Persons of trinity

[Vico]

Vico you are doing a great job trying to explain it and you are spot on when it comes to relations.

One of the things I think you are missing is the discussion of accidents and how relation is not your typical accident.

An accident is simple, it is something that is added on to the substance. So when I say water is clear, the substance water has the accident clear added on to it. Clearness is not a part of the substance water rather it is added on to it. Ice many times isn’t clear and is foggy but that is still the substance of water.

The problem is God can have no accidents in him, that would destroy his simplicity.

So why use relation, which is an accident, to talk about distinction in the Godhead. Well it is pretty simple. Relation actually doesn’t add anything on to the substance, rather it only talks about how the thing is in relation to something else. For example, James is sitting next to Joe. In this sentence next to is the accident of relation. Next to doesn’t add anything onto james or joe’s substance. them being next to each other has no impact on their substance.

Now we apply this to the divine God head. We know from scripture that God is a trinity of persons. Father Son and Holy Spirit. Relation can show us how we can have distinction without destroying the simplicity. The Father is related to the Son as being a father, only he is the father. The Son is related to the Father by b wing a son, only he is the son. The Spirit is related to the Father and Son by being the spirit that passes in-between both persons. Each person of the trinity because of relation has something that makes them different from one another. What allows it to keep the simplicity is that relation doesn’t add anything on to the substance.

I hope you understand

Yes. In response to “So why use relation, which is an accident, to talk about distinction in the Godhead.” I was trying to avoid using accidents, in keeping with what St. Thomas wrote that this idea of relation as an accident was an error.

Summa theologiae Part I, Q28, Art. 2:I answer that, it is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on this point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims. For he said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally affixed. … whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree considered relation in the former mode only.
Summa theologiae Part I, Q28, Art. 1:I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. …
Summa theologiae Part I, Q28, Art. 2 - Reply to Objection 2.:For it was above explained (13, 2), in treating of the divine names, that more is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified by any name. Therefore it does not follow that there exists in God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various names imposed by us.

 

[javid]

Dear Javid,
Sorry this is my last post to you. Adam and Eve are one. Eve alone doesn’t reveal the entire human essence. It takes both genders to fully reveal the one human nature. Even the Jehovah Witness cult in there own Translation calls Jesus the only begotten God. See John 1:18. The Father can’t be eternally Father without an Eternal Son.

Also even though women do not come directory from their husbands substance like Eve did - God has designed marriage to unite man and women as one flesh. Humanity consists of two genders not just one gender. We are also a multiplication of our first parents Adam and Eve. , the difference is the flesh of humans is uncomparable to the flesh of other creatures like apes and monkeys. Just like the spirit of the Father and the Son cannot be compared with our spirit or the spirit of the angels etc.

Be careful not to deny that Jesus is the true God as he said he will deny those who deny him in front of his Father who is in heaven.

Life in the Son and in his name.
Daniel

Dear Daniel

It was good discussion, but I can’t force any one to answer me.

Absolutly, adam and eve are two humans, and man and woman was not two humans, then men could lactate the baby!! Yes they are one in love but they are two beings.

And you forgot that our discussion is on simplicity, not on begotting!

 

[javid]

Relation is the essence. There is no real distinction in the essence. There is real distinction in the opposition of persons. Note that the Catechism states the term relation designates “the fact that their distinction lies in the relationship of each to the others”. What St. Thomas Aquinas wrote (posted before) is that "But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons."252 The Church uses

• (I) the term “substance” (rendered also at times by “essence” or “nature”) to designate the divine being in its unity,
• (II) the term “person” or “hypostasis” to designate the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the real distinction among them, and
• (III) the term “relation” to designate the fact that their distinction lies in the relationship of each to the others.

Dear Vico

Why you do not read thd question carefully?

My question is on distinction between persons, not distinction in essence. Please read again and answer.

All the best

 

[Vico]

Dear Vico

Why you do not read thd question carefully?

My question is on distinction between persons, not distinction in essence. Please read again and answer.

All the best

Your earlier third statement was “3.Each person has both essence and relation.” So I now ask, what is the third question?

Following is from what I posted before which addresses* distinction between persons*: There is real distinction in the opposition of persons. Note that the Catechism states the term relation designates “the fact that their distinction lies in the relationship of each to the others”.
And: What St. Thomas Aquinas wrote (posted before) is that "But relation … as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. …

252 The Church uses

• (I) the term “substance” (rendered also at times by “essence” or “nature”) to designate the divine being in its unity,
• (II) the term “person” or “hypostasis” to designate the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the real distinction among them, and
• (III) the term “relation” to designate the fact that their distinction lies in the relationship of each to the others.

