The definition of free will

[Gorgias]

Where does one draw the line between responding to influences and freely making a decision?

Do you answer some posts that are addressed to you, and defer to answer others? Are you really suggesting that it’s absolutely causally determined?

They are just one more factor in the determination of our choices.

I’m not certain whether you’re playing semantic games here, but just to be sure: you seem to be equating “determination” (i.e., the act of deciding) with “determinism” (the notion that determination happens outside the moral agent in question). Is that what you’re attempting to put in play here?

If so, then that’s rather dishonest. On the other hand, if it’s just playing with words, then it obfuscates rather than clarifies…

As I mentioned, we receive and process information to a far greater extent than a computer would - I would expect at least that a self-parking car might have sensors that would pick up obstacles such as traffic spikes, if it was worth the money one has to pay for such things.

Yet, if a new sort of obstacle – let’s say a force field – was implemented after the self-parking car was developed, it would have no ability to learn and make choices … even after frying itself on the force field a number of times. (Note that I’m not dumbing down the idea of free will to something that living non-rational agents may do, but instead, I’m just showing that it fails in your construction …)

But I first became aware of findings that our brains make decisions and coordinate reactions to circumstances before we are consciously aware of doing so

And yet, that’s not exactly what the study demonstrated. (I’ll try to get my hands on the original study; trying to ferret out what they really said, based on an article in Wired, isn’t trivial.) From the article: “The decision studied – whether to hit a button with one’s left or right hand – may not be representative of complicated choices that are more integrally tied to our sense of self-direction.” And again, from the author of the study:

“Real-life decisions – am I going to buy this house or that one, take this job or that – aren’t decisions that we can implement very well in our brain scanners,” said Haynes.
Also, the predictions were not completely accurate.

Upthread, someone made the distinction of “moral choices”; perhaps this should be our focus. I think it’s reasonable to suggest that there are pre-conscious processes at work in our brain which account for reactions to stimuli.

Nevertheless, in response to the question “are all choices causally determined?”, the notion of distinguishing between lower-level survival instincts and higher-level decision making isn’t unreasonable. Moreover, taking the latter of the two and breaking them into the difference between decision-making, conscious reflection on that decision making, and setting the body into motion isn’t unreasonable, either…

 

[JDaniel]

I notice you’ve also rather unsubtly snuck in an assumption that our use of rationality is “free” in the sense of being undetermined by anything, by any influence other than our own self (whatever that entity might be - although I notice advocates of free-will insist it must be separate from the actual substance that makes up our brains and nervous systems and sensory systems in order to be truly “free”).

Sair:

Actually, I think it is you who has “snuck in an assumption.” Your assumption is not only a frivolous dilemma, but also seems an impossible one! For, your conception seems to be that there must be unrestricted freedom through unrestricted choices. In other words, an infinity of choices. And you know that’s impossible because we are merely finite exigencies! We can only know what there is to learn of a finity of things; and, ours is a gathering of that knowledge in gradual steps. Thus, along the way, our choice-preferences can change.

As St. Thomas said, when we know an object or a thing, in a real sense, we possess it. The other is said to be in our minds. That we can agree on. But to think that it is the sheer propensities of matter that are the impetus of choice-making, is, of course, absurd.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

If it CANNOT be completed?

Serious:

Please give an example of something that CANNOT be completed.

God bless,
jd

 

[JDaniel]

But I first became aware of findings that our brains make decisions and coordinate reactions to circumstances before we are consciously aware of doing so through watching an Australian television show called Sleek Geeks. In one episode, Dr Karl Kruszelnicki explained that when, for example, we jump out of the way of an approaching car, our eyes have seen it and sent the information to our brains and caused us to react defensively - by jumping out of the way - before we are consciously aware of seeing and reacting to the hazard.

Sair:

This is a confusion. It is the confusion between our understanding what reactive mind means and what analytical mind means. One has some bearing on the other, but it is, for the moment, not relevant to get into. We have a reactive mind, or, that part of our mind used for the sole purpose of survival. Even the monkey, stalked by a lion, must rely on its reactive mind in order to get away, to survive. But, we use our analytical mind, or, that part of our mind for the purpose of thinking analytically, which includes choice-making. Your source is grotesquely conflating the two.

