Pascal's Wager and Faith

  • Thread starter Thread starter Qoeleth
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
Candide

And so you are precisely the kind of person Pascal’s wager is addressed to.
Indeed, so I’m well placed to judge on the success or failure of the wager. It fails.*
It’s obvious that you don’t think any religion is worth anything. But that is a cerebral judgment. According to Pascal, you should let your heart in on the action, becasue it has reasons the intellect cannot fathom. One of those reasons is that hope springs eternal in the human heart. When you douse the flame of hope, you become somewhat less than fully human. Ask anyone who feels hopeless about anything.*
Nope I’m feeling pretty happy and enthusiastic thanks. As for the value of religion… On the contrary, I think religion is very comforting to some people, and people find comfort to be valuable, so that means that to some people at least religion is valuable. Obviously that doesn’t make it any more likely to be true.*
I have been there. I know what it means to be an atheist, and I know what it means to chuck that for something better … vastly better … something that does not presume to know for a fact that God is a delusion for the mentally challenged, as most atheists clearly believe.*
Well I can’t speak for most atheists as I haven’t asked them. But I don’t think that religion is a delusion exactly. It’s just not correct. Many people have been wrong about loads of stuff throughout human history. So nothing new here.*
When you say or imply that all religions are delusional, this even presumes a bias on your part against all religion, since you cannot possibly have studied all religions and judged them all to be delusional.*
Nope, that’s one of the reasons why I say nothing of the sort.
My guess is that you haven’t studied Christianity at all … except maybe from a cerebral distance.*
Incorrect, I was a practicing Christian for many years. The reason I ceased to be was because I kept studying and reading and finding gaps, eventually it became apparent that the gaps were pretty much all there was and I realised I really wasn’t a Christian any more.*
So when the atheist dies and stands before Christ to be judged, what will be his plea?
“Lord, you didn’t make a convincing case.”
His answer will be the same as it was to Thomas.
“Blessed are those who believe and have not seen.”
If I end up standing before some form of deity to be judged then I think I should have nothing to fear in saying

“you gave me absolutely no evidence for your existence, so I held to my honesty, reason and intellectual integrity and did not believe in you”

If I get punished for that then he should also punish me for not having believed in Thor, Allah, Zeus and the Flying Spaghetti Monster too.*
 
*I’ve highlighted a couple of the problems. How about we run a simple example and you tell me what you think?

There could be, right now, someone silently sneaking up behind you with a knife to stab you. There is no evidence either way. There are four possible options…

1). You look over your shoulder and there is nobody there. Result: no effect. Cost: effectively zero.

2). You don’t look over your shoulder and there is nobody there. Result: no effect. Cost: zero

3). You look over your shoulder and there IS somebody about to stab you. Result: massive benefit - you run away and get to have the rest of your life. Cost: effectively zero

4). You don’t look over your shoulder and there IS someone about to stab you. Result: you die. Cost: huge - your life.*

So according to pascals wager you should check over your shoulder right? So, do you actually go around checking behind you every Few minutes? If not, why not?
**
The example you cite doesn’t really attack the mini-max regret option. If you were in a situation where you were unsure that attackers might be at hand, then you would choose the course with the least regret.

It isn’t, nor was it intended to be. The aim of the wager was to convince people that being Christian is in their best interests, so they should TRY to be. It does not even attempt to provide a rational basis for belief. Pascal does this in other parts of his writing, but it’s not what the wager is about.*

but using probabilistic arguments, decision theory, is by its very nature rational. You’ll see Pascal’s Wager discussed in books on subjective probability and decision theory. Again, I don’t understand or perhaps I should say agree with this last argument.
Pascal does not attempt to “prove” the existence of God. Indeed, he starts off this section (#233) with the statement: “If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since having neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are then incapable of knowing either what He is or if He is.” His argument is not for the atheist, but for the agnostic, who isn’t sure of the existence of God.
My own objections to the validity of Pascal’s Wager is that belief is not a matter of will, can’t be forced, and if one is not given the grace to believe, then rational arguments will not lead one to belief, as posts in this thread show.

