Modal Ontological Argument

[FrankSchnabel]

Hi Ateista,

Yes, let’s clarify the different modes of existing.

“Conceptually existing” would encompass all that is abstract or within the realm of ideas, whether or not they are rational (make sense, consistent, coherent, etc.), whether or not they are possible of being actualized, or whether or not they are in fact actualized.

But rather than “physical existence,” which you define in terms of capable of empirical measurement or verification, let’s just use “actual existence” defined as there being a manifestation or actualization of that entity.

So maybe C-existence to refer to abstractly existing and A-existence to refer to that which is actual or concrete?

 

[ateista]

Hi Ateista,

Yes, let’s clarify the different modes of existing.

“Conceptually existing” would encompass all that is abstract or within the realm of ideas, whether or not they are rational (make sense, consistent, coherent, etc.), whether or not they are possible of being actualized, or whether or not they are in fact actualized.

But rather than “physical existence,” which you define in terms of capable of empirical measurement or verification, let’s just use “actual existence” defined as there being a manifestation or actualization of that entity.

So maybe C-existence to refer to abstractly existing and A-existence to refer to that which is actual or concrete?

Sure.

But that still does not clarify if A-existence is equal to P-existence, or is there anything that is A-existent but not P-existent? And if there is what does it mean? How do we know about A-(but not P)-existence? If we want to incorporate this into the conversation, we need to understand the particulars of this type of existence.

I ask this because P-existence is something we all know about. There is no ambiguity in postulating that something P-exists. Please elaborate.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Mornin Ateista,

If we break Existence down into only two categories, conceptual (C) and physical (P), and P-existence is only that which is empirically verifiable, then we necessarily relegate Deity to the C-existing category. I can’t observe God with a telescope or detect Him with any measuring device. So someone trying to advance theism is going to balk at only using these categories. God, if He exists at all, only exists within the realm of ideas? He doesn’t “really” or actually exist?

And a traditional theist isn’t going to be comfy with the word “physical” because he is used to thinking that God exists immaterially, spiritually or super-naturally.

But, putting aside all preconceptions and biases, you are right to begin with these two categories. Intuitively they make sense. We begin with ideas and what we can observe, C-existence and P-existence. But we will have to refine these categories.

 

[ateista]

Mornin Ateista,

If we break Existence down into only two categories, conceptual (C) and physical (P), and P-existence is only that which is empirically verifiable, then we necessarily relegate Deity to the C-existing category. I can’t observe God with a telescope or detect Him with any measuring device. So someone trying to advance theism is going to balk at only using these categories. God, if He exists at all, only exists within the realm of ideas? He doesn’t “really” or actually exist?

And a traditional theist isn’t going to be comfy with the word “physical” because he is used to thinking that God exists immaterially, spiritually or super-naturally.

But, putting aside all preconceptions and biases, you are right to begin with these two categories. Intuitively they make sense. We begin with ideas and what we can observe, C-existence and P-existence. But we will have to refine these categories.

I do not object to the concept of “A-existence” at all. I find it a very valuable and precise concept. I do not a-priori discard the concept that something may “exist”, which is neither “C-existence”, nor “P-existence” - let’s call it “X-existence”.

So using some abbreviations - existence (E) in general can be broken down into three categories,

E = C + P + X or E = C + A where A = P + X

depending on the granularity we wish to address.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

OK, using these categories, how do we discuss and make sense of “null world”?

 

[ateista]

OK, using these categories, how do we discuss and make sense of “null world”?

I think it is still somewhat premature. All we can say so far that the null-world C-exists, but not P-exists.

The question we should contemplate is the hypothesized X-existence. Which is not purely conceptual, but also not physical, but nonetheless actual. Since I have no idea about this type of existence, I am unable to comment on it.

Sorry to toss the ball into your court, but I think that you should start. After all I am willing to accept the hypothesis of the X-existence, but I have no idea just what this existence might be.

So the question is twofold: 1) what are the attributes of the X-existence and 2) how do we obtain knowledge of the X-existence? The second one seems to be very difficult, since “knowledge” is the equivalent of “information” and I have no idea how to obtain information about something that does not P-exist.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

X existence. What 'tis it?

Traditional theism would say it is supernatural existence, or that which is unexplainable in terms of natural, materialistic causes. Positivists, of course, reject this. If it ain’t empirically verifiable, explainable in terms of cause and effect in the natural order, it don’t exist. Just because we can’t explain something now, doesn’t mean that we won’t be able to someday. But traditional theists, I think, would stubbornly insist that there a supernatural order (it X-exists) and that is unknowable through the natural order in principle. (How convenient, the positivists retort).

