The Fifth Way: Argument from Design

[o_mlly]

I think you hold the belief that there is in principle a conflict between science and metaphysics.

Not a conflict in principles; rather different principles.

The rules that the physical scientist employs to constrain his claims are different than the rules employed by the metaphysician. For instance, on examining his data, a scientist may claim “emergent property” or “brute fact” both of which are synonymous with “we have no idea how that effect came to be”. The metaphysician, in contrast, must impute to one or more of the causes the potential for the observed property in the effect – just as Aquinas does in arguing that, “Therefore, some intelligent being exists … .”

I cannot conclude with that principle that Macro-evolution is false and think you have yet to give a very good reason why such an idea whether it is scientific fact or mere philosophy would conflict with first principles.

? I have given the metaphysical argument against macroevolution as an explanation of speciation or, indeed, human evolution many times in this forum.

Furthermore, I explained previously that science axiomatically supposes that repeated, controlled experiments will produce the same results …

The axiom applies but only to the pure, or experimental sciences.

The scientific method for the historiographical sciences, where direct observation of past events or experimentation are impossible, relies on the principle of uniformity. These scientists propose theories that organize the data under the principle of uniformity, using primarily, analogical reasoning. The concreteness of their claims are far more fragile than the claims of the experimental scientist and they await the next overturned rock to overturn their claims. Looking backwards under the principle of uniformity, a scientist will not see a principle of finality.

As for the addendum, what point is it you’re saying I’m agreeing with?

… for how can they cause species which have powers they lack? … The basic principle is that a cause (or group of causes) cannot give what they do not have. … I’m not taking a stand there

Macroevolution, as a science, not only denies the principle of finality, but dismisses first principles of metaphysics. I pointed this out in my first post on this thread. My position is clear; we await yours.

 

[IWantGod]

the Fallacy of Composition applies - and I think it obvious - that just because components of the universe appear to have a purpose, the universe as a whole does

But that’s not whats being argued. So you have failed to show how the fallacy of composition applies.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

Furthermore, I explained previously that science axiomatically supposes that repeated, controlled experiments will produce the same results …

The axiom applies but only to the pure, or experimental sciences.

The scientific method for the historiographical sciences, where direct observation of past events or experimentation are impossible, relies on the principle of uniformity. These scientists propose theories that organize the data under the principle of uniformity, using primarily, analogical reasoning. The concreteness of their claims are far more fragile than the claims of the experimental scientist and they await the next overturned rock to overturn their claims. Looking backwards under the principle of uniformity, a scientist will not see a principle of finality.

Discussion of evolution is a tangent to my main point, and we may have been talking past each other a bit. Science can’t tell us that the purpose of a heart is to pump blood, for science can’t directly measure purpose in that way. I do think we’re justified in making an intellectual judgment about that based on what science tells us, but that’s something else. The same with the purpose or ends of man in general.

However, that’s not the only manner in which a sort of final causality in terms of causal regularity in non-living things is. The scientific method can tell us how an electron behaves according to its charge in magnetic fields, under nuclear forces, etc… It can be used to find causal regularity in weather systems (not perfectly due to epistemic limits), or how things behave in gravity wells.

And my point isn’t so much about what the scientist believes but that, from a metaphysical perspective, the scientific method is incoherent without a notion of final causality. That doesn’t mean scientists have to think about that when conducting experiments.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

As for the addendum, what point is it you’re saying I’m agreeing with?

… for how can they cause species which have powers they lack? … The basic principle is that a cause (or group of causes) cannot give what they do not have. … I’m not taking a stand there

Macroevolution, as a science, not only denies the principle of finality, but dismisses first principles of metaphysics. I pointed this out in my first post on this thread. My position is clear; we await yours.

Two things. First, I don’t necessarily agree with all of those objections, I just felt it was necessary and intellectually honest to present some of the current discussions essentialists are having. Second, even if we suppose that all of those objections apply, none of them were opposed to macroevolution in some sense, for they would allow a great deal of change and speciation over time. It’s just that nutritive species would (if we assume the objections hold) never naturally give rise to sensitive species. Nutritive species would only (macro)evolve into other nutritive species. Sensitive species could macroevolve into other sensitive species or nutritive species, but never into rational species (again, just assuming the objections I cited are true). So it’s not a point against macroevolution per se, just a point that certain leaps (from non-living to living, nutritive to sensitive, sensitive to rational) may not be sufficiently explained by solely natural means.

