Molina

[thinkandmull]

Molinists say the same thing, except that God has knowledge of sins because of the sins instead of because He knows what infallibly results from efficacious grace

 

[Vico]

Molinists say the same thing, except that God has knowledge of sins because of the sins instead of because He knows what infallibly results from efficacious grace

There is an issue with Molina however, although accepting the timelessness of God, as St. Thomas Aquinas does, Molina still uses temporal language to say that God holds knowledge at certain points in tirne. So it can be said is that God enjoys extra-temporal knowledge of matters described as past, present, or to be, from an intra-temporal point of view. According to the timeless view, however, God has no* foreknowledge* of anything, and none of His knowledge of metaphysically contingent states is ever necessary.

 

[thinkandmull]

Well God’s decision to create can be described in temporal terms. I don’t see these as much of an issue, especially considering that the other 2 options to Molinism either reject free will or reject prophecy’s possibility

 

[Vico]

Well God’s decision to create can be described in temporal terms. I don’t see these as much of an issue, especially considering that the other 2 options to Molinism either reject free will or reject prophecy’s possibility

St. Thomas Aquinas did not deny either:
Summa Theologica, Part I
Question 19. The will of God
Article 10. Whether God has free-will?

I answer that, We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above (Article 3), He has free will with respect to what He does not necessarily will.

Summa Theologica, Part II, 2
Question 172. The cause of prophecy
Article 1. Whether prophecy can be natural?

I answer that, As stated above (171, 6, ad 2) prophetic foreknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as they are in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes. Now, to foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is proper to the Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as stated in I, 14, 13. Wherefore such like foreknowledge of the future cannot come from nature, but from Divine revelation alone. On the other hand, future things can be foreknown in their causes with a natural knowledge even by man: thus a physician foreknows future health or death in certain causes, through previous experimental knowledge of the order of those causes to such effects. Such like knowledge of the future may be understood to be in a man by nature in two ways. On one way that the soul, from that which it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): “Some have deemed the human soul to contain a certain power of divination.” This seems to be in accord with the opinion of Plato [Phaed. xxvii; Civit. vi], who held that our souls have knowledge of all things by participating in the ideas; but that this knowledge is obscured in them by union with the body; yet in some more, in others less, according to a difference in bodily purity. According to this it might be said that men, whose souls are not much obscured through union with the body, are able to foreknow such like future things by their own knowledge. Against this opinion Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): “How is it that the soul cannot always have this power of divination, since it always wishes to have it?”

Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as stated in I, 84, 6, it is better to have recourse to another explanation, and to hold that men have no such foreknowledge of the future, but that they can acquire it by means of experience, wherein they are helped by their natural disposition, which depends on the perfection of a man’s imaginative power, and the clarity of his understanding.

Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two ways from the former, which comes through Divine revelation. First, because the former can be about any events whatever, and this infallibly; whereas the latter foreknowledge, which can be had naturally, is about certain effects, to which human experience may extend. Secondly, because the former prophecy is “according to the unchangeable truth” [171, 3, Objection 1], while the latter is not, and can cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not the latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as stated above (Question 171, Article 3), prophetic knowledge is of things which naturally surpass human knowledge. Consequently we must say that prophecy strictly so called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine revelation.

 

[thinkandmull]

You need to follow the discussion. Prophecy is contrary to the third theory of predestination. As for classical Thomism, they use lip service to free will but its not logical to their system. It’s hard for many to grasp the idea of something not having to be done but will certainly be down in the Thomistic way. When seen in the light clearly and distinctly, this is contrary to free will. What is free does not necessarily go in one direction or another

 

[dmar198]

You need to follow the discussion. Prophecy is contrary to the third theory of predestination. As for classical Thomism, they use lip service to free will but its not logical to their system.

I’ve been following the discussion, and I don’t think free will is illogical in Thomism. One problem many have with the Thomist doctrine of free will is that it says God is the direct cause of Good actions And they are still free. But that’s not illogical. There is no logical reason why a free action can’t be caused by God in a way that is compatible with its being free. One way that can happen is through the concept of assistance. If I assist someone with building a house, my actions are part of the cause that builds the house. But that action is free both for me and for the person I’m helping. Similarly with God’s grace, He assists us with His grace, and that causes our good actions. But the assistance of grace doesn’t remove our freedom, it assists and in fact enables our freedom.

 

[Vico]

You need to follow the discussion. Prophecy is contrary to the third theory of predestination. As for classical Thomism, they use lip service to free will but its not logical to their system. It’s hard for many to grasp the idea of something not having to be done but will certainly be down in the Thomistic way. When seen in the light clearly and distinctly, this is contrary to free will. What is free does not necessarily go in one direction or another

There is no conflict when using b-series time with St. Thomas Aquinas. Compatibilism (the view that free will is compatible with determinism) works with b-series.

 

[IWantGod]

There is no conflict when using b-series time with St. Thomas Aquinas. Compatibilism (the view that free will is compatible with determinism) works with b-series.