Process metaphysicians like Whitehead and Hartshorne argue that there must be X-existence as a matter of metaphysical truth. These guys see X existence when the whole of reality is contemplated. A whole is always more than the mere sum of its parts or fragments. So X existence is that which “ties it all together” or makes it one.

Process guys would say that there must be something novel always added to reality which is indeterminate or free. i.e. not explainable by a cause. If reality is a process, a succession of events (“one dang thang after anudder”), the succeeding event must always be more than the sum of its causes. For it weren’t, then no change is possible and nothing could happen.

 

[ateista]

X existence. What 'tis it?

Yes, that is the question. Fun to contemplate it.

Traditional theism would say it is supernatural existence, or that which is unexplainable in terms of natural, materialistic causes. Positivists, of course, reject this. If it ain’t empirically verifiable, explainable in terms of cause and effect in the natural order, it don’t exist. Just because we can’t explain something now, doesn’t mean that we won’t be able to someday. But traditional theists, I think, would stubbornly insist that there a supernatural order (it X-exists) and that is unknowable through the natural order in principle. (How convenient, the positivists retort).

Well, fortunately I do not subscribe to the concept that if it is not empirically verifyable, it is nonsense. The laws of logic, for example cannot be empirically verified and still we accept them as axiomatically true. So, that is one hurdle we both took without falling on our face.

Process metaphysicians like Whitehead and Hartshorne argue that there must be X-existence as a matter of metaphysical truth. These guys see X existence when the whole of reality is contemplated. A whole is always more than the mere sum of its parts or fragments. So X existence is that which “ties it all together” or makes it one.

I am not sure how is this different from C-existence.

Process guys would say that there must be something novel always added to reality which is indeterminate or free. i.e. not explainable by a cause. If reality is a process, a succession of events (“one dang thang after anudder”), the succeeding event must always be more than the sum of its causes. For it weren’t, then no change is possible and nothing could happen.

That is fine, but the causative agent is always another physical entity.

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Here is the problem as I see it. The X-existence is different from C-existence. A concept is an “inert” entity, it cannot “do” anything. (We as, phisical beings, can act on a concept, of course, but that is not the same.)

P-existence we know about. The concept of verification is applicable here, we can say if it cannot be verified, it is not worthy of consideration. That is not a problem, since X-existence is not physical either.

Now, X-existence. There are two possibilities here:

One, that X-existence is completely separate from P-existence, there can be no interaction between the two. Objects that are P-existent cannot act on objects which are X-existent and conversely, objects which are X-existent cannot act on objects which are P-existent. This is a simple case. If there cannot be interactions between the two realms, there is nothing to contemplate. Whether there is any X-existence or not, is irrelevant.

Two, however is much more problematic. We assume that there can be interaction between the two realms, either one way or two-way. Traditional theism assumes a one way action from X to P-existence. For completeness sake we really ought to contemplate all possibilities, but fortunately it is not necessary.

Whether the inteaction is one-way or two-way, the concept of interaction presumes an interface between the two realms. The interface must belong to both realms, unless we want to postulate some unknowable “magical” form of interaction - and I would not like to do that - since “magic” cannot be dicussed in a rational manner.

So, here is the problem: if the interface belongs to both realms, then there is an object (the interface) which is both P-existent and X-existent. (This does not preclude that there are objects which are only X-existent and as such not subject to empirical verification.)

Mind you, this does not bring us any closer to understanding the “essense” of X-existence. The properties of X-existence are still total unknowns. How to gain information (knowledge) about X-existence is still up in the air.

But my question presents a practical problem. The interface between the two types of existence is partially physical. It is subject to empirical verification. How can that be accomplished, at least in principle?

What say you?

 

[davidv]

That is fine, but the causative agent is always another physical entity.

How so? If I am in my workshop with piece of word turning in my lathe, what physical entity causes me to place the tool at a particular place on the tool rest and move in a particular way. I would submit to you the it was my non physical thought about how I want the piece to look, with the knowledge (also non phyiscal) I have about how the process works, is what causes the physical motion that positions the tool in the place of my choosing.

 

[ateista]

How so? If I am in my workshop with piece of word turning in my lathe, what physical entity causes me to place the tool at a particular place on the tool rest and move in a particular way. I would submit to you the it was my non physical thought about how I want the piece to look, with the knowledge (also non phyiscal) I have about how the process works, is what causes the physical motion that positions the tool in the place of my choosing.

