On refutation of the Unmoved Mover

[polytropos]

Your assumption is wrong. To me (and I think you) real philosophy is about keeping an open mind and not settling for easy answers. But on the internet what many call philosophy is talking up their favorite boy bands and conforming to tribal stereotypes. Anyone with a different take has to put up with their constant lynching parties.

As I said, I apologize if I was wrong.

As far as philosophy goes, I wouldn’t say, “real philosophy is about keeping an open mind and not settling for easy answers.” That very well might be necessary to find the truth, but say we were to find the truth easily. Then we would certainly be doing bad, unreal philosophy if we were to reject the truth for open-mindedness and tough answers. But that isn’t really important here.

By the argument alone I think the unmoved mover is closer to a principle than a deity.

Well, as I’ve intimated before, “principles” don’t have any causal efficacy. So you might say, “It is a principle that there is a purely actual Unmoved Mover.” But you couldn’t say, “The Unmoved Mover is a principle,” since that wouldn’t make sense, since the argument shows that the Unmoved Mover has causal efficacy by necessity.

Even if we assume the argument is correct, it doesn’t follow that the unmoved mover didn’t put the universe in motion and then leave it on autopilot. Although admittedly that’s how some see God, constantly looking for signs.

Linux is correct. On the contrary, it does follow that the Unmoved Mover is not a deistic god. The argument begins from any instance of change, including anything happening right now (like, say, you blinking your eyes as you read this post). As you’ll recall, it makes reference of per se causal series, which are simultaneous, so the argument shows that any change right now requires the existence of an Unmoved Mover (and because there could be no distinction between “two” things which are Pure Act, every change is in fact caused by the same Unmoved Mover).

The argument says nothing about the creation of the universe. As has been discussed at length in this topic, Aquinas did not believe that it was philosophically demonstrable that God created the universe (or that the universe had a finite past).

Though many would say the number 1 is real, and unlike physicalists, idealists would say fundamentally reality is ideas. Even some physicalists say that since math underlies all physical law, perhaps math is all there is. For example, string theory tries to explain everything in terms of different geometrical arrangements, where cause and effect and all else also comes down to geometry. Which may well be wrong but points to an underlying assumption in the argument that material bodies are more than just math. Our common sense can fool us.

What do you mean by “an underlying assumption in the argument that material bodies are more than just math”? Are you math?

You seem to allow that this might be wrong, but if you want to use it as an objection you’d have to argue for it positively. To me this seems like a bad example of modern eliminativism. Physical laws are mathematical abstractions about relationships between matter and energy. So are you suggesting that we reify the abstractions and deny the existence of matter and energy? Or what? (Please correct me if I am misrepresenting what you are proposing.)

As for the number 1, the argument goes forward whether it exists ontologically as some sort of immaterial object or is just an abstraction.

The issue though, is with statements in the argument such as “whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another”, since we now know that everything is made of particles and all particles must be in constant motion. Which raises questions such as whether a state of lack-of-motion is even possible, and from there, whether our common sense cause-and-effect view is naive.

Is everything made of particles… or is everything made of math? Which is it going to be? (Just kidding, ignore this.)

In any case, in the statement “whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another,” motion means change, which means “a reduction from potency to act by something else in act.” So that can’t be conflated with the Newtonian understanding of particles in constant motion, because the two notions are just referring to different things.

Not to mention, in the Newtonian conception, motion is a state, whereas in the Aristotelian conception, motion is change. So the principles at face value agree: a particle stays in motion (Newtonian) unless acted upon by some force. It only changes from its state when it is acted upon. In Aristotelian terms, it has a state (act) but could be in another state (potentiality) only if it is acted upon by something else in act.

A discussion of the compatibilities of Newtonian and Aristotelian motion can be found faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/PSMLM10/PSMLM10.pdf. (I hope you don’t interpret this as didactic or condescending. It just covers the topic in more depth than we can go into here; ignore it if you’d like.)

Too many to mention. Take our relationship with God, take the problem of evil, take all the differing answers.

It should be obvious while this won’t do. You said there were “many” alternatives. I said, fine, at least show me “a few.” And now you say, “Too many to mention.”

I don’t know what “our relationship with God” or “the problem of evil” has to do with it. Could you clarify?

 

[polytropos]

I could take this as continuing the supporters’ agenda that anyone who disagrees with the argument must perforce be in urgent need of education. But if I did want to go beyond what I’ve read in the past, Feser would not be my choice as he has always seemed agenda driven.

I am not suggesting the books because you disagree with the argument. I am only suggesting them because you expressed that you had a dubious introduction to the arguments and because, in my opinion, you have demonstrated a lack of familiarity with them. The problem is not that you disagree with them; I fully expect that, if you read Feser’s books, you would continue to disagree with them. But I think you might also think of some novel, heretofore unanswered objections, in which case we might have a more interesting discussion. (If you said that all of my arguments had been addressed in detail by some author I haven’t read, then I would not begrudge you for referring me to said author, as long as it was not a substitute for argument.)

The other issue is that everyone who writes about the Five Ways has an agenda. The writers of those “tracts” had an agenda, perhaps, to pass off arguments as definitive without sufficient support. You refer to “supporters” of the argument for the Unmoved Mover, who seem to have a zealous agenda and regard the argument as inviolable and sacrosanct. There are biased intro philosophy textbooks, which uncharitably introduce the argument with indefensible premises like “everything has a cause,” and which have an agenda of making religion appear stupid and intellectually nonviable.

So of course Feser has an agenda. But so does everyone. Recognizing that people have agendas is fine and good, but if you let that limit what you read then you shouldn’t read anything. If you want to dispute an argument, it is best to argue against its best supporters, who obviously think the argument is good. Tearing down the arguments of lightweights may be satisfying, but at the end of the day you’ve really accomplished little.

In any case, I think Feser is eminently fair in addressing common objections to the argument.

 

[Portofino]

No it isn’t unless you’re saying that the argument makes a testable prediction, in which case let’s hear it. Otherwise, if it doesn’t make any such predictions, then it cannot be falsified by empirical evidence.

