The central contradiction running through the arguments of many of those new atheists authors

[ThomasToo]

ThomasToo, my position (which is from Aquinas) shows Euthyphro’s dilemma to be a false dilemma. That is, it fails to consider the third possibility that (1) the concept of goodness is grounded in God’s nature, while (2) our duties follow from God’s commands, which follow from God’s nature. So God commands the good because goodness is God’s nature. This means that God’s commands aren’t arbitrary, as they would be if God’s commands determined the good (the first horn of the ‘dilemma’), and that the good isn’t independent of God’s commands, as it would be if God commanded something because it’s good (the second horn of the ‘dilemma’).

Interesting… So, and I ask this without judgment or spite, only your theology manages to avoid the dilemma and it’s other theists’ with which to deal?

I would disagree with you insofar as the arbitrariness of the principles underpinning atheistic (in the loose sense) moral systems.

 

[Eric0802]

Interesting… So, and I ask this without judgment or spite, only your theology manages to avoid the dilemma and it’s other theists’ with which to deal

Not my theology, but my philosophy. As a Thomist, I think that what I said about God’s nature (in my response to the Euthyphro dilemma only, e.g. God’s necessary existence, His essential goodness, etc.) can be known by reason alone.

 

[AntiTheist]

The problem with your above assessment is that Claim A and Claim B are mutually exclusive; in other words, they are two alternatives, not two unrelated claims.

The actual truth of the matter is either one or the other – but beliefs aren’t limited to those two choices. Just like the flipped coin that we can’t see: it’s either heads or tails – the truth value is one or the other. But our beliefs aren’t limited to two options. We can choose not to accept both claims.

My overall point is that atheists, in embracing Claim B, are by definition rejecting Claim A.

I think I already agreed that those who accept B are a subset of those who don’t accept A.

Are you trying to assert that it is impossible to not accept A and also not accept B? If so, you are incorrect. The example of the coin demonstrates this quite well.

 

[ThomasToo]

But we’re NOT just quibbling about definitions. We’re debating the question of whether atheism is a belief system.

The problem with your above assessment is that Claim A and Claim B are mutually exclusive; in other words, they are two alternatives, not two unrelated claims. My overall point is that atheists, in embracing Claim B, are by definition rejecting Claim A. Thus, it is false to claim that atheists have “no beliefs” about God, and it is true to claim that they have (as I said initially) an affirmative belief that there is no God.

Which, of course, begs the question: why? There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that there is no God, and there is a long history of human belief and experience to suggest that there just might be.

How about two other possible propositions?

1. When I roll this die, it will come up 1.
2. When I roll this die, it will not come up 1.

Does rejecting one necessitate the rejection of the other? Or is it possible to say ‘I’m not sure’ to both just as with A and B above even if we can say (2) is more likely than (1) but neither is certain?

By what standard can morality be objectively judged if not by one that is absolute, eternal, and perfect – in other words, indisputably correct

I think they can be objectively judged by universalizing our experience–in the same way that we assume there are other minds (i.e. solipsism is false)–and making the objective statement ‘suffering is bad.’ From there we can arrive at the moral principle ‘suffering ought to be minimized wherever possible’ as a universalizable maxim.

No moral system–including yours–is ‘indisputably correct,’ at least insofar as people can disagree on whether any moral schema is correct.

 

[ThomasToo]

Not my theology, but my philosophy. As a Thomist, I think that what I said about God’s nature (in my response to the Euthyphro dilemma only, e.g. God’s necessary existence, His essential goodness, etc.) can be known by reason alone.

Sorry for conflating your theology and your philosophy. Interesting argument(s) but I, obviously, disagree.

 

[AntiTheist]

How about two other possible propositions?

1. When I roll this die, it will come up 1.
2. When I roll this die, it will not come up 1.

Does rejecting one necessitate the rejection of the other? Or is it possible to say ‘I’m not sure’ to both just as with A and B above even if we can say (2) is more likely than (1) but neither is certain?

Oh, I like this example. I’m stealing it from now on.

 

[ThomasToo]

Oh, I like this example. I’m stealing it from now on.

