Non-theistic foundation of morality?

[Peter_Plato]

That’s the kind of thing I was thinking about. But no malice does not equal no crime. Manslaughter, death by drunken or dangerous driving, or by gross negligence, are all crimes, and all immoral. Lack of malice doesn’t make an act good.

Under consequentialism, yes, win-win, as all the actors are agreed that the best possible consequence is to end the life, done and dusted. But most people believe there are self-evident a priori rules such as “do no harm” or “everyone is sacred”, which at a minimum question such ethics, and overturn them.

Let’s get a little clearer about why consequentialism isn’t a complete moral system.

One way might be to liken the moral/spiritual enterprise to being in a state of war.

The consequentialist would argue that “war” (i.e., morality) is merely about winning battles. The more battles won the better because then the war will end quicker.

The problem is that taking that position presumes a whole lot – not the least of which is to ignore the fact that one could win most of the battles but still lose the war overall. So strategy is more important than merely engaging in battles. Winning the important battles is more important than winning more of them.

Secondly, it ignores completely the question of whether you are on the right side of the war to begin with. You have to have a moral system to gauge whether or not the side you are on is the “good” side, so to speak. You might be fighting battles and making gains (i.e., bringing about “good” or “benefit” or “advantage” or “well-being”) but for the wrong side – in a sense, you would be doing “good” but for the evil side.

But even if you happen to be on the right side, it doesn’t mean that you, as a moral agent, are fulfilling what you need to do as a good moral agent. You could be on the right side, but be there for all of the wrong reasons.

Not only that, but I would suggest that as a moral agent, your first responsibility is to become right-ordered as a moral agent. As Christ said, “What good is it for a man to win the whole world (or, in this case, win the entire war) but lose his very self.”

As an inherently good moral agent, you would have the compass to determine which side is the good one and, hopefully, the capability and foresight to take in the entire moral landscape and determine which battles, strategically speaking, are the ones that need to be won.

This is why good works do not save us – the most important aspect of the moral and spiritual endeavor for each of us is not to win battles (do good works) necessarily, but to be transformed into the kind of being we ought to be. It is possible for an evil thing to do good works incidentally – for good things to come out of an evil man now and then, but if the sepulcher has been culled of dead men’s bones and exorcized of evil spirits, then out of a truly good man will flow good things in abundance.

Ergo, the endeavor of each of us should not merely be to do good things with resultant good consequences, but to BE truly good – to be the creatures we have been made to be by the perfect God – from the very core of our being. Not merely aspiring to become whited sepulchers that look “good” or do discernible “good” deeds in front of others or ourselves, but to be reborn and bring forth fruit that will last from the depth of Being itself.

I realize that this analogy may not be a comprehensible one for some, but I do think it highlights some of the key principles in terms of what morality is really all about. Life and death are placed before us as are good and evil. It is in the proper discernment of what life and death mean and what good and evil are that we can make the proper choices which will bring about the Summum Bonum, the highest good – not just for ourselves but for all, as it is intended to be.

 

[PRmerger]

Ah, the satisfying crack of a nail being hit on he head.

As to moon landings, there is only one correct answer.

So it sounds like you’re agreeing with me that folks having different opinions about a particular issue is irrelevant in the context of our discussion?

 

[Peter_Plato]

“When an ectopic pregnancy does not resolve by itself, a morally acceptable approach would involve removal of the whole section of the tube on the side of the woman’s body where the unborn child is lodged. Although this results in reduced fertility for the woman, the section of tube around the growing child has clearly become pathological, and constitutes a mounting threat with time. This threat is addressed by removal of the tube, with the secondary, and unintended, effect that the child within will then die.”
catholiceducation.org/en/science/ethical-issues/when-pregnancy-goes-awry-ectopic-pregnancies.html
Rev. Tadeusz Pacholczyk, Ph.D.
Director of Education for The National Catholic Bioethics Center
fathertad.com/?page_id=5

Yes, and this is because the infected section of the tube is the problem, just as the heavy crate in the lifeboat is the problem. It is proper to target the problem.