I think my perspective is comparatively similar to yours. Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular makes a number of rather bold predictions, in fact:

1. Jesus will return to judge the living and the dead
2. the resurrection of the body will occur
3. when we die, we will experience either heaven, purgatory, or hell
4. the Church has been entrusted with everything necessary for salvation

Events 1 and 2 are set at some indefinite time in the future; it could be today, or it could be 5,000 years from now, 10,000 years from now, or 100,000 years from now. It could be never – meaning, homo sapiens becomes extinct and Jesus never comes back – but the Second Coming of Christ could only be definitively disproven…when there are no longer human beings left around to disprove it As long as the species homo sapiens exists, there is no way to prove that Jesus isn’t one day coming back.

So, indeed, there’s no way to test this prediction’s falsity, only a means of testing this prediction’s truth (namely, if Jesus does come back, it will prove that this prediction was true).

The same for event 2 – if it doesn’t happen, so long as homo sapiens exist, there’s no way to disprove it; if it does happen, it will be proven.

As of now, I consider it neither proven nor disproven–which, temporally speaking, is obviously the case–and it depends on where one places the burden of proof. I personally don’t believe it (if I was obligated to believe in everything that was neither proven nor disproven, I would have a very cluttered brain! ). I can’t disprove that the world won’t end in 2015, either – the world could end (including through natural causes) at any time. So I cannot falsify the statement, “the world will end in 2015,” either.

As for predictions 3 and 4, there is no way to falsify them experimentally, nor verify them experimentally, until after we’re dead (thus, again in temporal terms, this is neither proven nor disproven). If there’s no afterlife, no one will be in a position to say “it’s disproven” and no believer will ever be obligated to say “I was wrong.”

If there is an afterlife, however, and it is in any way different than what Catholicism posits, then one theoretically would be in a position to say, “it’s disproven”; but I suppose it’s a moot point, because it would be evidence presented not in a court composed of the living, but of the dead.

 

[DanAl]

For example, particles wouldn’t gain mass without the Higgs boson. The consequence is that all particles is moving at the speed of light. Movement seem to be the fundamental condition.

When Aquinas is speaks of “movement” he means something more general: change. the unmoved mover argument can be translated as the unchanged changer argument. I don’t see why change or movement refutes Aquinas, after all, there must be some cause for particles to move at the speed of light.

But the most important argument is supposedly this: Human logic is provedly subjective, non-intutive and highly fallible. You can rarely conlude on reality, based on philosophy alone. You can be easily mistanken om premises.

is logic subjective? that seems like a self-defeater, you could not even prove that logic is subjective because the argument is subjective as well.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I’m not sure whether to report you. I did take a position on one thread for science and against the neutered version of philosophy often seen on the internet, but you have no right to call me a proponent of scientism. Jumping threads and in particular questioning the sincerity of my beliefs are against forum rules.

So either report me or report yourself, but try not to use your inability to understand others as an excuse for personal attacks. Consider in particular that on the internet there is no defense against someone who questions your identity and your values, which makes it the most despicable possible form of bullying.

QUOTES by Inocente
1.
Although come to mention it the unmoved mover argument does have attributes of a whacky theory: it’s based on arcane and somewhat convoluted concepts, makes no testable predictions, and as regards the notion that it proves a personal deity :-
2.
The issue though, is with statements in the argument such as “whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another”, since we now know that everything is made of particles and all particles must be in constant motion. Which raises questions such as whether a state of lack-of-motion is even possible, and from there, whether our common sense cause-and-effect view is naive.
3.
No it isn’t unless you’re saying that the argument makes a testable prediction, in which case let’s hear it. Otherwise, if it doesn’t make any such predictions, then it cannot be falsified by empirical evidence.
The article you cited makes the common assumption that the argument is about God, but even in the form given by Aquinas the argument only attempts to prove a first cause rather than establish its nature.
5.
Only by virtue of bafflement do we then throw up our hands and plead that it must be God for what else could it be (or as Thomas puts it more kindly “to which everyone gives the name of God”).
6.
But pasta-ists would likewise assume it’s the Flying Spaghetti Monster and Yoda would assume it’s the Force, powerful it is.
7.
I know there are supplementary arguments, but if the purpose of this type of argument is to “prove” God, it turns out there’s a much simpler alternative available even unto the unwashed, known as faith, which approves of much does Christ.
8.
Talking like Yoda hard it is now to stop.

Quote: ( from Polytropos )
The other issue of course is that people who are educated in the field of philosophy of religion - including atheists - are probably less likely to reject the cosmological argument out of hand than the typically college graduate. Whether someone educated in chemistry or English finds numerous flaws in the cosmological argument really means nothing as an appeal to authority, since they are not experts on such matters. What matters is whether professional philosophers of religion take the argument and its proponents seriously. And they do.( end quote )
9.
Then most of those who accept the argument also do so without understanding it!
10.
If the machinery behind the argument really is so complicated that it requires as much training as brain surgery or quantum physics, most people won’t have that training and so can only accept or reject it as an argument from authority.
11.
In which case we have to ask what do these professional philosophers of religion think they are doing? If they can find no way to explain these complexities to the unwashed then all they can ever do is perpetuate their isolated way of life.
12.
I mean if they can provide no evidence for their conclusions other than “trust me I’m a professional philosopher of religion”, how do we know all that training isn’t really just a lengthy acquisition of special glasses to see convoluted concepts which only exist in the minds of those who have gone through the indoctrination rites?
13.
Anyhow, I think this adds to my point that if after 80 posts there’s no agreement on what “truth” means, nor on whether an infinitely old universe is or isn’t a paradox, and now on who is qualified even to discuss such things, then likely objective the argument isn’t.
Though many would say the number 1 is real, and unlike physicalists, idealists would say fundamentally reality is ideas. Even some physicalists say that since math underlies all physical law, perhaps math is all there is. For example, string theory tries to explain everything in terms of different geometrical arrangements, where cause and effect and all else also comes down to geometry. Which may well be wrong but points to an underlying assumption in the argument that material bodies are more than just math. Our common sense can fool us.