All yours. Not stealing though, pirating possibly but not even that… =]

 

[Slowlearner]

Beg pardon… Did I ever say there was something I can’t prove in which I have faith? I don’t think objective morality necessitates something over and above the universe…

How? How do you get around what Eric0802 said in post 175. Science gives us no proof of good or essence of good or existence of good. As Eric pointed out, philosophically derived systems of morality, though objective in their application, all start with an assumption that cannot be proved.

I suspect (and some smart person like Aquinas has probably said this), that while humans have an innate sense of good (conscience, natural law), proof of the existence of good is impossible for humans because it is necessarily something bigger than us. If good exists as more than just a feeling we have, more than our evolved instinct, then it is by definition supernatural.

What if good is love? And what if love is more than an emotion we feel? What if love is real and bigger and more powerful than mere individuals? Should we ignore it, or should we try to gain understanding of it and serve it?

By the way, I’m out of my league with you folks here (of all persuasions), so please feel to correct and enlighten me – especially if I’m running afoul of Church teaching. Thanks.

 

[AntiTheist]

And just to be clear, I think the wording that an atheist is someone who “holds no belief about gods” is misleading. A far better (more precise) wording is “someone who does not accept the claim that there are gods.”

This includes people who also accept the claim that there are no gods, but it is not limited to them.

[Just as, in the “roll a die” example, an a-1-ist could be someone who only doesn’t accept the claim that the die will be 1 or someone who also accepts the claim that the die will be some number other than 1]

 

[AntiTheist]

How? How do you get around what Eric0802 said in post 175. Science gives us no proof of good or essence of good or existence of good. As Eric pointed out, philosophically derived systems of morality, though objective in their application, all start with an assumption that cannot be proved.

Not to answer for Thomas, but I think we need to make this clear: not all atheists completely and totally rely on “science” for every last assumption of every last argument they ever make.

I’m an example. In my day to day life, I rely on all kinds of assumptions – usually reasonable – that cannot be “proven.” I don’t need to meticulously “prove” everything that I assume to be true in my daily life.

Now, in addition to being an atheist, I am also a skeptic. This means that I think that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Thus, ordinary claims and assumptions are fine to assume…the more extraordinary the nature of the claim, the more convincing evidence I will need to accept it.

So, as you can see, almost no atheist will always and ever need to “prove” every last thing that he or she believes in. So it is very, very possible for an atheist to make arguments – particularly philosophical arguments – that start from assumptions or “facts not in evidence.”

Now, I’ll probably disagree with the philosophical arguments of those atheists on precisely those grounds…but that’s a different issue.

 

[ThomasToo]

How? How do you get around what Eric0802 said in post 175. Science gives us no proof of good or essence of good or existence of good. As Eric pointed out, philosophically derived systems of morality, though objective in their application, all start with an assumption that cannot be proved.

I suspect (and some smart person like Aquinas has probably said this), that while humans have an innate sense of good (conscience, natural law), proof of the existence of good is impossible for humans because it is necessarily something bigger than us. If good exists as more than just a feeling we have, more than our evolved instinct, then it is by definition supernatural.

What if good is love? And what if love is more than an emotion we feel? What if love is real and bigger and more powerful than mere individuals? Should we ignore it, or should we try to gain understanding of it and serve it?

By the way, I’m out of my league with you folks here (of all persuasions), so please feel to correct and enlighten me – especially if I’m running afoul of Church teaching. Thanks.

Please see my post #184.

What if good is sensual pleasure (accounting for the hangover principle)? I think that we can both argue our points–though this is not how I would define ‘good.’

I think that’s all sort of what ifs what, frankly approach the counterfactual. What if there’s an invisible, cold-flaming, incorporeal dragon in my garage? At what point is it simply unmeaningful to say ‘there is a dragon in my garage’?

 

[Slowlearner]

Not to answer for Thomas, but I think we need to make this clear: not all atheists completely and totally rely on “science” for every last assumption of every last argument they ever make.

I’m an example. In my day to day life, I rely on all kinds of assumptions – usually reasonable – that cannot be “proven.” I don’t need to meticulously “prove” everything that I assume to be true in my daily life.

Now, in addition to being an atheist, I am also a skeptic. This means that I think that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Thus, ordinary claims and assumptions are fine to assume…the more extraordinary the nature of the claim, the more convincing evidence I will need to accept it.

So, as you can see, almost no atheist will always and ever need to “prove” every last thing that he or she believes in. So it is very, very possible for an atheist to make arguments – particularly philosophical arguments – that start from assumptions or “facts not in evidence.”