However, it isn’t EVER proper to target an innocent human life and make them the “problem.”

To target an innocent in the lifeboat and throw them overboard would be exactly like claiming the fetus (and NOT the infected Fallopian tube) is the problem, which would permit abortion any time a woman’s life is in danger because it would then be permissible to target the fetus.

That is NOT what Fr. Pacholczyk is arguing. Nor is it what the Principle of Double Effect entails.

 

[o_mlly]

Yes, and this is because the infected section of the tube is the problem, just as the heavy crate in the lifeboat is the problem. It is proper to target the problem.

I think your introduction of the crate does not clarify but muddles the moral problem. The critical issue is as Fr. Pacholczyk describes, one of agency, direct and indirect. “We may never directly take the life of an innocent human being, though we may sometimes tolerate the **indirect **and unintended loss of life that comes with trying to properly address a life-threatening … situation.” This manufactured scenario predicts two direct physical evils – death of one by drowning or death by shark attack. No moral evil occurs if the intention of the thrower is the saving of 4 lives.

However, it isn’t EVER proper to target an innocent human life and make them the “problem.”

There is no “targeting” the loss of a human life. And there is no direct human act that causes death.

To target an innocent in the lifeboat and throw them overboard would be exactly like claiming the fetus (and NOT the infected Fallopian tube) is the problem, which would permit abortion any time a woman’s life is in danger because it would then be permissible to target the fetus.

Not according to the good father, “Yet the difference in how the baby dies is, in fact, critical. There is always a difference between killing someone directly and allowing someone to die of indirect causes.”

That is NOT what Fr. Pacholczyk is arguing. Nor is it what the Principle of Double Effect entails.

I believe this is what the good father is arguing.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Not according to the good father, “Yet the difference in how the baby dies is, in fact, critical. There is always a difference between killing someone directly and allowing someone to die of indirect causes.”

I suppose, then, that your view supports throwing someone off the top of the building because throwing someone off a building into the air doesn’t directly kill them. It would be “allowing someone to die” of the indirect cause of hitting the ground, making the action permissible, in your view.

I believe this is what the good father is arguing.

I don’t think that is what he is arguing.

I think the crate analogy is an apt one because it adds a feature into the scenario that is somewhat anomalous, just as an embryo becoming stuck in the Fallopian tube is an irregular eventuality that “muddles” the issue of abortion to some extent.

 

[o_mlly]

I suppose, then, that your view supports throwing someone off the top of the building because throwing someone off a building into the air doesn’t directly kill them. It would be “allowing someone to die” of the indirect cause of hitting the ground, making the action permissible, in your view.

Throwing someone off the top of a building is a morally neutral act. One must therefore look at the intentions of the actor to determine if the act is morally good or evil.

Throwing someone off the top of a one story building on fire to save their life is morally good. Throwing someone off the top of a ten story building to kill them is murder – directly acting to effect their death.

I think the crate analogy is an apt one because it adds a feature into the scenario that is somewhat anomalous, just as an embryo becoming stuck in the Fallopian tube is an irregular eventuality that “muddles” the issue of abortion to some extent.

I think we agree that the scenario is already overly contrived. I think a modification which allows “safely putting the heavy crate overboard” avoids the double effect since now there is no bad effect to address. Or does the crate sink and the innocent person die? If so, the crate doesn’t change the dilemma.

 

[Aloysium]

The baby in the fallopian tube is a situation analogous to the scene in Master and Commander:

