The First Way Explained

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Lesson 4, A Brief Diversion

Why study Metaphysics? Aristotle answers this in Metaphysics, book 1, lesson 3, ch 1, 980a21-983a3 ( from Thomas’ Commentary ).

" 64. Nor must we think (32).

Here he proves the fourth attribute, namely, that this is the most honorable science, by the following argument. That science which is most divine is most honorable, just as God Himself is also the most honorable of all things. But this science is the most divine, and is therefore the most honorable. The minor premise is proved in this way: a science is said to be divine in two ways, and only this science is said to be divine in both ways. First, the science which God has is said to be divine; and second, the science which is about divine matters is said to be divine. But it is evident that only this science meets both of these requirements, because, since this science is about first causes and principles, it must be about God; for God is understood in this way by all inasmuch as He is one of the causes and a principle of things. Again, such a science which is about God and first causes, either God alone has or, if not He alone, at least He has it in the highest degree. Indeed, He alone has it in a perfectly comprehensive way. And He has it in the highest degree inasmuch as it is also had by men in their own way, although it is not had by them as a human possession, but as something borrowed from Him. "

Not bad coming from a Pagan, would that our modern pagans were so wise.

Or, how about this? " 66. But it is necessary (33).

He now gives the goal toward which this science moves. He says that its progression comes to rest, or is terminated, in the contrary of what was previously found in those who first sought this science, as also happens in the case of natural generations and motions. For each motion is terminated in the contrary of that from which the motion begins. Hence, since investigation is a kind of movement towards knowledge, it must be terminated in the contrary of that from which it begins. But, as was stated above (53), the investigation of this science began with man’s wonder about all things, because the first philosophers wondered about less important matters and subsequent philosophers about more hidden ones. And the object of their wonder was whether the case was like that of strange chance occurrences, i.e., things which seem to happen mysteriously by chance. For things which happen as if by themselves are called chance occurrences. For men wonder most of all when things happen by chance in this way, supposing that they were foreseen or determined by some cause. For chance occurrences are not determined by a cause, and wonder results from ignorance of a cause. Therefore when men were not yet able to recognize the causes of things, they wondered about all things as if they were chance occurrences; just as they wondered about changes in the course of the sun, which are two in number, namely, the solstices, that of winter and that of summer. For at the summer solstice the sun begins to decline toward the south, after previously declining toward the north. But at the winter solstice the opposite occurs. And they wondered also that the diagonal of a square is not commensurable with a side. For since to be immeasurable seems to belong to the indivisible alone (just as unity alone is what is not measured by number but itself measures all numbers), it seems to be a matter of wonder that something which is not indivisible is immeasurable, and consequently that what is not a smallest part is immeasurable. Now it is evident that the diagonal of a square and its side are neither indivisible nor smallest parts. Hence it seems a matter of wonder if they are not commensurable. "

Again, the modern pagans could learn from those old Greeks.

Linus2nd
 
Lesson 5

BOOK II
WHAT IS NATURE? WHAT THINGS HAVE A NATURE? WHAT THINGS ARE ‘ACCORDING TO NATURE’? ( Important for answering certain objections of modern science.)

…
  1. He says, therefore, first that we say that of all beings some are from nature, whereas others are from other causes…
Now we say that the following things are from nature: every sort of animal, and their parts, such as flesh and blood, and also plants and simple bodies, i.e., the elements, such as earth, fire, air and water, which are nbt resolved into any prior bodies…

All of these things differ from the things which are not from nature because all things of this sort seem to have in themselves a principle of motion and rest; some according to place, such as the heavy and the light, and also the celestial bodies, some according to increase and decrease, such as the animals and plants, and some according to alteration, such as the simple bodies and everything which is composed of them.

But things which are not from nature, such as a bed and clothing and like things, which are spoken of in this way because they are from art, have in themselves no principle of mutation, except per accidents, insofar as the matter and substance of artificial bodies are natural things. Thus insofar as artificial things happen to be iron or stone, they have a principle of motion in them, but not insofar as they are artifacts. For a knife has in itself a principle of downward motion, not insofar as it is a knife, but insofar as it is iron.
  1. But it does not seem to be true that in every change of natural things a principle of motion is- in that which is moved. For in the alteration and the generation of simple bodies, the whole principle of motion seems to be from an external agent. For example, when water is heated, or air is converted into fire, the principle of the change is from an external agent.
…
  1. And so it must be said that a principle of motion is in natural things in the way in which motion belongs to them. Therefore in those things to which it belongs to move, there is an active priatiple of motion. Whereas in those things to which it belongs to be moved, there is a passive principle, which is matter. And this principle, insofar as it has a natural potency for such a form and motion, makes the motion to be natural. And for this reason the production of artificial things is not natural. For even though the material principle is in that which comes to be, it does not have a natural potency for such a form.
So also the local motion of the celestial bodies is natural, even though it is from a separated mover, inasmuch as there is in the celestial body itself a natural potency for such a motion.

However in heavy and light bodies there is a formal principle of motion. (But a formal principle of this sort cannot be called the active potency to which this motion pertains. Rather it is understood as a passive potency. For heaviness in earth is not a principle for moving, but rather for being moved.) For just as the other accidents are consequent upon substantial form, so also is place, and thus also ‘to be moved to place’. However the natural form is not the mover. Rather the mover is that which generates and gives such and such a form upon which such a motion follows.
  1. …
Natural things differ from the non-natural insofar as they have a nature. But they differ from the non-natural only insofar as they have in themselves a principle of motion. Therefore, nature is nothing other than a principle of motion and rest in that in which it is primarily and per se and not per accidens.

…

Moreover, nature is called a principle and cause in order to point out that in that which is moved nature is not a principle of all motions in the same way, but in different ways, as was said above #144].

… This, however, must not be understood to mean that in everything which is moved naturally nature is also a principle of coming to rest. For a heavenly body is indeed moved naturally, but it does not naturally come to rest. But on the whole it can be said that nature is not only a principle of motion but also of rest.

Further he says ‘in which it is’ in order to differentiate nature from artificial things in which there is motion only per accidens.

Then he adds ‘Primarily’ because even though nature is a principle of the motion of composite things, nevertheless it is not such primarily. Hence that an animal is moved downwards is not because of the nature of animal insofar as it is animal, but because of the nature of the dominant element.

