Phoenix Down

[danserr]

So now to the new stuff.

Perplexity argues that inscrutable suffering is improbable on theism in this way:

(T): There necessarily exists at least one essentially immaterial, omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect person.

(T) doesn’t seem in anyway to tell us that this person would create anything, much less inscrutable suffering with all the conditions it requires.

and clarifies here:

When K includes knowledge of our world, friends and family etc. minus beliefs and knowledge of suffering, it doesn’t seem like theism leads us to expect to find inscrutable suffering. Whereas atheism, coupled with knowledge of natural disasters (etc.) seems to near entail inscrutable suffering.

I have a preliminary reservation here. I’m not sure the argument that theism does not predict inscrutable suffering is strong enough as it is currently. For example, a good argument in this style is Robin Collin’s fine tuning argument"

1. The fine-tuning of the universe for life is highly improbable on atheism.
2. the fine-tuning of the universe for life is not highly improbable on theism.
3. therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe for life is evidence of theism over atheism.

Partly what makes this a good argument is that he can show premise 1 very clearly and offer evidence that the fine-tuning is very improbable on atheism. He isn’t just saying "so the fine tuning is probable on theism, but there’s no reason for thinking it’s probable on atheism. He goes further and offers reasons why it is improbable on atheism.

On the other hand, the argument from evil here seems to be weaker in this, as it just says “there is no reason theism predicts suffering.” This may or may not be true, but it still seems weaker to me than “there are reasons x,y,z why we should expect there to not be inscrutable suffering if theism is true.”

This is just a preliminary reservation, but I wonder what you think of it.

Second, suggesting ways that inscrutable suffering is not necessarily improbable on (Christian) theism.

Perplexity,
We’ve put off discussing a relevant point here, but now it needs to come up. You’ve suggested that the issue is not Christian theism, but bare theism (an omnipotent, morally perfect, loving, omniscient, God exists). You say that a theist needs to defend bare theism, not Christian theism. This is because even if he could show that evil is not improbable on Christian theism, if the Christian leave bare theism undefended, then the foundation of his defense is weak.

I would disagree with this. I agree with you that Christian theism is a theological elaboration of bare theism (it gives us more information about God), however, I think this is important. Perhaps bare theism tells us a few things about God, and maybe (or maybe not) it does not give us enough information to cause us to expect inscrutable suffering on it. But, maybe, in providing more information about God, Christian theism gives us reason to expect inscrutable suffering on the basis of that further information.

In this case, then, if it could be shown that inscrutable suffering is unsurprising given Christian theism, then the existence of inscrutable suffering is not evidence against Christianity (including the Christian God).

At this point then, I think people should start to offer reasons for thinking that given bare theism or Christian theism, the existence of inscrutable suffering is not surprising. (I’ll try to come back to it, need to run out now and didn’t think this would take as long as it did).

 

[prodigalson2011]

So now to the new stuff.

Perplexity argues that inscrutable suffering is improbable on theism in this way:

and clarifies here:

I have a preliminary reservation here. I’m not sure the argument that theism does not predict inscrutable suffering is strong enough as it is currently. For example, a good argument in this style is Robin Collin’s fine tuning argument"

1. The fine-tuning of the universe for life is highly improbable on atheism.
2. the fine-tuning of the universe for life is not highly improbable on theism.
3. therefore, the fine-tuning of the universe for life is evidence of theism over atheism.

Partly what makes this a good argument is that he can show premise 1 very clearly and offer evidence that the fine-tuning is very improbable on atheism. He isn’t just saying "so the fine tuning is probable on theism, but there’s no reason for thinking it’s probable on atheism. He goes further and offers reasons why it is improbable on atheism.

On the other hand, the argument from evil here seems to be weaker in this, as it just says “there is no reason theism predicts suffering.” This may or may not be true, but it still seems weaker to me than “there are reasons x,y,z why we should expect there to not be inscrutable suffering if theism is true.”

This is just a preliminary reservation, but I wonder what you think of it.

This has been my chief problem with this argument. I have pointed it out a few times, but only in the breadth of a sentence or two. Thanks for laying this out so much more eloquently.

 

[Perplexity]

I don’t want to drag you away from the topic at hand, but if you find the time, I would very much like to see how you would defend moral realism from an atheistic standpoint.

Well, when moral realism is defended, there are rarely (if ever, I don’t know of any) references to theism or atheism. Moral realism is in the realm of moral philosophy. So, I’d probably just use the same ol’ argument moral realists use, and at the end add that I’m atheist. I’d recommend watching Craig’s debate with Shelly Kagan. It’s on whether God is required for this kind of morality. Kagan is a leading atheist moral philosopher, fascinating debate.