I’ll bet that upon seeing that oncoming vehicle, we don’t take the time to analyze whether or not we want to remain in that place, or move out of its way, unless . . . unless we’ve previously made the free-will choice that such a turn of events would be a good opportunity to commit suicide.

God bless,
jd

 

[Serious]

I guess I don’t understand. Say two people both have a desire to murder another person because it would benefit them materially in some manner. One refrains from killing because of conscience or fear of the legal system or both while the other one goes ahead and carries out the desire. They were both physically free to perform the act but only one did it. Was the other one not free?

Of course he was free, just like I am free NOT to pass my seat to an elderly person. He “chickened out”, and I follow my “programming”. He could have overcome his fear, just like I could overcome my “programming”. We are free if there is no external force to dictate our actions, but we are never free from our INNER conscience, or fear, or what have you.

It seems to me that free will all begins and ends in the will itself. It may have no effect on the world-and therefore no relevance-if I can’t possibly carry out the dictates of my will, but that doesn’t mean I can’t continue to will it.

Yes, you can will it. And then? It is just an empty wish, a “pie in the sky”.

Just like the person who is trapped in locked room with a raging fire. He can “will” to escape, but there is no way to escape. He has no options.

Just like another person who is trapped in locked room on the 20th floor with a fire. He can break the window, and then he can “choose” to burn to death or to fall to death. But he does not want either of these options. He is forced to do one of them.

Just like the person who is blackmailed into carrying out an action he does not want to do. He can “will” all day long to find a loophole, which is not there. His has no option, but to obey, because the other option is intolerable. If this latter case the “force” is not physical, but psychological.

 

[Gorgias]

Just like another person who is trapped in locked room on the 20th floor with a fire. He can break the window, and then he can “choose” to burn to death or to fall to death. But he does not want either of these options. He is forced to do one of them.

So, free will doesn’t exist unless a person has access to all possible options? Ludicrous.

Counter-example: At any given moment, I will to win the lottery. At each of the moments of my life up till the present, I have not done so. Conclusion: I have no free will. :nope:

C’mon, now…

 

[Serious]

Two thoughts:

FIrst, you seem to be implying that free will requires the ability to make all choices at all times.

No, I never said that, not even close. The first prerequisite was to “have an aim that the person wishes to carry out”. Obviously the question of freedom only arises in THAT RESPECT, not “all choices” at “all times”. The free will is relevant only in that respect. The point is always: “I wish / will / desire to do SOMETHING”. What is my freedom in THAT RESPECT?

If you placed all possible flavors of ice cream in front of me, and my choice was “1988 Convertible Ford Mustang”, then likewise you would conclude that I had no free will – after all, I wasn’t able to make the choice that I wanted! That, naturally, is absurd!

It would be, if I said anything like that. Your remarks are all WAY off the mark. The starting point was that you wish / will / want / desire to have ice cream - and specifically you want CHOLCOLATE ice cream, when there is only vanilla available. What is this nonsense about a Ford Mustang???

Second, If we condition the question of free will on the particular choices available, then we’re saying that free will is a question of environment and not of the rational agent. If your definition of free will is “what the world gives me”, then you’ve stopped making sense. I would argue that free will is something that is intrinsic, not external to the rational agent.

Again, where did all that come from? The agent is never free from SOME environment. The question is, does the environment limit the freedom to a significant degree - namely, are there at least TWO ways to carry out the PARTICULAR will / wish / desire?

1. we have a desire, which we wish to achieve.
   2a) there is no way to carry it out - no freedom - in THAT RESPECT
   2b) there is onlt one way to carry it out - no freedom - in THAT RESPECT
   2c) there are at least two ways to carry it out.

The next part pertains only to 2c). When it comes to the decision making, who makes that decision?

3a) The agent makes the decision - the agent has free will in THAT RESPECT.
3b) Someone takes over and makes the decision - the agent has no free will in THAT RESPECT.

