your assertion that meaninglessness follows from (is entailed by) temporal independence, is false.

What do you mean by the “standard model”?

As for the cosmological models in general (and the Big Bang theory in particular) we can say that they only pertain to the observed part of the Universe.

 

[ateista]

I would still argue that knowing all of space is knowing all of time, if they’re comparable at any level

Continuing from above:

There is another possibility. We are constrained by space and time, therefore - for us - the future has not happened yet. If God is not constrained by our limitations (as asserted), the differentiation of past, present and future does not exist for him. From that it follows that our perception is incorrect, the existence of past, present and future is just an illusion.

If this is the case, then on what grounds would anyone assert that our “free will” is real, it is not just an illusion itself?

If the future “exists” just like the past “exists” (both of which I deny) then there is no meaningful way to speak of “choices”. A choice is meaningful only if it pertains to somethig that does not exist yet - which will be decided based upon the execution of our choice. There are no choices in the past. The past cannot be changed. (Before anyone misunderstands: I did not say that there were no choices in the past.)

So, no matter how you twist it, the concept on “knowing” the future leads to an absurdity.

 

[davidv]

Continuing from above:

There is another possibility. We are constrained by space and time, therefore - for us - the future has not happened yet. If God is not constrained by our limitations (as asserted), the differentiation of past, present and future does not exist for him. From that it follows that our perception is incorrect, the existence of past, present and future is just an illusion.

I disagree, our perception is what it is, like a “fact”. It is only our interpretation of, or conclusions drawn from, the perception that can be correct or incorrect. Whether illusion or not, we perceive that things have occured “before”, we are “now”, and we anticipate something “after”. The limitations on our perceptions only makes them incomplete, not incorrect.