It is pretty clear that these comments prove what I said. You have an unreasonable prejudice against philosophy. You have not tried to disprove it, you have only ridiculed it via numerous ad hominems of the science itself and of the people who employ it.

You clearly regard science as the only source of truth outside Faith. That puts you in the camp of scientism, whether you like it or not.

And that naturally raises the question; how can one who is convinced that all truth must be " falsefiable " regard Faith as a source of truth? How does one reconcile the two in the same mind?.

So, make the most of it. As you please.

Linus2nd

 

[Portofino]

You cannot be a proponent of scientism and be a Christian of any sort. I understand why one who holds such a position would attack Thomistic Philoslophy. But I don’t understand how they could be a Christian, a Muslim, or a Jew

Hmm… I think the term “scientism” may be misleading; I would categorize scientism as belonging to the larger category of empiricism, and even those who demand empirical evidence for some forms of truth claims do not necessarily demand empirical evidence for all of them (so the argument becomes over which truth claims need to be empirically demonstrated, and which don’t).

There are some truths of Christianity that could only definitively be proven empirically; failing that, one does the best one can, but it is not controversial to acknowledge that only empirical evidence would constitute a smoking gun. Even the word “empirical” is a big-sounding word; a more colloquial way of expressing it is to speak of actual events/occurrences/happenings (which, by definition, are empirical, are related to experience).

Two examples are the resurrection of Jesus and the virgin birth. These are claimed to have been events/happenings/occurrences; therefore, any evidence in support of these propositions would have to be empirical in nature. No argument from pure metaphysics could ever be sufficient to demonstrate the truth of these claims, because the resurrection of Jesus and the virgin birth are claimed to be historical events that manifested themselves in the world of experience.

The Second Coming of Christ also will need to be proven empirically, or not at all. Metaphysics alone cannot get the job done. This too, I think, is not a controversial notion – if it happens, consider it proven. Until it happens, it is not yet proven. Since the burden of proof is on those who would adduce positive evidence for the Second Coming, not to believe in it does not beg the question.

I think the failure to see eye to eye – which is profound – is between those who consider metaphysical proofs for the existence of God to be akin to pure logic or mathematics (in which case the expectation of empirical verification is not relevant), and those who consider that metaphysical proofs for the existence of God to have at least “one foot” in what should be observable, testable phenomenon (in the physical world, the world of events and phenomenon).

For me, the ultimate smoking gun in demonstrating the truth of Christianity would be the Second Coming of Christ, if and when it occurs. This will be all the empirical verification one could ever need or ask for This single event would settle the whole matter.

I see metaphysical proofs as arguments breathing with one lung; it may be possible to breathe with one lung (as a metaphor for considering the matter sufficiently proven) but even pro-metaphysics people can agree that there ideally would be empirical means of testing and verifying their metaphysical assertions. The Second Coming of Christ – an empirical event – would do this. It would supply a second lung to the whole affair – it would be the ultimate “bingo” moment, in terms of quieting the skeptics and naysayers, who can always squabble over the definition of metaphysical terms and of whether metaphysical truth claims need to be empirically testable. It will be not only the smoking gun, but the firing of the gun itself.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Hmm… I think the term “scientism” may be misleading; I would categorize scientism as belonging to the larger category of empiricism, and even those who demand empirical evidence for some forms of truth claims do not necessarily demand empirical evidence for all of them (so the argument becomes over which truth claims need to be empirically demonstrated, and which don’t).

There are some truths of Christianity that could only definitively be proven empirically; failing that, one does the best one can, but it is not controversial to acknowledge that only empirical evidence would constitute a smoking gun. Even the word “empirical” is a big-sounding word; a more colloquial way of expressing it is to speak of actual events/occurrences/happenings (which, by definition, are empirical, are related to experience).

Two examples are the resurrection of Jesus and the virgin birth. These are claimed to have been events/happenings/occurrences; therefore, any evidence in support of these propositions would have to be empirical in nature. No argument from pure metaphysics could ever be sufficient to demonstrate the truth of these claims, because the resurrection of Jesus and the virgin birth are claimed to be historical events that manifested themselves in the world of experience.

The Second Coming of Christ also will need to be proven empirically, or not at all. Metaphysics alone cannot get the job done. This too, I think, is not a controversial notion – if it happens, consider it proven. Until it happens, it is not yet proven. Since the burden of proof is on those who would adduce positive evidence for the Second Coming, not to believe in it does not beg the question.

I think the failure to see eye to eye – which is profound – is between those who consider metaphysical proofs for the existence of God to be akin to pure logic or mathematics (in which case the expectation of empirical verification is not relevant), and those who consider that metaphysical proofs for the existence of God to have at least “one foot” in what should be observable, testable phenomenon (in the physical world, the world of events and phenomenon).

For me, the ultimate smoking gun in demonstrating the truth of Christianity would be the Second Coming of Christ, if and when it occurs. This will be all the empirical verification one could ever need or ask for This single event would settle the whole matter.

I see metaphysical proofs as arguments breathing with one lung; it may be possible to breathe with one lung (as a metaphor for considering the matter sufficiently proven) but even pro-metaphysics people can agree that there ideally would be empirical means of testing and verifying their metaphysical assertions. The Second Coming of Christ – an empirical event – would do this. It would supply a second lung to the whole affair – it would be the ultimate “bingo” moment, in terms of quieting the skeptics and naysayers, who can always squabble over the definition of metaphysical terms and of whether metaphysical truth claims need to be empirically testable. It will be not only the smoking gun, but the firing of the gun itself.

The point I wanted to make, intended to make, is that if the criteria of " falsifiable " is the only criteria for evaluating the truth value of a position, then how does Faith survive that criteria? It’s a reasonable question. The answer is that there are different types of truth, common sense truth, empirical or scientific truth, philosophical truth, and the Truth of Faith.

