Molina

[Vico]

Aquinas didn’t say that by “predestination” is meant soley election to glory. It could also mean election to (sufficient grace). Take the example of a dog. It decides to run over to its master, it is not a machine, but it doesn’t have free will. You are saying humans are dogs

For the readers: he is saying that God can infallibly move the will to do something even though the action will be free.* For the reader*: he hasn’t explained how this is not a blatant contradiction in two philosophical concepts

Vico, you are saying that God can decide “I want John Doe to convert” and ensure/know without reference to free will that this will happen.

The the last post, no, that is not what St. Aquinas was writing, rather there is free will for God “He does not allot it without election”.

The grace is actual grace, however that could be either sufficient or efficacious.

Summa Theologica has for Q23, A4, 1, regarding “Whether the predestined are chosen by God”, that election is implied for both grace and glory.

Reply to Objection 1. If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (Question 6, Article 4). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied.

 

[thinkandmull]

The election comes from the good works, not a pre-decision to give efficacious grace. That intrepretation of Aquinas fits.

You are saying “this is just the power of God”. But I’ve argued that it is contrary to the nature of free will and you haven’t shown otherwise

 

[Vico]

The election comes from the good works, not a pre-decision to give efficacious grace. That intrepretation of Aquinas fits.

You are saying “this is just the power of God”. But I’ve argued that it is contrary to the nature of free will and you haven’t shown otherwise

Catholic teaching is that it is only by God’s grace, which is completely unmerited by works, that one is saved.

What Aquinas said, in that same section Q23, A4 is that “that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination.”

I answer that, Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above (Article 1), is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above (Question 22, Article 2). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:–love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (20, 2, 3):–election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above (Article 3). Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love.

 

[thinkandmull]

We are not talking about pelagianism but premotion. Molinists are not denying that God’s grace saves, that predestination to grace precedes election, and everything else your quotes from Aquinas are saying. It’s premotion that is the issue. So tell us how God can know what a person will do without a vision of the person’s choice. If only by vision, then you are a Molinist. If by the nature of efficacious grace, I again ask how God can infallibly cause a free will to act in a way if the will is truly free.

 

[Vico]

We are not talking about pelagianism but premotion. Molinists are not denying that God’s grace saves, that predestination to grace precedes election, and everything else your quotes from Aquinas are saying. It’s premotion that is the issue. So tell us how God can know what a person will do without a vision of the person’s choice. If only by vision, then you are a Molinist. If by the nature of efficacious grace, I again ask how God can infallibly cause a free will to act in a way if the will is truly free.

It was posted earlier, shown below, Divine influence does not preceed the acts of man in the order of time. God, existing outside of time (this fits well with b-series of events – there is no tenseness in reality) has knowledge of all human choices.

The premotion of Thomists is presented in Catholic Encyclopedia:

Inasmuch as the Divine influence precedes all acts of the creature, not in the order of time, but in that of causality, the motion emanating from God and seconded by free intelligent agents takes on the character of a physical premotion (proemotio physica) of the free acts, which may also be called a physical predetermination (proedeterminatio physica), because the free determination of the will is accomplished only by virtue of the divine predetermination.​

Also the Summa Theologica Q14, A13 (excerpt):

Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above (Question 10, Article 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.

newadvent.org/summa/1014.htm#article13

 

[thinkandmull]

The quote from Aquinas is in line with Molinism. There is a sense in which Molinism would not be against the desription of premotion you give there. In your selection of quotes, instead of engaging the writer, you are a good sophist, which is why I think this conversation will go on for eternity

 

[Vico]

The quote from Aquinas is in line with Molinism. There is a sense in which Molinism would not be against the desription of premotion you give there. In your selection of quotes, instead of engaging the writer, you are a good sophist, which is why I think this conversation will go on for eternity

There is a difference between the two approaches. The Thomist answers the question of how God knows, by means to God’s creative act, the Molinist answers it by means of God’s scientia media. Molina professed scientia (knowledge) media (means).

The Thomists insist that scientia media is not necessary, because the choice seen in scientia media exists and so is the free creation of God. Per the Thomists, all we need to know is what God will do.

 

[multitude]

A lot of people misunderstand Molinism. To say that God merely knows what a person will do with grace under any situation is to know the person and perfectly how grace will affect him and thus the outcome, which is the position of those attacking Molinism. This is so because Molinist still believe in the power of grace and their opponents still believe in free will under its influence

Yah, that’s what I’m starting to get at. I don’t like philosophizing over this one too much since it can get really convoluted. But on the whole, if you were to take a step back, the contending positions are actually the other way round, upside down.