For instance, I cannot for the life of me understand how you can deduce the probability of completely metaphysical events (such as God creating this or that world) with Bayes’ Theorem. It seems to me that any such calculation would be completely arbitrary and contrived. But I’m open to being proven wrong… Hope you’ll be patient with me.

No worries With the Bayes’ theorem thing, remember the theorem tells us how a piece of evidence should effect our confidence in a hypothesis. The numbers we plug into the theorem are just numerical representations of our degrees of confidence. Bayes’ theorem just gives us a principled way of discerning how evidence should effect our confidence in a hypothesis.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Second, suggesting ways that inscrutable suffering is not necessarily improbable on (Christian) theism.

Perplexity,
We’ve put off discussing a relevant point here, but now it needs to come up. You’ve suggested that the issue is not Christian theism, but bare theism (an omnipotent, morally perfect, loving, omniscient, God exists). You say that a theist needs to defend bare theism, not Christian theism. This is because even if he could show that evil is not improbable on Christian theism, if the Christian leave bare theism undefended, then the foundation of his defense is weak.

I would disagree with this. I agree with you that Christian theism is a theological elaboration of bare theism (it gives us more information about God), however, I think this is important. Perhaps bare theism tells us a few things about God, and maybe (or maybe not) it does not give us enough information to cause us to expect inscrutable suffering on it. But, maybe, in providing more information about God, Christian theism gives us reason to expect inscrutable suffering on the basis of that further information.

In this case, then, if it could be shown that inscrutable suffering is unsurprising given Christian theism, then the existence of inscrutable suffering is not evidence against Christianity (including the Christian God).

At this point then, I think people should start to offer reasons for thinking that given bare theism or Christian theism, the existence of inscrutable suffering is not surprising. (I’ll try to come back to it, need to run out now and didn’t think this would take as long as it did).

Agreed again. I addessed this from the angle of genus vs. species, where bare-theism is the genus and Christian-theism is the species. To use a biological analogy, I cannot deduce from the genus panthera that the animal in question is native to Africa. If I add to this genus the species tigris, I can now say that this is so.

I actually conceded this argument when Perplexity noted that philosophers work from an idea of bare theism that presumes the deity’s goodness, etc., thus excluding deism or other philosophies which may invoke an indifferent deity. However, I think on second thought, I would like to resume this stance, as what he is calling bare-theism really provides too much specific information to be so. These other postulated deities still meet the qualia necessary to create a universe, so I think bare-theism must be restricted to such specifications, regardless of what philosophers have done in the past. To do otherwise, it seems to me, is to select a few points from one or more particular species of theism and ignore the rest of the corresponding data.
To go back to the tiger analogy, it is akin to saying, “On pantheraism, given that all panthera have stripes, it is highly improbable that panthera will have spots.” The quality of stripes belongs to certain species of pantera (panthera tigris, for our example) while we yet know that spots are also a quality of certain species of panthera (Panthera pardus, commonly known as the leopard.) In the analogy Pantheraism would obviously stand for bare-theism, while the assertion of all panthera having stripes would represent the (mis)appropriation of a very limited number of characteristics (benevolence, etc.) from species to genus, and the faulty conclusion (improbability of spots) being the logical result of a fallacious argument. The qualities of benevolence and such go beyond that which is necessary for a being powerful enough to create the universe, and to go anywhere beyond that is to begin to further define it, and this brand of “bare-theism” attempts to leave this more specific definition incomplete. You cannot define a tiger by its stripes alone. Much less can you define its entire family by its particular characteristics.

 

[In_Spiration]

Brief thoughts re: Atheous 2.0, a.k.a. “Phoenix Down”, by Perplexity*

First, I’m pleased that this has thus far, once again, apart from the occasional exception, remained a good example of civil argumentation. I think danserr has been putting forth an admirable defense of theism, one with which I often, perhaps unsurprisingly, found myself agreeing. I’ll likely cherry-pick – a whole lot, i.e., like a ridiculously unjustified amount – on the majority of his maneuvers. (And while I’m currently still undecided about condemning empther’s polemical tone, I only hesitate to the extent I would hypo- and self-critically take up an anti-philosophical stance against anything remotely bordering hyper-analysis or “logical procrastination”.)