I am adding this from Summa Theologica Part I, Q40, Art 2:

Reply to Objection 2. The divine persons%between% are not distinguished as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their distinction.

newadvent.org/summa/1040.htm#article8

​

 

[javid]

Your earlier third statement was “3.Each person has both essence and relation.” So I now ask, what is the third question?

Following is from what I posted before which addresses* distinction between persons*: There is real distinction in the opposition of persons. Note that the Catechism states the term relation designates “the fact that their distinction lies in the relationship of each to the others”.
And: What St. Thomas Aquinas wrote (posted before) is that "But relation … as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. …

252 The Church uses

• (I) the term “substance” (rendered also at times by “essence” or “nature”) to designate the divine being in its unity,
• (II) the term “person” or “hypostasis” to designate the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the real distinction among them, and
• (III) the term “relation” to designate the fact that their distinction lies in the relationship of each to the others.

I am adding this from Summa Theologica Part I, Q40, Art 2:

Reply to Objection 2. The divine persons%between% are not distinguished as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their distinction.

newadvent.org/summa/1040.htm#article8

​

Dear vico

Third statement was a part of question. I never said that essence of God isn’t simple. I said according to this definition persons are not simples, because essence and distinction can’t be one, so each person has two parts: essence and distinction.

You just said dustinction is relation and claimed that relation is essence. I said if relation is essence so it can’t be the distinction, because essence is shared in each person and can’t be the distinction. It is your problem: Is the relation distinction or essence?

So I never did any claim on God’s essence.

 

[catholictiger]

Yes. In response to “So why use relation, which is an accident, to talk about distinction in the Godhead.” I was trying to avoid using accidents, in keeping with what St. Thomas wrote that this idea of relation as an accident was an error.

Summa theologiae Part I, Q28, Art. 2:I answer that, it is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on this point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims. For he said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally affixed. … whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree considered relation in the former mode only.
Summa theologiae Part I, Q28, Art. 1:I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. …
Summa theologiae Part I, Q28, Art. 2 - Reply to Objection 2.:For it was above explained (13, 2), in treating of the divine names, that more is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified by any name. Therefore it does not follow that there exists in God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various names imposed by us.

I need to clarify things some things. I was partially correct in what I said, but I left out some very key details.

So I don’t have to worry about messing up again I will let Augustine and Botheius do the work for me.

Let us now consider the category of relation, to which all the foregoing remarks have been preliminary; for qualities which obviously arise from the association of another term do not appear to predicate anything concerning the substance of a subject.** For instance, master and slave are relative terms**; let us see whether either of them are predicates of substance. If you suppress the term slave,b you simultaneously suppress the term master. On the other hand, though you suppress the term whiteness, you do not suppress some white thing,c though, of course, if the particular whiteness inhere as an accident in the thing, the thing disappears as soon as you suppress the accidental quality whiteness. But in the case of master, if you suppress the term slave, the term master disappears. But slave is not an accidental quality of master, as whiteness is of a white thing; it denotes the power which the master has over the slave. Now since the power goes when the slave is removed, it is plain that power is no accident to the substance of master, but is an adventitious augmentation arising from the possession of slaves.

It cannot therefore be affirmed that a category of relation increases, decreases, or alters in any way the substance of the thing to which it is applied. The category of relation, then, has nothing to do with the essence of the subject; it simply denotes a condition of relativity, and that not necessarily to something else, but sometimes to the subject itself. For suppose a man standing. If I go up to him on my right and stand beside him, he will be left, in relation to me, not because he is left in himself, but because I have come up to him on my right. Again, if I come up to him on my left, he becomes right in relation to me, not because he is right in himself, as he may be white or long, but because he is right in virtue of my approach. What he is depends entirely on me, and not in the least on the essence of his being.