 

[Wesrock]

IWantGod:

I think he made it clear that he does. The fallacy of composition does not always apply, which he clearly demonstrated. If you want us to think that it applies to any of the five ways you have to demonstrate that fact and not simply assert it. Otherwise you might in fact be guilty of special pleading.

Not sure if you are referring to me or Wesrock.
I’ll assume it’s me - the Fallacy of Composition applies - and I think it obvious - that just because components of the universe appear to have a purpose, the universe as a whole does not necessarily have a purpose. More evidence is required. The universe, perhaps, just “is”. Just as God just “is”.
There is no difference. Specifically, there is no reason I can’t replace ‘universe’ everywhere you say ‘God’.

If you are saying that even if the Fifth Way is true we could substitute the Universe in for God, that is not true, unless you’re either (1) special pleading or (2) proposing that the Universe is intelligent.

Second, the Fifth Way would be true of individual things even if there was no beginning to the universe.

Third, you haven’t shown that even considering the universe as a thing in itself is true.

Fourth, you’re coming across as arguing in bad faith. You listed objection. I provided arguments. Your subsequent posts just say no and state the objection again. You could at least actually respond to my counter examples and specifics and requests for you to back up where you believe St. Thomas is committing the fallacy of special pleading and why you think his argument is refuted by posing multiple universes and saying it’s just based on improbability.

 

[IWantGod]

@Wesrock, i found this video, it’s very short. I just wanted to run it by you to see if it’s a correct representation of the fifth way.

He basically argues that there is nothing that can naturally justify regularity in nature, and that is why we must infer an intelligent cause.

 

[IWantGod]

The “Argument from Design” as put forth by Aquinas

What is that argument?

 

[IWantGod]

Thomas Aquinas, "The Argument from Design"

Do you understand the argument.

Here is a quote from your source.

Summary of the Argument from Design:

1. All things have an order or arrangement, and work for an end. (Again, note that the argument proceeds from empirical evidence of adaptation of ends to means of such natural processes as sensory organs, the food chain, the nitrogen cycle, the Krebs cycle, and so forth; hence, Thomas’ argument is à posteriori or inductive.)

2. The order of the universe cannot be explained by chance, but only by design and purpose.

3. Design and purpose is a product of intelligence.

4. Therefore nature is directed by a Divine Intelligence or Great Designer.

Can you explain why the fallacy of composition applies to the above quote.

 

[IWantGod]

What precisely would be the ultimate end of the universe?

It’s irrelevant. The argument is that physical reality has casual regularity and regularly acts for particular ends. Aquinas argues that this order we find in physical reality which we often describe as the laws of physics, cannot occur by chance and can only be explained by an intelligent cause because physical causes are blind to there own ends.

He doesn’t argue that some component of the universe appears to be designed and that therefore the whole universe is designed.

The fallacy of supposing the whole must have the same property of the parts: for example, of supposing an all-star team is better than the team that wins the playoffs.’)) by supposing the universe as a whole has a purpose? I.e. if the parts of the universe are ordered, it would not necessarily follow that the universe as a whole must be also.

I think it’s clear that this objection misunderstands the argument. The idea that the universe exists for a grand purpose is not the argument. The argument is that the laws of physics can only be explained by an intelligent cause.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

If you are saying that even if the Fifth Way is true we could substitute the Universe in for God, that is not true, unless you’re either (1) special pleading or (2) proposing that the Universe is intelligent.

The first objection doesn’t apply (special pleading), This is the point I am making. If you can claim special status for God, I can claim special status for the universe.

No. Put “God” aside for a moment. The Fifth Way argues that that which is lacking intelligence must be directed to its ends by something intelligent. Unless you are arguing that the universe is intelligent, it isn’t something you can substitute in as an explanation, and if you argue that it is an exception to the argument in that it is not intelligent but it doesn’t need to be directed, then you are special pleading.

The second one (Universe is intelligent) is a worthwhile objection to what I am saying - I agree. However, you will then have to prove that the universe REQUIRES intelligence. This is not a component of the argument. WHY does the universe require an intelligent designer? This is far from clear. And as Hume stated, in many ways it seems the opposite - an intelligent agent did NOT create the universe given the problems and inefficiencies. The problem of evil I already mentioned - but there are many others, such as Hiddeness, the puddle analogy, and so forth.

