Molina

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There is still causality even if time is nothing. Don’t you believe in motion (First Way)? If neither God or earth is in time, why are you still claiming there is the causality of efficacious grace? You are way confused. You need to try to learn from others, you don’t know everything. I’ve never seen you consede a point before
 
thinkandmull said:
There is still causality even if time is nothing. Don’t you believe in motion (First Way)? If neither God or earth is in time, why are you still claiming there is the causality of efficacious grace? You are way confused. You need to try to learn from others, you don’t know everything. I’ve never seen you consede a point before
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Very close to my beliefs. To lay them out simply: Free will and predestination are mutually exclusive. One cannot exist with the other, no matter the logical twists and turns anyone will offer.The definition of free is not contested here…is it?

John
 
It is. They are trying to say that free will is not causation or that free will can be free while necessarily having to do some act
 
What is wrong with Molina’s position. It was very profound. There is a place in eternity were all our choices, those that would have been, are known. Only one choice per moment is made actual in time. The consequences follow from them. Is this impossible? I don’t see why it would be. It implies that there is a certain consciousness we had in this other place, but they are not the same as choices in this world. They are like air or smoke. They are not real, not corporeal. I know it is way out there but I don’t see how one can say they know for sure it didn’t happen. Predestination makes sense no other way
 
thinkandmull said:
There is still causality even if time is nothing. Don’t you believe in motion (First Way)? If neither God or earth is in time, why are you still claiming there is the causality of efficacious grace? You are way confused. You need to try to learn from others, you don’t know everything. I’ve never seen you consede a point before
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It is not my idea, rather, it is from St. Thomas Aquinas that everything that has temporal location is timelessly present to God. As seen in the Summa, following Aristotle, the argument from contingency allows for a Universe that has no beginning in time. Also, I wrote of no cause in the temporal sense, not in a tenseless sense. The reality is not necessarily the perception, and metaphor is often used to communicate.

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I
Question 2. The existence of God
Article 3. Whether God exists?

(excerpt)

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm#article3
 
As you know, that has nothing to do with Molina’s objection to Thomism
 
The timelessness of God alone cannot explain prophecy either. God sees what happens on earth in an instant, but in prophecy He enters history and says what will happen. But what if knowledge of the prophecy changes what will happen in the future? Then the prophecy was wrong, impossible to have been a prophecy. Molinism has an explanation
 
thinkandmull said:
The timelessness of God alone cannot explain prophecy either. God sees what happens on earth in an instant, but in prophecy He enters history and says what will happen. But what if knowledge of the prophecy changes what will happen in the future? Then the prophecy was wrong, impossible to have been a prophecy. Molinism has an explanation
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Molina rejected secondary causes.

Providence is through secondary causes, an opinion, See St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica Question 22. The providence of God:

I answer that, Two things belong to providence–namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of this order, which is called government.

Types of Everything

As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything, because He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand the type of those effects in His mind.

Government (Intermediaries)

As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God’s providence; for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato’s opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence.


  1. *]First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes.
    *]The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction.
    *]The third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2:
    viii, 14).

    newadvent.org/summa/1022.htm#article4
 
Molina did not reject secondary causes. His critics instead say he limited the primary cause. I hadn’t asked about timeless realities, but about causes within it, specifically free will. To be free is to be without determination to one choice or its opposite. Your interpretation of Aquinas rejects this, and thus it slips into Calvinism
 
All quotes from Aquinas I’ve seen on this are sufficiently ambiguous, and he doesn’t quote Augustine’s direct Calvinistic statements. Molina was not the only one opposed to the “Thomistic” school on this question. Francis de Sales agreed with Molina because he saw that “Thomism” was a psychological reaction to the affect of grace and did not, as it thought, know from this God’s “perspective” to their internal acts of grace: that is, God could not move His grace to **infallibly **cause someone to do something by his free will. Can you address that in particular?
 
thinkandmull said:
Molina did not reject secondary causes. His critics instead say he limited the primary cause. I hadn’t asked about timeless realities, but about causes within it, specifically free will. To be free is to be without determination to one choice or its opposite. Your interpretation of Aquinas rejects this, and thus it slips into Calvinism
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He rejected the Thomistic type secondary causes: premotion. Molina liked simultaneous concurrence.

Per St. Thomas, the free will is a secondary cause from predestination, which ensures that God is not the direct cause of evil. Calvin disagrees with Saint Thomas, for example Calvin seems to deny the distinction between primary and secondary causation, See: Chapter 23, Book III of the Institutes,

The premotionof Thomists is presented in Catholic Encyclopedia:

Inasmuch as the Divine influence precedes all acts of the creature, not in the order of time, but in that of causality, the motion emanating from God and seconded by free intelligent agents takes on the character of a physical premotion (proemotio physica) of the free acts, which may also be called a physical predetermination (proedeterminatio physica), because the free determination of the will is accomplished only by virtue of the divine predetermination.

newadvent.com/cathen/06710a.htm
 
The phrase “God as the primary cause” is ambiguous. Don’t blur the question in play: how can something free to infallibly made to something? How can a will be **made **to do something while still acting freely? All you can say is that its a mystery. Although placing the mystery in God’s hand, you will still, in handing this over, be giving up **all **understanding of what will really is.
 
