Modal Ontological Argument

[ateista]

This is fine, if you mean by “conscious” that the necessary being is a rational being.

Let’s hope that this being is rational. Just kidding. No problem at all.

Yes, I know this is how “existence” could be commonly understood. I’m using “exists” as short for “existed, exists, and will exist in the future”. I need some term to distinguish our universe, with its series of events which occurred in the past and events which will occur in the future, from another universe in which these events did not or will not occur. Thus I say our universe actually “exists” and the other universe actually “does not exist”, even if the verb tense isn’t correct strictly speaking.

Excellent. As long as we both understand each other, the word “exists” is fine.

I would like to point out something here. The past and the present are “singular” in the sense that there is one present and the events that happened to lead to this present are “one set of events” (though they could have been different, and then the present would be different, too).

This does not apply to the future. The future does not exist as one predetermined set of events (unless one believes the universe is a giant Newtonian clockwork, which I do not). So regardless of the “tense” the existence of the future is fundamentally different from the existence of the present and past. I am not sure that this distinction will be relevant or not to the topic at hand, but just in case, I want to make sure that we are on the same wavelength.

A being that exists outside time would, as you show, need to be an immaterial being. You cannot prove however, empirically or logically, that the existence of immaterial beings is impossible.

Well, it is physically impossible - since we are not talking about a physical being. Of course such an entity cannot be empirically verified, lacking the attributes which make empirical verification possible. And I see nothing problematic with the logic - yet, since nothing has been said about this entity - so far. It is all up in the air.

But I am quite concerned about the meaning of “existence” when applied to this entity. (I am still reluctant to call this entity a “being”, since it has not been established yet.) As we could agree that the “existence” in the present and past are unambiguous, and I wait for your (name removed by moderator)ut as to what does “will exist” means, none of those are applicable to timeless “existence”. It is a totally different phenomenon.

I think we are making progress here. I am waiting for your next installment.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Hi Ateista,

I sed: 1. Begin with the idea of an individual (God) which cannot conceivably have a greater. (what I’ve been calling the GCB)

You replied:
Please, I think I already made it clear that “greatness” cannot be objectively defined. Different people or sentient beings can define “greatness” in different manner.

Greatness can never, ever be objectively defined?

 

[ateista]

Hi Ateista,

I sed: 1. Begin with the idea of an individual (God) which cannot conceivably have a greater. (what I’ve been calling the GCB)

You replied:
Please, I think I already made it clear that “greatness” cannot be objectively defined. Different people or sentient beings can define “greatness” in different manner.

Greatness can never, ever be objectively defined?

Sure it can, but not is a generic fashion. Let’s call “greatness” the maximum of an attribute. As long as you talk about one specific attribute, you can meaningfully define its optimum. If you want to define “greatness” as the maximum of two or more attributes, you run into a mathematical problem of multi-purpose programming.

Sometimes (in specific circumstances) it is possible to maximize two or more functions at the same time, and their maximum will be reached for the same value. But this is rare. In most circumstances when one function is maximal, the other(s) will be suboptimal.

But this is a technical problem. The real difficulty is to agree which attributes constitute “greatness”. You will never find concensus in that respect.

Just one example: posters on this board emphasised some of God’s alleged attributes, namely that he is unable to lie, unable to commit evil - and they considered this a sign of “greatness”. In my eyes this is a serious limitation. Someone who is able to lie and able to commit evil - but chooses not to! - is “greater”, then the one who merely plays out his script, like any well-programmed robot does. How could be these contradictory positions reconciled?

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Let’s imagine you are King of the Universe and that you convened a Universal Ecumenical Council. You ask each faction to define Greatness. Of course, each will have its own idea as to how to measure what is good and ultimately, maximally good (great). The faction that values bravery will define greatness as maximally brave. The faction that values cowardice will define greatness as maximally cowardly, etc. Some views will be diametrically opposed and contradictory. At this point it appears that what is great is just in the eyes of the beholder. People might be able to agree whether X is more brave than Y, but there will be intractable disagreements over whether that attribute is better or has more value than another.

What to do? Well, a learned man from the planet Zircon makes this observation: There are many views of what is of ultimate concern in the universe. But there is in fact a universe in which all these values exist. So at the very least we can say that the universe itself, all that exists, the whole of it, is greater than any fragment of it. We can at least ascribe ultimate greatness to the whole of everything which encompasses all value. Now that would be inarguably great.