Here’s another link to a similar, but somewhat simpler argument.

faith.org.uk/publications/Magazines/Mar11/Mar11PascalsWagerInsuranceForAgnostics.html

I* am doing my best. Alas because everyone has a point of view, everyone has some form of bias.*/QUOTE] **good for you! **👍
 
Ok, with the possibility of someone behind your shoulder with a knife- if someone told me that there was someone there, that would constitute some evidence that there was, so I would then check.
Exactly, but in the wager there is no compelling evidence. So you can’t have someone telling you there is someone there. At best you can have someone positing the hypothetical to you, as I have done on this thread.*

So, again, have you actually been checking over your shoulder ever since you read my last post? If not, why not? By the logic of the wager you should have been.*
Now, most cultures tell us that there is some kind of God, so that is evidence (in a sense)-kind of like someone warning us about the person with the knife.
Again, you’re letting the evidence in. I’ve posited the hypothetical to you, thus we are in a suitable situation for pascals wager to apply. How do you respond and why?
A person may not believe there is a God. Fair enough. But maybe people like Augustine, Epictetus, Aquinas (ugh!), Pascal- maybe these people, who were not dunces, got it right. Even a convinced atheist would have to concede that there is a pretty good chance that the collective opinion of most history and most cultures could be right- that there is a God.
It is possible of course. But so what? It’s also possible that the flying spaghetti monster exists. I just don’t believe it does because there’s no evidence for it.

Loads of clever people have been Hindu as well, and Buddhist, and atheist, and Pagan, and agnostic, and deistic… Should I believe all these clever people were right even though they contradict each other? If not which one to pick? Ok, I’ll go on the evidence. Drat, there isn’t any.*
I am a committed Catholic- I am prepared to admit there is a good chance I am totally wrong about my beliefs. But if I am, the decision to live like a Christian won’t be any real loss- perhaps it will even be a gain. But now, can an atheist admit, just as freely as I do, that there is a good chance they are totally wrong?
Yes, of course it’s possible. Why would I have difficulty saying so?*
 
The example you cite doesn’t really attack the mini-max regret option. * If you were in a situation where you were unsure that attackers might be at hand, then you would choose the course with the least regret.
So you’ve been checking over your shoulder regularly since you read my post then yes? The hypothetical is posed, there COULD be someone right now sneaking up behind you as you read this, are you going to check? Of course he could be arriving while you write your reply, or in half an hour, or in the morning… Or at absolutely any other time. Do you keep checking?*
Pascal does not attempt to “prove” the existence of God. * Indeed, he starts off this section (#233) with the statement: *“If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since having neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. *We are then incapable of knowing either what He is or if He is.” *
Indeed, that was my point.
*His argument is not for the atheist, but for the agnostic, who isn’t sure of the existence of God. **
Depends which definitions of those terms you use really.*
My own objections to the validity of Pascal’s Wager is that belief is not a matter of will, can’t be forced, and if one is not given the grace to believe, then rational arguments will not lead one to belief, as posts in this thread show.
And that is another entirely valid crticism.
 
So you’ve been checking over your shoulder regularly since you read my post then yes? The hypothetical is posed, there COULD be someone right now sneaking up behind you as you read this, are you going to check? Of course he could be arriving while you write your reply, or in half an hour, or in the morning… Or at absolutely any other time. Do you keep checking?*
I’m sitting in my family room at the computer at this time, and my wife is reasonably friendly and sane, our dogs love me, so, no I don’t keep looking over my shoulder. If I were in downtown Baltimore at night (as was the poor fellow on St. Patrick’s Day), yes, I would keep looking over my shoulder.