…But the principle of a natural motion is in the natural body which is moved insofar as it is moved. For insofar as fire has lightness, it is carried upward. And these two things are not divided from each other so that the lightness is different than the body which is moved upward. Rather they are always one and the same. And all artificial things are like the doctor who cures. For none of them has in itself the principle of its own making. Rather some of them come to be from something outside, as a house and other things which are carved by hand, while others come to be through an intrinsic principle, but per accidens, as was said #142]. And so it has been stated what nature is.
  1. …
He says that those things which have in themselves a principle of their motion have a nature. And such are all subjects of nature. For nature is a subject insofar as it is called matter, and nature is in a subject insofar as it is called form.
  1. …
He says that ‘to be according to nature’ is said both of subjects whose existence is from nature and also of the accidents which are in them and caused by such a principle. Thus to be carried upward is not a nature itself, nor does it have nature, but it is caused by nature.

( Thomas’ Comm. on A’s Physics )

Linus2nd
 
Lesson 6, Thomas’ Commentary on Book 8 of A’s Physics
dhspriory.org/thomas/english/Physics8.htm#8 ( I neglected to mention in Lesson 5 that it was from Thomas’ Commentary on Book 2 of A’s Physics ).

The following will take more than one post. The conclusion to be drawn is that a moving object will continue in motion once it is set in motion, through a its own natural potentiality or capacity of its nature to be receptive to an impetus supplied by an agent outside itself. Either that or this receptive potency was inscribed or designed into its nature by its generator, i.e. ultimately God. Thus, it is disproven that Newton’s Laws have any adverse effect on The First Way, considered strictly in its Local Motion aspect. For this insight, I am indebted to Fr. John A. Weisheipl ( R.I.P. ) and his wonderful book Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages

Lecture 8

What moves the heavy and light. Everything moved, moved by another.
  1. After showing that the heavy and the light do not move themselves, he shows.by what they are moved.
First he shows by what they are moved;

Secondly, he concludes to his main intention, at 1036.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that they are naturally moved by something;

Secondly, he investigates by what they are moved, at 1030.

He says therefore first (798) that although the heavy and the light do not move themselves, they are nevertheless moved by something. And this can be made clear if we distinguish moving causes. For just as in things that are moved, we must take it that (1) some things are moved according to nature and some not, so also in movers, some move not according to nature, e.g., a stick, which is not naturally capable of moving a heavy body such as a stone; and that (2) some things move according to nature, as what is actually hot naturally moves what is according to its nature potentially hot, and similarly in other cases. And just as what is in act causes motion naturally, so what is in potency is naturally moved, with respect either to quantity or quality or where.

And because in Book II he had said that those things are moved naturally whose principle of motion exists in them per se and not by virtue of some concomitant attribute, which might lead one to suppose that what is only potentially hot is, when it becomes hot, not moved naturally in that it is being moved by an external active principle of its motion, he now adds, as though to preclude this objection, “since it has a principle of this kind in itself and not accidentally,” as if to say that in order that a motion be natural, it is enough that a principle of this kind, i.e., the potency, about which he made mention, exist in that which is moved per se and not per accidens, as a bench is potentially combustible, not precisely as bench but as wood.

Hence in explaining the expression “per accidens,” he adds that the same subject can be quantified and qualified, but one of these is related to the other per accidens; what is potentially of such and such a quality is also potentially quantified, but per accidens.

Therefore, because what is in potency is naturally moved by something else in act, and nothing is in potency and in act with respect to the same, it follows that neither fire nor earth nor anything else is moved by itself but by another. Fire and water are moved by another, but by compulsion, when their motion is outside their natural potency; but they are moved naturally when they are moved to their proper acts, to which they are in potency according to their nature.
  1. Then at (799) he shows by what they are moved. And because what is in potency is moved by something in act,
First he distinguishes potency;

Secondly, from this he shows by what such things are moved, at 1035.

About the first he does three things:

First he shows that it is necessary to know the ways in which something is said to be in potency;

Secondly, he explains this at 1031;
Code: 
        Thirdly, with this he solves a question, at 1033.
He says therefore that the reason why it is not evident by what heavy and light things are moved with respect to their natural motion (as fire upward and earth downward) is that the expression “being in potency” has many senses.

Cont. in next post.

Linus2nd
 
Lesson 6 Cont.

Secondly, he explains this at 1031;
Code: 
        Thirdly, with this he solves a question, at 1033.
He says therefore that the reason why it is not evident by what heavy and light things are moved with respect to their natural motion (as fire upward and earth downward) is that the expression “being in potency” has many senses.
  1. Then at (800) he distinguishes “being in potency”:
First in the understanding;

Secondly, in quality, at 1032;

Thirdly, in local motion, at 1033.

He says therefore first that one who is learning and does not yet have the habit of science is not in potency to science in the same way as one who already has the science but is not using it by considering.

But something is reduced from the first potency to the second, when the active principle is united with the patient; and then the patient through the presence of the active principle comes to be with respect to such an act, but after that the patient is yet in potency: for example, a learner is through the action of the teacher reduced from potency to act, but when he is in this state of act, there is yet another potency present. Consequently, the thing existing in first potency comes to be in another state of potency; because one having science, and not considering, is in a sense in potency to an act of science, but not in the same way as he was before he learned. Therefore, from first potency he is reduced to an act to which is united a second potency, by some agent, namely, the teacher.