Now, I’ll probably disagree with the philosophical arguments of those atheists on precisely those grounds…but that’s a different issue.

I understand that. Didn’t your read my post where I said I was not going to argue with you?

I’m confused when Thomastoo says, “I think they can be objectively judged by universalizing our experience–in the same way that we assume there are other minds (i.e. solipsism is false)–and making the objective statement ‘suffering is bad.’ From there we can arrive at the moral principle ‘suffering ought to be minimized wherever possible’ as a universalizable maxim.” I don’t believe the statement ‘suffering is bad’ is objective from a philosophical viewpoint (I may be saying that wrong). If Thomastoo were to say, I accept without proof that ‘suffering is bad,’ and use that to develop a moral system, I’d say fine.

Far be it for me to object to someone deciding proof is not necessary and proceeding on faith. Admittedly our Catholic moral system is founded on faith. That is why I largely agree with Thomas when he says, “No moral system–including yours–is ‘indisputably correct,’ at least insofar as people can disagree on whether any moral schema is correct.” (I’d use “objectively provable” instead of ‘indisputably correct’).

Moral systems are no little things. Whatever your moral beliefs are, they have a huge impact on how you conduct your life. For Catholics and Christians, the moral teachings are one of the major elements of the faith. Perhaps we could break the faith into two parts: moral/behavioral faiths and spiritual/theological faiths. (I’m a newbie, so Catholics correct me if I’m wrong in any way to say this.)

Thus if an atheist is not a moral skeptic, I’m really confused that they would be so active debating faith with Christians when they are half-way there themselves.

I’ve got a feeling that I’ve already argued this earlier, you know Chesterton saying there are those with faith who admit it and those with faith who don’t admit it. (And he didn’t even let off you moral skeptics as I have – on the subject of morality. I’d bet that many of the assumptions, for which skeptics do not require proof, are central to their happiness.)

 

[DonM]

=This means that I think that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.

Who decides when evidence is “extraordinary?”

Unless you have an objective test, this is just an out to say “that’s still not enough” no matter what proof is presented.

A skeptic would view evidence equally, and not engage in such subjective nonsense.

 

[DanteAlighieri]

The actual truth of the matter is either one or the other – but beliefs aren’t limited to those two choices. Just like the flipped coin that we can’t see: it’s either heads or tails – the truth value is one or the other. But our beliefs aren’t limited to two options. We can choose not to accept both claims.

I think I already agreed that those who accept B are a subset of those who don’t accept A.

Are you trying to assert that it is impossible to not accept A and also not accept B? If so, you are incorrect. The example of the coin demonstrates this quite well.

Yes, our belief options are less limited – one can choose to believe there is a God, or there is not a God, or the sky is blue. One can also choose to believe the coin will land heads, the coin will land tails, or that fish has a funny aftertaste. In both of these cases, the third options – while valid beliefs to choose – are totally unrelated and therefor meaningless in this discussion.

In any case, since we have now established and agree that atheists by definition DO have a belief system, let’s get back to the validity of asserting there is no God without any evidence. Shall we?

Peace,
Dante

 

[DanteAlighieri]

How about two other possible propositions?

1. When I roll this die, it will come up 1.
2. When I roll this die, it will not come up 1.

Does rejecting one necessitate the rejection of the other? Or is it possible to say ‘I’m not sure’ to both just as with A and B above even if we can say (2) is more likely than (1) but neither is certain?

Saying “I’m not sure” is neither a rejection of (1) nor an acceptance of (2).

Rejecting (1) is exactly the same as accepting (2).

Syaing “(2) is more likely than (1), but neither is certain” is not a choice between the two – it’s a long-winded version of “I’m not sure”.

I think they can be objectively judged by universalizing our experience–in the same way that we assume there are other minds (i.e. solipsism is false)–and making the objective statement ‘suffering is bad.’ From there we can arrive at the moral principle ‘suffering ought to be minimized wherever possible’ as a universalizable maxim.

No moral system–including yours–is ‘indisputably correct,’ at least insofar as people can disagree on whether any moral schema is correct.

But what makes suffering “bad”? At what point (if ever) is suffering good?