Warley works on the swaying mizzen, wood and rope straining as they wrestle to turn. Then with a tremendous crack as the mizzen-topmast splits and flies backward into the sea, carrying Warley along with it.
Bonden cries, “Man overboard!”
Sail and cordage fall over the men at the wheel; a loose block and tackle swings murderously in the gale.
Jack fights free from the tangle of ropes as Warley vanishesin the foam. The mizzenmast is acting as a sea-anchor, dragging the ship’s head northwards toward the black rocks.
Jack grabs a speaking-trumpet as Warley briefly reappears.“Swim for the wreckage, man!” he shouts out
Then to Pullings, Jack continues, “Reduce sail!”
As crewmen scramble frantically into the rigging, Jack turns back to see Warley desperately swimming toward the trailing wreckage, his mates shouting encouragement over the howling wind.
With sails reduced the ship perceptibly slows, but the dragging wreckage is swinging the ship broadside on to the waves.
Bonden shouts, “She’s broaching!”
Pullings runs to Jack, pointing to the trailing mass of ropes and mast. “It’s acting as a sea-anchor! We must cut it loose, Sir!”
Warley still struggling to reach the wreckage but going under with each wave.
Jack, agonized, makes his decision. “Axes!”
Awkward Davies scrambles up the ladder with an axe, but loses his footing and falls sprawling over the quarterdeck.
Jack grabs the axe and attacks the ropes. He’s joined by Nagel who has run to assist before realizing that the man overboard is his friend Warley.
Jack shouts his command, “Set to then. Set to!!”
Nagel’s face is a mask of horror, but he obeys Jacks orders and starts chopping. He and Jack work shoulder to shoulder, matching blow for blow.
The prow keeps turning, wave after wave coming at right angles to the ship.
A hatch cover is torn off by the force of water, a sudden mighty deluge pouring down into the lower levels drenching the men and swamping the guns.
Hollar yells below, “All hands to the pumps!”
Jack and Nagel keep hacking at the tangle of ropes, knocking chips off the railing in their urgency to cut free the dragging mast.
Finally they succeed. The last of the ropes whips away, the broken mizzen disappears aft and the ship swings southward, away from the rocks.
The wreckage is swept away by the next wave, leaving Warley struggling, his last chance of getting back to the ship gone.
Then another wave breaks over him and he is gone.
Nagel is bereft. Jack lowers his head.
(Edited from the screenplay)

 

[Peter_Plato]

The baby in the fallopian tube is a situation analogous to the scene in Master and Commander:

Agreed.

Quite different from throwing someone overboard.

The “someone” is already in a precarious position because of circumstances (infected fallopian tube, locked inside a heavy crate, etc.,) and not because other moral agents put them into that position.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Throwing someone off the top of a building is a morally neutral act. One must therefore look at the intentions of the actor to determine if the act is morally good or evil.

No actually. The "intentions of the actor” do not make a whiff of difference if the building is sixty stories tall. The act would not be “morally neutral.” The person will die irrespective of the intentions. The actor would know that for certain. If the actor threw them off the building with the direct intent to kill them, the act is morally bad. If the actor undertook some other action without the intent to kill but knowing that the death of the victim would result (though unintended) that would meet the requirements for the principle of double effect, but the act would have to involve some other action where the death would be incidental and not integral to it. If killing the person is the reason for carrying out the act (throwing someone off a building or into the ocean) then the act is morally bad.

Directly targeting the fetus, one of the innocents on a lifeboat or deciding to throw someone off a building are ALL still directly intending the death of an innocent.

 

[o_mlly]

No actually. The "intentions of the actor” do not make a whiff of difference if the building is sixty stories tall.

Yes, the intention is determinative of the morality of all acts which are not intrinsically disordered.

CCC#1752 The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the purpose pursued in the action. The intention is a movement of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity.

And in our case, that first goal is saving 4 lives.

CCC# 1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. … Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves…

The unintended consequence, the death of the one thrown overboard, does not change the morality of the act.

The act would not be “morally neutral.” The person will die irrespective of the intentions.

So does the fetus. The intention must be important if you argue that the surgeon acts morally.

The actor would know that for certain. If the actor threw them off the building with the direct intent to kill them, the act is morally bad.

Already agreed. Note: you have specified an evil intention.

If the actor undertook some other action without the intent to kill but knowing that the death of the victim would result (though unintended) that would meet the requirements for the principle of double effect, but the act would have to involve some other action where the death would be incidental and not integral to it.

