Pope Francis: Death penalty is contrary to the Gospel

[irenaeus1]

Yes he told parables, but I never thought of them as what Jesus would do.

Actually, in some of the parables illustrating punishment, Jesus explicitly says that this is what his Father would do if we act as those in the parable.

 

[simpleas]

Interesting thanks.

 

[simpleas]

Yes his father, not Jesus himself, can’t help but think of Jesus as more loving, merciful, forgiving that the father, since we need to go through Jesus to get to the father, he is definitely more welcoming as he came as one of us, so a little more easy to relate to and to aspire to also.

Never really did any study into the scriptures tbh, mostly listened to what the priest preached about on a sunday, and most of them are, or at least seem to be opposed to death sentences for us sinners, since we go to confession etc.
What God decides to do with us upon our death is up to him, but living as a human for me, is to respect life, even in the worst of sinners, since we can afford to do this is the developed world.

Thanks.

 

[OneSheep]

Good Morning Irenaeus,

More than that, one will proceed as not forgiven, not merely as if not forgiven.

This goes back to one’s image of God. Mine is reflected in this:

Pope Francis‏Verified account @Pontifex

God is always waiting for us, he always understands us, he always forgives us.

Also, then-Ratzinger’s writing assessing Anselm’s theology of redemption does not say anything about repentance or contrition no longer being needed.

Yes, it takes two to have a relationship.

Below is from the Council of Trent regarding the atonement:

Nice. The passage does not support the idea that God was feeling resentful toward man, so man had to pay, as Anselm implied. It also gives room for different images of God, which I think is a good way to go about doctrine.

 

[o_mlly]

“You ask about the correct interpretation of the teaching of the encyclical on the death penalty. Clearly, the Holy Father … has simply deepened the application of such principles in the context of present-day historical circumstances. (Cardinal Ratzinger, 1995)

Act: The state executes a prisoner whose identity, guilt and responsibility have been fully determined.

Object: 1) To redress the disorder introduced by the offense.
2) To defend human lives against this unjust aggressor.

Intent: To redress the disorder introduced by the offense.

Circumstance: The state has other means to effectively defend human lives against this unjust aggressor.

CCC# 1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together.

This execution is immoral; the act is evil in its circumstance.

Only states which do not have the means to effectively defend human lives against unjust aggressors may execute. The definition and existence of efficacious means remains debatable.

 

[Ender]

Object: 1) To redress the disorder introduced by the offense.
2) To defend human lives against this unjust aggressor.
Intent: To redress the disorder introduced by the offense.
Circumstance: The state has other means to effectively defend human lives against this unjust aggressor.

Your object is not valid, in fact you cite exactly the same thing as the intent. It ought to be obvious that intent and object are actually two different things. Further, if you identify (correctly) the intent as redressing the disorder then a circumstance that is not related to achieving what is intended really shouldn’t be considered an invalidating circumstance.

Redressing the disorder is a separate objective of punishment than is protection. It is also the primary objective, so clearly the consequences related to a secondary objective cannot control what is or is not appropriate for achieving the primary objective.

 

[o_mlly]

Your object is not valid, in fact you cite exactly the same thing as the intent. It ought to be obvious that intent and object are actually two different things.

The end in view is quite often an identity to the moral object. Wherever did you get the idea that object and intent must be different?

Further, if you identify (correctly) the intent as redressing the disorder …

Correctly? But I did identify the intent as redressing the disorder. What are you trying to say?

… a circumstance that is not related to achieving what is intended really shouldn’t be considered an invalidating circumstance.

The circumstantial font of the moral act is not dependent on the font of intention. I do not think you can cite a Catholic source to support your claim . For if you could then no act good in its intention could not be found evil in its circumstance. Which is absurd.

 

[Ender]

The end in view is quite often an identity to the moral object. Wherever did you get the idea that object and intent must be different?

They’re different because the church lists them separately, just as the circumstances is a separate and distinct part of a moral act so too are the other two fonts: object and intent.

1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject.

Of course they are different.

The circumstantial font of the moral act is not dependent on the font of intention. I do not think you can cite a Catholic source to support your claim . For if you could then no act good in its intention could not be found evil in its circumstance. Which is absurd.

Well, it’s not as absurd as you believe:

1754 Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves…

But that really wasn’t my point. The circumstance you cited applied to the accomplishment of a secondary objective of punishment, and is irrelevant in discussing what is required to satisfy the primary objective.

 

[o_mlly]

They’re different because the church lists them separately, just as the circumstances is a separate and distinct part of a moral act so too are the other two fonts: object and intent.

1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject.

Of course they are different.

The proposition that the moral object and intent of an act cannot be identical is as illogical as claiming that what is taught in Veritas Splendor cannot be the same as that taught in the 1997 Catechism. These two fonts of Catholic thought teach the same truths.

Well, it’s not as absurd as you believe:

1754 Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves…

The absurd claim – “a circumstance that is not related to achieving what is intended really shouldn’t be considered” – to which I took exception has nothing to do with 1754 which relates circumstance to the moral quality of the act.