But, someone objects, X is the greatest value in the universe! The Zircon guy replies: So what? the universe contains everything that exemplies that value and all other values besides. How can you exceed that?

IOW, if we take things to a high enough level of generality and abstraction, we can agree that ultimate greatness exists even if we can’t imagine how it is actualized. At the very least, greatness exists as the whole of all that is.

 

[ateista]

Let’s imagine you are King of the Universe and that you convened a Universal Ecumenical Council. You ask each faction to define Greatness. Of course, each will have its own idea as to how to measure what is good and ultimately, maximally good (great). The faction that values bravery will define greatness as maximally brave. The faction that values cowardice will define greatness as maximally cowardly, etc. Some views will be diametrically opposed and contradictory. At this point it appears that what is great is just in the eyes of the beholder. People might be able to agree whether X is more brave than Y, but there will be intractable disagreements over whether that attribute is better or has more value than another.

What to do? Well, a learned man from the planet Zircon makes this observation: There are many views of what is of ultimate concern in the universe. But there is in fact a universe in which all these values exist. So at the very least we can say that the universe itself, all that exists, the whole of it, is greater than any fragment of it. We can at least ascribe ultimate greatness to the whole of everything which encompasses all value. Now that would be inarguably great.

But, someone objects, X is the greatest value in the universe! The Zircon guy replies: So what? the universe contains everything that exemplies that value and all other values besides. How can you exceed that?

IOW, if we take things to a high enough level of generality and abstraction, we can agree that ultimate greatness exists even if we can’t imagine how it is actualized. At the very least, greatness exists as the whole of all that is.

The bold sentence is in error. Some of these factions hold mutually contradictory views, therefore it is impossible to have one universe which contains all of them.

But, let’s suppose (just for the fun of it) that the views are compatible, there is no contradiction. Even in that case it is conceivable that the maximum of attributes does not manifest itself in one being. A very stupid little example: suppose that the emerging “greatness” is two attributes: the “tallest” and the “heaviest”. It is possible, but not certain that the tallest being is also the heaviest. Maybe the tallest being is very thin, and therefore cannot be the heaviest. This is to illustrate that the multi-functional maximum does not necessarily exist.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Mornin Ateista,

i sed: “But there is in fact a universe in which all these values exist.”

u sed: T"he bold sentence is in error. Some of these factions hold mutually contradictory views, therefore it is impossible to have one universe which contains all of them."

You are right. The sentence needs to be reformulated. Just because someone somewhere thinks something is Great doesn’t mean it exists. One’s defintion of Greatness could be nonsensical, for example.

But we know that our universe exists, and insofar as certain values are capable of existing, the universe is inclusive of them.
And if a certain value is capable of existing, we can imagine a maximal case of it.

So I still think it is meaningful to say that Greatness exists.

 

[john_doran]

But, let’s suppose (just for the fun of it) that the views are compatible, there is no contradiction. Even in that case it is conceivable that the maximum of attributes does not manifest itself in one being. A very stupid little example: suppose that the emerging “greatness” is two attributes: the “tallest” and the “heaviest”. It is possible, but not certain that the tallest being is also the heaviest. Maybe the tallest being is very thin, and therefore cannot be the heaviest. This is to illustrate that the multi-functional maximum does not necessarily exist.

unless, of course, “necessary existence” is a great-making property.

then, if it is conceivable that maximal greatness is exemplified by one being, that being exists in every possible world.

 

[ateista]

unless, of course, “necessary existence” is a great-making property.

then, if it is conceivable that maximal greatness is exemplified by one being, that being exists in every possible world.

Conceivable by whom?

 

[john_doran]

Conceivable by whom?

you. me. whomever.

 

[ateista]

Right, but in an eternity of time, there is an infinity of events. If there is any finite probability that an event, or chain of events, leads to the destruction of the universe then the probability that the universe will persist for eternity is zero. If there is zero probability that any event or chain of events could lead to the destruction of the universe then I say the universe exists “necessarily” as I have defined the term. I’m not exactly sure where your objection lies here.