Of course the environment plays a very important role. It can restrict our choices. As long as there are at least two valid choices available, we do have freedom to choose and the freedom to carry it out.

You often reference the example of prisoners, whose ability to act has been curtailed. You mention this, I presume, as an example of “no degrees of freedom”; in other words, you’re making the case that prisoners have no free will.

No freedom - IN CERTAIN RESPECTS. The prisoner cannot leave, cannot decide when to have a shower, cannot make a decision when to eat and what to eat - but he certainly has many freedoms.

I have problems with this on two counts: first, it says that free will is a function of situation – as I’ve mentioned before to you, what you’re saying is that a person goes through various states of free will throughout his life, with the possibility of relatively less and relatively more (and maybe even completely none) at various times.

Why? You have freedom in SOME RESPECTS, and no freedom in OTHERS. What is your problem? The freedom cannot be separated from “freedom to do what?”

That doesn’t seem right: free will is, or it isn’t.

Why so? You certainly have “free will” to “desire / wish / want / will” to do ANYTHING at ANY TIME. That cannot be taken away, but it is a trivial observation. It is all “pie in the sky”.

Second, you’ve used the notion of constraint to argue against free will in various situations: hostages, crimes of rape. Let’s use this prisoner example that you’ve made recourse to. We have a prisoner sitting in his cell. His ability to actualize his decisions has been taken away. According to you, he has no free will.

In SOME RESPECTS. Is that really so problematic?

However, some small percentage of prisoners, under the same set of constraints, decide that the best course of action is to attempt escape. They may or may not succeed, but that is immaterial: according to you, “zero degrees of freedom” means “no free will”. Yet, some take this “zero degrees of freedom” and make choices substantially different than others. Your example, then, says that the two prisoners – all other things being equal – demonstrate ‘free will’ and ‘lack of free will’ simultaneously. In other words, we’ve reduced your definition to an absurdity…

They can try to escape, they do have the freedom to attempt it. But as long as they fail, they were unable to carry out what they desired.

Now, I answered your questions again. Are you going to answer mine? “If only the desire / wish / will is what counts, then God can take away the freedom to carry out the desires of those people, whose actions God disapproves of - and their free will is not violated” - says you. Do you still maintain this?

I think I was patient enough, and answered your points in detail. If you have more questions or more objection, that is fine. I will entertain them, but ONLY after you answered mine. It is your turn.

 

[Serious]

So, free will doesn’t exist unless a person has access to all possible options? Ludicrous.

It would be if I said anyhing like that.

Counter-example: At any given moment, I will to win the lottery. At each of the moments of my life up till the present, I have not done so. Conclusion: I have no free will. :nope:

I guess, I will have to emphasize it again: “You can WILL it day in and day out. Your will is futile. You have no free will in THAT RESPECT!!!” Do you get it? Or should I use even larger letter size?

 

[Gorgias]

No freedom - IN CERTAIN RESPECTS. The prisoner cannot leave, cannot decide when to have a shower, cannot make a decision when to eat and what to eat - but he certainly has many freedoms.

So a person both has free will and yet has no free will simultaneously? That doesn’t make sense.

Why? You have freedom in SOME RESPECTS, and no freedom in OTHERS. What is your problem?

This is the problem, I think. Freedom is not free will. Yes, one may have some of his freedoms held in check and others unconstrained, simultaneously. However, that doesn’t mean he has some free will and simultaneously not have free will. This is where your argument goes off the rails. You mean something other than “free will” (“freedom to act” seems the right term), but are using the term “free will” to refer to it.

That being the case – sure, prisoners have limited freedom to act. Those being victimized by crime have certain limitations on their freedom to act.

However, this is not a question of free will…

Why so? You certainly have “free will” to “desire / wish / want / will” to do ANYTHING at ANY TIME. That cannot be taken away, but it is a trivial observation. It is all “pie in the sky”.

Ding ding ding! And here we go: now we’re talking about the same thing: free will speaks to the person’s ability to will something. It cannot be taken away … unless you posit determinism, which says that what appears to be will is actually the causally determined action of certain forces (biology, instinct, the hand of a puppeteer god).