It is the physical “you” that places the wood into the machine. Your thought - which is not a physical object - cannot do it. Ideas, concepts, thought, knowledge (information) none of these are active objects. They are inert, though you can (and do) act on them.

 

[davidv]

It is the physical “you” that places the wood into the machine. Your thought - which is not a physical object - cannot do it. Ideas, concepts, thought, knowledge (information) none of these are active objects. They are inert, though you can (and do) act on them.

Without my thought would any of the phyical things have happened? If not, then the thought is a cause, and we have demonstrated that there is a non-physical cause of a physical.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Mornin Ateista,

You sed: “I am not sure how is this [wholeness] different from C-existence.” and
“That is fine, but the causative agent is always another physical entity.”

While we can observe a given phenomenon (P-existing entity), we look at it necessarily as an effect for which we can have no complete explanation. There is always more there than we can account for in terms of the antecedent causes. Some novelty or other is “injected” as we move from event to event.

When I entertain the thought of this novelty it is C-existing. But I am thinking of something that is P-existing as an effect, caused in part by something that is X-existent.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

What say you?

Well, what do we know for sure here? For one, we have conceived of sumptin called X existence. So X existence is at least C-existing for now.

We know about P-existence. We not only can think about P-existing entities, we can empirically verify them.

And we can abstract and generalize from P-existing phenomena. We develop laws which explain natural phenomena. This leads to philosophical and metaphysical speculation. Folks eventually learn that determinism and materialism lead to absurdities and that there must be something more than P-existence.

This X-existence is necessarily existing, we then conclude. That is its essence. So far we have gained knowledge of X-existence by our awareness of the physical world, our inferences therefrom and reason.

We, created beings who P-exist, have gained knowledge of X-existence through experience and reason. An interface between X-existence and us isn’t necessary up to this point(but it sure would help!).

From a Christain theistic POV, discovering the attributes or characteristics of X existence is possible to an extent through reason and working out the implications of X existence. But to fully know about X existence requires Revelation and an Interface (Jesus).

 

[ateista]

While we can observe a given phenomenon (P-existing entity), we look at it necessarily as an effect for which we can have no complete explanation.

No, that is not universally true. In many instances we know precisely what is going on, how an event effects another event.

Well, what do we know for sure here? For one, we have conceived of sumptin called X existence. So X existence is at least C-existing for now.

We know about P-existence. We not only can think about P-existing entities, we can empirically verify them.

And we can abstract and generalize from P-existing phenomena. We develop laws which explain natural phenomena. This leads to philosophical and metaphysical speculation.

So far, so good.

Folks eventually learn that determinism and materialism lead to absurdities and that there must be something more than P-existence.

Well, such a sweepingly general statement simply cries out for substantiation, don’t you think? I have never heard that materialism leads to absurdities. Maybe a few examples would be in order.

And since this is the foundatoin for the rest of your post, we cannot go on until this part is clarified.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Hi Ateista,

This is how process guys look at it:

That materialism is absurd is demonstrated because ultimately it cannot account for change. Materialists admit that there is change, but their system ultimately denies it is possible.

Materialism says matter is the only reality in the world and that every event results from the conditions and activities of matter.

Materialists say that everything is comprised of some kind of finite basic units of reality, some ultimate entity or beings. P-existing stuff, I suppose, however indirectly we detect them or infer their existence.

Well, if matter is the only reality, where did it come from? Matter is uncreated and eternal, say materialists. Udderwise, there would be something more than matter to account for it. So matter, in its basic and fundamental units, must be uncreated, unchanging and eternal. All that exists are the basic units and the void between them.

But if that is all that exists, how can there be anything else, given that there are only two basic realities or unities: the oneness of each “atom” and the oneness of the void? Well, materialists say, the BU’s move and rearrange themselves.

Well, we ask, what are these rearrangements? Are they beings themselves? No, materialists say, they are just rearrangements, aggregates. They can’t be wholes or unities because only the BU’s are whole entities, beings.

So does change really happen if nothing exists but the BU’s and the void between them? If we have one pattern of BU’s and then rearrange them, have the individual BU’s changed with the new arrangement? No, materialists say. They remain the same unity. If that is the case, we ask, where is the change? It is not in the BU’s. Is it in the void? That can’t be either because the void is nothing. Nothing can do nothing, let alone retain past and present arrangements. So change isn’t real after all.