Linus2nd

 

[Ismael]

I’m a young, foreign apologist, and I’ve become intrigued with A-T metaphysics after reading Feser’s “The Last Superstition”.

Sorry if this a simple question, but I’m a newbie at Thomism and it’s one I’ve been confronted with as a “refutation” of Aristotelian metaphysics and Aquinas’ first mover:

For example, particles wouldn’t gain mass without the Higgs boson. The consequence is that all particles is moving at the speed of light. Movement seem to be the fundamental condition.

But the most important argument is supposedly this: Human logic is provedly subjective, non-intutive and highly fallible. You can rarely conlude on reality, based on philosophy alone. You can be easily mistanken om premises.

Nothing in logical and physical state aren’t neccesarily alike. Standstill isn’t neccesarily a fundamental condition.

Time is likey to be an emergent property, which makes all arguments on events that led to the origin of the universe based on understanding something that’s presently outside all human cognitive faculty to understand.

Well first of all not all particles gain mass through the higgs boson, rather the Higgs mechanism is involved in the generation of masses for “weak force” bosons in electroweak theory.

In this theory there is a ‘break of symmetry’ and the higgs mechanism is one of the possible solutions (yes the Higgs boson is still theoretical, even after the LHC results they are not completely sure they observed an Higgs boson.

–

Second ‘what is motion’? Special relativity asks this question and shows that (linear) motion is relative.

If I ride on a train the train is ‘still’ in my perspective and the world around is moving. A person in a station will see it otherwise.

Wa we CAN agree upon is CHANGE, i.e. that something accelerates or changes direction.

That is the notion of ‘motion’ that Aquinas takes… and I think that works well in modern physics too.

A particle that moves with constant linear velocity (no change in velocity or direction) could be though as in a ‘state’. Some people might see it move at speed v. Some people will see it at rest, depending on their own frame of reference.

So the ‘unmoved mover’ is not like a motor that moves something while standing still itself, but rather means something that is in itself changeless but can bring change.

Moreover I would be very ware to ‘absolute reduction’ into physics.

The unmoved mover is a metaphysical concept, not something that is readily testable in the realm of physics.

====

Another note:

terminology and understanding thereof is fundamental in any discussion. When people speak of motion, substance, essence, color, flavor, etc… in different contexts they often also mean very differen thigs.

… unless you really believe a quark is really ‘green’ or ‘blue’ or ‘red’…

 

[polytropos]

Two examples are the resurrection of Jesus and the virgin birth. These are claimed to have been events/happenings/occurrences; therefore, any evidence in support of these propositions would have to be empirical in nature. No argument from pure metaphysics could ever be sufficient to demonstrate the truth of these claims, because the resurrection of Jesus and the virgin birth are claimed to be historical events that manifested themselves in the world of experience.

True. I would add that, although they are not supported by pure metaphysics, metaphysics may influence our interpretation of the evidence. One who accepts through philosophical argument that there is an intelligent, good, omnipotent Unmoved Mover does not have as much reason as the strict materialist does to reject the resurrection on a purely philosophical basis. I think that is an important point, since many scholars reject the resurrection on philosophical grounds even without a thoroughly plausible alternative theory.

Then, if one believes in the resurrection of Jesus, one might understand why an immaculate conception and virgin birth might have been necessary, in which case it isn’t so much a matter of having historical evidence that stands on its own but of having a biblical account that is philosophically coherent (as opposed to believing that the biblical account is legendary, which might cause philosophical problems).

I think the failure to see eye to eye – which is profound – is between those who consider metaphysical proofs for the existence of God to be akin to pure logic or mathematics (in which case the expectation of empirical verification is not relevant), and those who consider that metaphysical proofs for the existence of God to have at least “one foot” in what should be observable, testable phenomenon (in the physical world, the world of events and phenomenon).

Perhaps I don’t know what you’re getting at with this distinction. Metaphysical proofs do have one foot in the observable, since their premises are based on observations of the world. I do, however, think that their premises apply universally - it would not make sense to deny that a per se causal series has finite elements, it would not make sense to say that potencies come about uncaused, change occurs, etc. The disagreement does not seem to me to be over whether the proofs should have any grounding in observation but what would count as evidence for or against them.

I think someone could certainly say, “I don’t see a hole in the argument, but I need to see the smoking gun before I will believe.” And I think if that is someone’s attitude, no philosophical argument could have convinced him in the first place, and the philosopher has done all that he can. That is, perhaps, where faith comes in.

The Second Coming of Christ – an empirical event – would do this. It would supply a second lung to the whole affair – it would be the ultimate “bingo” moment, in terms of quieting the skeptics and naysayers, who can always squabble over the definition of metaphysical terms and of whether metaphysical truth claims need to be empirically testable. It will be not only the smoking gun, but the firing of the gun itself.

Of course, it will all be certain at the Second Coming of Christ, “the firing of the gun itself.” I take the argument as an attempt to show that right now there is an unfired gun, and it would be best to get out of the line of fire.

 

[inocente]

Well a full understanding of the argument reveals that God has to actualise all potency since more cannot come from less and change is the reduction of potency to actuality. That which is brought into actuality does not have intrinsic to its own nature the power of actuality which is intrinsic to the First Cause since it is receiving the power to act and is therefore merely a medium to the power it receives and is not the power itself.

Therefore God cannot be thought of as merely a deistic God who puts the universe in auto pilot. However God does let the universe evolve or move according to its inherent nature.

Linux is correct. On the contrary, it does follow that the Unmoved Mover is not a deistic god. The argument begins from any instance of change, including anything happening right now (like, say, you blinking your eyes as you read this post). As you’ll recall, it makes reference of per se causal series, which are simultaneous, so the argument shows that any change right now requires the existence of an Unmoved Mover (and because there could be no distinction between “two” things which are Pure Act, every change is in fact caused by the same Unmoved Mover).

I’ve never seen it claimed before that the unmoved mover can’t leave. Perhaps one of you could highlight the relevant point in the translation here.