But when he is in the state of possessing the habit of science, it is not necessary that he be reduced to second act by some agent; rather he operates immediately by himself, just by considering, i.e., unless he is prevented by other occupations or by sickness or by his will. On the other hand, if he were not impeded and still could not consider, then he would not be in the habit of science but in its contrary, namely, ignorance.
  1. Then at (801) he manifests the same thing in qualities. And he says that what was said with respect to the potency of anything in the mind applies also to natural bodies. For when a body is actually cold, it is potentially hot, just as an ignorant person is potentially a knower. But when this body has been so modified that it has the form of fire, then it is now actually fire and has the power to burn; and it acts at once and burns, unless it is prevented by something acting to the contrary or somehow preventing its acting, as by removing the combustible material. This is similar to what was said above, that when someone after learning becomes a knower, he at once considers, unless prevented by something.
  2. Then at (802) he manifests the same thing in the local motion of the heavy and the light. And he says that a light thing comes to be from a heavy, as a hot thing comes to be from the cold, as, for example, when air which is light comes to be from water which is heavy. Therefore, this water is first potentially light and later becomes actually light, and then it has its own activity at once, unless something prevents. But now being light, it is related to a place as potency to act—for the act of the light as light is to be in some definite place, namely, above; but it is prevented from being up by the fact of being in a contrary place, namely, down, because it cannot be in two places at the same time. Hence, that which keeps a light thing down prevents it from being up. And what has been said of local motion is true also of motion with respect to quantity or quality.
  3. Then at (803) he uses the foregoing to answer a question. For although the act of the light is to be above, yet some ask why the heavy and the light are moved to their appropriate places. But the cause of this is that they have a natural aptitude for such places. For to be light is to have an aptitude for being above, and the nature of the heavy is to have an aptitude to be down. Hence, to ask why a heavy thing is moved downward is exactly the same as to ask why it is heavy. Accordingly, the very same thing that makes it heavy makes it be moved downward.
  4. Then at (804) he uses the foregoing to show what moves the heavy and the light. And he says that since what is in potency is moved by what is in act (as has been said), it must be considered that something is said in many senses to be potentially light or heavy.
For in one way, when something is yet water, it is in potency to lightness; in another way, when from the water air has now been made, it is still in potency to the act of what is light, which is to be above in the same way that one having the habit of science and not considering is said still to be in potency—for what is light can possibly be prevented from being up.

If, therefore, that obstacle be removed, it immediately acts for the purpose of being up by ascending, as it was said with respect to quality that when a thing is actually of such and such a quality, it immediately tends to its act, as a knower immediately considers, unless he be prevented. And the same is true with respect to the motion to quantity, for from the fact that an addition of quantity has been made to a quantitative thing, extension immediately follows in an increasable body, unless something prevents.

Cont. in next post

Linus2nd
 
Lesson 6 Cont.

Accordingly, it is clear that what moves, i.e., what removes the obstacle preventing and sustaining does in some sense cause motion and in other senses does not; for example, if a pillar supports something heavy and thus keeps it from descending, the one who casts down the pillar is said somehow to move the heavy object that was supported by the pillar. In like manner, one who removes a stopper that was preventing water from flowing out of a container is said in some sense to move the water; for he is said to move per accidens and not per se. Also when a ball rebounds from a wall, it is moved per accidens by the wall but per se by the one who first threw it. For it was not the wall but the thrower that gave it the impetus for motion; but it was per accidens that, being prevented by the wall from continuing according to its impetus, it rebounded into a contrary motion, the original impetus remaining. In like manner, the one who casts down the pillar did not give the heavy object resting upon it the impetus or inclination to be downward, for it had that from the first generator, which gave it the form upon which that inclination follows. Consequently, the generator is the per se mover of the light and the heavy, whereas the remover of obstacles is a per accidens mover.

He concludes, thereforel that it is clear from the foregoing that none of these, i.e., of the heavy and the light, moves itself; yet their motion is natural, because they have in themselves the principle of their motion, not indeed a moving or active principle but a passive one, which is a potency to such-and-such an act.

From this it is evidently contrary to the intention of the Philosopher that in matter there be an active principle, which some declare is necessary for a natural motion; for a passive principle is sufficient, since it is a natural potency for act.
  1. Then at (805) he concludes to the conclusion chiefly intended in the whole chapter. And he says that if it is true that all things which are per se moved are moved either according to nature, or outside their nature and by compulsion, and if of those which are moved by compulsion it is true that all are moved not only by a mover but even by an external mover that is other; and, again, if among things that are moved according to nature, some are moved by themselves—in which things it is clear that they are moved by something not extrinsic but intrinsic—while others, such as heavy and light things are moved according to nature not by themselves but by some mover) as has been explained—for they are moved either per se by the generator which makes them be heavy and light, or they are moved per accidens by whatever removes what impedes or removes their natural motion—it is accordingly clear that all things which are moved are moved by something, i.e., either by an intrinsic or an extrinsic mover; which is to be moved by something other.
The important conclusions to be drawn from Lessons 5 and 6 will follow in next post.

Linus2nd
 
Lesson 7, Part 1, summary of Lessons 5 & 6, sort of.

The main things I would like to point out about the previous two lessons is that Aristotle and Thomas both agree that natural philosophy deals with things of nature. Those things which have in themselves, as something of their very nature, principles of motion and rest. That is, all the mobile ( moveable ) beings which are sensable to us are beings of nature and they have a nature ( a source or principle of movement) by which they can move themselves in characteristic ways, but they do not move themselves as an agent moves something else. They move themselves spontaneously and naturally.Of course, they may also be moved in uncharacteristic ways by an external agent, as when a ball is thrown against a wall by a boy.

When they move in these characteristic ways or act in these characteristic ways, they are said to be acting according to nature, from an intrinsic principle. Yet they are moved by another, the other is the generator ( agent cause/ efficient cause, whether instrumental or primary ) which gave them such a nature which acts when certain conditions are present ( the right temperature, moisture content in the soil, the right nutrients, the right amount of sun light, etc).

So it is true that " whatever is moved is moved by another. " But this mover may be either the generator of the being’s nature ( that which put such a nature in the being in the first place), or an external cause ( instrumental or efficient agent ) which moves it contrary to its nature, a compulsive force. And in either of these cases the moving cause need not be and often is not acting at the same time the being is being moved. And this is an error repeated in nearly all the textbooks on the Philosophy of Nature and Metaphysics of the Thomistic sort which have been used since beginning of the 20th century. So compare your textbook with what I have said here. I think the reason for the error is that those who wrote the texts have not read Thomas completely. Or have not read Aristotle or both.