This is just one of the problems with materialism. Process guys like Duane Voskuil, who stands int he same tradition as Whitehead and Hartshonrne, summarizes them this way:

1. No way to compare differences.
2. No way to logically express sequence.
3. No way to explain “nothingness.”
4. No way to explain continuous motion.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Determinism is likewise absurd because it doesn’t allow anything new to really happen. Since patterns or arrangements don’t exist, they can’t really change.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Da Catlick Cyclopeedia dispatches materialism this way (in one paragraph at the end of a long article):

The idea, whose revival and development, as Lange expects, "will raise mankind to a new level is, as we have shown, not to be sought in non-Christian philosophy. Only a return to the Christian view of the world, which is founded on Christian philosophy and the teachings of the Socratic School, can prevent the catastrophes prophesied by Lange, and perhaps raise mankind to a higher cultural level. This philosophy offers a thorough refutation of cosmological and anthropological Materialism, and raises up the true Idealism. It shows that matter cannot of itself be uncreated or eternal, which indeed may be deduced from the fact that of itself it is inert, indifferent to rest and to motion. But it must be either at rest or in motion if it exists; if it existed of itself, in virtue of its own nature, it would be also of itself in either of those conditions. If it were of itself originally in motion, it could have never come to rest, and it would not be true that its nature is indifferent to rest and to motion and could be equally well in either of the two conditions. With this simple argument the fundamental error is confuted. An exhaustive refutation will be found in the present author’s writings: “Der Kosmos” (Paderborn, 1908); “Gott u. die Sch pfung” (Ratisbon, 1910); “Die Theodizee” (4th ed., 1910); “Lehrbuch der Apologetik”, I (3rd ed., Münster, 1903).

 

[ateista]

Well, if matter is the only reality, where did it come from?

This is not a meaningful question.

It is akin to asking: “what is outside the universe?” or “what happened before the universe came into existence?” or “what is to the north of the North Pole?” or “on which day of the year is the wedding anniversary of a bachelor?” or “when did you stop beating your wife?”… or infinitely many others.

The fact that these questions are syntactically well-formed does not imply that they are meaningful questions.

Matter, energy simply exist. Patterns, arrangements of material objects exist. It is meaningless to ask, who “made” the circle so that every point is to the same distance from the midpoint? Who made the circle different from an ellipsoid?

Sure, these questions can be asked. But they do not require an answer. And they most certainly do not invalidate the materialist world-view.

On an added note, materialism does not equal to determinism.

 

[Hastrman]

Sure, these questions can be asked. But they do not require an answer. And they most certainly do not invalidate the materialist world-view.

On an added note, materialism does not equal to determinism.

Forgive me, but what is it, inherent in matter, that causes it to exist? Put another way, in what way is “to be” an intrinsic part of matter’s nature?

But you’re right, materialism does not equal to determinism–if quantum physics is right…but only Copenhagen…but Copenhagen requires that something about an observer not be describable by the laws of physics, or else they would themselves only be probabilities, and would therefore cause an infinite regress of observers.

So materialism does not equal determinism, if and only if an interpretation of quantum physics is correct, that denies materialism.

Wheeeeee…

 

[ateista]

Forgive me, but what is it, inherent in matter, that causes it to exist? Put another way, in what way is “to be” an intrinsic part of matter’s nature?

Matter / energy simply exist. “Causation” cannot be applied to axiomatic entities.

But you’re right, materialism does not equal to determinism–if quantum physics is right…but only Copenhagen…but Copenhagen requires that something about an observer not be describable by the laws of physics, or else they would themselves only be probabilities, and would therefore cause an infinite regress of observers.

So materialism does not equal determinism, if and only if an interpretation of quantum physics is correct, that denies materialism.

Wheeeeee…

Determinism has nothing to do with the different interpretations of quantum phyics. Quantum physics in just a bunch of mathematical equations, which happen to describe the events in a Wilson-chamber and allow the predictions of different experimental results.

It is not necessary that those equations be “interpreted” in any manner. It is true, that having a good interpretation might give special insights. But that is just icing on the cake. The mathematical proof of the four-color theorem does not “explain” why are four colors necessary and sufficient to color any conceivable map on a Euclidean surface. The lack of such explanation does not detract an iota from the correctness of the proof.

We accept axiomatically that free will exists - even though it cannot be “proven”. It means that man is a primary causative agent, and thus determinism is incorrect.