No runaway trolley this time

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Then you could talk about the morality of stopping that threa[t].
Yes, I remarked on just that when this “not very good dilemma” was introduced. But in Scowler’s world, local civil authorities define impermissible homicides, not any moral principles, other than perhaps the one Ender identifies (“it’s ok if I think it’s ok).
 
So… they’re able to kill him, but not to let him know he’s infected? (This is getting more and more contrived…)
Contrived or not is not relevant - as long as it is logically possible. And it is quite possible to shoot from a greater distance than to communicate.

Why don’t you concentrate on the gist of the problem: It is allowed to use lethal force against someone who volitionally and knowingly puts your life into jeopardy. What should you do if someone accidentally and unknowingly puts you into mortal danger? Are you expected just to roll over and die? In both cases there is no other option. If it is possible (and we know it is) that there is no other option to defend against a volitional danger, it is equally possible that there is no other option against accidental danger. Let’s stop all these attempts to sidetrack the question.
I’m still looking for the expression of principles that can be applied in determining whether or not I should commit an act. You may disagree with the principles the church has defined, but they are at least well defined, and understandable, even if difficult situations make them difficult to apply. Without a clear expression of your principles it isn’t clear they arise above “it’s OK if I think it’s OK.”
The principle is a somewhat extended version of the Hippocratic oath: “First, do no harm”. The extension is: “If the circumstances force you do harm, then do as little harm as possible”. Not complicated at all.

Now I ask you back: “If someone accidentally puts you (and/or others) into mortal danger, and the only way to avoid it is to kill that person, are you expected to die and also allow the other affected people to die, too”? Or does the self-defense extend to defending against involuntarily caused danger. So far no one was willing to answer this bare-bones dilemma.
Using that as the framework, I would answer with what some would regard as entirely too idealistic; the end never justifies the means.
But I agree with you, with one caveat: “the end and the means cannot be evaluated in isolation”.
But in Scowler’s world, local civil authorities define impermissible homicides, not any moral principles.
Who else? We live in a society where the “law of the land” (how I hate that pompous expression) is not decided by some religious authority or theocracy. Would you like the Sharia law to be the decider of secular questions?

Bye-bye self-defense.
 
Who else? We live in a society where the “law of the land” (how I hate that pompous expression) is not decided by some religious authority or theocracy. Would you like the Sharia law to be the decider of secular questions?
I suggested earlier that if you see the question as s matter of jurisprudence, take the “not good dilemma” to a legal forum. This one is about moral theology.
 
The principle is a somewhat extended version of the Hippocratic oath: “First, do no harm”. The extension is: “If the circumstances force you do harm, then do as little harm as possible”. Not complicated at all.
OK, but having an obligation not to do harm is not the same as having a positive obligation to do good. You want to shoot the disease carrier to limit the harm he will cause, but your principle doesn’t address that situation. What is my obligation to prevent the harm that others do, or to be good to others? Why must I be a Samaritan?
Now I ask you back: “If someone accidentally puts you (and/or others) into mortal danger, and the only way to avoid it is to kill that person, are you expected to die and also allow the other affected people to die, too”? Or does the self-defense extend to defending against involuntarily caused danger. So far no one was willing to answer this bare-bones dilemma.
Well, this is just a non-specific way of rephrasing your dilemma with regard to the disease carrier (which to me makes it all the more difficult to oppose your solution).

Clearly the principle of self defense allows me to kill (where necessary) a person who directly and intentionally threatens my life. It also allows me to kill a person who directly and intentionally threatens the lives of others. So, the question is: may I kill a person who equally threatens my life but does so unintentionally?

Is it reasonable to ask whether a person is still innocent who is an unintentional threat, or if he is otherwise exempt from the rules governing self defense? If someone attacks me with a knife believing I am someone else, may I kill him? If someone has drugged him and under the influence of those drugs he attacks me, may I kill him? At what point do his actions, intentional or not, justify responding to him as the threat he unquestionably is?

