Well, it’s obvious, for example, that a language that didn’t have a word for “guilt” would not have the same notion of criminal justice that we have. The idea that language affects thought has been a staple of contemporary anthropology, a staple of modern philosophy of language, and a staple of all “postmodern” thought.
Or some very straightforward examples can be found at
blog.ted.com/2013/02/19/5-examples-of-how-the-languages-we-speak-can-affect-the-way-we-think/
Almost everything you say about Plato here is false – though these are common misconceptions. There is no form of a laptop, and one does not need such a form to evaluate a laptop as a bad laptop. There are no Forms of artifacts. When Plato talks about the “form of a bed”, for example, this is not a Platonic Form, since Plato agrees with you, Oreo, that the nature of a bed (or a laptop) is conventional. There are no standards of correct naming pertaining to beds or laptops, in the Cratylus.
There are, however, standards of correctness pertaining to things like beauty or happiness or (as becomes apparent in Plato’s Laws) marriage. This is not completely unproblematic, of course, since the names for these things only attach to them conventionally. But if we fix up Plato’s theory of reference, which was a mess, the point he was trying to make was that certain things are not “up to us”. What name we give to trees is entirely conventional, but it would be wrong for us to use the word for trees (whatever it is) to apply equally well to tubas. There are ways of dividing up the world that are irrational.
(Note that I think there IS (on Plato’s view) a form of a tree, since trees are a natural kind. But if you like, I could just as well say that "the name we give to gravity is conventional, but it would be wrong for us to say that the word for gravity applies equally well to centrifugal force.)