The next important thing to understand is what Thomas said in post # 179 where he says, " …Also when a ball rebounds from a wall, it is moved per accidens by the wall but per se by the one who first threw it. For it was not the wall but the thrower that gave it the impetus for motion; but it was per accidens that, being prevented by the wall from continuing according to its impetus, it rebounded into a contrary motion, the original impetus remaining. In like manner, the one who casts down the pillar did not give the heavy object resting upon it the impetus or inclination to be downward, for it had that from the first generator, which gave it the form upon which that inclination follows. Consequently, the generator is the per se mover of the light and the heavy, whereas the remover of obstacles is a per accidens mover. "

Again he says in De Potentia, Ques 3, Article 11, ad 5, " An instrument is understood to be moved by the principal agent so long as it retains the power communicated to it by the principal agent; thus the arrow is moved by the archer as long as it retains the force wherewith it was shot by him. Thus in heavy and light things that which is generated is moved by the generator as long as it retains the form transmitted thereby: so that the semen also is understood to be moved by the soul of the begetter, as long as it retains the force communicated by that soul, although it is in body separated from it. And the mover and the thing moved must be together at the commencement of but not throughout the whole movement, as is evident in the case of projectiles. "

This is important because it explains how an object receives an accidental form of impetus from an agent who uses compulsive force to move an object and by which accidental form the object will continue in motion until stopped by an opposing force ( a wall, etc. ). As explained before, Fr. John A. Weisheipl in Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages uses this to explain the causality behind Newtons Law of continuous motion.

Combine this with what Aristotle and Thomas say about the natural motion of the " heavy " and the " light " and celestial motion and you can see that even in Quantum Mechanics there is an answer for the natural activities of the quanta, even though we may not be able to identify them. And that is not so strange since we cannot actually " see " the quanta, we can only detect that " something " is happening. Just what is happening and just what quanta are is a matter of interpretation. But there certainly is no justification in saying they have no natural cause or that they have no cause at all. So neither Newtonian Mechanics nor Quantum Mechanics disprove anything about the First Way.

Next time we will get into matter and form and potentiality and actuality. Reading Thomas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics is very difficult, parts of it are almost incomprehensible to the modern mind. It may help to read the " summary " Fr. Kenny has left us ( he passed a few months ago ). dhspriory.org/thomas/english/defaultNat.htm

Linus2nd
 
Lesson 7 cont. Instead of going on to matter and form and act and potency I would just like to show how Fr. Joseph Kenny explained gravitational and compulsive movement. He obviously had been studying what Fr. John A. Weisheipl had to say about these in his lectures and in Nature and Motion in the Middle ages., Several points here to be learned are, again.
  1. " Whatever is moved is moved by another. " But in many cases the other is the generator of the motion, directly ( God ) or instrumentally.
  2. In these cases the generator causes a accidental form to be present in the moved object whose nature has a potency for its reception.
  3. When the new accidental form has been received in the potency of the matter, the object acts naturally . If it is heavy, it falls, if it is a projectile which has been thrown or projected by other means ( the explosion of a star, the erruption of a vulcano, the firing of a rocket, etc ), it will have received from the generator the accidental form of Impetus. From that point the object, whatever it is, will continue moving until stopped by a stronger opposing force. If it happens to have been projected into a void it will continue in the same manner until it reaches the boundary of the universe ( if there is one ).
  4. In these cases, the mover does not accompany the moved, that is obvious, since the generator ( mover ) could have imparted the impetus thousands of years prior to its present movement.
  5. You should all read Fr. Kenney’s Summary of Thomas’ Commentary on Physics.
    dhspriory.org/thomas/english/NATURE12.htm
12.3 Gravitational movement (Book 8, Lessons 7-8)

What of gravitational motion, which is not compulsory but natural? First, gravitational fall is not self-motion, since self-motion is proper to animate bodies which can start or stop their motion and move one way or another according to appetite, whereas heavy bodies, as such, are not animate and must fall if there is no impediment, and they must fall down. More fundamentally, gravitational fall applies to solid continuous bodies (without flexible limbs), where there can be no division between moving and moved parts.

To understand gravitation, we must consider the different senses of “being in potency”: One can be in potency to knowledge before he has learned something. But after he has learned it, but has another potency to think about what he has learned; to activate this potency (which is virtually in act) he needs no outside agent, but simply has to think, unless he is prevented by other occupations or by sickness or by his will. On the other hand, if he were not impeded and still could not think, then he would not be in the habit of science but in its contrary, namely ignorance. Likewise, the nature of the heavy is to have an aptitude to be down. Hence, to ask why a heavy thing is moved downward is exactly the same as to ask why it is heavy. Consequently, the generator is the per se mover of the heavy, whereas the remover of obstacles is a per accidens mover. The gravitational motion of heavy things is natural, because they have in themselves the principle of their motion, not indeed a moving or active principle but a passive one, which is a potency to such-and-such an act.

12.4 Magnetism and projection (Book 7, Lesson 3)

A magnet moves a piece of iron from a distance through an electric field set up in the medium encompassing it and the iron. The earth has a similar magnetic field that affects a compass; so does the electric motor. Thus magnetism operates by altering the molecular structure of the iron it affects and in this way pulls it.

Projection, however, Aristotle explains as a reverberation between the projectile and the air: the projectile pushing the air and the air coming from behind and pushing the projectile. In Book 8, Lesson 8, however, Thomas says: “When a ball rebounds from a wall, it is moved per accidens by the wall but per se by the one who first threw it. For it was not the wall but the thrower that gave it the impetus for motion, but it was per accidens that, being prevented by the wall from continuing according to its impetus, it rebounded into a contrary motion, the original impetus remaining.” Again in De potentia (q.3, a.11, ad 5) Thomas says: “An instrument is understood to be moved by the principal agent as long as it retains the power of the principal agent impressed in itself; thus an arrow is moved by the archer as long as the power of the archer’s impulse remains.” Thus Thomas introduces the modern notion of impetus, which is a form, similar to heaviness (or knowledge in the above comparison) which accounts for the projectile’s motion. This is an accidental form that acts in a similar way to natural heaviness, but is transient in that can be corrupted by resistance (or friction).

Thus everything moved is moved by another, but not always here and now, because both natural movement (whether gravitational or living self-motion from a soul power) and compulsory (as in a projectile) last in the mobile after the generator or mover has conferred on it a virtual motion. "

Linus2nd
 
Lesson 7 cont.

Completed reading Thomas’ commentary on A’s Physics ( Whew! What a load!). That doesn’t mean by any stretch that I understood it all. It helps a little if you have your Aristotle next to you and you follow along from the beginning. Obviously A. takes much more time because Thomas is summarzing and commenting only. The problem is that T. doesn’t follow A. exactly. He gives the main outline of each Lecture which more or less follows the development of each of A’s eight books of P. But he jumps around quite a bit, even so far as to reference other works by A - and I think he referrenced them all at least once, some more than a couple of times.