It is not as simple as asserting: “Killing the innocent is murder.” While it is transparently true, in this case it is also an evasion.
 
Clearly the principle of self defense allows me to kill (where necessary) a person who directly and intentionally threatens my life.
A psychotic person running at you with a knife may be stopped with lethal force if necessary. I don’t know whether we’d say he acted intentionally though - in fact, I believe we’d say he did not.

There was never any problem with ultimately taking (potentially lethal) action against the infected person, since ultimately, he ceases to be innocent by not acceding to isolation [thus we may have homicide without murder - speaking morally]. Scowler simply could not bother with the path to arrive at that point.

Scowler will then tell you that “isolation” is not a possibility, requiring you to now accept that the mere existence of the individual - mere existence - is the unjust threat. .

At the end of the day, he will insist anything can be done if (in his judgement) it averts a greater misfortune. And this is quite reasonably when one holds to no principle that opposes evil deeds absolutely.
 
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OK, but having an obligation not to do harm is not the same as having a positive obligation to do good. You want to shoot the disease carrier to limit the harm he will cause, but your principle doesn’t address that situation. What is my obligation to prevent the harm that others do, or to be good to others? Why must I be a Samaritan?
No, you are not obliged to be a good a Samaritan. You are not even obliged to defend yourself against an explicit or implicit danger. If you so choose, you may just stand quietly and allow the attacker to kill you and/or anyone else. But that is not the problem here. The problem is: “are you morally allowed (not obliged!) to defend yourself and/or others”? In the case of the explicit danger you are allowed to defend - IF you so choose.
So, the question is: may I kill a person who equally threatens my life but does so unintentionally?
Yes, this is the question. Does the ethical system of Catholicism (because THAT is being discussed here) mandate or require you to “roll over” and allow to get killed, or allow the others get killed? My ethical system allows this defense. What about the ethical system of the Catholic Church?

I am very glad that you are willing to contemplate this problem. So far you are the only one. The others all tried to wiggle out, for their “unfathomable” reasons. Until they come up with an explanation for their evasive tactics, I will have to use my reasoning skills, and arrive at the conclusion that they do not dare to examine it. After all it is very problematic to get confronted with a major inadequacy in you ethical system.
Scowler will then tell you that “isolation” is not a possibility, requiring you to now accept that the mere existence of the individual - mere existence - is the unjust threat.
Don’t attempt to read my mind. You are not qualified to do it. There is nothing “just” or “unjust” about being exposed to some lethal virus. The carrying agent is “innocent” of any malice.
At the end of the day, he will insist anything can be done if (in his judgement) it averts a greater misfortune.
Yes, this is almost correct. If the two options only differ in degree, then one should choose the path which leads to the lesser one.
 
Does the ethical system of Catholicism (because THAT is being discussed here) mandate or require you to “roll over” and allow to get killed, or allow the others get killed? My ethical system allows this defense. What about the ethical system of the Catholic Church?
I don’t believe this question is directly addressed in the catechism…which doesn’t mean it’s not addressed, only that I don’t exactly know where. That said, we do have guidelines we can apply.

We are allowed to kill in self defense (2264): “it is legitimate to insist on respect for one’s own right to life. Someone who defends his life is not guilty of murder even if he is forced to deal his aggressor a lethal blow”: This passage only refers to an “aggressor”, it says nothing about whether the aggression is intentional or accidental.

We also have 2265: Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible for another’s life. Preserving the common good requires rendering the unjust aggressor unable to inflict harm. While this one seems more directed to police and the military I think the principle is what makes us responsible for the life of an who falls into a pool at our feet. We have a moral obligation to pull him out despite not being officially responsible for his life.

So: can we shoot the virus carrier given that: he is completely unaware of his condition - there is no malicious intent involved, and this is the only way to stop him before he massively, and fatally, infects others?

2265 refers to an “unjust aggressor”, which doesn’t really apply to our clueless carrier, but it seems to me the catechism cannot give a detailed explanation of what is valid in all circumstances; we really have to look elsewhere for that.