In SOME RESPECTS. Is that really so problematic?

It is. It turns your argument away from ‘free will’ and toward ‘license to act’. Different issues.

 

[Serious]

So a person both has free will and yet has no free will simultaneously? That doesn’t make sense.

Not in the SAME RESPECT. The law of non-contradiction says that the proposition cannot be true and false “at the same time in the same respect”.

This is the problem, I think. Freedom is not free will. Yes, one may have some of his freedoms held in check and others unconstrained, simultaneously. However, that doesn’t mean he has some free will and simultaneously not have free will. This is where your argument goes off the rails. You mean something other than “free will” (“freedom to act” seems the right term), but are using the term “free will” to refer to it.

That being the case – sure, prisoners have limited freedom to act. Those being victimized by crime have certain limitations on their freedom to act.

However, this is not a question of free will…

Without the ability to act upon that will it remains wishful thinking, daydreaming. You define free will as “the free ability to fantasize, daydream, engage in wishful thinking…”. Not much of a topic for a philosophical discussion.

Ding ding ding! And here we go: now we’re talking about the same thing: free will speaks to the person’s ability to will something. It cannot be taken away … unless you posit determinism, which says that what appears to be will is actually the causally determined action of certain forces (biology, instinct, the hand of a puppeteer god).

I already said this.

It is. It turns your argument away from ‘free will’ and toward ‘license to act’. Different issues.

Not different at all. Without the “freedom to act”, the “freedom to will” is completely irrelevant.

Now, I want to point out that so far you have been evading my question MANY times. Please stop wasting my time with these evasions and answer my question. Also I suggest you open a new thread with the title: “God could prevent all the human atrocities without violating our free will, since free will is nothing more than our ability to ‘will’ something, even if that ‘will’ cannot be actualized”. Just try it, and see the firestorm coming your way.

 

[Pitcharan]

Just the definition, nothing more. Is there a common definiton we all can agree upon? Many years ago I encountered someone, who insisted that “free will” is simply the internal freedom to be able to come to a decision, and it is not relevant or important that the decision could be carried out. He argued that “free will” should not be confused with “freedom of action”. When I heard that the first time, I was almost speechless from the astonishment. But since then I saw the same argument again.

Needless to say, I contend that “free will” cannot be separated from “freedom of action”.

Objections:

1. What good is to have the freedom to come to a decision which cannot be carried out?
2. If only the freedom of decision matters, then one can say that the free will of a rape victim is not curtailed. Someone even might say that she has the freedom of “fighting back” or “lay back and enjoy the experience”.
3. If a criminal kidnaps you family, and threatens to kill you children, unless you follow the orders he gives you, then your free will is not touched. You have the freedom to giving in, or resist and thus condemn your children to torture and death.
4. Moreover, if you give in to the demands, and your free will was not curtailed, then you acted on your own volition, and as such your are responsible for all the actions you take.
5. Finally, If only the freedom of “will” matters, then God could safely interfere and prevent all the planned atrocities, after all the “will” was free, only the action was prevented.

Needless to say that I hold this view ludicruous and absurd.

The definition I propose is simple. There are the following necessary conditions:

1. There is an aim or a goal that the agent wills / wishes / desires to carry out.
2. There are at least two possible ways or means to carry out that wish. (Principle of Alternate Possibilities - or PAP).
3. The Locus of Decision (LoD) rests with the agent. IOW, it is the agent who makes the decision. (No brainwashing)

The Stanford Encyclopedia plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/ says:

Clearly indicating that the action is inseparable from the will.

That is all. Your thoughts? Is it possible to come to an agreement?

If we are allowed to know the consequence of our actions so that our decisions may be based on the outcome we prefer, then we have “free will”.

By virtue of “free will” we may even disbelieve what we know, and learn from real foretaste

 

[Gorgias]

Now, I want to point out that so far you have been evading my question MANY times. Please stop wasting my time with these evasions and answer my question. Also I suggest you open a new thread with the title: “God could prevent all the human atrocities without violating our free will, since free will is nothing more than our ability to ‘will’ something, even if that ‘will’ cannot be actualized”. Just try it, and see the firestorm coming your way.

