The Fifth Way: Argument from Design

[Wesrock]

The 1st premise presumes an Intelligence exists whose knowledge controls and directs all events, even chance events, to preordained goals. Aquinas’ universal claim that all things “work toward some goal” is rather a faith-belief rather than a science-fact. No one in his time would reject that in a perfectly ordered cosmos that the opposite could be true. Not so today, the premise begs the very question. (Since there are laws then there must be a lawgiver.)

I don’t think it’s possible to give a more uncharitable reading towards St. Thomas in his Fifth Way (and he did not write “work toward some goal”). St. Thomas was here writing a summary of theology intended for students of theology who already had some education. He understood the sciences (broadly construed) as being hierarchical, with physics/nature at the bottom, followed by mathematics, followed by philosophy, with theology at the top. He did not think one could study the “higher sciences” without grasping the lower. For example, one can be a good philosopher without being a good theologian, but one could not be a good theologian without being a good philosopher. He understood how to approach things on “neutral ground”, so to speak, depending on his audience. The Five Ways are not constructed as formal syllogisms. They are incredibly brief summaries that are not preceded (in the context of the Summa) by any philosophical setup, and that was due to the nature of the book not because he thought such things were unnecessary full stop. I completely reject the notion that he took this as an article of faith. He is clear (even at later points in his Summa) when he believes something is an article faith (such as the universe having a beginning). The Fifth Way does begin with a statement that things lacking intelligence move toward some end, and then quickly states the reason why without providing comprehensive arguments. To quote, “We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result.” He is simply speaking that we perceive causal regularity in nature and that this causal regularity is related to the ends of natures lacking intelligence. It also doesn’t mean everything (like an eclipse) as discussed earlier is a specific end.

I apologize for the above paragraph, it’s a bit slapdash, I know.

The relation of final cause to effect is in an inverse relationship to the normal precedence of cause to effect. Science does not, and I think, should not recognize this inversion as doing so would preempt to a large extent the necessity to experiment: Why test what is predetermined?

This is nonsense. You can’t know what the actual ends of things are without study of those things, and controlled experiments which attempt to remove interfering causes provide a methodical means of observation. We don’t simply say “thing B has thing A as its cause,” we also say “thing A regularly effects thing B”.

Continued in next post.

 

[Wesrock]

Continued from previous post.

Furthermore, I explained previously that science axiomatically supposes that repeated, controlled experiments will produce the same results, and that these results will allow us to make predictions in nature and future experiments. (Sometimes we don’t possess the means to remove epistemic uncertainty, but that isn’t disproof). This axiom just is final causality, for if things are not “acting always, or nearly always, in the same way” we should have no expectation that experiments will give us any information about what things do, and we should not expect the possibility of predictive models.

Finally, if we accept final causality in principle and apply the principle to what is presently unknown as opposed to what finality is presumably known: human life on earth, what does the principle require us to believe about the existence of human life on other planets?

If nature is determined to continually develop new life forms, as final causality shows that it does on earth, and the emergence of these life forms is partly determined by fortuitous circumstances (chance) to end in human life then ought we to believe that human life, or at least life, exists or will exist elsewhere in the immensity of time and space? Disbelief requires identifying some unique and unrepeatable chance circumstance on earth that is never possible on other planets. The word “never”, like “always”, makes scientists cringe.

I have two different answers, one philosophical and the other theological.

Philosophical: Evolution in itself is not aimed at producing humans, but by chance it could give rise to human beings on other planets.

Theological: Just because evolution in itself has tendencies which, with chance occurrences, could produce humans elsewhere in the universe, the universe as it is exactly as intended by God. If God wished to create a universe which used this process (a process which in its nature could result in producing humans multiple times throughout the universe), he could still choose to create an actual universe in which it only happened once.

We have no scientific or philosophical reason for ruling out the possibility of human life elsewhere, but we may have a theological one. The theological one isn’t meant to convince the scientist. It is a thing of religion. There’s no reason to declare that evolution must lack the capacity of creating human life elsewhere.