Hume’s objection has no logical necessity to it, and you’re just showing you don’t even know what the Fifth Way is. The argument is that which lacks intelligence but has causal regularity requires intelligence.

Here’s a very simple one - if the universe was created by design, why did it have to exist for 14B years before human beings even appeared? That doesn’t seem very well designed, does it? Or, why will the universe die in heat death trillions of years from now? Such facts directly contradict the teleological argument. Certainly an intelligent designer could come up with better solutions than that, no?
Note how even the architects of Judeo-Christian thought knew this. Read Genesis again. Genesis is specifically architected with the concept of design - the earth is 6000 years old, humans appeared immediately, and so forth. According to Genesis, the universe is very well designed. But - as we have learned - it is not.

I wonder if Aquinas would still put forth his proofs if he knew then what we know now.

Okay. I am throwing my hands up. You don’t even know what St. Thomas’ argument is. You believe the modern intelligent design arguments are variations of it. They’re not.

 

[Wesrock]

jan10000:

Thomas Aquinas, "The Argument from Design"

Do you understand the argument.

Here is a quote from your source.

Summary of the Argument from Design:

1. All things have an order or arrangement, and work for an end. (Again, note that the argument proceeds from empirical evidence of adaptation of ends to means of such natural processes as sensory organs, the food chain, the nitrogen cycle, the Krebs cycle, and so forth; hence, Thomas’ argument is à posteriori or inductive.)

2. The order of the universe cannot be explained by chance, but only by design and purpose.

3. Design and purpose is a product of intelligence.

4. Therefore nature is directed by a Divine Intelligence or Great Designer.

Can you explain why the fallacy of composition applies to the above quote.

That’s not even a correct interpretation or explanation of the argument that jan provided.

 

[Wesrock]

And jan’s logic requires that the universe be a whole in itself, an organism of some sort with a single essence that provides order to everything below it. So unless Jan is actually a pantheism or panentheist, I don’t see the point.

Jan, you can’t have your cake and eat it, too. Either the universe is a single thing in itself with a distinct essence which gives order to its parts, in which case it as a thing must have ends to do so, or it is not a single thing in itself and what we refer to as the universe is just an relstionally accidental collection of things which can be considered separately.

Even if we did accept that the universe is a substance in itself with its own distinctive essence, such as how Spinoza or Hegel might have characterized it, I would still have fundamental disagreements with the notion that the whole is more fundamental than the parts in terms of being, and I think both Spinoza and Hegel made some bad suppositions which led to their conclusions.

 

[HarryStotle]

Hume, quite humorously, points out that if the universe DID have a designer, he’s obviously not very smart when consider the mess this universe is (formally - the problem of evil).

Hume’s assumption is that humans are in no need of formation with regard to their moral agency. The existence of some evil in the universe might be necessary for the development of human moral agency. A universe where no evil existed wouldn’t provide a proper environment for moral agents to freely make moral (as opposed to immoral) choices to develop requisite moral virtues.

The question is whether the tradeoff of permitting some evil to exist for the sake of providing an environment for at least some morally good and free agents to develop is worth it. Do you have an argument for the relative value of moral vs amoral agency?

 

[Wesrock]

Thomas Aquinas, "The Argument from Design"

I spent a good deal of time earlier in the topic explaining the first premises and the argument. If you want me to explain it, reference those posts which I already wrote in my own words. But I will speak to this link, which doesn’t present the argument as put forth by St. Thomas.

Abstract: Thomas Aquinas’ Argument from Design and objections to that argument are outlined and discussed. Thomas argues the intricate complexity and order in the universe can only be explained through the existence of a Great Designer.

The article is not off to a great start. It begins “Thomas argues the intricate complexity…” Already they begin with misinformation. The notion of intricate complexity plays no role in St. Thomas’ Fifth Way. No doubt the author already familiar with Intelligent Design arguments put forth by Paley and Swineburn thinks St. Thomas argued along the same tact. He does not. The notion of “order in the universe” is a little more on point. St. Thomas’ Fifth Way is based only on things consistently acting in the same way instead of randomly, on causal regularity in nature. And this would be as true if all of the universe was nothing more than a lone electron with nothing else.

Aquinas’ Argument from Design begins with the empirical observation of the design and order of the universe. Hence, this argument is an à posteriori argument, and the conclusion is not claimed to follow with absolute certainty. This argument is also termed, “The Teleological Argument.” Teleology is the study of purpose, ends, and goals in natural processes. A teleological explanation accounts for natural processes in accordance with purposive or directive principles.