Just wanted to point out that by using the term “eternal” you presuppose the existence of “time”, which presupposes the existence of matter / energy. I have no problem with it.

The total amount of matter/energy in the universe is zero, as far as we can tell. No physical laws were therefore violated at the Big Bang.

Well, that would be an interesting question. If the overall matter / energy is zero, then of course the physical dimensions of the universe would be also zero - like a mathematical point. I have to ask: from what vantage point would the universe be the equivalent of a mathematical point (since the “outside” is nonsensical)?

Also, the Big Bang was not the “beginning” of the universe, it was merely a transition from a singularity into the currently known structure. But I don’t know if this is necessary for the current discussion.

I agree, but if you want to apply set theory to formal logic, you must distinguish between an “empty set” and a “null set”. If you do not you end up in logical paradoxes. This is explained quite well here:

phy.duke.edu/~rgb/Philosophy/axioms/axioms/node18.html

I will need more time to read the whole article. Part of it I already read, and have some problem with it. The “orange” universe postulates two entities, oranges and boxes, and considers the empty box as an equivalent of the empty set. It is a visualization of the empty set, but not the equivalent of the empty set.

But, let me make a compromise. The concept of the mathematical empty set is not something that can be meaningfully actualized. It is a very useful concept, but not a “world”. So I will not go back and argue based upon that concept (unless I find a compelling new reason to do so, which is unlikely).

So, let’s define a universe. As you said (and I agreed) the universe is everything that exists. A universe will have “N” spatial dimensions, “M” temporal dimensions, and “X” physical entities. In out universe M >= 3, N >= 1 and X is simply huge. I would say that the N = 0, M = 0 and X = 0 is a “degenerate” world (the equivalent of the conceptual empty set) and it can be disregarded. Therefore the values of N, M, and X cannot be all zero.

Furthermore, the values of spatial dimensions are not independent of the physical entities. Therefore, if the number of physical particles if greater than zero, the number of spatial dimensions must also be greter than zero. It is possible, that the universe is static, and there is no temporal dimension to it. So the minimal universe has one physical object, one spatial dimension and no temporal dimension to it → N = 1, M = 0 and X = 1.

Is this agreeable to you?

 

[ateista]

you. me. whomever.

I cannot conceive that. As I said, the concept of “greatness” is a subjective one, based upon the person’s value system. What is the consequence of this? If just one person can conceive it, will that be sufficient? If two people can conceive it, but their concept of “greatness” is contradictiory, will there be two “necessary and maximally great beings”?

 

[john_doran]

I cannot conceive that.

cannot conceive of what, exactly?

and what do you mean by “conceive”? why can’t you conceive of it? is it a logical limitation or a practical one?

ateista:

As I said, the concept of “greatness” is a subjective one, based upon the person’s value system.

i would say either that the kind of “greatness” we’re talking about here either isn’t an axiological concept (i.e. one of value), or it is, and it is an objective value.

 

[ateista]

cannot conceive of what, exactly?

and what do you mean by “conceive”? why can’t you conceive of it? is it a logical limitation or a practical one?

It is a problem of insufficient definition. Greatness is defined as a maximum in some respect or another. What one considers “great” is simply a personal preference based upon what the person considers of value. For someone who is inherently malevolent a “greatest” being is someone who is maximally evil.

i would say either that the kind of “greatness” we’re talking about here either isn’t an axiological concept (i.e. one of value), or it is, and it is an objective value.

Why would it be objective? What is valuable to one person may be irrelevant to another.

 

[john_doran]

It is a problem of insufficient definition. Greatness is defined as a maximum in some respect or another. What one considers “great” is simply a personal preference based upon what the person considers of value.

“X is great” is not synonymous with “I prefer X”; being “maximal” is not the same thing as being “most preferred”.

ateista:

For someone who is inherently malevolent a “greatest” being is someone who is maximally evil.

again, “greatest” in this context does not mean “that which I like the most”.

i don’t have to like something to recognize its value; just like i don’t have to like something to recognize its speed or height or weight.

ateista:

Why would it be objective? What is valuable to one person may be irrelevant to another.

it would be objective if its value was independent of personal preference.

you have to motivate the claim that the set of things one considers valuable is identical with the set of things that one prefers, or “likes”. or, put another way, you have to show that one cannot value something without liking it.