Yes, the principle of the double effect may never tolerate a moral evil; only physical evils may be tolerated. The death of the one thrown overboard is consequential and, therefore, not integral to the act of throwing overboard. Perhaps we are down to the nub. I say the death of the one thrown overboard is a physical evil – drowning or shark attack. The death is a foreseeable indirect and unintended consequence. You must argue that throwing a survivor overboard is intrinsically evil. However, that act is not so. Further, since the intention is to save lives, the act is morally good.

If killing the person is the reason for carrying out the act (throwing someone off a building or into the ocean) then the act is morally bad.

Already agreed. An evil intention renders all acts morally evil.

Directly targeting the fetus, one of the innocents on a lifeboat or deciding to throw someone off a building are ALL still directly intending the death of an innocent.

That a consequence is foreseeable does not indicate the consequence is intended. Otherwise, the principle of the double effect is without meaning.

 

[e_c]

I think your introduction of the crate does not clarify but muddles the moral problem. The critical issue is as Fr. Pacholczyk describes, one of agency, direct and indirect. “We may never directly take the life of an innocent human being, though we may sometimes tolerate the **indirect **and unintended loss of life that comes with trying to properly address a life-threatening … situation.” This manufactured scenario predicts two direct physical evils – death of one by drowning or death by shark attack. No moral evil occurs if the intention of the thrower is the saving of 4 lives.

There is no “targeting” the loss of a human life. And there is no direct human act that causes death.

Not according to the good father, “Yet the difference in how the baby dies is, in fact, critical. There is always a difference between killing someone directly and allowing someone to die of indirect causes.”

I believe this is what the good father is arguing.

This is where I was in the understanding of this problem some years ago, after which I noticed the trouble with it. Then after months of agonizing, I finally “got it.” I am preparing to write a paper, hopefully finally ending the craniotomy debate, that goes right into the issue that you are stressing over… “targetting” and all that.

The same kind of reasoning you are using can, when pushed to its extremes, be used to justify all kinds of evil. You’ve failed to grasp the demarcation of the moral object, which is a very common error.

Again, the classic case is with craniotomies. Can you crush the child’s skull, or not? After all, you don’t want to kill the child, you are just trying to reshape its head…

It’s about the object. This is where the confusion is, as usual. Throwing someone overboard selects them for death - which is wrong.

 

[e_c]

Directly targeting the fetus, one of the innocents on a lifeboat or deciding to throw someone off a building are ALL still directly intending the death of an innocent.

Allow me to tweak this - they all still directly effect the death of an innocent… with “directly effecting” serving here as a short definition for “moral object.” A direct intention would mean they actively are trying to kill someone, willing that the soul separates from the body.

It is so, so, so important to get down what an “object” is… Otherwise, you can always say “I was just moving the sword,” or “I was just moving my trigger finger,” or even “I was just sending electric impulses to my muscles,” etc. Double-effect, tah dah! Morality can entirely disappear along this line.

At the end of the day, the question is: does the act necessarily involve, by its nature, the insertion of an innocent person into a deadly situation, or is the person only an accidental characteristic of the act? But actually, this is still not nuanced enough… it leaves aside the cases where the body of an innocent person is the direct material threat.

 

[PRmerger]

Start a thread on the moon landing.

Why should I do that?

The point of the post was to show you that pointing out that folks having different views of something is otiose.

Some folks can be wrong about a view.

We are agreed on that, yes?

 

[PRmerger]

Hmm. Trying to deflect attention is a debating technique of sorts, but I read you as saying science and evidence is a funny system which belongs to people other than your good self, and you think the truth of whether we landed on the Moon is just an opinion, facts don’t matter.

It’s a rhetorical question. It’s applying the same logic (or lack of it) that was being presented by Bradski and Tom.

 

[Bradski]

Some folks can be wrong about a view.

We are agreed on that, yes?

On a question of morals? When they are using ‘theistic morality’? So how do we know who is right? If using ‘theistic morality’ doesn’t always give us the right answer, indeed can in this case give one that is diametrically opposed to some views (also reached by reference to ‘theistic morality’), then can you tell me how we know who is interpreting it correctly?