Accordingly those predicates which do not denote the essential nature of a thing cannot alter, change, or disturb its nature in any way. Wherefore if Father and Son are predicates of relation, and, as we have said, have no other difference but that of relation, and if relation is not asserted of its subject as though it were the subject itself and its substantial quality, it will effect no real difference in its subject, but, in a phrase which aims at interpreting what we can hardly understand, a difference of persons. For it is a canon of absolute truth that distinctions in incorporeal things are established by differences and not by spatial separation. It cannot be said that God became Father by the addition to His substance of some accident; for he never began to be Father, since the begetting of the Son belongs to His very substance; however, the predicate father, as such, is relative. And if we bear in mind all the propositions made concerning God in the previous discussion, we shall admit that God the Son proceeded from God the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both, and that They cannot possibly be spatially different, since They are incorporeal. But since the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and since there are in God no points of difference distinguishing Him from God, He differs from none of the Others. But where there are no differences there is no plurality; where is no plurality there is Unity. Again, nothing but God can be begotten of God, and lastly, in concrete enumerations the repetition of units does not produce plurality. Thus the Unity of the Three is suitably established.

I have to separate both quotes because of the length of the quote. see the next post.

 

[catholictiger]

now Augustine

1. Wherefore nothing in Him is said in respect to accident, since nothing is accidental to Him, and yet all that is said is not said according to substance. For in created and changeable things, that which is not said according to substance, must, by necessary alternative, be said according to accident. For all things are accidents to them, which can be either lost or diminished, whether magnitudes or qualities; and so also is that which is said in relation to something, as friendships, relationships, services, likenesses, equalities, and anything else of the kind; so also positions and conditions,1 places and times, acts and passions. But in God nothing is said to be according to accident, because in Him nothing is changeable; and yet everything that is said, is not said according to substance.** For it is said in relation to something, as the Father in relation to the Son and the Son in relation to the Father, which is not accident**; because both the one is always Father, and the other is always Son: yet not** “always,**” meaning from the time when the Son was born [natus], so that the Father ceases not to be the Father because the Son never ceases to be the Son, but because the Son was always born, and never began to be the Son. But if He had begun to be at any time, or were at any time to cease to be, the Son, then He would be called Son according to accident. But if the Father, in that He is called the Father, were so called in relation to Himself, not to the Son; and the Son, in that He is called the Son, were so called in relation to Himself, not to the Father; then both the one would be called Father, and the other Son, according to substance. But because the Father is not called the Father except in that He has a Son, and the Son is not called Son except in that He has a Father, these things are not said according to substance; because each of them is not so called in relation to Himself, but the terms are used reciprocally and in relation each to the other; nor yet according to accident, because both the being called the Father, and the being called the Son, is eternal and unchangeable to them. Wherefore, although to be the Father and to be the Son is different, yet their substance is not different; because they are so called, not according to substance, but according to relation, which relation, however, is not accident, because it is not changeable.

newadvent.org/fathers/130105.htm

 

[catholictiger]

let me try to clarify what both Boethius and Augustine are trying to say

they are trying to explain by starting with accidental language making it clear that God can’t have any accidents in himself, than moving from there to explain how the accident of relation is not actually an accident in God. Augustine explains how the relations in the trinity are always in relation so there is no change in the substance.

Boethius goes at it in a slightly different way, he says that even in real world situations relation doesn’t add anything on to the substance. Joe is to the left of James, nothing is added on to Joe, if James than goes to the right of james nothing changes in Joe rather just his relation to james which has no impact on his substance. He will continue to argue that relation doesn’t have to do with spacial differences rather differences in the two substances. If this is the case than the trinity is only different in terms of relation. The Father is not to the son because the Father is the father of the Son. The Son can’t be the Father because he is the son. The Spirit can’t be father or son because he is the spirit. You can also add The father begets which makes him the father, the son is begotten which makes him the son, and the spirit proceeds which makes him the spirit. By relation we can understand how they can be different but yet God.

This is one of the most difficult topics in theology. I hope I explained this correctly.

let me make it clear real quick.

I talked about accidents because that is the way you have to approach this. You have to explain how an accident relation isn’t an accident in God. Now I didn’t do that clearly the first time sorry.

 

[Vico]

Dear vico

Third statement was a part of question. I never said that essence of God isn’t simple. I said according to this definition persons are not simples, because essence and distinction can’t be one, so each person has two parts: essence and distinction.

You just said dustinction is relation and claimed that relation is essence. I said if relation is essence so it can’t be the distinction, because essence is shared in each person and can’t be the distinction. It is your problem: Is the relation distinction or essence?

So I never did any claim on God’s essence.

See post 93, relation and essence in God are the same: forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=12144840&postcount=93

The distinction is in the opposition. The Catechism states:

(III) the term “relation” to designate the fact that their distinction lies in the relationship of each to the others.