Second, a question: what role might partial scrutability play in this discussion? So far, only perfectly complete scrutability on the part of S appears to be treated as sufficient for any denial of I’s truth. That strikes me as prima facie problematic, since, presumably, only an omniscient divine being could know anything at all – let alone an instance of suffering – in its entirety. (For example, Aquinas held that no mere man could ever fully explain even the existence of a mere rock; only our perfectly-knowing creator God can. Because fully and perfectly knowing an effect requires fully and perfectly knowing its cause; and perfect knowledge arguably necessitates identity of mind and truth…)

Third, a criticism: in support of premise (4) of the sub-argument favoring your major premise (1), you state that suffering under atheism wouldn’t be the type of thing for which one even attempts to seek justification, considering the basic nonsense of inquiring about “moral goodness”/“moral evil” in a godless, or a morally-gratuitous, world. However, this would raise troubles for your affirmation of I in (5)'s consequent, which entails that “(ii) after attempting to discern whether E is morally justified, S fails to know of any moral justification for E” (emphasis mine).

Actually, based on your definition of I, (5) is unmotivated and unsupported, as its consequent, i.e., the occurrence of inscrutable suffering, is by no means just unquestionably a result that follows from its antecedent, M. Your definition of inscrutable suffering also requires that “(i) S believes E has obtained”, another fact that arguably is not entailed by either the non-existence of God or the occurrence of morally-gratuitous suffering. A man can suffer plenty before acknowledging the fact that he’s suffered, let alone without seeking a moral explanation/justification of it (which, one would think, would be compelled by something curious/wanted/needed itself).

Fourth, a possible modification: your major premise (1) should perhaps read:
*
1’. If S knows that it’s true that inscrutable suffering does occur [that both (i) & (ii) are met], then S knows that there’s probabilistic evidence for the non-existence of God.*

Or do you consider both substantially/effectively the same? There could end up being an important dissonance between the two versions due to the fact this argument hinges heavily upon the distinction between subjective and objective probability and ultimately just functions like an argumentum ad hominem for the scrutability-lacking potential theist. But I’ll be honest: I haven’t yet even begun checking (1’)'s specific implications for any non-trivial variance. Just, y’know, putting it out there. If you like it, you can take it. If you don’t, send it right back.

***** I hope I might soon get back into this discussion with a genuine, reciprocal effort and attention to detail.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Brief thoughts re: Atheous 2.0, a.k.a. “Phoenix Down”, by Perplexity*

First, I’m pleased that this has thus far, once again, apart from the occasional exception, remained a good example of civil argumentation. I think danserr has been putting forth an admirable defense of theism, one with which I often, perhaps unsurprisingly, found myself agreeing. I’ll likely cherry-pick – a whole lot, i.e., like a ridiculously unjustified amount – on the majority of his maneuvers. (And while I’m currently still undecided about condemning empther’s polemical tone, I only hesitate to the extent I would hypo- and self-critically take up an anti-philosophical stance against anything remotely bordering hyper-analysis or “logical procrastination”.)

Second, a question: what role might partial scrutability play in this discussion? So far, only perfectly complete scrutability on the part of S appears to be treated as sufficient for any denial of I’s truth. That strikes me as prima facie problematic, since, presumably, only an omniscient divine being could know anything at all – let alone an instance of suffering – in its entirety. (For example, Aquinas held that no mere man could ever fully explain even the existence of a mere rock; only our perfectly-knowing creator God can. Because fully and perfectly knowing an effect requires fully and perfectly knowing its cause; and perfect knowledge arguably necessitates identity of mind and truth…)

Third, a criticism: in support of premise (4) of the sub-argument favoring your major premise (1), you state that suffering under atheism wouldn’t be the type of thing for which one even attempts to seek justification, considering the basic nonsense of inquiring about “moral goodness”/“moral evil” in a godless, or a morally-gratuitous, world. However, this would raise troubles for your affirmation of I in (5)'s consequent, which entails that “(ii) after attempting to discern whether E is morally justified, S fails to know of any moral justification for E” (emphasis mine).

Actually, based on your definition of I, (5) is unmotivated and unsupported, as its consequent, i.e., the occurrence of inscrutable suffering, is by no means just unquestionably a result that follows from its antecedent, M. Your definition of inscrutable suffering also requires that “(i) S believes E has obtained”, another fact that arguably is not entailed by either the non-existence of God or the occurrence of morally-gratuitous suffering. A man can suffer plenty before acknowledging the fact that he’s suffered, let alone without seeking a moral explanation/justification of it (which, one would think, would be compelled by something curious/wanted/needed itself).