It is easy to see why T. liked A. A. reasoned ( and you may question his reasoning of course) to the necessary existence of a single Unmoved Mover , Who was Eternal, Infinite in Power, Immaterial ( Spiritual, a Soul ), Uncaused, an Intellect and the Cause of every other motion, and Who Caused by the application of His Power ( a " spiritual movement " if you will). And T. immediately identifies this Unmoved Mover as God. No question in T’s mind at all about that.

All for now.
Linus2nd
 
Lesson cont. ( a diversion )

Here is an excellent video of a talk given by Edward Feser explaining the Aristotelian/Thomastic proof for the existence of God. I bring it up because it is equivalent to a three hour college survey course on the topic in 64min.

But it is excellent for many philosophical reasons, one of which is the answers he gives to certain objections raised by empericists against the argument. It is also good because he discusses actuality and potentiality, the principle of causality, efficient causality, the nature of the First Cause ( really excellent here), etc.

vimeo.com/60979789

I hope you will view the video several times, even though it does not use the example of local motion. It does raise the issue of existence which must be raised even when using examples from local motion. I will point this out before ending the thread.

It is important that Aristotle’s proof for the existence of God is the culmination of all his philosophy, not the beginning. Therefore it cannot be understood without understanding a thousand odd pages of his philosophy. The same applies to Thomas Aquinas. The problem is that we have people coming on to this thread who have read little or no philosophy expecting answers which took years to explain dedicated philosophy students, people who have heard a remark or two on U-Tube or some where else and think an immediate answer is available. This video goes a ways to cover that gap.

Linus2nd
 
Just finishing Aristotle’s Physics. It was certainly worth the effort. One thing that struck me was that eventhough his argument for God’s existence goes through his analysis of local motion, the existence of the movers themselves must be accounted for. For if they do not exist they cannot move anything. And their existence cannot be accounted for unless they are brought into being from non-being by the First Unmoved Mover, who Exists as an Eternal Being, who is Simple and Immaterial ( having no parts ), One ( since there cannot be more than one such being), and Intelligent ( Mind or Soul), who causes the being of all the other movers and of all other beings, otherwise they can neither be at rest nor in motion, nor be changing. So Thomists ( i.e. Feser ) who insist that the First Way of Thomas must consider the cause of the existence of things are absolutely correct.

If you are reading the Physics, don’t let yourself get bogged down by A’s " chalk board " demonstrations of motion. Just go to his summaries. It is all perfectlly logical and understandable.

Linus2nd
Now I will go back and read Thomas’ Commentary
 
Note. In reading Thomas’ commentary I ran into his reference to the " Commentator. " The " Commentator " was Averroes ( Ibn Rushd ) who was the best known commentator of Aristotle, and one Thomas had much respect for.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Summa_Theologica

I had to simle when Thomas said the Summa Theoloiae was meant as a course for beginning students of Theology. Clearly, the students of his day were of a higher caliber than the ones we have today ;)>

Linus2nd
 
Lesson 8, a propos

The First Way is not limited to local motion. It is about change, per se. That is, it is about Substantial Change, change in quality, change in quantity, and local motion. But a movent must exist before it can move anything. So the First Way is even more about existence. ( See Thomas’ Commentary on A’s Physics Book 8, paras 970 and following). That is why Thomas uses a discussion on potentiality and actuality to explain what he is talking about. Atheists, however, usually insist that it is strictly about local motion since they think that that " cooks Thomas’ goose, " thinking that Newton, Einstein, and Quantum Mechanics discredit any argument from local motion.

Both Aristotle and Aquinas were well aware of Impetus, which they applied to violent as opposed to natural motion. Aristotle’s famous phrase, " Quod movetur ab alio movetur… , " and adopted by Thomas in the First Way, was meant to apply to the Prime or Unmoved Mover who generated a body in the first place, giving it its Substantial Form ( and its matter) by which its natural movements, spontaneously begin operating naturally without the necessity of any other movent. Thus animals move naturally from place to place, digest, natural elements like uranium degenerate, light and heavy bodies seek their proper places, etc. without the need of any outside movent.

In the case of local motion, an outside movent is required only in the case of violent, constrained, or unnatural movements, and even this movent is an instrumental mover of the Prime Mover. Thus a thrown ball receives an impetus from the boy throwing the ball, which is overcome eventually by the resistance of the air and by the ball seeking its natural proper place.

It is true that Aristotle described the need for an accompanying mover in such cases, which he attributed to the transfer of the impetus given by the boy to the air rushing in behind the thrown ball and pushing the ball. Which, oddly enough, is demonstrated as somewhat true by the science of aerodynamics. Drive down the highway sometime close behind a semi truck and you will see this is true. It is even some what true for aircraft. The air collecting behind the moving object will provide some push. Of course this small amount of push could never provide enough impetus to explain what was going on here. So, in fact, no accompaning motor coniunctus is required except in extreme cases, like pushing a car out of a snow drift.

However, the principle was correct. Some mover was required to move an object unnaturallly. And that of course always leads to the Prime Mover who created the body and its substantial form in the first place, for a mover must exist before it can move anything. And that was the point of my post # 34, it showed that The First Way was always about existence and what caused things to exist in the first place. And local motion was merely an occassion of showing that necessity. The Third Way, skips local motion and goes directly from the act of existnece to He Who only could create extents out of nothing. Of course, since Thomas was assuming an eternal world, He would have had to have been creating eternally.

However, as early as the early 14th century, some scholastics began to disregard Aristotle’s explanation of projectile motion. They arrived at the conclusion that the impetus supplied by the mover was transferred to the moved object, in that the Creator of the object’s form, God, had given its nature a potentiality to receive an accidental modification of its form to receive an impetus. Once received, the object would continue to move, without an accompanying motor coniunctus until its inertia was overcome by opposing forces.
( Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages, by John A. Weisheipl, pgs 31-33). In these motions, the impetus is not a mover but an accidental natural form, an instrument of the Prime Agent, God. The boy who threw the ball would also be an instrumental cause of the Prime Agent.

So it is clear that Newton’s laws of Inertia offer no obsticales to Thomas’ First Way, as it might apply to local motion. For it has just been shown that God is the Prime Mover of such movements and He is operating with Infinite Power. So if the object would happen to be moving through a void ( which it will never do because none exists, nor can it exist), it would be by an infinitely powerful natural impetus supplied by an Infinitely Powerful God. It would not be the case of a finite push resulting in infinite motion.