This paragraph is a little better. St. Thomas did not believe it was possible to present an a priori argument for God, hence why he was critical of St. Anselm’s ontological argument. His arguments were therefore a posteriori. The author seems to randomly insert “and the conclusion is not claimed to follow with absolute certainty.” What does he even mean by this? A solipsist could claim he doesn’t know that I exist with absolute certainty, or that his sense provide him with anything for absolute certainty, or that he even lacks certainty that his thoughts track any truth at all. What is the bar the author here is using for absolute certainty, and where does he quote St. Thomas on this point?

 

[Wesrock]

Thus, if Thomas’ argument is correct, the degree of the truth of the conclusion should be comparable to the conclusions of the findings of modern science. It is important to see that since no claim is made as to the certainty of the conclusion but only as to its probability, the argument cannot be criticized on the grounds that the conclusion does not follow with absolute necessity.

Ah, a nice insert of the word probability here. Will he progress from here to some notion of the improbability of intricate complexity, which is nowhere found in St. Thomas? St. Thomas’ epistemology and philosophy of the mind allowed for knowledge of real truths and certainty about the external world. This author is trying especially hard to insert as much doubt as he can in here which St. Thomas would not have allowed.

Also, note that the concept of design involves the ability of human beings either to grasp intellectually the order of things or to impose intellectually order on what is being observed.

As previously noted, St. Thomas thought that we could obtain real knowledge of reality. This author seems content to push us into epistemological solipsism.

 

[Wesrock]

Summary of the Argument from Design:

1. All things have an order or arrangement, and work for an end. (Again, note that the argument proceeds from empirical evidence of adaptation of ends to means of such natural processes as sensory organs, the food chain, the nitrogen cycle, the Krebs cycle, and so forth; hence, Thomas' argument is à posteriori or inductive.)

2. The order of the universe cannot be explained by chance, but only by design and purpose.

3. Design and purpose is a product of intelligence.

4. Therefore nature is directed by a Divine Intelligence or Great Designer.

St. Thomas’ first premise notes that things tend to achieve the same results when under the same circumstances, even non-living things. He doesn’t really refer to “order or arrangement” in it. According to this author’s logic our entire basis for the scientific method is therefore inductive. The second point, considering that St. Thomas is speaking of individual things that don’t have intelligence, is somewhat true, but I already see (based on what was previously stated) that the author is misinterpreting this and the third premise. When St. Thomas says things cannot be explained by chance, he’s not sitting there saying “how could this complex system/organism have possibly evolved?!” What he’s saying is it’s not by chance that something like an electron always (absent other interfering causes) moving towards a positive charge and away from a negative charge. That is, there is something about the electron that causes it to move to these ends. It is not as if a “chance behavior generator” makes an electron behave this way in one moment, and then the next moment generates a new random behavior, then the next moment generates a new random behavior, such that the things an electron tends towards is always random. When he says it’s not by chance, he means that the electron (or more generally whatever non-intelligent thing is under consideration) behaves consistently. Certainly some effects are accidental confluences of other events, but those occur because the things involved in those systems exhibit consistent behavior.

I probably have three more posts worth of responses to that link but due to character restraints and consecutive posts limit I can’t add it at this time.

 

[AlNg]

3. Design and purpose is a product of intelligence.

4. Therefore nature is directed by a Divine Intelligence or Great Designer.

Can you explain why the fallacy of composition applies to the above quote.

Consciousness or intelligence may be something which is latent in matter. And you can have several designers with each one guiding a different type of order.

 

[Wesrock]

Some examples and clarification of the notion of design are noted before we turn to some of the standard objections.

For the universe to be understood at all, human beings must impose order on what is observed. As Kant noted, there are à priori conditions of sensibility and categories of understanding for perception to be possible. The same consideration holds for intellectual objects. For example, consider the following number series found on an IQ test. What is the proper order of the sequence of integers listed?

Aristotle, St. Thomas, and neo-Aristotleans today reject Kant’s epistemology and philosophy of knowledge. The author here supposes it as true. I will say, though, that I think getting down to these fundamental points is the way to go. Not that I’d agree with neo-Kantians, but it’d be interesting to discuss, and it’s better than anything I’ve seen from the “New Atheists” as you’re actually getting down to brass tacts and not just committing vague and not true charges of things like “special pleading”. Most Neo-Kantians and Hegelians I’ve spoken to confuse St. Thomas’ epistemology with Cartesian and Rationalist epistemology, and to be honest I think the Kantians have taken Rationalist epistemology to its logical ends. Anyway, no doubt they’d still end up disagree with St. Thomas.