[I have an important addendum to that but have hit both the character limit and the consecutive post limit.]

 

[Freddy]

We have no scientific or philosophical reason for ruling out the possibility of human life elsewhere, but we may have a theological one. The theological one isn’t meant to convince the scientist. It is a thing of religion. There’s no reason to declare that evolution must lack the capacity of creating human life elsewhere.

There is most definitely a scientific reason why human life would not occur elsewhere. Or at least a mathematical reason.

The odds that someone would win a lottery where the chances are one in a thousand billion are…well, one in a thousand billion. But the chances of it being won is 1. That’s the odds of us being here.

But consider starting the the universe off again and ending up with us here again. That’s the same as saying that the same person will win the lottery each time. And the odds are a lot longer than one in a thousand billion for winning it once.

It would be the same odds for any given species. The proposal that it would happen for a specific species is not credible.

Addendum: If the universe is infinite then all bets are off.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

We have no scientific or philosophical reason for ruling out the possibility of human life elsewhere, but we may have a theological one. The theological one isn’t meant to convince the scientist. It is a thing of religion. There’s no reason to declare that evolution must lack the capacity of creating human life elsewhere.

There is most definitely a scientific reason why human life would not occur elsewhere. Or at least a mathematical reason.

The odds that someone would win a lottery where the chances are one in a thousand billion are…well, one in a thousand billion. But the chances of it being won is 1. That’s the odds of us being here.

But consider starting the the universe off again and ending up with us here again. That’s the same as saying that the same person will win the lottery each time. And the odds are a lot longer than one in a thousand billion for winning it once.

It would be the same odds for any given species. The proposal that it would happen for a specific species is not credible.

[snip]

I don’t disagree on the incredible improbability of the chances happening again. But I don’t think improbability arguments are absolutely conclusive, especially when we don’t know the full scale of things. Maybe for practical reasons we can dismiss the chances, but theoretically? No, I don’t think we can. At least from a “natural” perspective.

This next part is the addendum I intended specifically for @o_mlly. You posting gives me the opportunity to add it tonight. It was intended to follow the paragraph you quoted.

Addendum: There are certain disputes among neo-Aristotleans and Thomists that I don’t plan to dive into but which I’ll quickly state. I’m not aware of any consensus on the matter. But a few points. Some readily accept evolution but balk at life coming from non-life, for how can something that is only transient causes give rise to something it does not have (immanent causality)? Others are fine with nutritive life evolving into other nutritive species, and sensitive life evolving into other sensitive species, but balk at nutritive life evolving into sensitive species, for how can they cause species which have powers they lack? The same goes for moving from the nutritive and sensitive to the rational. Moving from more powers to less through evolution isn’t seen as an issue, though. Others balk specifically at rational life due to intelligence which requires immateriality. The basic principle is that a cause (or group of causes) cannot give what they do not have. As I said there’s not a consensus. Some think that certain leaps would essentially require a miracle. Others that natural explanations are possible and that these things are present in some way in the causes. Depending upon where one stood on that issue, there may be philosophical reasons to object to certain leaps. I’m not taking a stand there, but given where I left the last paragraph I thought I’d add some additional thoughts.

 

[Freddy]

Freddy:

Wesrock:

We have no scientific or philosophical reason for ruling out the possibility of human life elsewhere, but we may have a theological one. The theological one isn’t meant to convince the scientist. It is a thing of religion. There’s no reason to declare that evolution must lack the capacity of creating human life elsewhere.

There is most definitely a scientific reason why human life would not occur elsewhere. Or at least a mathematical reason.

The odds that someone would win a lottery where the chances are one in a thousand billion are…well, one in a thousand billion. But the chances of it being won is 1. That’s the odds of us being here.

But consider starting the the universe off again and ending up with us here again. That’s the same as saying that the same person will win the lottery each time. And the odds are a lot longer than one in a thousand billion for winning it once.