What makes it “nice” to help a little old lady cross the street? What makes it “generous” to give to charity? At what point (if any) do these actions become shows of self-righteousness instead of real love for one’s neighbor?

This system ignores the truth that suffering can, in fact, be redemptive; that suffering and sacrifice for the sake of others is the true nature of charity. It ignores the reality that true goodness does not originate with us; that generosity and kindness are not merely positive attributes that make life nicer or allow us to pat ourselves on the back for being “good people”.

Taking the absolute out of morality makes it relativistic and mathematical instead of sincere and motivated by love – which, by the way, is the only real way to alleviate the suffering of others.

Peace,
Dante

 

[AntiTheist]

Yes, our belief options are less limited – one can choose to believe there is a God, or there is not a God, or the sky is blue. One can also choose to believe the coin will land heads, the coin will land tails, or that fish has a funny aftertaste. In both of these cases, the third options – while valid beliefs to choose – are totally unrelated and therefor meaningless in this discussion.

The “third option” that I’m talking about is to reject both claims A and B. That is, a person can not believe that gods exist and also not believe that no gods exist – in the exact same way that a person can not believe that a person is guilty but also not believe that a person is innocent.

In any case, since we have now established and agree that atheists by definition DO have a belief system

You haven’t really been reading, have you? To repeat, I consider the defining characteristic of an atheist to be the rejection of claim A. An atheist may additionally accept claim B, but his acceptance of that belief isn’t the thing that makes him an atheist.

As such, atheism is not a “belief,” and even in the case of atheists who accept claim B, I would not call it a “system” of belief…it’s a position on a single question.

Now, I might actually defend claim B at some point in the future, but I’m not going to until you acknowledge that it is possible to reject claim A without accepting claim B and that those who merely reject claim A are, under my definition, atheists.

Otherwise, we’re done here.

Rejecting (1) is exactly the same as accepting (2).

Utterly ridiculous. I can reject the claim that the die will come up 1 and also reject the claim that the die will come up 2-6.

You are not grasping the point that each claim needs to be accepted or rejected on its own. Rejecting A does not mean affirming not-A.

 

[AntiTheist]

Who decides when evidence is “extraordinary?”

I do.

Every person has standards for which they will accept certain claims.For me, claims that I consider extraordinary are going to need evidence that I consider extraordinary to demonstrate it.

For example, if you claimed you had been abducted by a UFO, I would not believe it on the basis of your eye-witness testimony, nor the eye-witness testimony of the hundreds of other people who make similar claims (whose stories often coroborate each other).

I would need some extraordinary evidence: like, for example, pieces of alien spacecraft recovered that no scientist can understand and that contains large quantities of elements not found on the earth; or a message from the aliens beamed into the minds of everyone on earth simultaneously; or a piece of alien technology that can be demonstrated to do incredible things under controlled, laboratory conditions.

Those things would begin to get me to accept the claim.

 

[AntiTheist]

I don’t believe the statement ‘suffering is bad’ is objective from a philosophical viewpoint (I may be saying that wrong). If Thomastoo were to say, I accept without proof that ‘suffering is bad,’ and use that to develop a moral system, I’d say fine.

Naturally, as a moral skeptic, I agree that “suffering is bad” isn’t some objective statement about the universe. Suffering is a vital part of the universe…pain serves the very useful function of directing our attention to areas that need to be fixed.

The thing is, for me, when we talk about how we behave, we’re no longer talking about facts (which can be demonstrated via evidence), but values (which are opinions about facts that cannot be demonstrated but are nonetheless part of the individual).

Where do values come from? Some of them come from biology: the empathetic “social animal” stuff I mentioned earlier. Some come from reason: rationally deciding the course of action best suited to cooperation and survival. Some come from tradition and training: we’ve spent so long as a species in a society with rules, and we’ve been trained in those rules, that we’ve “internalized” a lot of behavioral things that were rational decisions of our ancient ancestors. There are probably a lot of other sources, and I’m over-simplifying.

Our broad values – valuing orderly society, valuing not being killed, valuing not living in a society where stuff gets stolen – we are obviously going to share in common. Specific groups may have developed their own unique values, codes, and rules for social bonding and things like that (back in the day, different tribes had different rules, and today different religions have different rules, certain families might have their own traditions and values, etc).

Values can change over time, but the basic set of values I think are more or less set after a person emerges from childhood.

