But a rock is not a living thing so it does not by its nature seek its own perfection.
Hold on a second. You were saying before that we could differentiate life from non-life by recognizing beneficial behavior. Now it seems you’re saying that we differentiate beneficial behavior from “accidental properties” by checking to see if the object is alive.
It can’t be both, because that would be circular.
Whether a rock is in motion or not is an accidental property in any event since it is not essential to being a rock one way or the other.
The problem with “essence” and “accident” is that you can always finagle with the terminology a smidge and completely change the evaluation. This is a silly example, but I think it will suffice: You are right that it isn’t necessary for the rock to be motionless in order to be a rock, but if I were using the rock as, say, a paperweight, immobility would be essential. So by prescribing a different purpose for the rock, I have created an essential property out of thin air.
I think the problem here is that objects do not have inherent purposes, we merely assign purposes and judge what is beneficial, essential, etc., relative to that purpose.
I don’t doubt that a lot of modern Christians have real faith and are much more holy than I’ll ever be, but their intellectual presentation of God has never really been satisfying to me.
It’s good to hear that from a Christian so I know I’m not imagining it. Yes, even those I disagree with most vehemently on these forums have a far more sophisticated take on religion than the average person.
God is concluded as He who has existence through His own nature and does not dependent on anything else for existence, which arguably entails things like omnipotency, omniscience, immutability, timelessness, etc. So I wouldn’t even agree that it is possible for God to “intervene” in the universe since the universe is ultimately dependent on God at every moment to continue to be real, so God is not really ever wholly independent from it.
That’s an interesting perspective, and strictly speaking I don’t disagree with most of the above. It’s just that in order to jump from this conception of God to Christianity, you need to treat God as a sort of “superman” in some sense. I mean, I could postulate that the universe is the only necessary being, and timelessness, omnipotency, immutability, etc., would follow from this. But the universe doesn’t have opinions. It doesn’t care what humans do or try to judge our behavior. It doesn’t know anything. So in order to get to the god of which you speak, you need more than a necessary being, you need a mind; something that can discriminate, have opinions, etc. And this is the same reaction I give to Aquinas’ proofs of God. It doesn’t seem to be the same god Christians actually invoke in practice.
Well sure, but whether biology is just a collection of physical (and I am not using this word as a synonym for “material”) things is one of the things that is being disputed.
So what do you mean by “material”?
It seems like you haven’t completely reduced biology to physics if you always have to assume the higher-level organization in any simulation. Anyway, if you don’t accept that maybe at least you can see what the difficulty is.
I want to make sure I’m understanding what you’re saying first. Are you saying that, since I started with a biological problem, even translating the problem into physical terms doesn’t count as reduction? I will grant you that perhaps we wouldn’t appreciate the significance of our results if we just explained everything with physics jargon, but translation into physical terms is what I mean by “reducing to physics”. Maybe you take reduction to mean something stronger.
Metaphysics is certainly informed by empirical considerations (or should be anyway), but it is not experimental.
I guess I would need you to explain how you would make use of empirical data without experimentation before I can comment further on this. To be more specific, without assuming the scientific method, how do you decide 1) what is or is not empirical, 2) what is an acceptable method of collecting data, 3) how should the data be used to support or discredit a metaphysical claim?
But why should reality be predictable?
Probably the easiest way to explain my position on this is by asking what an unpredictable universe would look like. Would it be a universe in which people could hear colors and see sounds? Would it be a universe in which particles just teleport to different locations randomly? Would it be a universe composed entirely of gelatin?
I claim that each of those universes is in some sense predictable, because I did just that: I described how objects in the universe behaved, which naturally leads to predictions. Even a universe in which everything moves randomly would follow the laws of Brownian motion, for example. For a universe to be unpredictable, you would have to be unable to describe it, because any description will offer some predictive power.
One could ask why a universe needs to be describable, but I think the answer to that is uninteresting: We wouldn’t consider it a universe if it were beyond description, just as we don’t accept the existence of words that lack definitions.
I have enjoyed our conversations in the past and am happy to see that this can continue. After posting my response yesterday I was a little worried that I may have come off as a bit too brash (which wasn’t my intention) and I apologize if I gave offense.
It’s no problem. I sometimes come across as uncharitable, I’m sure. Anyway, I enjoy our discussions as well.