Regarding self defense, Aquinas said:
Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one’s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, is not unlawful (ST II-II 64, 7)

That seems to me would allow the killing of someone who threatened you regardless of his motivation. The intention of my act is to preserve my own life, not to take his, therefore my act is justified. Now, does this apply when lives other than my own are at stake? Probably, but I don’t have time to pursue that line at the moment.
 
The intention of my act is to preserve my own life, not to take his, therefore my act is justified. Now, does this apply when lives other than my own are at stake? Probably …
When you get the time, I hope you re-think the above sentiment. Kant made the same error – a good will is all that matters in determining the morality of an act. Morality, for Kant, is entirely subjective.
 
When you get the time, I hope you re-think the above sentiment. Kant made the same error – a good will is all that matters in determining the morality of an act. Morality, for Kant, is entirely subjective.
Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one’s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, is not unlawful (Aquinas)

What part of this comment do you reject? What part of the right of self defense does not apply? If my life is directly threatened where is it stated that I may not defend myself even if results in the death of the person who threatens me?

I said nothing to suggest I believe a good intention alone justifies an act, and after all that I’ve said on this subject it ought to be obvious that’s not my position…There is no justification for your comment.
 
Where is the Kantian error?
Not only can lethal self defence be non culpable, it can also be morally good to do.
If objective details are not incompatible with the alleged primary intention being so then what is intended is not only subjectively good but deemed objectively so also it would seem.
 
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What part of this comment do you reject?
This part.
So: can we shoot the virus carrier The intention of my act is to preserve my own life, not to take his, therefore my act is justified.
Your good intention is not sufficient to justify an act evil in its object.

The virus carrier is not an unjust aggressor.

Now, if the virus carrier tried to lick your face then one could, I suppose (cp), reasonably categorize him as a willful aggressor and repel him with moderate but sufficient force, even lethal force, iff necessary.

Is the prenatal infant implanted (and boring into) the fallopian tube an unjust aggressor? Like the virus carrier, No.
 
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I don’t believe this question is directly addressed in the catechism…which doesn’t mean it’s not addressed, only that I don’t exactly know where. That said, we do have guidelines we can apply.

We are allowed to kill in self defense (2264): “it is legitimate to insist on respect for one’s own right to life. Someone who defends his life is not guilty of murder even if he is forced to deal his aggressor a lethal blow”: This passage only refers to an “aggressor”, it says nothing about whether the aggression is intentional or accidental.

We also have 2265: Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible for another’s life. Preserving the common good requires rendering the unjust aggressor unable to inflict harm. While this one seems more directed to police and the military I think the principle is what makes us responsible for the life of an who falls into a pool at our feet. We have a moral obligation to pull him out despite not being officially responsible for his life.

So: can we shoot the virus carrier given that: he is completely unaware of his condition - there is no malicious intent involved, and this is the only way to stop him before he massively, and fatally, infects others?

2265 refers to an “unjust aggressor”, which doesn’t really apply to our clueless carrier, but it seems to me the catechism cannot give a detailed explanation of what is valid in all circumstances; we really have to look elsewhere for that.

Regarding self defense, Aquinas said:

Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one’s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, is not unlawful (ST II-II 64, 7)

That seems to me would allow the killing of someone who threatened you regardless of his motivation. The intention of my act is to preserve my own life, not to take his, therefore my act is justified. Now, does this apply when lives other than my own are at stake? Probably, but I don’t have time to pursue that line at the moment.
I like your analysis. Thank you for expressing it. If there would be a “cheers” emoticon, I would append it.
 
Is the prenatal infant implanted (and boring into) the fallopian tube an unjust aggressor? Like the virus carrier, No.
An “aggressor” is not such by merely living.

But a good man ‘sleep walking’ with an AK47 is a threat and can be stopped with lethal force if necessary.
 
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An “aggressor” is not such by merely living.