 

[javid]

See post 93, relation and essence in God are the same: forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=12144840&postcount=93

The distinction is in the opposition. The Catechism states:

(III) the term “relation” to designate the fact that their distinction lies in the relationship of each to the others.

Dear Vico

We discussed in this before and I replied that post. If you have the answer give it to me.

 

[Vico]

Dear Vico

We discussed in this before and I replied that post. If you have the answer give it to me.

I gave the answer to each of your questions. You need to be specific if there something that was not clear to you in my answer.

 

[Vico]

Dear Vico

We discussed in this before and I replied that post. If you have the answer give it to me.

Correctly stated:

1. Both relation and essence are real.
2. Relation as referred to the essence does not really differ. *
3. Essence is not really distinct from person.
4. So persons are simple.

• relation differs only in our way of thinking

 

[javid]

Correctly stated:

1. Both relation and essence are real.
2. Relation as referred to the essence does not really differ. *
3. Essence is not really distinct from person.
4. So persons are simple.

• relation differs only in our way of thinking

Dear vico

You don’t read the question! Who said Essence is really distinct from person? I said Please read my question carefully.

 

[Vico]

Dear vico

You don’t read the question! Who said Essence is really distinct from person? I said Please read my question carefully.

What is your question? Post it again please…

 

[Vico]

Dear vico

You don’t read the question! Who said Essence is really distinct from person? I said Please read my question carefully.

What is your question? Post it again please or say which post number it is. Is it # 103?

 

[catholictiger]

Correctly stated:

1. Both relation and essence are real.
2. Relation as referred to the essence does not really differ. *
3. Essence is not really distinct from person.
4. So persons are simple.

• relation differs only in our way of thinking

this sounds very dangerous and approaches heretical language.

are you saying that God is really only one but only in our way of thinking he is three?

 

[javid]

What is your question? Post it again please or say which post number it is. Is it # 103?

Dear vico

I wrote it in my first post.

 

[Vico]

Dear vico

I wrote it in my first post.

So this then:
javid;:

Hi. We believe in three persons in one God and each person is God.

They have some thing in common: essence

On the other hand, they have real distinction.

SO each person has two parts: essence and distinction, because essence is not their distinction. But god does not have two parts. So how each person is God?

How is each person of God really distinct yet with one essence?

St. Thomas Aquinas wrote:
"The persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them to be distinguished by the relations. The divine persons are not distinguished as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their distinction. Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word “another” signifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the order of nature."

 

[javid]

So this then:

How is each person of God really distinct yet with one essence?

St. Thomas Aquinas wrote:
"The persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them to be distinguished by the relations. The divine persons are not distinguished as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their distinction. Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word “another” signifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the order of nature."

Dear Vico

It is not the problem. Each person has a distinction(relation) and a common part(esence) with other persons. So how can they be simple?

 

[catholictiger]

Vico I really want you to answer my question.

you said, relation differs only in our way of thinking. That is heretical language. St. Thomas Aquinas makes it clear that relations are real in God and they are distinct in God. Divine revelation makes it clear, that there are three persons in the trinity. The best theology can do to explain this is with relation language. If you say that only in our way of thinking do relations differ than there is no distinctions in the Trinity, if there is no distinctions in the trinity there is only one person and you follow the same heresy as Sebalius. He was marked as a heretic by the Church.

In order to be fully Catholic and believe in the trinity YOU MUST, believe that the Father Son and Holy spirit are all God. That each three of the persons of the trinity are distinct. BUT at the same time all three persons of the trinity are one God not many.

The way Aquinas explains this is that Each person of the trinity has the fullness of the divine essence. The Son has the fullness of the divine essence. They don’t have a part of the essence or more or less of the essence by the person. The essence each person has is exactly the same and of the exact same fulness. What makes them distinct is relation. The Father is only father because he is in relation to the Son. Same goes with the spirit relation to the father and son, just understood slightly differently.

The reason I really got on you for accidents, is that in our way of understanding relation is an accident. Boethius who I quoted said that relation in the trinity doesn’t destroy the trinity because it doesn’t add anything to the substance. Augustine says that relation in the trinity is not an accident because the relations have no beginning therefore can’t be an accident.

Thomas Aquinas says that relations in the trinity must be real and must add distinction to the trinity. The relations in the trinity are real and must be opposed to each other so those distinctions really do exist in the trinity.

I want to say it very very clear

Relations must be real and distinct in the trinity, if not we don’t have a trinity.