" Depends which definitions of those terms you use really."
Definitions of “atheist” and “agnostic” are understood and generally agreed upon–an atheist strongly believes there is no god (or God–e.g. Dawkins, who says the likelihood of God existing is very small–think he said 6.9 out of 7); an agnostic, on the other hand, isn’t sure whether God exists or not–more like 50/50 type odds.
 
I’m not sure I follow your first argument. If you use a regret minmax option, then you choose the outcome you will regret the least. (see the link in the original post for a pertinent example). to me it’s clear that least regretful link (if one were to choose wrongly), amongst a number of religious options, or others would be that of a Christian God and afterlife.
This isn’t clear to me at all. Why would it be less regretful, for example, to wrongly believe in the Christian God (thus upsetting the Muslim God) than to wrongly believe in no God (thus upsetting the Christian God)?
I don’t believe that your second argument is relevant. There are many instances where we don’t act rationally–bet on the lottery even though the odds (expectation value) is against us; take on insurance (again, even though expectation values argue against doing so).
Expected value does not mean expected bank account balance. Money, in terms of raw expected dollars, is one thing that people value, but another very important one is financial security. Expected value in an insurance context is the balance of those two considerations: how much are you willing to spend to, for example, make it very unlikely that you will be bankrupted by a car accident? Many people think that it’s worth at least some money to have that kind of security: they think that they are better off being safe from emergencies even though the odds those emergencies times the payback don’t meet the premiums. When a person tries to figure out how much insurance is worth how much money, she is trying to maximize her expected value as a combination of wealth and security.

Now, you may be right that it is not always rational to try to maximize expected return. But my objection isn’t that we should always be expected value maximizers. Rather, my objection is that we often should not always be worst-case regret minimizers (as CW illustrates). In order to work, your version of the wager needs some premise like “We should hold that belief about God about which we would least regret being wrong.” I am challenging you to defend that premise.
 
Exactly, but in the wager there is no compelling evidence. So you can’t have someone telling you there is someone there. At best you can have someone positing the hypothetical to you, as I have done on this thread.*

So, again, have you actually been checking over your shoulder ever since you read my last post? If not, why not? By the logic of the wager you should have been.*

Again, you’re letting the evidence in. I’ve posited the hypothetical to you, thus we are in a suitable situation for pascals wager to apply. How do you respond and why?

It is possible of course. But so what? It’s also possible that the flying spaghetti monster exists. I just don’t believe it does because there’s no evidence for it.

Ok, I’ll go on the evidence. Drat, there isn’t any.*

Yes, of course it’s possible. Why would I have difficulty saying so?*
There is SOME evidence, or some things that could be evidence. It is possible that the existence of the universe proves there must be a Creator- if so, the apparent ‘design’ of nature is evidence. Personally, I don’t really believe this argument much. But, I’m not infallible in my logic, and I’d give the cosmological/creation/design argument maybe a 15% chance of being sound and valid.

If you told me, not hypothetically or subjunctively, but seriously, that there WAS a person with a knife behind me, yes, I would look over my shoulder.

I estimate that belief in only a 10% probability that God is for real should be enough to convert a person to act, more or less, as if He is. Would others agree?
 
This isn’t clear to me at all. Why would it be less regretful, for example, to wrongly believe in the Christian God (thus upsetting the Muslim God) than to wrongly believe in no God (thus upsetting the Christian God)?

.
They are the same God. The God of Abraham, of Jesus, of Mohammed. It is wrong to suggest that the God of the Jews is not the God of the Christians. And Muslims accept the Torah and the Gospel as the Word of God. Any claim that they are different God is a great mistake. If you go to Church in Malta, you will pray to “Allah”.
 
That’s beside the point. Whether or not they are the same God, living one’s life as a Muslim provokes a very different reaction from God than does living one’s life as a Christian.
 