I haven’t been avoiding your questions; we’ve already danced that dance, beginning with this post in this thread. It’d be a waste of both of our time to simply recapitulate that debate (after all, our tete-a-tete in this thread pretty much duplicates our discussion in that one, anyway, so this is getting a bit tedious). We disagree with each others’ definitions, so of course, we’re naturally going to disagree on the implications that those definitions bring to the party!

 

[Gorgias]

Gorgias:

Ding ding ding! And here we go: now we’re talking about the same thing: free will speaks to the person’s ability to will something. It cannot be taken away … unless you posit determinism, which says that what appears to be will is actually the causally determined action of certain forces (biology, instinct, the hand of a puppeteer god).

I already said this.

I’m not certain what you mean by “I already said this”. Do you mean that “free will speaks to the person’s ability to will something”? (I don’t think so.) Or do you mean that “free will cannot be taken away”? (Again, not if you’re trying to be consistent with your “will + action” notion.) Or do you agree with the definition of determinism? That’s the only thing left on the table that you could’ve “already said”.

So, if you agree that determinism is “causally determined action of certain forces” upon a person, such that this person might think they’re doing things of free will (but is mistaken), then upon what is determinism acting? The will to act of the person, or the action itself? After all, if determinism thwarts will, then my definition holds. But, if determinism thwarts action, then your definition holds. However, if determinism thwarts action (yet not will), then we’ve got your puppeteer god all over again – since we want to do something yet are physically constrained from doing so; yet, we know that this isn’t the case. Since determinism is arguable, then it can’t be having been argued from your perspective of free will. Maybe it’s both, though – if you’re willing to argue free will as “will + action”, maybe that’s what determinism thwarts? But, that doesn’t make much sense, either: if determinism thwarts will, then that’s sufficient; no need to force behavior if the will to perform the behavior has already been conformed.

(In other words, if I want you to take out the garbage, I either force you to perform the action, or I create in you the will to do it. Once you want to take out the garbage, I don’t have to force it – in fact, it’s silly to suggest that I’m forcing you to do something you already want to do!)

So, let’s see how you explain this one – cause on the face of it, a close look at determinism seems to weaken your arguments about free will…

It is. It turns your argument away from ‘free will’ and toward ‘license to act’. Different issues.

Not different at all. Without the “freedom to act”, the “freedom to will” is completely irrelevant.

Tell that to a POW.

 

[Serious]

I haven’t been avoiding your questions; we’ve already danced that dance, beginning with this post in this thread. It’d be a waste of both of our time to simply recapitulate that debate (after all, our tete-a-tete in this thread pretty much duplicates our discussion in that one, anyway, so this is getting a bit tedious). We disagree with each others’ definitions, so of course, we’re naturally going to disagree on the implications that those definitions bring to the party!

You did not answer, you have been avoiding the answer. In the tread you linked to, you have been avoiding; that is why I opened a new one. In this you are avoinding.

Quote from the first page:

At this point either we agree on this definition (choice + action), or we do not. If we do, all is well. If you still disagree, please comment on the question I posited before: “If only our inner choice is what matters, and the ability to carry out that choice does not curtail out free will, then God can remove all the ability to carry out those choices he disapproves, and we still have full free will. As such, the so-called free will defense cannot be used when the “problem of evil” is being investigated.”

Your answer from the thrid page:

You and I have already disagreed on the way the free will defense does or doesn’t work in this context. However, before I respond to your request, let me ask you: in the context of free will, ‘determinism’ is posited as its contrary: that is, if there is no free will, then there is determinism. How would you define determinism?

And since then you have been evading the answer, which you PROMISED you will give. Your promise is highlighted above.

From your definition it follows LOGICALLY that God could take away the freedom of action without violating the free will of the “bad people”. That is already obvious. I am only curious, why are you so very reluctant to actually confirm it?