 

[inocente]

The argument says nothing about the creation of the universe. As has been discussed at length in this topic, Aquinas did not believe that it was philosophically demonstrable that God created the universe (or that the universe had a finite past).

Perhaps it’s how you said it, but unless the unmoved mover necessarily created the universe, it isn’t the Creator God of Genesis.

What do you mean by “an underlying assumption in the argument that material bodies are more than just math”? Are you math?

Could well be. Atoms are virtually all space, and E = mc[sup]2[/sup] says that energy, mass and space-time (through the c[sup]2[/sup]) are related, therefore matter is no more or less a substance than energy, space or time. What are they all then? Well, they can all be represented by math, and it’s a bit mystifying why this should be unless they are math. That’s just some peoples’ guess, the string theorists and fellow travelers, but it seems whatever it is, it will be similarly surprising. If this is new to you, you’ll need to mull it around a while.

You seem to allow that this might be wrong, but if you want to use it as an objection you’d have to argue for it positively. To me this seems like a bad example of modern eliminativism. Physical laws are mathematical abstractions about relationships between matter and energy. So are you suggesting that we reify the abstractions and deny the existence of matter and energy? Or what? (Please correct me if I am misrepresenting what you are proposing.)

From the above, energy, mass and space-time are related. We also know that all things affect all other things through the inverse square law, etc. So in some deep sense all is one.

Philosophically, everything is what it is because of everything else, and without everything being how it is, nothing would be as it is. Which sounds rather Eastern mystic when put like that.

*Is everything made of particles… or is everything made of math? Which is it going to be? (Just kidding, ignore this.)

In any case, in the statement “whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another,” motion* means change, which means “a reduction from potency to act by something else in act.” So that can’t be conflated with the Newtonian understanding of particles in constant motion, because the two notions are just referring to different things.

At our scale level there are things, at a much smaller scale things are made of particles, and particles are waves, and waves are motion and cannot be otherwise.

Not to mention, in the Newtonian conception, motion is a state, whereas in the Aristotelian conception, motion is change. So the principles at face value agree: a particle stays in motion (Newtonian) unless acted upon by some force. It only changes from its state when it is acted upon. In Aristotelian terms, it has a state (act) but could be in another state (potentiality) only if it is acted upon by something else in act.

From all the above, since everything is everything, and everything is made of waves, and waves are motion and cannot be otherwise, the attempt to divide the world into things with various states of motion (change) is an artifact of how we see the world at our scale.

Which reminds me of a really cool demonstration of scale - htwins.net/scale2/

A discussion of the compatibilities of Newtonian and Aristotelian motion can be found faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/PSMLM10/PSMLM10.pdf. (I hope you don’t interpret this as didactic or condescending. It just covers the topic in more depth than we can go into here; ignore it if you’d like.)

Not at all, thanks it looks interesting, I’ll try to read some of it tomorrow.

*It should be obvious while this won’t do. You said there were “many” alternatives. I said, fine, at least show me “a few.” And now you say, “Too many to mention.”

I don’t know what “our relationship with God” or “the problem of evil” has to do with it. Could you clarify?*

The continuum from all-good to all-evil is a large space. Where is the unmoved mover in this space, and why (using only the first way)?

Then similarly, our relationship, for example does the argument say we are in the unmoved mover’s image? I think I can guess the answer to that.

 

[inocente]

I am not suggesting the books because you disagree with the argument. I am only suggesting them because you expressed that you had a dubious introduction to the arguments and because, in my opinion, you have demonstrated a lack of familiarity with them. The problem is not that you disagree with them; I fully expect that, if you read Feser’s books, you would continue to disagree with them. But I think you might also think of some novel, heretofore unanswered objections, in which case we might have a more interesting discussion. (If you said that all of my arguments had been addressed in detail by some author I haven’t read, then I would not begrudge you for referring me to said author, as long as it was not a substitute for argument.)

The other issue is that everyone who writes about the Five Ways has an agenda. The writers of those “tracts” had an agenda, perhaps, to pass off arguments as definitive without sufficient support. You refer to “supporters” of the argument for the Unmoved Mover, who seem to have a zealous agenda and regard the argument as inviolable and sacrosanct. There are biased intro philosophy textbooks, which uncharitably introduce the argument with indefensible premises like “everything has a cause,” and which have an agenda of making religion appear stupid and intellectually nonviable.

So of course Feser has an agenda. But so does everyone. Recognizing that people have agendas is fine and good, but if you let that limit what you read then you shouldn’t read anything. If you want to dispute an argument, it is best to argue against its best supporters, who obviously think the argument is good. Tearing down the arguments of lightweights may be satisfying, but at the end of the day you’ve really accomplished little.

In any case, I think Feser is eminently fair in addressing common objections to the argument.

I prefer either to read someone who is agnostic to an argument, or to read a dialog where advocates put views in turn. The problem with book-length prose is it tends towards argument by verbosity - read one book and be completely in favor of the motion, read another and be completely against. When exploring science it’s good to read the original papers first, even if we don’t understand everything. When exploring philosophy it’s also good to start from the horse’s mouth, then go on to articles written by authors with opposing views, such as in the Stanford encyclopedia. Imho.

PS: Sorry ran out of time, will respond to your other post tomorrow, God willing.

 

[inocente]

A discussion of the compatibilities of Newtonian and Aristotelian motion can be found faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/PSMLM10/PSMLM10.pdf. (I hope you don’t interpret this as didactic or condescending. It just covers the topic in more depth than we can go into here; ignore it if you’d like.)

I read Feser’s paper and made some notes. Sad to say I was hoping for something great but was sorely disappointed. The main problem is a basic mistake, as if he never completed high school physics.

The howler appears in several places starting on p.5 (II.1) and destroys his case. He argues that a continued state of uniform motion needs to be explained, questioning if it really is a state and implying there needs to be some agency maintaining the motion (a “necessarily existing intelligent substance or substances" on p.12).

But a state of uniform motion is exactly the same as a state of rest, the only difference is the observer’s frame of reference. There is no more need to explain uniform motion than lack of motion.