It would be the same odds for any given species. The proposal that it would happen for a specific species is not credible.

[snip]

I don’t disagree on the incredible improbability of the chances happening again. But I don’t think improbability arguments are absolutely conclusive, especially when we don’t know the full scale of things. Maybe for practical reasons we can dismiss the chances, but theoretically? No, I don’t think we can. At least from a “natural” perspective.

From a scientific viewpoint, one should never say anything is impossible. It is actually possible that my g and t will turn this very minute into a glass of milk. But there are some things that are so monstrously improbable that to all intents and purposes they are effectively impossible and to base any argument on it actually happening is nonsensical.

And your addendum is generously written in that it tends to indicate the possibility of a natural cause as opposed to any other reason. I often wonder how Aristotle or Aquinas for example would have presented their arguments had they lived in the present day.

Not only did they not know a lot about what might have changed their views. They didn’t even know what they didn’t know. With apologies to Rumsfeld.

 

[Wesrock]

This is the fallacy of composition. Just because a component of the universe has an attribute, does not mean the universe does. Again, there is nothing to differentiate your definition of God versus the Universe.

We should actually understand the fallacies before employing them. If every brick in a wall made only of bricks is six inches by two inches by three inches, I would certainly be committing a fallacy of composition if I asserted that the wall must therefore also be six inches by two inches by three inches. However, if every brick in a wall was red, I would not be committing a logical fallacy if I claimed that the wall must be red. Or if every brick was made of clay, it would not be a fallacy if I claimed that the wall was therefore made of clay. You will he hard pressed show that extension and the actualization of potency are like the size example and not like color or material, or that it’s even appropriate to consider the universe as one whole instead of a collection of things with being (more on that below). Even on a 4D conception or objects or just taking the universe as a whole (the latter of which would require certain other metaphysical claims, such as those provided below), the universe still has extension and we would be justified in still claiming a distinction between its essence and existence, and the universe would still be composed of parts.

Now, I have seen Spinozists and Hegelians offer claims on pantheism and pantheism as rebuttals, in which all things are either aspects of God under different modes or that reality is the instantiation of an Eternal Idea on a march to rediscovering itself in intellect and state, and suspect neither of those alternatives would be satisfying to you either, even though that’s the direction you’re going. Ultimately you’re leaning into the claim (insufficient without appeal to the prior concepts) that the universe is not just an accidental arrangement of parts, but that it itself is an organism under one mereological principle of essence which gives reason and explanation to all the parts. But that itself is something I would deny. Certainly the essence of a substance is the ordering principle and whatdetermines the ends of the parts. However, in terms of being the claim that it is an organism gets it backwards, for the parts are more fundamental than the whole, and we see this for any organism in our experience. But the dispute there requires significant expansion for either side. Again, though, I would not suppose you’d take that tact at all given the other commitments you would have to make and defend.

Continued in next post.

 

[Wesrock]

Continued from previous post.

And this is all to say again that there is plenty to differentiate what must be the ground of being from other things that are, and its precisely the conditioned attributes of the other things that are that do so. So unless your claiming that the universe is a thing of pure act without the actualization of any potencies, that it does not have a conditioned essence, that it is not composed and has no matter or extension, that all possible things are caused by it, that it is metaphysically unique and not belonging to any genus of things, that it is intelligent, and that it know all things and all possible things, then there is much that makes the universe distinct from anything that could be the ground of all being.

It seems more like you’d prefer to deny that things must have a sufficient explanation at all.

All that said, stating there is no difference just begs the question against the arguments and shows a lack of understanding of them. You don’t have to think these work and maybe you can find points that you don’t think follow, but just throwing out the words “special pleading,” “fallacy of composition,” and especially “why can’t it just be the universe” are bottom of the barrel objections that reflect lack of knowledge on what the arguments are, how they proceed, and their immediate corollaries.

