Thank you for providing this citation. It doesn’t include the entire article, however I was able to find a complete document
here.
Regarding paragraphs 8-9 -
it has been dismissed as merely the personal opinion of the Pope, a “prudential” judgment easily rejected by those who prefer their own expertise.
This is not merely glib, but insulting. There are valid reasons for believing the pope’s comments are in fact prudential (as several well respected individuals have claimed), and this statement simply dismisses the position as personal weakness.
Like all authentic Christian doctrine, it was complete with the apostolic teaching, but is capable of deeper understanding by the Church under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.
If authentic Christian doctrine was complete with the apostles then to what degree can it be changed? It is clearly true that a deeper understanding can develop with time, but the question is: can that deeper understanding include a repudiation of what has been taught? The author recognizes this problem when he asserts about JPII that:
He understood that this teaching had to be faithful to Tradition but also needed to find a fresh formulation…*
He faced a dilemma of how to reconcile the** history of the infliction of capita*l punishment in Christian society with the historic Christian witness against death—and solved it with one concise stroke. By distinguishing the legitimate use of capital punishment to protect society from direct aggression from its illegitimate use for other purposes, such as a supposed retribution or deterrence, we are able to understand fully, in some ways for the first time, the Church’s Tradition as it has unfolded in history.
I think the author’s entire thesis rests on the validity of this assertion. So, is it true?
In CCC 2266 we find a description of the primary objective of all punishment:
*The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense.
*Redressing the disorder is nothing other than retribution - retributive justice. As Cardinal Dulles explained, punishment has four objectives: protection, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. The point is, protection is only a secondary objective, so if capital punishment cannot be justified by the demands of the primary objective, how can it be justified by the needs of a secondary one?
I asked this question earlier: if a person does not deserve to die because of the heinous nature of the crime he has committed, how can we justify killing him for a crime he has not committed?
Ender