But that really wasn’t my point. The circumstance you cited applied to the accomplishment of a secondary objective of punishment, and is irrelevant in discussing what is required to satisfy the primary objective.

A bit confusing. Do you now argue that circumstances are dependent on the object of the act? Further, that only the primary (?) object may be circumstantially addressed? Remember, the intent is always the primary goal of a particular (subjective) actor. But the object lists all reasonably foreseeable outcomes for any actor.

As JP II taught and, as you cited, Cardinal Ratzinger clarified that historical circumstances have always limited the state’s use of capital punishment.

The state executes unjustly if: “Circumstance: The state has other means to effectively defend human lives against this unjust aggressor.”

 

[Ender]

The proposition that the moral object and intent of an act cannot be identical is as illogical as claiming that what is taught in Veritas Splendor cannot be the same as that taught in the 1997 Catechism. These two fonts of Catholic thought teach the same truths.

There are three components of a moral act. They are enumerated that way because they are different. It makes no sense to say there are three components if two of them are the same.

1750 The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the “sources,” or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.
1752 In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject.

As 1752 says, the intention resides in the acting subject; the object however includes the visible action. It is the difference between what we do and why we do it, therefore they can never be the same.

The absurd claim – “a circumstance that is not related to achieving what is intended really shouldn’t be considered” – to which I took exception has nothing to do with 1754 which relates circumstance to the moral quality of the act.

Let’s try this one more time. The circumstance you referred to related to a secondary objective of punishment, but is irrelevant to the accomplishment of the primary objective. Since it is the primary objective that must always be addressed, circumstances that are irrelevant to it cannot determine what actions are appropriate. As far as redressing the disorder is concerned, the lack of a need for protection simply doesn’t matter.

A bit confusing. Do you now argue that circumstances are dependent on the object of the act?

Of course not. The circumstances exist independently of the object and the intent.

Further, that only the primary (?) object may be circumstantially addressed?

Not at all, only that circumstances that may determine what is appropriate for achieving a secondary objective are not necessarily relevant to what is appropriate for achieving the primary objective.

Remember, the intent is always the primary goal of a particular (subjective) actor. But the object lists all reasonably foreseeable outcomes for any actor.

The object includes the action and its immediate outcome (proximate end); it does not include all foreseeable outcomes.

As JP II taught and, as you cited, Cardinal Ratzinger clarified that historical circumstances have always limited the state’s use of capital punishment.

True, just not for this reason. The primary objective is really justice (not protection), and if justice is not served by a particular punishment then it shouldn’t be used. That’s very different than saying it shouldn’t be used because it’s not necessary for protection.

The state executes unjustly if: “Circumstance: The state has other means to effectively defend human lives against this unjust aggressor.”

The state executes unjustly if the punishment is unjust, and an unjust punishment is one that is not commensurate with the severity of the crime. Whether a punishment is just has nothing to do with whether it protects.

 

[o_mlly]

There are three components of a moral act …

As we have already posted extensively on the moral theology of a human act in another thread, rather than repeat I refer interested readers to “The runaway trolley problem.”

Let’s cut to the chase of this thread.

The state executes unjustly if the punishment is unjust, and an unjust punishment is one that is not commensurate with the severity of the crime. Whether a punishment is just has nothing to do with whether it protects.

"Nothing to do with … " ??? Catholic teaching specifically claims that the justice of capital punishment has everything to do with the circumstance of alternate means to achieve society’s protection.

CCC 2267… If, however, non-lethal means are sufficient to defend and protect people’s safety from the aggressor, authority will limit itself to such means, as these are more in keeping with the concrete conditions of the common good and more in conformity to the dignity of the human person.

 

[Ender]

"Nothing to do with … " ??? Catholic teaching specifically claims that the justice of capital punishment has everything to do with the circumstance of alternate means to achieve society’s protection.

No, and actually this is one of the biggest problems with 2267: after just explaining the primary objective of punishment in 2266, it simply ignores that concern in 2267. It talks solely about protection - which is a secondary objective. The question of justice - the primary objective - is not even alluded to. It may well be unwise to execute someone these days because of its negative effect on society, and if one believes this then it would be unjust for that person to support capital punishment, but that is a prudential judgment about the effect, not a moral judgment about the act.

 

[o_mlly]

No, and actually this is one of the biggest problems with 2267: after just explaining the primary objective of punishment in 2266, it simply ignores that concern in 2267.

That is just not true. The logical sequence of 2267 to 2266 regarding public safety is explicit:

2266 … Punishment then, in addition to defending public order and protecting people’s safety …

2267 If, however, non-lethal means are sufficient to defend and protect people’s safety

 

[Ender]

That is just not true. The logical sequence of 2267 to 2266 regarding public safety is explicit:

2266 The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense.

Having just identified the primary objective of punishment in 2266 it is certainly puzzling why that objective was completely ignored in 2267. Yes, both sections talk about public safety, but 2266 makes clear that it is only a secondary concern.