But at any rate, a value – like the value I place on living in an orderly society, or the value I place on not getting hurt or killed – isn’t a fact about the universe that I can demonstrate with evidence…it’s an opinion about facts – and not always a rational opinion – that is a part of who I am. Values not only can’t be “proven,” they don’t have to be proven.

My personal take is that our behavioral decisions consist of weighing values against options in any given situation. Now since we start from a broad range of similar values, it is possible – given a shared value – to determine a rule that is more or less “objective” in terms of the group that shares that value.

But again…being an atheist doesn’t mean that you have to “prove” everything you think. It just means that you don’t believe in gods. You can believe in anything else for every irrational reason in the world: believe in absolute morality, psychic powers, souls, reincarnation, nutty new age stuff, whatever. The thing that defines an atheist is the rejection of the claim “gods exist.”

 

[DanteAlighieri]

Utterly ridiculous. I can reject the claim that the die will come up 1 and also reject the claim that the die will come up 2-6.

You are not grasping the point that each claim needs to be accepted or rejected on its own. Rejecting A does not mean affirming not-A.

But you cannot reject both “The die will come up 1” and “The die will NOT come up 1”. This is the analogous argument, since these are the only two options.

“There is a God/are gods” and “There is not a God/are not gods” are the only two choices. To reject BOTH is to refuse to make a choice between the only two possibilities that exist.

You are not grasping the fact that, when the two claims by definition are negations of one another, it follows that rejecting one is a de facto acceptance of the other – unless one refuses to take responsibility for one’s choices and obstinately refuses to follow the logical progression of one’s line of thinking.

I’m sorry, but it flies in the face of common sense to say one can reject both of these statements as false:

There is a God.

There is no God.

…just as it flies in the face of common sense that one could reject both of these:

Water is wet.

Water is not wet.

…or these:

I like chocolate ice cream.

I do not like chocolate ice cream.

…or, even, these:

The die will come up 1.

The die will not come up 1.

In all of these examples, one statement must be true, and one must be false. If one chooses to believe the false statement, that is one’s prerogative. It is also one’s prerogative to believe that both statements are false, but then one is being absurd and not just wrong.

With all due resepect, this is reality. It is common sense. If you choose to cling to the notion that one can reject both premises as false, then we really have nothing more to discuss. I mean no disrespect by this, but it you have built a semantic cocoon to protect you from the absurdity of your position.

So, I go. I’m conceding nothing; nor am I throwing in the towel or taking my ball and going home. But if we can’t at least agree on basic principles, then we’re wasting each other’s time.

Peace,
Dante

 

[ThomasToo]

But you cannot reject both “The die will come up 1” and “The die will NOT come up 1”. This is the analogous argument, since these are the only two options.

“There is a God/are gods” and “There is not a God/are not gods” are the only two choices. To reject BOTH is to refuse to make a choice between the only two possibilities that exist.

No, to refuse to pick is simply an acknowledgment of the fact that we have insufficient data to choose between these two options. We CAN reject that the die will come up 1 and that it will not come up one while not rejecting that it will either come up 1 or not. If you’re demanding we pick one of these two options I ask you to answer the question. I have a fair die here, when I roll it will it come up 1?

You are not grasping the fact that, when the two claims by definition are negations of one another, it follows that rejecting one is a de facto acceptance of the other – unless one refuses to take responsibility for one’s choices and obstinately refuses to follow the logical progression of one’s line of thinking.

Certainly you don’t have a firm statement of belief on every possible set of two complementary (insofar as the pair complete the maxim of the excluded middle) axioms. In lieu of extensive possible examples, please see my set of two possible statements at the bottom of this post.

In all of these examples, one statement must be true, and one must be false.

Of course but which one. One horse is sure to run faster than the others but we have no way before the race is over to know which one.

So, I go. I’m conceding nothing; nor am I throwing in the towel or taking my ball and going home. But if we can’t at least agree on basic principles, then we’re wasting each other’s time.

Neither am I but I think while I am willing to acknowledge the principle of non-contradiction/law of the excluded middle surely you must be willing to say that sometimes we lack the data to say which.

I present you with two possible statements–which if you maintain your position then you are bound to simply answer (1) or (2).

(1) the Riemann hypothesis is true
(2) the Riemann hypothesis is false.