 

[ateista]

“X is great” is not synonymous with “I prefer X”; being “maximal” is not the same thing as being “most preferred”.

You are right, but that is not something I advocated.

i don’t have to like something to recognize its value; just like i don’t have to like something to recognize its speed or height or weight.

These are not the same categories. Speed, height or weight are objective measurements of an object. The value of an object is contingent upon the person making a value judgment. A glass of water in a restaurant may be of very little value (especially to a beer drinker like myself) but the same glass of water would be immensely valuable in a desert.

We might have a misunderstanding. What is “maximal” for an attribute is objective (if it can be defined at all). What constitutes “greatness” is the selection of which attributes should be included in the definition of “greatness”. And that is subjective and is contingent upon the person’s value system.

 

[john_doran]

You are right, but that is not something I advocated.

i think it is…

see below.

ateista:

These are not the same categories. Speed, height or weight are objective measurements of an object. The value of an object is contingent upon the person making a value judgment.

how is “valuing” something different from “preferring”, “wanting”, or “liking”, by your lights?

i don’t see the distinction.

ateista:

A glass of water in a restaurant may be of very little value (especially to a beer drinker like myself)

right - because you prefer beer…

ateista:

but the same glass of water would be immensely valuable in a desert.

true. and i would say it was valuable whether or not a person wanted, liked, or preferred the water.

ateista:

We might have a misunderstanding. What is “maximal” for an attribute is objective (if it can be defined at all). What constitutes “greatness” is the selection of which attributes should be included in the definition of “greatness”. And that is subjective and is contingent upon the person’s value system.

…except that it seems to me that “value” is distinct from the act of valuing.

that is, what you’re calling a person’s “value system” still seems to me to be no different from a preference set.

 

[ateista]

that is, what you’re calling a person’s “value system” still seems to me to be no different from a preference set.

Going back I see the source of confusion. Yes, “X is great” equals “I prefer X”, while “X is maximal” has nothing to do with “I prefer X”.

The maximum of an attribute is objective. What each person values (prefers, likes, etc…) is subjective. It has nothing to do with the “maximum” of an attribute. That is the reason that “greatness” can not be objectively defined.

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Hi Ateista,

Anselm/Hartshorne say that to be Great is to be unsurpassable. IOW, think in terms of any attribute capable of existing and attributable to Deity, and God will exemplify it to a degree unmatched by anyone else. He is without rival.

Now it is admitted that attributes such as bravery exist in the world and are capable of achieving a maximal expression. We can say that bravery and even maximal bravery exists. But can we say Greatness as defined above exists? If all the constituent parts of Greatness are capable of existing, why not the whole thereof?

 

[FrankSchnabel]

Now you have pointed out that if we ascribe multiple traits to Deity, which certainly must be the case, then some of those traits will be competing. That is one cannot achieve its maximal expression in one entity if the other is present.

But this isn’t a problem for God because he is the one entity that is inclusive of all entities and would therefore embody the maximal expression of each separate attribute and all combinations thereof.
God is inclusive of all value whatsoever.

So this is why I am starting to conclude that, at the very least, some minimal, pantheistic concept of God is demonstrated by the OA.

God is all that exists and therefore must be Great.

 

[ateista]

Hi Ateista,

Anselm/Hartshorne say that to be Great is to be unsurpassable. IOW, think in terms of any attribute capable of existing and attributable to Deity, and God will exemplify it to a degree unmatched by anyone else. He is without rival.

Now it is admitted that attributes such as bravery exist in the world and are capable of achieving a maximal expression. We can say that bravery and even maximal bravery exists. But can we say Greatness as defined above exists? If all the constituent parts of Greatness are capable of existing, why not the whole thereof?

We run into the same problem as before. A simple attribute and its optimum (which is not always the maximum!) can be defined objectively. No problem there.

But greatness is not a simple attribute, it is a compostite attribute. It has many components. Which ones of simple attributes will be part of the composite is the question.

There are infinitely many possible simple attributes. The following humble request applies to you and john doran. Please make up the list of all the simple attributes which define greatness. Make sure the list is complete, it contains the necessary and sufficient attributes. Think it over, it may take some time.

It will be interesting to compare the two lists.