Also the quote at the top of p.11 shows clearly that act and potency are not valid concepts. In one inertial frame (the one implied) the body moves past A, B and C and so has the potency. In another inertial frame, not mentioned, the body is stationary and A, B and C move past it, thus they have the potency instead. The supposed potency is an artifact of the observer.

On p. 8 he makes the often repeated plea that science cannot tell us about the intrinsic character of reality while metaphysics can, but these basic errors show that, in his case at least, what individual philosophers hold to be intrinsic is relative to how they see the world, not how the world is.

 

[inocente]

inocente;11118178:

No it isn’t unless you’re saying that the argument makes a testable prediction, in which case let’s hear it. Otherwise, if it doesn’t make any such predictions, then it cannot be falsified by empirical evidence.

I think my perspective is comparatively similar to yours. Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular makes a number of rather bold predictions, in fact:

1. Jesus will return to judge the living and the dead
2. the resurrection of the body will occur
3. when we die, we will experience either heaven, purgatory, or hell
4. the Church has been entrusted with everything necessary for salvation

Events 1 and 2 are set at some indefinite time in the future; it could be today, or it could be 5,000 years from now, 10,000 years from now, or 100,000 years from now. It could be never – meaning, homo sapiens becomes extinct and Jesus never comes back – but the Second Coming of Christ could only be definitively disproven…when there are no longer human beings left around to disprove it As long as the species homo sapiens exists, there is no way to prove that Jesus isn’t one day coming back.

So, indeed, there’s no way to test this prediction’s falsity, only a means of testing this prediction’s truth (namely, if Jesus does come back, it will prove that this prediction was true).

Agreed though I think we shouldn’t treat God like a natural phenomenon.

Also, I was asking whether the argument makes a prediction about the unmoved mover, not whether Christianity makes a prediction/prophecy, sorry for any confusion.

*As for predictions 3 and 4, there is no way to falsify them experimentally, nor verify them experimentally, until after we’re dead (thus, again in temporal terms, this is neither proven nor disproven). If there’s no afterlife, no one will be in a position to say “it’s disproven” and no believer will ever be obligated to say “I was wrong.”

If there is an afterlife, however, and it is in any way different than what Catholicism posits, then one theoretically would be in a position to say, “it’s disproven”; but I suppose it’s a moot point, because it would be evidence presented not in a court composed of the living, but of the dead.*

Agreed, and the latest fashionable hope of a sign, NDE, appears to have an alternative explanation:

“These data demonstrate that the mammalian brain can, albeit paradoxically, generate neural correlates of heightened conscious processing at near-death” - pnas.org/content/early/2013/08/08/1308285110

 

[Portofino]

Also, I was asking whether the argument makes a prediction about the unmoved mover, not whether Christianity makes a prediction/prophecy, sorry for any confusion.QUOTE]

I see No, I can’t imagine the existence of an unmoved mover would be testable in that sense. One could posit, “if the unmoved mover didn’t exist, then the universe as we know it could not exist, period,” but there obviously would be no way to “pull the plug” on the unmoved mover for even a moment, to show what would happen in its absence (one can only hypothesize what would happen in its absence, at least by the standards of scientific method; correct me if you disagree).

That doesn’t in itself mean that the unmoved mover “hypothesis” (again, which is how a scientist might describe it) is untrue, merely that the squabbling over definitions involved in the unmoved mover argument will probably continue indefinitely (the proof stands or falls with the definition one ascribes to words, and whether one can demonstrate that these definitions “hook up” with the things themselves, with not even a hairline of disparity). Hard to demonstrate this. Bacon, whom I’ve been reading lately, made the obsservation that nature, no matter how subtle the reasonings of the human mind, was more subtle still in its operations (Zeno’s paradox? ). Thus, we needed to yoke ourselves to the “things themselves” as much as possible, and not so easily trust our conceptual definitions of them (e.g., substance, causality,).

I read recently that, if Einstein’s relativity theory had not received confirmation through the prediction it made regarding the measurements taken during the solar eclipse of 1919, disagreements among scientists over this theory would have continued for possibly another few decades. Once the solar eclipse occurred and it was determined that the Einsteinian predicted measurements were spot-on, while the Newtonian ones had a margin of error, scientific critics of the relativity theory “hung their heads”, so to speak, and admitted defeat (or so I’ve read).

If Jesus comes back, no amount of reasoning will permit one not to “admit defeat,” if one was a naysayer. William James once wrote that, “reality is that which pushes back,” and thus denying the divinity of Jesus (like denying the efficacy of gravity) would indeed “push back,” in a most definitive way

p.s. Zeno’s paradox, insofar as I understand it, makes a prediction – movement from point A to point B should be impossible. Yet, insofar as we empirically know that it is possible to get from point A to point B, we also know that Zeno’s reasoning (no matter how subtle and ingenious, and indeed incontrovertible on paper) must be wrong. skeptoid.com/episodes/4267

 

[Linux]

That doesn’t in itself mean that the unmoved mover “hypothesis” (again, which is how a scientist might describe it) is untrue

A knowledgeable scientist would say that a “God hypothesis” is not a hypothesis at all precisely because its untestable.

 

[polytropos]

I’ve never seen it claimed before that the unmoved mover can’t leave. Perhaps one of you could highlight the relevant point in the translation here.

As I’ve said, the Five Ways in the Summa Theologica are summaries of proofs that Aquinas gives in more detail elsewhere (for example, in Summa contra Gentiles). Nevertheless, the point stands from what is written here. Look at the last few sentences of the First Way:

If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

It should be clear from the example that Aquinas is using, “as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand.” This is an example of simultaneous and derived causality (a per se causal series, as opposed to a per accidens causal series in which each element has in a sense its own causal power). That would imply that there would have to be an Unmoved Mover at the moment of any given change. Since change is always occurring (I assume most would concede that much), the Unmoved Mover is always here.