 

[o_mlly]

2266 The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense.

Having just identified the primary objective of punishment in 2266 it is certainly puzzling why that objective was completely ignored in 2267. Yes, both sections talk about public safety, but 2266 makes clear that it is only a secondary concern.

It would be puzzling if, and only if, following the instruction in 2267 frustrates the instruction in 2266 of redressing the disorder. Is protecting the people’s safety mutually exclusive with redressing the disorder? No. Rather, it is clear to most that protecting the people’s safety is, in fact, part of redressing the disorder. Protecting the people’s safety is conducive, not exclusive, to redressing the disorder.

 

[Ender]

It would be puzzling if, and only if, following the instruction in 2267 frustrates the instruction in 2266 of redressing the disorder. Is protecting the people’s safety mutually exclusive with redressing the disorder? No. Rather, it is clear to most that protecting the people’s safety is, in fact, part of redressing the disorder. Protecting the people’s safety is conducive, not exclusive, to redressing the disorder.

Protecting people from future crimes is no part of redressing the disorder caused by a previous crime. The disorder that needs to be redressed is the order of justice which has been violated, and that can only be done by penalizing the offender with a punishment appropriate to the severity of the crime he has committed.

 

[o_mlly]

Protecting people from future crimes is no part of redressing the disorder caused by a previous crime.

Intuitively, I believe redress of the disorder requires action that reestablishes people’s safety.

Prior to his unjust act, the unjust actor is not an overt threat to the people’s safety. After his conviction for his unjust act, the unjust actor is an overt threat to people’s safety. To redress the disorder includes removing him as a threat to people’s safety.

You may disagree but this issue of whether the people’s safety is within redress disorder or without does not matter. 2266 requires authority to both redress the disorder and provide people’s safety as objectives in determining the punishment of the unjust actor.

Providing for the people’s safety does not frustrate redressing the disorder. Therefore, 2267 does follow logically from 2266.

 

[OneSheep]

Taking in a larger picture, though, moral development in a person, in people, moves in the direction from selfishness to justice to love.

Pope Francis is coming from the position of love. He does not ignore or demean justice, no, but he sees the limitation of the justice approach when it comes to love, mercy, and forgiveness for individuals. The prodigal son’s father did not begrudge his son before he came back, no, he waited, he probably searched. He wished for his son’s return; he had long forgiven him, and he may have never held anything against his son at all.

The prodigal son’s brother saw the father’s love as unjust. “How could he possibly love a person who is undeserving?” This is also the common attitude of those who are unwilling to forgive those who have murdered, or see justice as the final say, not love and mercy itself.

Indeed, God’s justice is mercy. The purpose of justice itself, which can be gleaned from moral development, is mercy and love for everyone, every individual. Justice itself must comply with love, and love sees human dignity.

 

[Ender]

Taking in a larger picture, though, moral development in a person, in people, moves in the direction from selfishness to justice to love.

Do you really want to argue that the church’s doctrines have moved from selfishness to justice to love? More than that, do you really want to argue that justice is somehow opposed to love?

Pope Francis is coming from the position of love. He does not ignore or demean justice, no, but he sees the limitation of the justice approach when it comes to love, mercy, and forgiveness for individuals.

Are you now arguing that the prior 260 odd previous popes, and all the Doctors and Fathers of the church missed this, and it is only Pope Francis that has comprehended the true relationship between punishment and love? Does that strike you as probable? Has the entire church really been so uncomprehending for 2000 years?
It would appear that this concept has been addressed before…

The good of the culprit, no less than that of the juridical community whose law he has culpably violated, must serve as a norm. Above both of these are the respect and excellence of the order established according to what is good and righteous. This norm requires, among other things, that, as is the case in the normal relations of men with one another, so also in the application of penal power, there be considered not only strict law and justice, but also equity, goodness and mercy. (Pius XII)

The consideration of mercy in the application of punishment did not originate with Francis.

The prodigal son’s brother saw the father’s love as unjust. “How could he possibly love a person who is undeserving?” This is also the common attitude of those who are unwilling to forgive those who have murdered, or see justice as the final say, not love and mercy itself.

Again, forgiveness does not rule out the necessity of punishment, nor is there any competition between justice and mercy.

In no passage of the Gospel message does forgiveness, or mercy as its source, mean indulgence towards evil, towards scandals, towards injury or insult. In any case, reparation for evil and scandal, compensation for injury, and satisfaction for insult are conditions for forgiveness. (Dives in Misericordia)

 

[simpleas]

In the parable of the prodigal son, the son is welcomed back by the father before the son has even asked for forgiveness. If punishment is such justice, why does the parable not include a form of punishment?
It seems the son had suffered, though it took him a long time to realise it, and the father knew this, therefore he celebrates his sons return and doesn’t seek some form of ‘revenge’.