The lesson here is that God is the ultimate cause behind every change and movement in that He supplies the power or motive force and the act of existence of the thing moved or changing.

Nor do any true ( as opposed to imaginary ) facts of Quantum Mechanics or of the Theoies of Relitivity offer any obstacles to any of the Five Ways. Whatever are the changes and motions of Quantum events ( and there is much speculation about this), there is always either instrumental causality through which God is operating or the direct causality of God Himself which is the cause of such motion, for nothing in this universe happens without the causality of God.

And finally, all the theories mentioned are mathematical explanations which are abstracted from the nature of things and thus leave unexplained the nature of the things themselves. It is the philosophies of Aristotle and Thomas which explain the nature of things and their ultimate cause. The theories address only the mathematical relationships of the physical happenings.

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Lesson 9, abstracted from another post, it was addressed to poster and I just left it as it was without changing the pronouns, etc.

Nothing in Science invalidates any of the Five Ways, not even the First Way. Even in the case of local motion ( and the First Way is not limited to local motion but includes all forms of change). Secondly, all the Five Ways are also concerned with the cause of the existence of limited and contingent beings, these being the movers and the moved, who must ultimately have their existence from the Unmoved Mover. For nothing moves or is moved unless it first exist. And neither can exist unless it first be brought into existence by the Unmoved Mover.

Now when the Unmoved Mover brings beings into existence, He gives them their Nature by which they are moved naturally. This is easy to see in living things where one part moves another and thus the whole creature, which is in turn moved by its soul. But it is the Unmoved Mover that has given the creature its Nature. In other words, the Unmoved Mover gives every creature, as a part of its nature, all it needs to move and function naturally without the need for an external mover.

This applies to inanimate beings as well. The Unmoved Mover gives their Natures every facility and potentiality to function and move naturally according to His Divine Plan.

Thus, if I fire a rocket into space and thus apply impetus to it, all its parts have been endowed by the creator with Natures, having the potentiality to receive this impetus and keep the rocket going indefinitely, as long as it is not countered by a contrary force. ( Contrary to what Newton said however, the rocket will not keep going for an infinite time because space is not a vaccum.) However if it were, then, by the impetus which it has received it will continue moving forever. But if so, it will be due to an infinite potential for infinite movement provided by the Creator at creation. So it is the Creator who is the Prime Mover of the rocket, the men who designed the ship, the fuel which supplied the impetus, the parts of the rocket, etc, would be instrumental movers only.

It is important to notice here that, this is a natural movement. Once the impetus is received the instrumental movers who built the ship and who fired it and the energy which supplied the energy can be forgotten. There is no accompanying mover to the moved. And this is true in all local motion which occurs naturally. The only time an accompanying mover would be required would be in examples of constrained movement like pushing a car up a hill.

So in the famous phrase, " Quod enim movetur ab alia movetur, " the other, the mover is Primary Mover who created a Nature with the potentiality of receiving an impetus capable of moving the ship, naturally and spontaneously, forever.

Thus, this is not a case of a finite power exercising infinite poser. It is a case of the Prime Mover creating Natures capable of converting a finite impetus into infinite motion, exercising an infinite power, instrumentally, supplied by the Prime Mover, Who alone has Infinite Power.

So those who misinterpreted Newton are proved wrong. Newton, more than once, declared that there was a Divine Cause which caused the natures from which his Laws were abstracted, to move and behave as they did.

God is the God of gravity as well. So those who ridiculed Aristotle and Thomas for their explanation of the movement of heavy and light bodies seeking their proper place are proven wrong also, These movements are explained by the potentiality of these objects to be moved by gravity to their proper places. And it is God, the Creator of their Natures, Who gave their natures the potential to be moved by gravity and to seek their proper places.

Other arguments can be made to answer Relativity and Quantum Mechanics. But I think enough has been shown to make reasonable people see that nothing excapes God’s causality, even if we cannot explain it down to the " T " or even if we cannot see the " objects, " as in Quntum Mechanics.

And so we see that in every case of local motion we are led to the Prime Mover who creates the Natures of beings, who move naturally, and with the potentially and power He created them with. All arguments contrary to this are nothing but Sophistical Red Herrings.

If you are interested in a more detailed explaination of these things you will need to get access to a really great book, Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages by John A. Weisheipl O.P. Good libraries should have a copy. Now out of print but can still be found at super high cost. I paid $140 for mine and that was cheap!!!

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Interlude: A’s Metaphysics, Book 1, ch 2 ( or part 2 ), translated by W.D. Ross
Excerpt: God

"Hence also the possession of it might be justly regarded as beyond human power; for in many ways human nature is in bondage, so that according to Simonides ‘God alone can have this privilege’, and it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him. If, then, there is something in what the poets say, and jealousy is natural to the divine power, it would probably occur in this case above all, and all who excelled in this knowledge would be unfortunate. But the divine power cannot be jealous (nay, according to the proverb, ‘bards tell a lie’), nor should any other science be thought more honourable than one of this sort. For the most divine science is also most honourable; and this science alone must be, in two ways, most divine. For the science which it would be most meet for God to have is a divine science, and so is any science that deals with divine objects; and this science alone has both these qualities; for (1) God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and (2) such a science either God alone can have, or God above all others. All the sciences, indeed, are more necessary than this, but none is better. "

From Thomas’ Commentary on this.

"
64. Nor must we think (32).

Here he proves the fourth attribute, namely, that this is the most honorable science, by the following argument. That science which is most divine is most honorable, just as God Himself is also the most honorable of all things. But this science is the most divine, and is therefore the most honorable. The minor premise is proved in this way: a science is said to be divine in two ways, and only this science is said to be divine in both ways. First, the science which God has is said to be divine; and second, the science which is about divine matters is said to be divine. But it is evident that only this science meets both of these requirements, because, since this science is about first causes and principles, it must be about God; for God is understood in this way by all inasmuch as He is one of the causes and a principle of things. Again, such a science which is about God and first causes, either God alone has or, if not He alone, at least He has it in the highest degree. Indeed, He alone has it in a perfectly comprehensive way. And He has it in the highest degree inasmuch as it is also had by men in their own way, although it is not had by them as a human possession, but as something borrowed from Him.
  1. From these considerations he draws the further conclusion that all other sciences are more necessary than this science for use in practical life, for these sciences are sought least of all for themselves. But none of the other sciences can be more excellent than this one. "
I think these little interluces are interesting. No wonder Thomas had such a high regare for Aristotle

Linus2nd
 
Lesson 55 The Unmoved Mover causes all creatures to move/change by creating them and all the powers and potentials of their natures and keeping them in existence. This is an eternal creation from nothing, but not in time.