 

[Serious]

I haven’t been avoiding your questions; we’ve already danced that dance, beginning with this post in this thread. It’d be a waste of both of our time to simply recapitulate that debate (after all, our tete-a-tete in this thread pretty much duplicates our discussion in that one, anyway, so this is getting a bit tedious). We disagree with each others’ definitions, so of course, we’re naturally going to disagree on the implications that those definitions bring to the party!

You did not answer, you have been avoiding the answer. In the tread you linked to, you have been avoiding; that is why I opened a new one. In this thread you are avoiding, too.

Quote from the first page:

At this point either we agree on this definition (choice + action), or we do not. If we do, all is well. If you still disagree, please comment on the question I posited before: “If only our inner choice is what matters, and the ability to carry out that choice does not curtail out free will, then God can remove all the ability to carry out those choices he disapproves, and we still have full free will. As such, the so-called free will defense cannot be used when the “problem of evil” is being investigated.”

Your answer from the thrid page:

You and I have already disagreed on the way the free will defense does or doesn’t work in this context. However, before I respond to your request, let me ask you: in the context of free will, ‘determinism’ is posited as its contrary: that is, if there is no free will, then there is determinism. How would you define determinism?

And since then you have been evading the answer, which you PROMISED you will give. Your promise is highlighted above. The truth is that as soon as I saw your “promise”, I already suspected that you will keep on evading. A standard technique around here to avoid answering a question is to ask “counter-questions” and hoping that the lack of answer will get lost in the exchange.

From your definition it follows LOGICALLY that God could take away the freedom of action without violating the free will of the “bad people”. That is already obvious. I am only curious, why are you so very reluctant to actually confirm it?

 

[Gorgias]

Serious,

Having done a bit of research, I found some citations you might find interesting.

First, Steven Boer constructed the argument that you’ve essentially restated here (regarding a world in which God allows moral choice but thwarts the effects of the choice, as a means of defeating the free will defense) in his article “The Irrelevance of the Free Will Defence” (1978). Frank Dilley responded to his argument along the lines I’ve provided in “Is the Free Will Defence Irrelevant?” (1982). Coughlan (“Moral Evil Without Consequences”) and McKim (“Worlds Without Evil”, 1984) attempted to redeem Boer’s assertions, and Dilley responded to their arguments in “The Free-Will Defence and worlds without moral evil” (1990).

Among Dilley’s initial responses to Boer:

“(1) to be able only to try to do evil, and not be able to accomplish it, makes nonsense eventually out of trying to do evil. (2) To have good be the inevitable result of one’s intentions, whether good or bad, makes nonsense also out of intending good. (3) To strip intentions of their consequences cuts the heart out of the notion of the creation of a community of interacting beings. (4) For coincidence miracles to occur every time they would be required would cause drastic revisions in our concepts of Laws of Nature. (5) Such revisions would prevent creatures from ever being cognitively free with respect to God.”

(Dilley, “Is the Free Will Defence Irrelevent”, Religious Studies 18 (1982): 357, quoted in Dilley, “The Free-WIll Defence and worlds without moral evil”, Philosophy of Religion 27 (1990): 2).

 

[Sair]

Do you answer some posts that are addressed to you, and defer to answer others? Are you really suggesting that it’s absolutely causally determined?

Some of those decisions may be influenced by genuine randomness, genuine indeterminacy - but more often, they are determined by my prior awareness of and reflection upon the issues discussed in each post to which I respond. In that sense, yes, they are causally determined. I hardly think they would be worth more if they were otherwise.

I’m not certain whether you’re playing semantic games here, but just to be sure: you seem to be equating “determination” (i.e., the act of deciding) with “determinism” (the notion that determination happens outside the moral agent in question). Is that what you’re attempting to put in play here?