They are the same God. The God of Abraham, of Jesus, of Mohammed. It is wrong to suggest that the God of the Jews is not the God of the Christians. And Muslims accept the Torah and the Gospel as the Word of God. Any claim that they are different God is a great mistake. If you go to Church in Malta, you will pray to “Allah”.
If they are the same God, how can He have no son come as the Messiah (Jews), a Son come as the Messiah (Christians) and only one prophet and his name is Mohammed (Muslims)?

Clearly this is NOT the same God?

Sarah x 🙂
 
Expected value does not mean expected bank account balance. Money, in terms of raw expected dollars, is one thing that people value, but another very important one is financial security. Expected value in an insurance context is the balance of those two considerations: how much are you willing to spend to, for example, make it very unlikely that you will be bankrupted by a car accident? Many people think that it’s worth at least some money to have that kind of security: they think that they are better off being safe from emergencies even though the odds those emergencies times the payback don’t meet the premiums. When a person tries to figure out how much insurance is worth how much money, she is trying to maximize her expected value as a combination of wealth and security.

Now, you may be right that it is not always rational to try to maximize expected return. But my objection isn’t that we should always be expected value maximizers. Rather, my objection is that we often should not always be worst-case regret minimizers (as CW illustrates). In order to work, your version of the wager needs some premise like “We should hold that belief about God about which we would least regret being wrong.” I am challenging you to defend that premise.
From what you are saying I can only conclude that you’re not really clear about what the mini-max regret option is. See James O. Berger*,Statistical Decision Theory and Bayesian Analysis*, p.18. If you believe in the possibility that God exists, then this option in decision theory makes sense. If you’re a hard-core atheist, that is, believe the probability is exactly 0 that god (or God) exists, any option in decision theory would not make sense and rational arguments won’t work with you. As I’ve said in other posts, Pascal’s Wager is for the Agnostic, to whom grace might be given, but not for the atheist.
 
If they are the same God, how can He have no son come as the Messiah (Jews), a Son come as the Messiah (Christians) and only one prophet and his name is Mohammed (Muslims)?

Clearly this is NOT the same God?

Sarah x 🙂
No, it is the same God. One person (Jewish) says “Mr.G has no Son, but has sent prophets”. Another (Christian)says "Mr. G has a son and His name is J ", another (Muslim) says “Mr. G sent a Messiah, named J, who was only His son metaphorically, in the same sense that David and other prophets were His sons”. It is evidently the same “Mr. G” they are speaking of. Obviously, Jesus prayed to the God of the Jews. Since the Koran quotes Jesus in the Gospel saying “My God is your God”, there is an evident identity.

It might be wise to accept my opinion on this.
 
Jd,*

Afraid you’ve lost me somewhat here. List my what? If this is referring to evidence then I think I’ve been pretty clear that I don’t have anything I would call evidence against the existence of a god. Indeed, I think it’s always possible to postulate an undetectable god. The things people put forwards as evidence against a god do not pass muster as evidence to me.
Candide:

So, it appears that you wish to start, despite your initial confession. That’s your first argument, then? It would seem that, according to you, God should not be Infinite, or eternal. It would seem that you want God to be visible, that you want God to be a bigger version of us, perhaps, but still finite. And, should he be wearing a big, white lab coat too? I wonder how such a being would create a universe, not to mention a ‘multiverse’!
Equally the things people put forwards as evidence for the existence of god (ie “the universe”)do not pass muster as evidence to meeither.*
Which one, or ones, might that/they be?

God bless,
jd
 
Candide
**
Well I can’t speak for most atheists as I haven’t asked them. But I don’t think that religion is a delusion exactly. It’s just not correct. Many people have been wrong about loads of stuff throughout human history.**

How can a thing not correct be anything but false? And if it is false, how can it not be a delusion?
 
Candide
**
Well I can’t speak for most atheists as I haven’t asked them. But I don’t think that religion is a delusion exactly. It’s just not correct.** Many people have been wrong about loads of stuff throughout human history.