Thomas Aquinas distinguished two kinds of creation, " . For Aquinas there are two senses of creation out of nothing, one philosophical, the other theological. The philosophical sense simply means that God, with no material cause, makes all things to exist as entities that are really different from His own being yet completely dependent upon His causality. The theological sense of creation denies nothing of the philosophical sense but merely adds to it the notion that the created universe is temporally finite. Thus, reason alone can arrive at an understanding of the essential features of the doctrine of creation – of everything, that is, but the temporal beginning of the world. Aquinas also thinks that the causality of Aristotle’s unmoved mover is able to be understood – or perhaps expanded to include – the causality of creation. Despite the difficulties that the attribution of an understanding of creation to Aristotle raises for Aristotelian scholars, it reveals the extent to which Aquinas finds a complementarity between reason and faith.(48)

Aquinas observes that “the causality of the Creator . . . extends to everything that is in the thing. And, therefore, creation is said to be out of nothing, because nothing uncreated pre-exists creation.”(49) The Creator is prior to what is created, but the priority is not fundamentally temporal. Creation has its origin in a creator and is wholly dependent upon the Creator for its existence; the dependence is metaphysical not temporal:

[N]on-being is prior to being in the thing which is said to be created. This is not a priority of time or of duration, such that what did not exist before does exist later, but a priority of nature, so that, if the created thing is left to itself, it would not exist, because it only has its being from the causality of the higher cause [ex influentia causae superioris].(50)

As I have said, Thomas Aquinas saw no contradiction in the notion of an eternal created universe.(51) For, even if the universe had no temporal beginning, it still would depend upon God for its very being. The radical dependence on God as cause of being is what creation means. The kind of contingency which creatures qua creatures possess extends to necessary beings,(52) that is, those which, although created, do not undergo corruption or change.(53) It is easy to confuse different senses of contingency. There have been suggestions recently that, despite the radical altering of the nature of time in Hawking’s cosmology, Hawking’s view reinforces the idea of the creaturely contingency of the universe. Robert J. Russell, director of the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences at Berkeley, claims that:

Because of his [Hawking’s] insistence on the distinction between a finite past and a beginning of time, Hawking has, in effect, helped us claim that the universe is indeed a creation of God even if it has no beginning.(54)

www3.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/ti/carroll.htm

Thus, whether we consider motion to be any change or restrict it to change of place we arrive at an Unmoved Mover, a Pure Act of Existence who creates everything that exists out of nothing, giving each substance all that it is, matter, form, nature/essence, powers, potentialities, and existence and continually holds in existence everything that exists. And this Unmoved Mover we can rightly call God, in the Christian sense.

And remember that neither Newton’s Laws nor any law of science disproves this proof from motion.

Cheers Everyone

Linus2nd
 
Lesson 10 continued ( lesson 55 should have bee Lesson 10 )

If you remember, I discussed the example of a thrown ball in which the thrower imparted an impetus to the ball, changing its form by the addition of the accident of impetus. This accident of impetus allows the ball to continue moving at a fixed speed until overcome by an opposing force. But I pointed out the the ball and received its form from another agent, a form which was susceptable to being modified by an impetus. Ultimately the orgin of this form was the first Unmoved Mover. But it must also be pointed out that the thrower received his power of movement ultimately from the Unmoved Mover as well. And it must be futher be pointed out that the existence of the ball and or the thrower also depend on the Unmoved Mover, who is pure act. The following excerpt from De Potencia explains why this is so.

On the contrary it is written (Heb. i, 8): Upholding all things by , the word of his power: and the gloss remarks “Even as all things were created by him, so by him are they preserved unchangeable.”

Again, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): “The might of the Creator and the Power of the Almighty is the cause of existence in every creature; and if the ruling power of God were withdrawn from his creatures, their form would at once cease and all nature would collapse;” and further on: “The world would not stand for one instant, if God withdrew his support.” Again, Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 37) that all things would fall into nothingness were they not upheld by the hand of the Almighty.

Again, in the book De Causis (prop. ix) it is said: “Every intelligence derives its immobility” i.e. stability and essence, “from that goodness which is the first cause.” A fortiori therefore, other creatures are not stabilised in existence save by God.

I answer that without any doubt whatever it must be admitted that things are preserved in existence by God, and that they would instantly be reduced to nothing were God to abandon them. The proof of this may be expressed as follows. An effect must needs depend on its cause. This is part of the very nature of cause and effect; and is evidenced in formal and material causes, seeing that on the removal of any of its material or formal principles, a thing at once ceases to exist, because such principles enter into its essence., The statement applies to efficient causes even as to formal and material causes: since the efficient cause produces a thing by inducing the form or disposing the matter. Hence a thing depends equally on its efficient cause, its matter and its form since through the one it depends on the other.

As to final causes the same is to be said of them as of efficient causes: because the end is a cause only for as much as it moves the efficient cause to act, since it comes first not in existence but in the intention. Consequently there is no action where there is no final cause (Metaph. iii, 2). Accordingly the existence of a thing made depends on its efficient cause inasmuch as it depends on the form of the thing made. Now there can be an efficient cause on which the form of the thing made does not depend directly and considered as a form, but only indirectly: thus the form of a generated fire does not depend on the generating fire directly and by reason of its species, seeing that it occupies the same degree in the order of things, and the form of fire is in the same way in both the generated and in the generating fire, and is distinguished therefrom only by a material distinction, through being seated in another matter. Hence since the generated fire has its form from some cause, this same form must depend on some higher principle, that is the cause of that form directly and in respect of its very species.

Now seeing that properly speaking the existence of a form in matter implies no movement or change except accidentally, and since no bodies act unless moved, as the Philosopher shows, it follows of necessity that the principle on which the form depends directly must be something incorporeal, for the effect depends on its active cause through the action of a principle. And if a corporeal principle be in some way the cause of a form, this is due to its acting by virtue of an incorporeal principle and as its instrument. In fact this is necessary in order that the form begin to exist, inasmuch as it does not begin to exist otherwise than in matter: because matter cannot be subject of a form unless it have a particular disposition, since the proper act should be in its proper matter.