• How can the distinction between chance and a law of natural order be maintained? We normally think of flipping a coin a matter or probability. Yet, with precise knowledge of the size, shape, center of gravity, force, point of application of force, landing zone, wind velocity, relative humidity, gravitational force, and so on, the outcome of the toss would be predictable. Is a chance event just a lack of precise knowledge of initial states?

No, a chance event is something like a farmer striking a chest of gold when plowing his field. His end was only to create a furrow in the ground. The end of someone else in the past was to bury the gold. It was chance that these two intentional things came together for this accidental result. We can consider the same thing in regards to non-intelligent objects, like what happens during a solar eclipse, which is just a chance event but involves other normal regularities. The author’s point that with precise knowledge we can predict things plays exactly into St. Thomas’ point that we can make predictions based on accurate knowledge of causal regularities. His point is that these causal regularities we make predictions on are there at all.

 

[Wesrock]

What precisely would be the ultimate end of the universe? Even if there are teleological factors in separate states of affairs, wouldn’t Thomas commit the Fallacy of Composition by supposing the universe as a whole has a purpose? I.e. if the parts of the universe are ordered, it would not necessarily follow that the universe as a whole must be also. The assumption that nature is purposive is disputable, and some sort of additional evidence needs to be advanced.

I provided thoughts on this previously, insofar as one considers the universe as a whole one either actually has to commit to being a thing and there being an “essence” of the universe which gives order to its component parts (and there you have its ends) or you accept that things in the universe have only accidental relation to each other and can be considered separately, which means rejecting the objection or committing special pleading. As for the “fallacy of composition”, I should probably add at this point that St. Thomas’ argument is not about the universe as a whole, so he suggests no great composition which would be subject to a fallacy. He considers things individually.

As David Hume and a number of other philosophers have pointed out, imperfections in the product would point to imperfections in the maker. Hence, the problem of evil arises again with this argument.

A theodicy is a different topic altogether, but the Fifth Way by itself makes no appeals to perfections, only that things which lack intelligence which exhibit regularity in their own ends (and not just accidental relations) must be directed to do so by an intelligence.

There are a prodigious number of hypotheses which can be reasonably maintained. There could be any number of great designers; nature, itself, could be self-organizing (i.e., an immanent teleology); order could be a presupposition of existence. And, of course, polytheism is not ruled out by Thomas’s argument.

I went over this with AlNg earlier and did say that taken with the other Four Ways and all their corollaries all of those objects are resolved, but taken by itself would seem (to my reading) to allow for multiple designers. Again, that’s by itself, without other arguments going with it. The one thing I disagree with in the statement is it’s point about self-organization. That misunderstands what St. Thomas is saying because that type of self-organization is, in addition to other things, what the Fifth Way is addressing as not sufficiently explainable in things lacking intelligence without appeal to an intelligence.

Order, itself, can be described on probabilistic grounds. Given any state of affairs, with sufficient time and effort, human beings can impose an order and arrangement on the apparent chaos. To exist is to be ordered in some manner.

This has nothing to do with the Fifth Way and mistakes it as referring to intricate complexity. It doesn’t. However, the fact that order could arise presupposes some sort of causal regularity in the things that comprise the system.

 

[Wesrock]

Thomas confuses descriptive laws of nature with prescriptive laws made intelligent beings. The laws of nature are discovered; prescriptive law is imposed. The first kind of law is always true; the second kind can be broken: we can violate a speed limit by driving too fast, but we cannot violate the law of gravity since it is merely a description of what is.

This just gets Thomist thoughts on laws of nature wrong on both ends. I spoke to this early in the topic.

The Argument from Design is an analogical argument (and a poor one):

[man-made product : man :: nature-made product : Nature-Maker]
The last term of the formula goes beyond possible experience while the remainder of terms is well within human experience. (For more on this point see Paley's Watch Argument.) Finally, any such "Nature-maker" need not be equated with God since this conception is not the traditional characterization of the Deity.

While analogy is used to make a point, it is not an analogical argument and makes no appeal to intricate complexity and has nothing to do with Paley’s Watch Argument or his type of intelligent design arguments. The author just betrays his ignorance of St. Thomas’ thinking here.

Fin