How can a thing not correct be anything but false? And if it is false, how can it not be a delusion?
Denotationally, yes, but connotationally, ‘deulsion’ might be needlessly forceful. It is possible to have mistaken views, which are not, however, unreasonable. If Christianity turned out to be completely wrong about God, etc., it would still be a reasonable error, and therefore, I would not use the word delusional.

Similarly, I would not describe an atheist as delusional, since their veiws could also be quite reasonable.
 
Perhaps it would help if you were to explain.
Here’s the explanation given in the link:
In contemporary decision analysis one can proceed in two ways:
  1. to examine possible gains and losses for various options, in the absence of known probabilities, and to choose that option which would correspond (psychologically or economically) to a preferred strategy:
  2. to use known or estimated probabilities for various outcomes and to choose the option with the maximum expected value (see below). Let’s first assume that probabilities aren’t known, and see what considerations might be involved in choosing an option. Here is the example:
investing 10,000 units (pounds in the UK, dollars in the US) in 1) a savings account at 2% interest; 2) a conservative stock portfolio paying 6% in a good market, and losing 10% in a bad market; 3) a sure thing—an unreported diamond mine in Northern Scotland that your Uncle Angus has told you about—you’ll double your investment. The table below summarizes the possible outcomes; the columns represent “state of nature”, that is “good” outcome for a particular option and “bad” outcome ( a – sign means a loss), the rows, the different options.

If you’re an optimist, you would of course choose the diamond mine. If you are a pessimist or risk-averse, you would choose the option with the least possible loss, the Savings Account (you would follow what is called the mini-max principle in decision analysis, choosing the option with minimum possible loss).

Now suppose Uncle Angus was right about the diamond mine—you’d berate yourself for not having invested in it. This regret is quantified in a decision analysis scenario and used to justify a “mini-max regret” approach 10 for decision making. For each state of nature (column) you subtract the best outcome to give a negative figure for “regret”. You then list the worst (that is most negative) regret for each row (option) and choose that option with the least negative worst regret, as shown in the following table:

OPTION \\ REGRET FOR GOOD \\ REGRET FOR BAD \\ WORST REGRET
Savings \\\ 200-20,000=-19,800 \\\ 200-200 =0 \\ -19,800
Cons.stock \\ 600-20,000=-19,400 \\ -1000-200= =-1200 \\ -19,400
Mine \\ 20,000-20,000 =0 \\ -10000-200=-10200 \\ -10,200
**Best Result \\ 20,000 \\\ 200
**

The option with with the least negative worst regret is the diamond mine, so if you were to follow a mini-max regret approach you would choose that option. Clearly this is the restatement, in contemporary decision analytic terms, of Pascal’s choice for belief, absent a known probability for the existence of God. Put as a table one would have, symbolically:

OPTION \\ REGRET (God exists) \\ REGRET (God doesn’t exist) \\ WORST REGRET
Belief \\ X-X =0 \\ -Y-Z \\ -Y-Z
Non-Belief \\ Z-X (negative) \\ Z-Z=0 \\ Z-X(most negative)
**Best Result \\ X (belief, very large) \\ Z(non-belief, not so large)
**

There aren’t numbers here, but clearly the value for belief in the existence of God (and the afterlife), X, is much greater than Y (the loss -Y one sustains by belief) or Z (the gain of a possibly hedonistic life that one sustains by unbelief), so the minimum worst regret (least negative) is that for belief in God.

However, it is clear there is an assumption and the confirmed atheist will never credit that X, benefits from belief, are much greater than Z (benefits from non-belief).

Which is why I say the argument is rational, but rationality isn’t a mechanism to enhance a zero belief in God.