When, therefore, matter is in a disposition unsuitable to a particular form, it cannot directly receive that form from an incorporeal principle on which the form directly depends, so that there is need for something to .transmute the matter: and this will be a corporeal agent whose action consists in moving something. This corporeal agent acts by virtue of the incorporeal principal, and its action terminates in this or that form, inasmuch as this or that form is in the corporeal agent either actually (as in universal agents) or virtually (as in equivocal agents).

Accordingly these lower corporeal agents are not the cause of the forms in things made, except to the extent of their causality in trans-muting matter, since they do not act except by transmuting, as stated above (Q. iii, AA. 7, 8): and this is by transmuting matter and educing the form from the potentiality of matter. Hence the form of the thing generated depends naturally on the generator in so far as it is educed from the potentiality of matter, but not as to its absolute existence.

Continued on next post.

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And, therefore, when the act of the generator ceases, the eduction of the form from potentiality into actual being, that is the becoming of the thing generated, ceases, whereas the form itself whereby the thing generated has its existence, does not cease. Hence it is that the existence of the thing generated, but not its becoming, remains after the action of the generator has ceased. On the other hand, forms that do not exist in matter, such as intellectual substances, or that exist in matter nowise indisposed to the form, such as the heavenly bodies wherein there are no contrary dispositions, must proceed from a principle that is an incorporeal agent that acts not by movement, nor do they depend on something for their. becoming without depending on it also for their being.

Wherefore just as when the action of their efficient cause which acts by movement ceases, at that very instant the becoming of the thing generated ceases, even so when the action of an incorporeal agent ceases, the very existence of things created by it ceases. Now this incorporeal agent by whom all things, both corporeal and incorporeal are created, is God, as we have proved above (Q. iii, AA. 5, 6, 8), from whom things derive not only their form but also their matter. And as to the question at issue it makes no difference whether they were all made by him immediately, or in a certain order as certain philosophers have maintained. We conclude then that with the cessation of the divine operation, at the same instant all things would fall into nothingness, as we have proved by the authorities quoted in the arguments On the contrary.

See the link for complete explanation

dhspriory.org/thomas/english/QDdePotentia.htm

Therefore we see that God, the Unmoved Mover, is continually creating all things, keeping them in existence, and moving them through secondary agents.

The conclusion is that the Unmoved Mover moves and changes objects even if we restrict our definition of motion to local motion. And he does this by an eternal act of creation by which he bestows existence and form on all his creatures and by an eternal act of his sustaining power by which he providentially keeps all things in existence and guides them to their proper ends. And we rightly call this Being God, the God of Christianity.

Linus2nd.
 
I want to thank everyone who has stopped by and encourage you to continue coming back. There is a lot here and from time to time I will post something else. But the essential argument has been presented and I think proven. That is , we can prove the existence of a God, that can be identified as the God of Christianity, even by limiting The First Way to strictly local motion.

Linus2nd
 
To really understand any of Thomas’ arguments it is necessary to understand the fundamental elements of the philosophy of Aristotle and Thomas. The first thing necessary to understand is the concept of Nature. The following is from the old Catholic Encyclopedia and will explain this concept.

Nature

" Etymologically (Latin natura from nasci, to be born, like the corresponding Greek physis from phyein, to bring forth) has reference to the production of things, and hence generally includes in its connotation the ideas of energy and activity. It will be convenient to reduce to two classes the various meanings of the term nature according as it applies to the natures of individual beings or to nature in general.
I. In an individual being, especially if its constitutive elements and its activities are manifold and complex, the term nature is sometimes applied to the collection of distinctive features, original or acquired, by which such an individual is characterized and distinguished from others. Thus it may be said it is the nature of one man to be taller, stronger, more intelligent, or more sociable than another. This meaning, however, is superficial; in philosophical terminology and even in ordinary language, nature refers to something deeper and more fundamental. These features are manifestations of a man’s nature; they are not his nature. Nature properly signifies that which is primitive and original, or, according to etymology, that which a thing is at birth, as opposed to that which is acquired or added from external sources. But the line that divides the natural from the artificial cannot be drawn with precision. Inorganic beings never change except under the influence of external agencies, and in the same circumstances, their mode of activity is uniform and constant. Organisms present a greater complexity of structure, power of adaptation, and variety of function. For their development out of a primitive germ they require the co-operation of many external factors, yet they have within themselves the principle of activity by which external substances are elaborated and assimilated. In any being the changes due to necessary causes are called natural, whereas those produced by intentional human activity are called artificial. But it is clear that art supposes nature and is but a special adaptation of natural aptitudes, capacities, or activities for certain esthetic or useful purposes. Stars, rivers, forests, are works of nature; parks, canals, gardens, and machines are works of art. If necessary conditions are realized, where the seed falls a plant will grow naturally. But the seed may be placed purposely amid certain surroundings, the growth of the plant may be hastened, its shape altered, and, in general, the result to be expected from natural activities may be modified. By training the aptitudes of an animal are utilized and its instincts adapted for specific ends. In such cases the final result is more or less natural or artificial according to the mode and amount of human intervention.

In scholastic philosophy, nature, essence, and substance are closely related terms. Both essence and substance imply a static point of view and refer to constituents or mode of existence, while nature implies a dynamic point of view and refers to innate tendencies. Moreover, substance is opposed to accidents, whereas we may speak of the nature and essence not only of substances but also of accidents like colour, sound, intelligence, and of abstract ideals like virtue or duty. But when applied to the same substantial being, the terms substance, essence, and nature in reality stand only for different aspects of the same thing, and the distinction between them is a mental one. Substance connotes the thing as requiring no support, but as being itself the necessary support of accidents; essence properly denotes the intrinsic constitutive elements by which a thing is what it is and is distinguished from every other; nature denotes the substance or essence considered as the source of activities. "Nature properly speaking is the essence (or substance) of things which have in themselves as such a principle of activity (Aristotle, “Metaphysics”, 1015a, 13). By a process of abstraction the mind arises from individual and concrete natures to those of species and genera …]

newadvent.org/cathen/10715a.htm

Linus2nd
 
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