 

[AlNg]

The basic principle is that a cause (or group of causes) cannot give what they do not have.

This is contradicted by emergence which occurs when something has properties its parts do not have on their own.

 

[Wesrock]

This is contradicted by emergence which occurs when something has properties its parts do not have on their own.

There is no issue with the notion of emergence in some senses, otherwise Aristotle and St. Thomas would have no notion of substantial change, which they do. A water molecule has properties that hydrogen and oxygen do not, for example, and we can recombine hydrogen and oxygen into water and see it happen in nature. The concerns are to do with very specific qualitative leaps. Not just the emergence of new properties full stop, but for example immanent causality arising from transient causes alone. Such emergence hasn’t been scientifically demonstrated. I’m not saying it can’t be, but if it ever did it would be because the effects did have some mode of existence in the cause, not because the principle wasn’t true.

(Some people mistake the principle as stating that the effect needs to be in a cause formally (an easy example is that a lit match is on fire and causes a wick to be on fire, both the match and the effect involve having the form of fire (and in this example we don’t have to think of form in a hylemorphic way)). But there are other ways an effect can be present in a cause.)

The principle is basically that an effect is sufficiently explained by its causes (in an ontic way. Whether or not we have the epistemic means to know the explanation is a different question). And really, I know some Aristotlean things seem mysteriously stated (I disagree that they are mysterious, but the wording and terminology sometimes sounds odd to some ears), but the precise terms really come from philosophical reflection on the more plainly stated intuitions and observations that “effects are sufficiently explained by their causes” and “things have causal regularity.”

St. Thomas was committed to understanding being (and things that are) as being intelligible. Again, not necessarily that we always have the epistemic means to know everything, but just in itself.

 

[IWantGod]

Not only did they not know a lot about what might have changed their views. They didn’t even know what they didn’t know. With apologies to Rumsfeld.

I would argue that Aquinas’ Arguments, while they are dependent on what we observe, they are not dependent on “scientific truth”. To do science is to operate in a different context to metaphysics. It literally doesn’t matter what science has or has not discovered or what Aquinas knew about it.

Aquinas could be wrong about everything that is scientifically true but at the same time be correct about everything he said in the context of metaphysics. If he were here today, he would simply change his scientific understanding.

 

[IWantGod]

It is the nature of a thing to move to those specific ends. That is one of the first propositions and is readily apparent. One of the objections the early moderns had with the notion of final causality was specifically over the same issue St. Thomas saw: in what we can a thing’s end be present in the thing? The end is certainly not present really . The end is only really present when it’s been effected. The only other mode of existence was for it to be present mentally or intelligibly, but these things lacked intelligence and the ability to hold things in thought. The early moderns saw that, too, and so struck it from the board. St. Thomas saw, however, was that eliminating final causality was nonsense, and that the only remaining explanation is that the aiming had to be provided by something intelligent.

So it is because the end isn’t actually present in an object that gives reason to question how it is still true that a thing is ordered toward any particular or number of ends that are not real?

Lets say that clay can transform into the substance we call rubber as one of it’s potential ends. Is it because the substance we call rubber isn’t actually present in the clay that gives me good reason to ask how that end is truly present ontologically. Is this a question of proportionate causality?

 

[IWantGod]

But you do not understand philosophically what a fallacy is.

I think he made it clear that he does. The fallacy of composition does not always apply, which he clearly demonstrated. If you want us to think that it applies to any of the five ways you have to demonstrate that fact and not simply assert it. Otherwise you might in fact be guilty of special pleading.

 

[IWantGod]

I find this disingenuous since invoking the fallacy of composition is a well-known refutation of the argument from design.

So your argument is that because the fallacy of composition applies to one argument from design, that therefore all arguments for an intelligent creator are wrong? But are you not committing the fallacy of composition right there.