Is there really a difference, in terms of actual mechanism, actual events in time and space, between the determination that involves causal progression, and the determination that involves a conscious agent making a decision between one alternative and another? Proponents of libertarian free will would probably say yes - that there has to be a point at which “my” decision has to be “up to me”. Full disclosure - I am currently reading a book by Daniel Dennett entitled Freedom Evolves, and this is at present heavily influencing my thinking on the subject of free will. One of the points Dennett makes in this book (and has made in earlier works) is that, “If you make yourself really small, you can externalise everything.” The point, of course, is to draw attention to our conception of what, precisely, instantiates the “self” - is it some entity that exists apart, in time and space, from the substance of our bodies, or is it the very product of our physical existence? Under what circumstances is a decision to be considered “up to me” as opposed to “up to the neurons that compose my brain, up to the influences absorbed during my lifetime, up to the genetic predispositions inherited from my ancestors”, and so on? I have yet to see any clear dividing line drawn - and, importantly, substantiated - between the latter and the former.

Yet, if a new sort of obstacle – let’s say a force field – was implemented after the self-parking car was developed, it would have no ability to learn and make choices …

As I think I pointed out.

Upthread, someone made the distinction of “moral choices”; perhaps this should be our focus. I think it’s reasonable to suggest that there are pre-conscious processes at work in our brain which account for reactions to stimuli.

But not for the decisions that we consider to matter in a moral sense?

Nevertheless, in response to the question “are all choices causally determined?”, the notion of distinguishing between lower-level survival instincts and higher-level decision making isn’t unreasonable. Moreover, taking the latter of the two and breaking them into the difference between decision-making, conscious reflection on that decision making, and setting the body into motion isn’t unreasonable, either…

Of course there is room for distinction, if only in terms of the complexity of each type of decision. We can, of course, make off-the-cuff decisions without extensive deliberation - such as whether to cross the road or not, when there may or may not be vehicles approaching. But again, the question remains as to whether the difference between this kind of decision and the kind that involves more extensive deliberation and consideration of circumstances and possible outcomes - especially those that are far more speculative than the probability of being hit by a car or not - is a qualitative or quantitative difference. Is the higher-level moral decision, with potentially life-changing ramifications, removed by degree or by kind from the everyday, practical decisions we make without lengthy contemplation?

 

[itullian]

the ability to weigh and decide your actions.

 

[Serious]

Serious,

Having done a bit of research, I found some citations you might find interesting.

First, Steven Boer constructed the argument that you’ve essentially restated here (regarding a world in which God allows moral choice but thwarts the effects of the choice, as a means of defeating the free will defense) in his article “The Irrelevance of the Free Will Defence” (1978). Frank Dilley responded to his argument along the lines I’ve provided in “Is the Free Will Defence Irrelevant?” (1982). Coughlan (“Moral Evil Without Consequences”) and McKim (“Worlds Without Evil”, 1984) attempted to redeem Boer’s assertions, and Dilley responded to their arguments in “The Free-Will Defence and worlds without moral evil” (1990).

Among Dilley’s initial responses to Boer:

“(1) to be able only to try to do evil, and not be able to accomplish it, makes nonsense eventually out of trying to do evil. (2) To have good be the inevitable result of one’s intentions, whether good or bad, makes nonsense also out of intending good. (3) To strip intentions of their consequences cuts the heart out of the notion of the creation of a community of interacting beings. (4) For coincidence miracles to occur every time they would be required would cause drastic revisions in our concepts of Laws of Nature. (5) Such revisions would prevent creatures from ever being cognitively free with respect to God.”

(Dilley, “Is the Free Will Defence Irrelevent”, Religious Studies 18 (1982): 357, quoted in Dilley, “The Free-WIll Defence and worlds without moral evil”, Philosophy of Religion 27 (1990): 2).

Links would have been much more helpful. But we have to deal with what we got.

(1) to be able only to try to do evil, and not be able to accomplish it, makes nonsense eventually out of trying to do evil.
Answer: So what? There is no brainwashing, the agent could try and try again, but there would be some pesky coincidence. Of course, eventually it might discourage the attempt. Just like being in a locked room would discourage to bang on the door which remains closed. Also it shows that the “intent alone” makes free will futile. This is what I am arguing. Funny to see the support from your side.