Besides that, one might note that the Unmoved Mover, as Pure Act, cannot change, and so he couldn’t decide to “leave” (whatever that would mean in this context).

unless the unmoved mover necessarily created the universe, it isn’t the Creator God of Genesis.

I don’t think it can be “necessarily” demonstrated through philosophical argument that the Unmoved Mover created the universe. It is, as I’ve said before, an article of faith.

(I would agree that the Unmoved Mover would have to have created the universe in order for it to be the Creator God of Genesis. What I am not claiming is that we can know through philosophical argument that the Unmoved Mover did such a thing. But it wouldn’t follow then that the Unmoved Mover did not create the universe.)

Could well be. Atoms are virtually all space, and E = mc[sup]2[/sup] says that energy, mass and space-time (through the c[sup]2[/sup]) are related, therefore matter is no more or less a substance than energy, space or time. What are they all then? Well, they can all be represented by math, and it’s a bit mystifying why this should be unless they are math. That’s just some peoples’ guess, the string theorists and fellow travelers, but it seems whatever it is, it will be similarly surprising. If this is new to you, you’ll need to mull it around a while.

The bolded portion is a massive non-sequitur: math can represent some aspects of matter and energy; therefore matter and energy are math. (I think few, even among those beholden to scientism, would claim that math can represent all aspects of matter and energy.) It would also remain to be defined just what it would mean for everything to be made of math, which as I’ve said is generally taken to be an abstraction. If everything is abstracted, then from whence and by whom was it abstracted?

From the above, energy, mass and space-time are related. We also know that all things affect all other things through the inverse square law, etc. So in some deep sense all is one.

Philosophically, everything is what it is because of everything else, and without everything being how it is, nothing would be as it is.

I am not sure what the relevance of this is. No one is denying that energy, mass, and space-time are related.

At our scale level there are things, at a much smaller scale things are made of particles, and particles are waves, and waves are motion and cannot be otherwise.

From all the above, since everything is everything, and everything is made of waves, and waves are motion and cannot be otherwise, the attempt to divide the world into things with various states of motion (change) is an artifact of how we see the world at our scale.

Except I have provided justification as to why the principles I’m using (the act/potency distinction, the principle of causality) apply just as much to the molecular level as to any other level. What you are providing is a lot of scientific language and handwaving, without actually showing how “the attempt to divide the world into things with various states of motion (change) is an artifact of how we see the world at our scale.” Whether everything is composed of particles or waves does not really bear on the principle of causality or act/potency distinction - unless you show how it does.

 

[polytropos]

Then similarly, our relationship, for example does the argument say we are in the unmoved mover’s image? I think I can guess the answer to that.

As the article mentioned, the Unmoved Mover is intelligent (“Finally, as the source of all change, this prime mover would be the ultimate cause of things coming to have the qualities and attributes that they do – eminently, if not formally. Inasmuch as that would include all powers, we would conclude that this being is all powerful and all knowledgeable.”). Scholastics like Aquinas took humans to be “rational animals,” so we are created in the Unmoved Mover’s image insofar that we are rational and intellectual (that is what, in the classical theistic understanding, it means for us to be created in God’s image).

I imagine that this is a conclusion you would disagree with. It is based on other disciplines like philosophy of mind. A defense of this position would be another topic entirely (whether or not rationality and intellect are “real,” whether or not they succumb to a materialistic explanation, etc.). The current point is that the assumption that Aquinas (or any other classical theistic thinker) did not address all of these issues is simply prejudicial and false.

I’m not sure what you think Aquinas wrote in his several thousand pages of philosophy. From the things you would say, it would seem as though you think he wrote the Five Ways and left the rest of the pages blank. I don’t know why you smugly act like it’s obvious that defenders of his arguments simply haven’t thought of things like this.

The continuum from all-good to all-evil is a large space. Where is the unmoved mover in this space, and why (using only the first way)?

I don’t think that, upon brief reflection, there are nearly as many options as you propose. Good and evil either are ontological or merely conventional realities. If they are ontological, then the Unmoved Mover would have to be either all-good or all-evil, since any other position on the continuum would consist of a lack and so would be ruled out with respect to a being which is Pure Act. If good and evil are merely conventional, then they obviously cannot be attributed in any absolute sense to the Unmoved Mover. So there are really only three possibilities, even on a pre-Thomistic analysis:
1). God is all-good.
2). God is all-evil.
3). God is neutral.

As Aquinas says (Summa Theologiae Ia6.1):

We should especially associate goodness with God. For something is good in so far as it is desirable. But everything desires its perfection, and an effects perfection and form consists in resembling its efficient cause (since every efficient cause produces an effect like itself). So an efficient cause itself is desirable and good, what is desired from it being a share in resembling it. Clearly, then, since God is the first efficient cause of everything, goodness and desirability belong to him.

If I have time, I will try to write up a more comprehensive defense of the Unmoved Mover’s goodness in the next few days. For now, hopefully this short bit will suffice. I’ll add that desirability here does not refer to conscious desirability, as it might with respect to human desires, so Aquinas is not arguing that the largely unconscious world “desires” anything consciously. He is largely referring to directedness and final causality inherent in things’ forms, and that things are objectively good insofar that they instantiate their forms (ie. a triangle drawn with straight lines is better than a triangle drawn with slightly curved lines, a dog with four legs is better than a dog with three legs, etc.).

This conclusion, also, I suppose you would reject. But it is pretty clear that those defending arguments like these do not leave the Unmoved Mover’s qualities unanswered.

The last point I would make is that, even if one is a committed nominalist, for instance, and denies that there is goodness inherent in the instantiation of things’ forms (or that we could come to know that goodness), and therefore that the Unmoved Mover is Goodness Itself (or that we could come to know that the Unmoved Mover is Goodness Itself), it would not bear on the existence of the Unmoved Mover or any of its other qualities per se. As such, one might still know that we are made in the Unmoved Mover’s image as intellectual (and likely uniquely so) and that we are sustained in being by the Unmoved Mover at every instant. Given that the disjunction between all-goodness, all-evilness, and neutrality that I previously mentioned, I’d argue that there is still a strong case for associating the Unmoved Mover with goodness - at least enough that one might be able to consider the Unmoved Mover in light of the major monotheistic religions, which, as I have consistently maintained, is a move of faith.