 

[IWantGod]

There are many other well-justified objections. The other one I brought up is also well-known - that nature itself is self-organizing. This is known as immanent teleology. These teleological arguments all result from a posterior reasoning (even Aquinas acknowledges that his conclusion is uncertain). They also expand from personal incredulity - “the universe sure looks designed, there MUST be an intelligent designer”.

The argument from design is, in more modern terms, effectively the Teleological Argument. There are just so many refutations of this I really could go on almost indefinitely. For example, the argument REQUIRES that there is only one universe. I can simply ask, “How many trials” - this is my simplification of the probabilistic objection - but I’m not the first to bring it up. Hume, quite humorously, points out that if the universe DID have a designer, he’s obviously not very smart when consider the mess this universe is (formally - the problem of evil).

I’m having difficulty understanding the fifth way, but it’s clear to me that you have no understanding of it at all since you are conflating different design arguments with teleology.

At least try to understand an argument before dismissing it. But i doubt that you care to learn.

 

[Wesrock]

But you do not understand philosophically what a fallacy is. There are many examples we can each give that show a fallacy in reasoning yet the conclusion is correct. But you are STILL committing a fallacy. Your reasoning is unsound. Consider this example, which uses the gambler’s fallacy:

The New York Yankees have not won a World Series in 11 years. They are “due”. If the Yankees win next season, I can’t brag about how I was right. My assumptions were correct, the conclusion was correct - but my argument was UNSOUND because I used a fallacy.

Sure. But you didn’t really respond to the issue. We can argue from composition for some things, such as what the wall is made of based on what the parts are made of. That it’s correct isn’t chance, it’s sound logic. And even so, you haven’t established whether it’s even appropriate to consider the universe as one substance (and I commented on that at length in my last post).

I find this disingenuous since invoking the fallacy of composition is a well-known refutation of the argument from design. I didn’t come up with this objection. There are many other well-justified objections. The other one I brought up is also well-known - that nature itself is self-organizing. This is known as immanent teleology.

Are you saying nature is itself self organization or are you saying that’s a faulty claim? I can’t tell, and the former would be in line with St. Thomas’ premises. I filtered your posts to find where else you brought it up and did not see it.

As for a “well-known objection,” I’ve yet to see it employed against any of the Five Ways in a way that didn’t beg the question or represent a misunderstanding of the argument. And I hope you’re referring to people who don’t have the last names Dawkins, Hitchens, Dennett, or Hyde.

They also expand from personal incredulity - “the universe sure looks designed, there MUST be an intelligent designer”.

So… do you know what St. Thomas’ Fifth Way is? I spent a good deal of time on the first premises and how the argument proceeds. Or are you confusing it with Paley and Swineburn’s unrelated and separate arguments?

For example, the argument REQUIRES that there is only one universe. I can simply ask, “How many trials” - this is my simplification of the probabilistic objection - but I’m not the first to bring it up.

Please explain to me how the Fifth Way requires that there only be one universe or is incredulous about the improbability of complex systems.

And to be fair, your complete lack of understanding of basic philosophy interns of soundness of arguments based on your fallacy comments makes me question your reasoning.

The special pleading fallacy is real. The fallacy from composition is real. He just didn’t commit these. You brought up special pleading. Please show me where St. Thomas commits it in any of his Five Ways.

 

[o_mlly]

I apologize for the above paragraph, it’s a bit slapdash, I know.

Agreed. The 3,200 word limit reflects the fact that this medium and “document dumps” do not harmonize well.

… and he did not write “work toward some goal”.

Better to take that up with the thread’s OP:

… work toward some goal,

He understood the sciences (broadly construed) as being hierarchical, with physics/nature at the bottom, followed by mathematics, followed by philosophy, with theology at the top. … one can be a good philosopher without being a good theologian

Let me attempt to focus you on the issue at hand. It is not whether “one can be a good philosopher without being a good theologian” rather it is whether the metaphysician can impose his rules on the scientist. If you doubt that scientists (rightly) reject the 5th argument’s conclusion then you are not reading the posts.