(2) To have good be the inevitable result of one’s intentions, whether good or bad, makes nonsense also out of intending good.
Answer: Nonsense. Only the intentional “evil” would be thwarted, the neutral ones would do through. As such the intent to do good remains untouched.

(3) To strip intentions of their consequences cuts the heart out of the notion of the creation of a community of interacting beings.
Answer: Another ill-conceived pseudo-argument. Why would it? The “natural” problems would remain, and helping someone who slipped and broke her leg is still a worthy endeavor.

(4) For coincidence miracles to occur every time they would be required would cause drastic revisions in our concepts of Laws of Nature.
Answer: Yet another dumb argument. The laws of nature can stay alone. Only a minor, even unobservable interference is needed. For example: When a rape is intended, a cop shows up “miraculously” in time. No one would know if that was a simple coincidence, or a “miracle”.

(5) Such revisions would prevent creatures from ever being cognitively free with respect to God.
Answer: the top of idiocy. We would be free from baseless and blind faith, on the other hand it would give us a meaningful option to worship God, or not.
Summary: These so-called arguments are unable to support what the author intended. On the other hand, they support what they were supposed argue against. It argues that if the “intent only” would matter and the action would be thwarted, it would make the “free will” a futile endeavor. As such it proves MY POINT: the intent AND the ability to carry out that intent would be a valid concept of “free will”.

Adding one more remark. This whole “free will defense” is based on a fallacy: “it assumes that the existence of the free will (intent + ability) will necessarily lead to an actualization of some morally evil act”. And that is simply not true. There is no LOGICAL connection between the ability to do evil and the actualization of evil. Of course, the ability to do evil leads logically and inevitably to the POSSIBILITY of evil. It is possible to create a world, where everyone has “REAL free will” (intent + ability) and yet there is no evil at all. But this is another conversation.

 

[Gorgias]

Links would have been much more helpful. But we have to deal with what we got.

Sorry I couldn’t make your life more convenient…

Seriously, though: I accessed some of these articles through JSTOR. That means that they likely aren’t freely available on the internet. Take a ride down to your local library, and you, too, can access them…!

(1) to be able only to try to do evil, and not be able to accomplish it, makes nonsense eventually out of trying to do evil.
Answer: So what?

His point is that, by making this turn, you’ve essentially taken the “evil” out of “the problem of evil”. With your assumption in place, you’ve invalidated the argument: remember your mantra – “you can’t have it both ways” – you can’t both argue that God allows evil unreasonably and set up a construction which requires God to thwart evil.

Also it shows that the “intent alone” makes free will futile. This is what I am arguing. Funny to see the support from your side.

No, it doesn’t. It just shows the absurdity of setting up your thought experiment in this manner. Notice, however, that Boer and Dilley aren’t setting up the example as you have: you’re claiming that my contention is illogical, and hence, this “coincidental miracle” God (as Boer labels him) is the illogical result. However, these articles are a demonstration of exactly the opposite point: these arguments aren’t coming from the hopes of making a reductio ad absurdum argument – they’re starting from an acceptance of the notion of free will, and moving forward!

(2) To have good be the inevitable result of one’s intentions, whether good or bad, makes nonsense also out of intending good.
Answer: Nonsense. Only the intentional “evil” would be thwarted, the neutral ones would do through. As such the intent to do good remains untouched.

No… if all there is in the world is good action, then there is no distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil’; therefore, there’s no such thing as “doing good”. It’s the logical extension of his first point.

(3) To strip intentions of their consequences cuts the heart out of the notion of the creation of a community of interacting beings.
Answer: Another ill-conceived pseudo-argument. Why would it? The “natural” problems would remain, and helping someone who slipped and broke her leg is still a worthy endeavor.

Which “natural problems”? Note that helping someone is a so-called ‘good’ action; its presence doesn’t imply that there’s anything else out there except good actions! In other words, in a world full of goody-two-shoes, there’s no measure of goodness! (And, in fact, in this world, a person who said, “ehh… screw her – someone else will help her” would find themselves unable not to help, since that would be an evil act! In your conception, then, we’re reduced to absurdity – the ability to make a free choice would be moot.

To be continued…