Thanks for pointing that out. While you’re right that this avoids my previous objection, there are at least two objections that do apply to the maximin argument:
The first is just the familiar many-gods objection. If I adopt the maximin principle, my decision will be for whichever alternative has the best worst-case scenario. But the worst-case scenario of Christianity isn’t what Pascal says it is: if any of, to give a few examples, the Muslim God, the Professor’s God (that’s the one who rewards skepticism and punishes mercenary faith), and a malicious God were to exist then Christianity would have just as bad an outcome as the case where Christianity is correct and the agent rejects it. So maximin won’t get me to my decision. And if I appeal to some sort of tiebreaker, then that’s just to say that the maximin Pascal’s Wager does no actual work: I decide whatever I end up deciding because of the tiebreaker, while the weight of the Wager is by definition neutrally balanced.
The second objection is that the maximin principle here is ad hoc. We are not, in our daily lives, maximin decision-makers: we recognize that, for example, the worst-case outcome of crossing the street is still worth even the trivial benefits of going out for ice cream. Perhaps you’re suggesting that I’m mistaken and that I should be a maximin decision-maker, or at least that I should be on some topics. In that case, I’d like to see the argument.