The point being, you are going to say that you are right and others are wrong. Unless you tell me that you too can be wrong. In which case why should anyone listen to your views unless you have reasonable arguments to put forward?

And as theistic morality gives different answers to different people, we cannot use that as a basis for your reasonable arguments. Because you are going to have to admit that, using it, you could be wrong.

Killing someone is usually wrong. Throwing someone out of a lifeboat (on the understanding that he will die as a result) is wrong. In the example we have been discussing, it is the least wrong position to take.

You don’t need ‘theistic morality’ to reach that view.

 

[Tomdstone]

On a question of morals? When they are using ‘theistic morality’? So how do we know who is right? If using ‘theistic morality’ doesn’t always give us the right answer, indeed can in this case give one that is diametrically opposed to some views (also reached by reference to ‘theistic morality’), then can you tell me how we know who is interpreting it correctly?

The point being, you are going to say that you are right and others are wrong. Unless you tell me that you too can be wrong. In which case why should anyone listen to your views unless you have reasonable arguments to put forward?

And as theistic morality gives different answers to different people, we cannot use that as a basis for your reasonable arguments. Because you are going to have to admit that, using it, you could be wrong.

Killing someone is usually wrong. Throwing someone out of a lifeboat (on the understanding that he will die as a result) is wrong. In the example we have been discussing, it is the least wrong position to take.

You don’t need ‘theistic morality’ to reach that view.

People who rely on the theistic foundation of morality have differed on a lot of issues: capital punishment, burning at the stake, the use of torture during the inquisition. slavery, the charging of interest on loans.,

 

[PRmerger]

On a question of morals?

No. In general.

Some people can be wrong about a view, and the fact that there are differing views is irrelevant.

We are agreed about that, yes?

 

[PRmerger]

People who rely on the theistic foundation of morality have differed on a lot of issues: capital punishment, burning at the stake, the use of torture during the inquisition. slavery, the charging of interest on loans.,

And so do people who have an atheistic framework.

But with those of us who have a theistic foundation, we have a canon by which we can measure right/wrong, good/bad.

Those who are atheists can only say, “It’s not my preference to rape women”.

 

[Pallas_Athene]

And so do people who have an atheistic framework.

But with those of us who have a theistic foundation, we have a canon by which we can measure right/wrong, good/bad.

Those who are atheists can only say, “It’s not my preference to rape women”.

This is rather simplistic, even though it is true. Our preference is not based upon some authority, rather it is based upon our own preferences AND the concept of reciprocity…

1. we start with our own preference (subjective as it is)
2. we do not want to be raped
3. we project our preference unto others, and thus
4. we are against raping women (or anyone else). (Remember: do NOT do unto others…)

It is nothing but our preference, I admit - though it does have a rational foundation.

Now it is your turn. Your preference is based upon the authority of the “canon” (which is nothing but a different personal preference). That is fine. Does it have a rational foundation which is not based upon the authority?

 

[PRmerger]

This is rather simplistic, even though it is true.

Thank you.

Our preference is not based upon some authority, rather it is based upon our own preferences AND the concept of reciprocity…

1. we start with our own preference (subjective as it is)
2. we do not want to be raped
3. we project our preference unto others, and thus
4. we are against raping women (or anyone else). (Remember: do NOT do unto others…)

Why should someone have to submit to this paradigm?

Someone says, “I prefer to rape women and I don’t care a whit if you try to rape me. I’m bigger than you. And stronger. Just try to rape me. And I happen to be in power.”

What’s the atheistic framework you resort to here?

It is nothing but our preference, I admit

Thank you for this, too.

• though it does have a rational foundation.

Someone else may find it rational to assert: those who are the most intelligent have the most value.

What’s the atheistic rejoinder to this?

Now it is your turn. Your preference is based upon the authority of the “canon” (which is nothing but a different personal preference).

Absolutely not.

It is NOT my preference. In fact, some things which are viewed as wrong are definitely NOT my preference.