But a good man ‘sleep walking’ with an AK47 is a threat and can be stopped with lethal force if necessary.
Just as the object of an act is not the mere physicality of the act but expresses the end(s) of an act proceeding from deliberate will, the unjust aggressor is not merely an expression of the physicality of the person but specifies the end(s) proceeding from a deliberate (evil) will even if that person’s intellect is so disordered so as to see as a good that which is evil.

Evil is in the deliberate will. I think that until the sleepwalker chambers a round, removes the safety, raises the weapon or does some overt action that reasonably indicates a deliberate evil will that we may not harm the sleepwalker merely because of his physicality – sleepwalking while holding an AK47.
 
I think that until the sleepwalker chambers a round, removes the safety, raises the weapon or does some overt action that reasonably indicates a deliberate evil will that we may not harm the sleepwalker merely because of his physicality – sleepwalking while holding an AK47.
You know more about the mechanics of using an AK47 than I do. Yes, there must be proper grounds to fear an imminent act before one may take aggressive defensive action. The point though is that while merely living cannot justify lethal force against a person, a conscious intent to harm is not necessary to justify an act of (potentially lethal) self defense. The person whose actions constitute a threat warranting potentially lethal self defense may in fact bear no culpability for his actions.
 
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Why don’t you concentrate on the gist of the problem: It is allowed to use lethal force against someone who volitionally and knowingly puts your life into jeopardy.
To be more precise: it’s ok to defend yourself against an aggressor. It’s not ok to intend to murder that person (but, if your only defense is one that also kills the aggressor, it can be (not necessarily always is in all cases) morally acceptable to do so).
In both cases there is no other option. If it is possible (and we know it is) that there is no other option to defend against a volitional danger, it is equally possible that there is no other option against accidental danger. Let’s stop all these attempts to sidetrack the question.
Then perhaps I misunderstand your intent in asking the question: if there’s no moral dilemma… then what’s the issue here?
 
To be more precise: it’s ok to defend yourself against an aggressor. It’s not ok to intend to murder that person (but, if your only defense is one that also kills the aggressor, it can be (not necessarily always is in all cases) morally acceptable to do so).
I already stipulated that the “killing” or “homicide” is only allowed if that is no other way to stop the attacker. No need to re-hash the old problem, especially since we agreed. I wonder what kind of exception can you present in this case. A killing which includes torture would be a legitimate exception. But a direct killing - even if intended - is acceptable. Your wording implies something very strange. It seems that one is allowed to grab a gun, close one’s eyes and hope that the bullet will stop the attacker, but it is not allowed to aim to shoot to kill. Any and all instructors will tell you that if must shoot, shoot to kill and never to “maim”.
Then perhaps I misunderstand your intent in asking the question: if there’s no moral dilemma… then what’s the issue here?
I see no moral problem. If you also see no problem, then we have an agreement. So far only Ender agreed that there is no difference between defending against an intended endangerment (I chose the word very carefully and intentionally) and an unintended one. Are you going to join our little community? I am reluctant to repeat the pointed phraseology of the problem, but here it is: “Are you required to roll over and just die, if there is no ill intent on the part of the other person?”
 
Ender: What part of this comment do you reject? o_mlly: This part.
Let me rephrase the question: what part of Aquinas’ comment do you reject?

Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one’s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, is not unlawful. (Aquinas)
The virus carrier is not an unjust aggressor.
He may not be an unjust aggressor, but if my life is directly threatened by his actions, am I justified in shooting him? Is it your position that I may not respond to inadvertent threats to my life?
Now, if the virus carrier tried to lick your face then one could, I suppose (cp), reasonably categorize him as a willful aggressor and repel him with moderate but sufficient force, even lethal force, iff necessary.
The virus is spread simply by him exhaling. He doesn’t need to touch me to infect me. If he gets close to me I will in all probability die. Am I prohibited from responding to threats that I perceive to be lethal?
Is the prenatal infant implanted (and boring into) the fallopian tube an unjust aggressor? Like the virus carrier, No.
The prenatal infant, however, is destroyed by the action taken to defend the mother. The virus carrier is destroyed by the action taken to defend me. The distinction here is less than obvious.
 
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