Fourth, a possible modification: your major premise (1) should perhaps read:
*
1’. If S knows that it’s true that inscrutable suffering does occur [that both (i) & (ii) are met], then S knows that there’s probabilistic evidence for the non-existence of God.*

Or do you consider both substantially/effectively the same? There could end up being an important dissonance between the two versions due to the fact this argument hinges heavily upon the distinction between subjective and objective probability and ultimately just functions like an argumentum ad hominem for the scrutability-lacking potential theist. But I’ll be honest: I haven’t yet even begun checking (1’)'s specific implications for any non-trivial variance. Just, y’know, putting it out there. If you like it, you can take it. If you don’t, send it right back.

***** I hope I might soon get back into this discussion with a genuine, reciprocal effort and attention to detail.

Very good points! We have some true heavy weights around here. Unforunately, things got a bit nasty between empther and Perplexity on a separate thread (Against Free-Will) and apparently Perplexity has left the forum, so I don’t expect we’ll see a reply to your post. It’s a shame, really.

 

[empther]

Unforunately, things got a bit nasty between empther and Perplexity on a separate thread (Against Free-Will) and apparently Perplexity has left the forum, so I don’t expect we’ll see a reply to your post. It’s a shame, really.

Perplexity came on these forums with reams of meaningless, ill-defiined “because S then it follows B as a consequence of D’s indeterministic skeptical theism” mumbojumbo and piled on enough of it to fill a book, thinking that the sheer volume of it would make people bow down to his omniscience. :bowdown: :bowdown2:
But people didn’t give him the adulation he thirsted for and even had to nerve to argue with him!!
So he used me as an excuse to leave, and go try destroying people’s faith elsewhere.

 

[danserr]

Perplexity came on these forums with reams of meaningless, ill-defiined “because S then it follows B as a consequence of D’s indeterministic skeptical theism” mumbojumbo and piled on enough of it to fill a book, thinking that the sheer volume of it would make people bow down to his omniscience. :bowdown: :bowdown2:
But people didn’t give him the adulation he thirsted for and even had to nerve to argue with him!!
So he used me as an excuse to leave, and go try destroying people’s faith elsewhere.

Mocking his posts as meaningless and ill-defined simply shows ignorance on your part. The issues we are discussing are legitimate issues in the philosophy of religion.

Stop acting proud of yourself. You have only been rude, mocking, and childish, and your personal attacks are disgusting.

The only thing left to say to you is that you sir, are neither a gentleman nor a scholar. Other people have taken the time and effort to make serious answers to his posts. If you cannot, then do not post.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Perplexity came on these forums with reams of meaningless, ill-defiined “because S then it follows B as a consequence of D’s indeterministic skeptical theism” mumbojumbo and piled on enough of it to fill a book, thinking that the sheer volume of it would make people bow down to his omniscience. :bowdown: :bowdown2:
But people didn’t give him the adulation he thirsted for and even had to nerve to argue with him!!
So he used me as an excuse to leave, and go try destroying people’s faith elsewhere.

Well, I can’t say I’m entirely unsympathetic to your perspective. I know all too well that some people do just enjoy trying to destroy others’ faith (as at one time that person was me.) However, I must agree with the others that personal attacks are not the way to counter it. I admit some of the exchanges between Perplexity and I were a little bit contentious, but I think we both took it in good sport. I, personally, was curious to engage him a little further, as I read through some of his older posts to get a feel for his overall philosophical approach, and was surprised to find that it seems he was a practicing Catholic not very long ago. Who knows… dannser or In Spiration may have presented an argument that tipped the balance back a bit? I guess what I mean to say is, even atheists need our respect and it is our duty to present Christ to them (though Lord knows I fail time and again.) I was an atheist for a long time and one of the things that really stuck with me was when a Christian would talk calmly and hospitably to me, even in the face of my most disrespectful comments.

 

[empther]

I read through some of his Perplixity ] older posts to get a feel for his overall philosophical approach, and was surprised to find that it seems he was a practicing Catholic not very long ago.

I’m surprised too!

So. I see.
Apparently, he had some kind a faith a while ago. He knew something about having a faith. He knew something about what having a faith meant to a person. It’s not like he had no experience in these matters.

And now he goes around trying to destroy other people’s faith? :bigyikes::banghead::banghead:

 

[empther]

danser wrote:
Stop acting proud of yourself. You have only been rude, mocking, and childish, and your personal attacks are disgusting.

The only thing left to say to you is that you sir, are neither a gentleman nor a scholar. Other people have taken the time and effort to make serious answers to his posts. If you cannot, then do not post.

Uh hunh.

On the catholic.org forum Perplexity would have been banned in two minutes.

Pretty rude, hunh? Or maybe they have the right idea over there.