So, how does compatibalism work? It seems that free will and determinism are not compatible precisely because if something other than your will is determining your will then it is not your will determining the action.

 

[dmar198]

It seems that free will and determinism are not compatible precisely because if something other than your will is determining your will then it is not your will determining the action.

Why can’t your will and God Both determine your action? That would seem to preserve both God’s action and your will’s freedom.

 

[thinkandmull]

It is simply not true that assistance or b theory has anything to do with this. Think about your free will. If it necessarily had to go to one side you didn’t have free will. When the will is free the only way you can know what it will choose is through a vision of it, not from its cause. There is no cause of will except itself. That is what the Church teaches about free will because its the truth. She allows Thomism-Augustinians, that is until it is condemned

 

[dmar198]

It is simply not true that assistance or b theory has anything to do with this.

I think it does because assistance is a type of causation.

Think about your free will. If it necessarily had to go to one side you didn’t have free will.

I agree with that.

When the will is free the only way you can know what it will choose is through a vision of it, not from its cause. There is no cause of will except itself.

First, I don’t think the Church teaches that, though I do think that’s an okay opinion. Second, in my own fallible opinion, I don’t think your first sentence of is logical – the one that says you can know the will through a vision but not from its cause. One reason why is because the will is allowed to have causes In Some Sense and still be free. As an example, any time someone says “Why did you choose that?” we usually give our motives. I chose that food because it smelled good, I chose that car because it was cheap, I chose that gift because I thought she would like it. All of those are motivations, and motive is a type of cause. Thus our will remains free even though our choices have multiple causes In Some Sense. Also, you said the will Causes Itself, but in the following sense it did not cause itself: it didn’t bring itself into being. God caused man’s free will to exist. He created it, therefore He is the cause of it in That sense. The will didn’t cause itself, but it does cause its own choices. And I, in my own fallible opinion, think it is true to say that God’s assistance causes our will’s choices too. Assistance, like motive, is another type of cause.

[The Church] allows Thomism-Augustinians, that is until it is condemned

If I’m understanding you correctly, that is true for all opinions. Thomism is one opinion. Augustinism is another opinion. Molinism is another opinion. The Church doesn’t Teach any of those. The Church teaches that free will exists. Based on that teaching, there are various Opinions about how it works, and the Church doesn’t say any of them are true. Someday one or more of them might get condemned.

 

[Vico]

So, how does compatibalism work? It seems that free will and determinism are not compatible precisely because if something other than your will is determining your will then it is not your will determining the action.

Yes, with a causal chain, that is the argument. The b series has order, but not time; time is an illusion. St. Thomas Aquinas hold that a persons cooperation with grace is not of necessity. Freedom of the will is is exercised within constraints.

 

[IWantGod]

Yes, with a causal chain, that is the argument. The b series has order, but not time; time is an illusion. St. Thomas Aquinas hold that a persons cooperation with grace is not of necessity. Freedom of the will is is exercised within constraints.

What do you mean by time? What do you mean by an illusion?

 

[thinkandmull]

dmar198, we are speaking of infallible knowledge of purely free choices from the eternal causes alone.

Vico, “within constraints” does NOT mean that the will is going to always go with the greater delight or push from grace. So only a vision in eternity, not knowledge of cause alone, is the knowledge that God has of choices.

Its like taking two stain glass windows, one depicting free will and the other grace, and trying to meld them into exatly one picture with a cloth over it which read “just a mystery”. I realize not necessary like an animal mind you but in the sense that free will infallibly does something… if that can be true nothing in philosophy is safe

 

[dmar198]

Post deleted by author

 

[Vico]

What do you mean by time? What do you mean by an illusion?

• In the a-series, there is tense: past, present, and future. These are not permanent.
• In the b-series, there is no tense, but there is order: earlier than and later then. These are permanent.
• Illusion is unreality. Nothing really has a-series properties so does not exist in time.

 

[Vico]

dmar198, we are speaking of infallible knowledge of purely free choices from the eternal causes alone.

Vico, “within constraints” does NOT mean that the will is going to always go with the greater delight or push from grace. So only a vision in eternity, not knowledge of cause alone, is the knowledge that God has of choices.

Its like taking two stain glass windows, one depicting free will and the other grace, and trying to meld them into exatly one picture with a cloth over it which read “just a mystery”. I realize not necessary like an animal mind you but in the sense that free will infallibly does something… if that can be true nothing in philosophy is safe

By within constraints, I mean that there are limited choices.

 

[thinkandmull]

The unreality of time is irrelavent since we are speaking about causality

 

[thinkandmull]

I don’t know if you are fully understanding the concept of will in which it will freely but necessarily do something. It is a concept that takes much thought although it is wrong and Calvinistic. And the b theory of time doesnt affect any of the three types of predestination I has written on in this thread. In a moment or in time (as usually understood), casuality is a subject all of its own

 

[Vico]

The unreality of time is irrelavent since we are speaking about causality

With a-series (subjective, psychological), foreknowledge is not the cause of happening. B-series (objective) nothing is in time, so there is no cause in the temporal sense.