 

[polytropos]

I read Feser’s paper and made some notes. Sad to say I was hoping for something great but was sorely disappointed. The main problem is a basic mistake, as if he never completed high school physics.

The howler appears in several places starting on p.5 (II.1) and destroys his case. He argues that a continued state of uniform motion needs to be explained, questioning if it really is a state and implying there needs to be some agency maintaining the motion (a “necessarily existing intelligent substance or substances" on p.12).

But a state of uniform motion is exactly the same as a state of rest, the only difference is the observer’s frame of reference. There is no more need to explain uniform motion than lack of motion.

I think you’ve mischaracterized what Feser argues. He is not questioning whether or not it is mathematically precise to characterize Newtonian motion as a state. He certainly is not denying what the principle of inertia claims (that an object in motion will remain in uniform motion unless acted upon by an external force). But like Kepler’s laws do not explain why the planets behave as they do (they just describe how they behave), Newton’s principle of inertia does not explain why objects in uniform motion behave as they do. And just like Kepler’s laws do not warrant the conclusion that the planets just behave as they do with “no more need” of an explanation, Newton’s principle of inertia does not eliminate the need of an explanation for uniform motion. What you have done here is restate the principle of inertia, but that is simply missing the point of what Feser has argued.

Furthermore, you claim he’s made a “basic mistake” by failing to understand that states of motion and of rest are the same when considered in different inertial reference frames, but Feser specifically addresses the issue of different reference frames throughout the paper; it’s not like it ignores what the principle of inertia has to say about them, as someone might suppose by only reading your thoughts. So again, having read Feser’s paper, you have just reasserted that the principle of inertia shows that uniform motion and rest are “exactly the same” and need no explanation, when that is precisely what is at issue.

Feser also considers a few different interpretations of the principle of inertia. The point of the whole paper is whether considering Newtonian motion either as real change or as a state has any bearing on the principle of causality. To say that rest and motion are the same does not really accomplish much, since Feser argues that whether you think it’s real change or a state, it does not circumvent the principle of causality; while I think Feser favors the interpretation that Newtonian motion is real change, he goes on to argue that even if one does not take that interpretation, it does nothing to undermine the principle of causality. You have in no way addressed that point in your response, even though it was perhaps the central point of the paper.

Also the quote at the top of p.11 shows clearly that act and potency are not valid concepts. In one inertial frame (the one implied) the body moves past A, B and C and so has the potency. In another inertial frame, not mentioned, the body is stationary and A, B and C move past it, thus they have the potency instead. The supposed potency is an artifact of the observer.

A, B, and C are spatial locations, not objects; it does not make sense for them to have potency. Certainly, we may think of another inertial reference frame in which A, B, and C move past a stationary body, but that does not undermine the act/potency distinction in the way you imply it does. The body is stationary, but it is still actually at A and has the potential to be at B and C. It goes on to B, and is then actually at A and has the potential to be at C. Thinking of the body as stationary does not change its actualities and potencies; they are not relative to the observer.

What is at issue (and what you have not addressed) is whether there is no cause for those changes in location.

I start classes next week. I probably will only be able to fit in 1 or 2 more rounds of posts, but then I will need to spend a little less time on CA.

 

[Portofino]

I don’t think that, upon brief reflection, there are nearly as many options as you propose. Good and evil either are ontological or merely conventional realities. If they are ontological, then the Unmoved Mover would have to be either all-good or all-evil, since any other position on the continuum would consist of a lack and so would be ruled out with respect to a being which is Pure Act.

Perhaps it’s the duality between good and evil that is itself a man-made convention (the poet Blake wrote, “the roaring of lions, the howling of wolves, the raging of the stormy sea, and the destructive sword, are portions of eternity too great for the eye of man”). Thus, if one accepts that the Unmoved Mover is pure actuality, it is not that it must be either all good or all evil; rather, it is simply All.

This is not so dissimilar from Eastern thought (Easterners accuse us westerners of creating artificial dualities, binary oppositions, where there are only gradations). The yin/yang; the Tao, a complete circle. The concepts “good” and “evil” are the human conventions, whereas the All encompasses both, and – at the same time – transcends such binary oppositions.

such, one might still know that we are made in the Unmoved Mover’s image as intellectual (and likely uniquely so) and that we are sustained in being by the Unmoved Mover at every instant.

Matter can be neither created, nor destroyed; it only changes form. The destruction of a plant, of an animal, of a building, of a consciousness would be simply a change of form. It would seem that the existence of matter (animate or inanimate) would thus be identified with the good, not the continued existence of “you” or “I”, or “he” or “she” in particular. “You” or “I”, “he” or “she” are but ephemeral, whereas the basic building blocks – the basic material – of time, space, matter and energy will perdure. Whether that matter-energy is conscious or unconsciousness would seem to be a matter of indifference; a conscious, living body becomes a non-conscious, non-living body, and yet existence perdures.

the disjunction between all-goodness, all-evilness, and neutrality that I previously mentioned, I’d argue that there is still a strong case for associating the Unmoved Mover with goodness

I think a case could also be made for the Unmoved Mover existing beyond good and evil, as something that just is. Perhaps we conceive of it in terms of dualities – “all good, not at all evil” – because we are the imperfect beings, that cannot help but think – with our limited minds – of the universe as a duality, not a unity. When we walk the streets of a city, we see only separation and difference. When we become airborne, looking at from above, we see the larger pattern of interconnectedness and unity.

On quite a different level, a faith level, Jesus being “fully God and fully man” (100% of both?) has never posed any conceptual problems, so I don’t see why “fully good, fully evil” or “neither good, neither evil; it is the All, the totality of everything” should pose a problem. Catholics are the great champions of “Both/And”, as opposed to “Either/Or”, so this more Eastern conception would simply be adding yet another “Both/And” to the equation.