It seems to commit you to the view that reality is intrinsically ordered to some end by its very nature, at least at some level of reality. In other words, some things behave they way they do because of what their nature is. So it seems to be bringing formal causality back into the picture.
I’m not sure I would use that terminology. In my opinion, it doesn’t simplify the ideas at hand. In particular, I don’t see how “this object behaves as it does because of what its nature is” is any clearer than “this object behaves as it does because of what it is”. “Nature” is just a filler word that creates the illusion of depth.
Denying this seems to lead to having to stipulate that all the order we experience is really coming from our own minds, which means that we don’t really have any knowledge of external reality at all but only knowledge of the way our minds happen to work.
But I didn’t use the word “order”, nor am I inclined to. It’s always struck me as a normative term. You have to have some notion of how things “should be” for order to be well-defined. I suppose you could require that things should be as they are and infer from this that the universe is ordered, but that’s just tautological.
By all means, correct me if you mean something different by it. But “order” in its everyday use is normative, e.g., my room is ordered if my possessions are arranged in some prescribed way, perhaps in a way that I subjectively deem to be organized. If I take my room to be organized as it is, it is automatically ordered. So “order” isn’t a very helpful notion because it tells you more about my preferences than the actual arrangement of objects. I would prefer to cut out the middle man and just describe the arrangement of objects directly.
But this is just begging the question against the OP who is claiming that something like life really is different in-kind from non-life.
I was addressing the Fine-Tuning Argument specifically, which argues that life is special simply because its prerequisites are improbable. Clearly we need more than that for something to be special, as the sand argument illustrates.
You’re assuming that everything is really just an accidental arrangement of fundamental particles (or whatever it turns out to be), but that assumption is highly suspect, especially given how prolific our knowledge of higher levels of reality has become.
I’m not assuming anything. I’m saying that the Fine-Tuning Argument needs life to be special to get off the ground, and it hasn’t demonstrated such a thing. The onus is on those advancing the argument to show that life requires a metaphysical explanation.
Claiming that we are alive so “of course we think life is special” is an instance of the genetic fallacy. Maybe we do say that life is special because we are living things, but so what? That doesn’t mean that life really isn’t different in kind from non-life.
The genetic fallacy does not apply to explanations. I was explaining why people believe life is special, I was not attempting to infer that it is not special. It could be special, but this hasn’t been demonstrated.
You’ve posted something like this in the past, so I think it is important to clarify what we generally mean by the word “metaphysics.” It is the study of being as being. What does it mean to say that “something is” or “something exists?” That’s the question metaphysics answers. There’s no need to have a “meta-metaphysical explanation” of anything, whatever that would mean, because you wouldn’t be talking about anything having to do with existence.
I’ve heard multiple definitions of “metaphysics”. Typically when you affix “meta-” to a discipline, it refers to the study of the discipline itself. Metalogic is the study of logic, metaethics is the study of ethics, etc. Metaphysics addresses (supposedly) why physics “works” as well as it does, why the universe conforms to physical laws in the first place, etc. So in this sense it is the study of physics. But then you need an explanation for the “laws” of metaphysics, i.e., you need a meta-metaphysics.
Now you could take the laws of metaphysics you subscribe to as axiomatic, but then why not just take the scientific method as axiomatic (or whatever foundation of physics you like) and be done with it? The question is what greater understanding is actually gained by adding another level of abstraction?