  1. I don’t remember Aquinas ever speaking of premotion upon will
  2. In the Vatican the writings of Aquinas has multiple handwritings so we can’t know for
    sure exactly what he wrote (for sure that is, but its not a matter of faith)
 
thinkandmull said:
All quotes from Aquinas I’ve seen on this are sufficiently ambiguous, and he doesn’t quote Augustine’s direct Calvinistic statements. Molina was not the only one opposed to the “Thomistic” school on this question. Francis de Sales agreed with Molina because he saw that “Thomism” was a psychological reaction to the affect of grace and did not, as it thought, know from this God’s “perspective” to their internal acts of grace: that is, God could not move His grace to **infallibly **cause someone to do something by his free will. Can you address that in particular?
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thinkandmull said:
The phrase “God as the primary cause” is ambiguous. Don’t blur the question in play: how can something free to infallibly made to something? How can a will be **made **to do something while still acting freely? All you can say is that its a mystery. Although placing the mystery in God’s hand, you will still, in handing this over, be giving up **all **understanding of what will really is.
Click to expand...
thinkandmull said:
  1. I don’t remember Aquinas ever speaking of premotion upon will
  2. In the Vatican the writings of Aquinas has multiple handwritings so we can’t know for
    sure exactly what he wrote (for sure that is, but its not a matter of faith)
Click to expand...
Banez did not agree with Molina.

Per St. Thomas Aquinas, the principle of predilection presupposes grace to be efficacious of itself and not from our consent. When the grace give by God is not elected then it is called merely sufficient grace.

Ps. 51:12
A clean heart create for me, God;
renew within me a steadfast spirit.

Summa Theologica I:
Question 23. Predestination
Article 4. Whether the predestined are chosen by God?

Reply to Objection 1. If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (Question 6, Article 4). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied.

Ultimately, some are predestined for Heaven but no one is predestined for Hell.
 
First, you need to speak plainly so that the average reader knows what you are saying and are not just mystified by your phrases. Second, you have yet to explain how something free can be made to do something. Third, where does Aquinas say that election to glory comes before choices? He speaks of unequal confirmation of graces, but never speaks of premotion (efficacious grace infallibly working)
 
thinkandmull said:
  1. I don’t remember Aquinas ever speaking of premotion upon will
  2. In the Vatican the writings of Aquinas has multiple handwritings so we can’t know for
    sure exactly what he wrote (for sure that is, but its not a matter of faith)
Click to expand...
thinkandmull said:
First, you need to speak plainly so that the average reader knows what you are saying and are not just mystified by your phrases. Second, you have yet to explain how something free can be made to do something. Third, where does Aquinas say that election to glory comes before choices? He speaks of unequal confirmation of graces, but never speaks of premotion (efficacious grace infallibly working)
Click to expand...
Premotion is a term of Banez, so you will not find that word used by St. Thomas Aquinas, however the concept is used in the Summa Theologica and other writings, for example see the quotes below. The effects of grace are contingent. God moves voluntary causes.

All good come from God and no evil. Evil is from our free will to not use the actual grace given by God. When we use that actual grace given by God to finally choose evil, we call that actual grace sufficient grace, to indicate that evil is not from God but by our choice. When we use that actual grace given by God to finally choose good, we call that actual grace efficient grace, to indicate that all good is from God.

Quaestiones disputatae de malo 6, 1, ad 3:

The ordering of predestination, however, is certain, not only with respect to its general end, but also with respect to a particular and determinate end. For one who is ordained to salvation by predestination never fails to obtain it. Moreover, the ordering of predestination is not certain with reference to a particular end in the way in which the ordering of providence is; for, in providence, the ordering is not certain with respect to a particular end unless the proximate cause necessarily produces its effect. In predestination, however, there is certitude with respect to an individual end even though the proximate cause, free choice, does not produce that effect except in a contingent manner.

dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVer.htm

The concept is here ST I, Q83, A1: Whether man has free-will?

Reply to Objection 3. Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

newadvent.org/summa/1083.htm
 
Aquinas didn’t say that by “predestination” is meant soley election to glory. It could also mean election to (sufficient grace). Take the example of a dog. It decides to run over to its master, it is not a machine, but it doesn’t have free will. You are saying humans are dogs
 
For the readers: he is saying that God can infallibly move the will to do something even though the action will be free.* For the reader*: he hasn’t explained how this is not a blatant contradiction in two philosophical concepts
 
Vico, you are saying that God can decide “I want John Doe to convert” and ensure/know without reference to free will that this will happen.
 
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