And, as long as these scientists argue from the rules of science, I agree with them. Philosophers ought not to impose metaphysical claims onto scientists. Scientists examine and respect only the material/efficient causes. Aquinas’ 5th argument conclusion is rightly rejected.

But, and this is my point, once the scientist makes truth claims that go beyond his observed data he gives up his cloak as scientist and becomes a philosopher. The scientist who claims the truth of microevolution stands on his observed data. The scientist who claims the truth of macroevolution (intelligence from non-intelligence) has no observed data and the claim can only be supported, if at all, with metaphysical argumentation. Now, the scientist as philosopher must defend his claims within the rules of metaphysics, i.e., first principles.

This next part is the addendum I intended specifically for @o_mlly. You posting gives me the opportunity to add it tonight. It was intended to follow the paragraph you quoted.

Addendum: …

Oddly, in this addendum you agree with my initial post in this thread and call upon first principles. ?

 

[IWantGod]

rather it is whether the metaphysician can impose his rules on the scientist.

No one can impose the rules of science on metaphysics and neither can the opposite be true. I think you hold the belief that there is in principle a conflict between science and metaphysics. If scientists reject the fifth way, they do not do so as scientists but as philosophers. Neither do i think that because science doesn’t acknowledge teleology that there is therefore a conflict, because the scientific method is not designed to observe teleology and thus teleology should be irrelevant to a scientist. They are not competing methods, but rather science and metaphysics is two methods that deal with reality in two different contexts.

 

[IWantGod]

The scientist who claims the truth of microevolution stands on his observed data.

Macro-evolution is not metaphysically impossible. Metaphysical arguments rely on Reductio ad Absurdum to justify conclusions. I cannot conclude with that principle that Macro-evolution is false and think you have yet to give a very good reason why such an idea whether it is scientific fact or mere philosophy would conflict with first principles. In fact macro-evolution, if it is true, provides some philosophical reasons to think that teleology is evident in nature, after all evolution would suggest that there is a blue-print in nature for different biological forms with goal directed ends.

 

[Freddy]

In fact macro-evolution, if it is true, provides some philosophical reasons to think that teleology is evident in nature, after all evolution would suggest that there is a blue-print in nature for different biological forms with goal directed ends.

That’s a little better than suggesting that teleology is simply people having goals in their life. But still wrong.

The ‘ends’ that you surmise are simple happenstance. Imagine if there was a process that hit a small ball towards a hole with a flag in it on a green and the ball ended up in the hole 99.99% of the time. I guess you’d say that it was a remarkably efficient process and it appears to work as designed to an end because only one or two don’t drop beause they hit the flag and stay out. But dropping into the hole is the equivalent of extinction. So it that the end cause? Everything points to that conclusion.

That you find yourself sitting precariously on the edge of the hole was never the aim of the game. It was the result of a lucky bounce. A small deviation from the norm. A tuft of grass or a sudden breeze. Pure chance.

 

[Wesrock]

And, as long as these scientists argue from the rules of science, I agree with them. Philosophers ought not to impose metaphysical claims onto scientists. Scientists examine and respect only the material/efficient causes. Aquinas’ 5th argument conclusion is rightly rejected.

This just restates your position without actually addressing what I wrote: “Furthermore, I explained previously that science axiomatically supposes that repeated, controlled experiments will produce the same results, and that these results will allow us to make predictions in nature and future experiments. (Sometimes we don’t possess the means to remove epistemic uncertainty, but that isn’t disproof). This axiom just is final causality, for if things are not “acting always, or nearly always, in the same way” we should have no expectation that experiments will give us any information about what things do, and we should not expect the possibility of predictive models.”

Anyway, my point isn’t about what scientists believe, it’s that an Aristotlean feels perfectly at home with the scientific method and sees it as consistent with the four types of causes, and in fact even sees it presupposed in the metaphysics of science and as explanatory for the scientific method.

As for the addendum, what point is it you’re saying I’m agreeing with?