I apologize for the messy appearance—tables don’t copy and it seems to be impossible to make a table in a response.:o
 
I’m sitting in my family room at the computer at this time, and my wife is reasonably friendly and sane, our dogs love me, so, no I don’t keep looking over my shoulder. *If I were in downtown Baltimore at night (as was the poor fellow on St. Patrick’s Day), yes, I would keep looking over my shoulder.
I’m afraid your location and surroundings would be considered evidence. Since it is perfectly possible for there to be someone about to stab you yet you not detected them we can sensibly say that there is no compelling evidence either for or against the hypothesis.*

Clearly the truth is that you are in fact NOT going to apply Pascals wager to this proposition and decide to keep checking over your shoulder. If you did you’d rapidly find people considering you to be crazy. So the question is WHY? What’s is the difference between Pascals wager for God (which you find compelling) and Pascals wager for a potential assassin (which you don’t). I strongly suspect that the answers is that you find the evidence compelling for the former but not the latter. Thus we can see that the wager fails.
" Depends which definitions of those terms you use really."
Definitions of “atheist” and “agnostic” are understood and generally agreed upon–an atheist strongly believes there is no god (or God–e.g. Dawkins, who says the likelihood of God existing is very small–think he said 6.9 out of 7); an agnostic, on the other hand, isn’t sure whether God exists or not–more like *50/50 type odds.
That’s a different definition to the ones I’ve generally found used. The way I’ve found the terms used is as different answers to different questions. This you can have agnostic atheists and agnostic theists.*
 
There is SOME evidence, or some things that could be evidence. It is possible that the existence of the universe proves there must be a Creator- if so, the apparent ‘design’ of nature is evidence.*
I’m afraid that doesn’t hold much water, firstly we’d have to start from the conclusion (assume god exists and created the universe), then we can get to some evidence that he exists. If we don’t start from that assumption then the evidence vanishes… Surely you can see that makes no sense.*
Personally, I don’t really believe this argument much. But, I’m not infallible in my logic, and I’d give the cosmological/creation/design argument maybe a 15% chance of being sound and valid.*
The cosmological argument is a decent argument for saying that something happened first. The problem is that “something” is no more likely to be a god than a quantum fluctuation or a little green pixie.*
If you told me, not hypothetically or subjunctively, but seriously, that there WAS a person with a knife behind me, yes, I would look over my shoulder.
Ok, I’m telling you seriously that today someone will sneak up behind you with a knife and attempt to stab you. Now are you going to spend all day looking over your shoulder every few minutes? Bear in mind that I’ll tell you the same thing tomorrow, and the next day, and the next…
I estimate that belief in only a 10% probability that God is for real should be enough to convert a person to act, more or less, as if He is. Would others agree?
If there was a large probability, like 10% of a SPECIFIC god existing, then yes, we could use pascals wager. Unfortunately I have (in the absence of any evidence) no way of differentiating between the odds of Allah, or Baal, or Thor, or Quetzalcoatl. So we should either behave as if they all exist, or none of them.*

To select one and say it works for this one but none of the others is special pleading based on the religion you happen to already hold. In other words the religion for which you already find the evidence compelling. In other words the wager works ONLY if you find the evidence compelling and therefore do not need the wager.
 
I’m afraid your location and surroundings would be considered evidence. Since it is perfectly possible for there to be someone about to stab you yet you not detected them we can sensibly say that there is no compelling evidence either for or against the hypothesis.*

Clearly the truth is that you are in fact NOT going to apply Pascals wager to this proposition and decide to keep checking over your shoulder. If you did you’d rapidly find people considering you to be crazy. So the question is WHY? What’s is the difference between Pascals wager for God (which you find compelling) and Pascals wager for a potential assassin (which you don’t). I strongly suspect that the answers is that you find the evidence compelling for the former but not the latter. Thus we can see that the wager fails.

That’s a different definition to the ones I’ve generally found used. The way I’ve found the terms used is as different answers to different questions. This you can have agnostic atheists and agnostic theists.*
There is indeed evidence for a God, and atheists choose to ignore it. Your definition of agnostic and atheist is one I’ve never seen and is not in accord with the dictionary definition.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top