The First Way Explained

[inocente]

A question was raised about " gravity waves. " No evidence has yet been found that these exist, though it seems that they are predicted by Einsteins General Theory of Relativity - I’ll accept expert opinion on that. Scientists are working hard to find them but have not succeeded so far. Although, gravity itself does exist.

GR predicts them and the article I posted is of observations which agree with GR to 8 millionths of a second per year. That’s not conclusive evidence, but put it alongside the evidence for many biblical events and apply a consistent standard.

Incidentally, here are the philosophical objections to the First Way I found the other day. They are lecture notes, and from the web address they turn out to be Professor Gideon Rosen’s for one of his classes at Princeton.

princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/phi203/cosmological

 

[Linusthe2nd]

GR predicts them and the article I posted is of observations which agree with GR to 8 millionths of a second per year. That’s not conclusive evidence, but put it alongside the evidence for many biblical events and apply a consistent standard.

Incidentally, here are the philosophical objections to the First Way I found the other day. They are lecture notes, and from the web address they turn out to be Professor Gideon Rosen’s for one of his classes at Princeton.

princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/phi203/cosmological

I have read both links. There is no confirmation that " gravity waves " exist. Perhaps some day but not yet. And even if confirmed, what would it mean. As far as I can see, it would only mean that there was a cause for the fact that ponderable bodies move toward each other. I don’t know if that would confirm the dreaded " attraction " that Newton claimed had no physical cause but was rather the direct causality of God.

As to the " explanation " of the first way I noticed right away that the author agreed with me that the " motion " Thomas speaks of covers every type of change and was not limited to local motion. I noticed a couple of erroneous aspects of the analysis. One was that one aspect would have to be rejected. Thomas does not mean that the mover would have to actually have to be " F " before it could move the moved to " F. " Thomas’ view is that it would only have to have the power to impart " F " This power would have to be either imminent or virtual. Example, the arm of the artist does not cause the the statue to be formed from the block of clay. The arm is the immediate cause of the form of the statue and it has the power to make the form by virtue of the power it receives from the artist, who in turn has his power from the Actuality of the First Cause, Who is in Actuality with respect to all possible Acts that it can impart by means of its Will.

A more detailed response to the analysis of the author would be a little difficult here, at least for the moment, for it goes on for seven pages. And his closing " alternative " treatment was not clear to me. I didn’t understand it. It didn’t make sense to me.

Linus2nd.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Inocent,
Corrected version of last post, got interrupted and got timed out.

GR predicts them and the article I posted is of observations which agree with GR to 8 millionths of a second per year. That’s not conclusive evidence, but put it alongside the evidence for many biblical events and apply a consistent standard.

Incidentally, here are the philosophical objections to the First Way I found the other day. They are lecture notes, and from the web address they turn out to be Professor Gideon Rosen’s for one of his classes at Princeton.

princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/phi203/cosmological

I have read both links. There is no confirmation that " gravity waves " exist. Perhaps some day but not yet. And even if confirmed, what would it mean? As far as I can see, it would only mean that there was a cause for the fact that ponderable bodies move toward each other. I don’t know if that would confirm the dreaded " attraction " that Newton claimed had no physical cause but was rather the direct causality of God.

As to the " explanation " of the first way, I noticed right away that the author agreed with me that the " motion " Thomas speaks of covers every type of change and was not limited to local motion. I noticed a couple of erroneous aspects of the analysis. One was that one aspect would have to be rejected. Thomas does not mean that the mover would have to actually have to be " F " before it could move the moved to " F. " Thomas’ view is that it would only have to have the power to impart " F " This power would have to be either imminent or virtual. Example, the arm of the artist does not cause the the statue to be formed from the block of clay. The arm is the immediate ( instrumental ) cause of the form of the statue and it has the power to make the form by virtue of the power it receives from the artist, who in turn has his power from the Actuality of the First Cause, Who is in Actuality with respect to all possible Acts that it can impart by means of its Will.

A more detailed response to the analysis of the author would be a little difficult here, at least for the moment, for it goes on for seven pages. And his closing " alternative " treatment was not clear to me. I didn’t understand it. It didn’t make sense. Whether that is due to my dullness or the author’s inability to make his idea clear I don’t know.

Have a happy Thanksgiving. Will you have turkey in Spain?

Linus2nd

 

[inocente]

I have read both links. There is no confirmation that " gravity waves " exist. Perhaps some day but not yet. And even if confirmed, what would it mean? As far as I can see, it would only mean that there was a cause for the fact that ponderable bodies move toward each other. I don’t know if that would confirm the dreaded " attraction " that Newton claimed had no physical cause but was rather the direct causality of God.

As I said the evidence confirms with great accuracy a prediction of the theory which also predicts gravity waves. Ask yourself who has more cause for skepticism: (a) your refusal to believe GR without further confirmation, or (b) a non-Christian who denies that Christ was born of a virgin.

As to the " explanation " of the first way, I noticed right away that the author agreed with me that the " motion " Thomas speaks of covers every type of change and was not limited to local motion. I noticed a couple of erroneous aspects of the analysis. One was that one aspect would have to be rejected. Thomas does not mean that the mover would have to actually have to be " F " before it could move the moved to " F. " Thomas’ view is that it would only have to have the power to impart " F " This power would have to be either imminent or virtual. Example, the arm of the artist does not cause the the statue to be formed from the block of clay. The arm is the immediate ( instrumental ) cause of the form of the statue and it has the power to make the form by virtue of the power it receives from the artist, who in turn has his power from the Actuality of the First Cause, Who is in Actuality with respect to all possible Acts that it can impart by means of its Will.

The notes are for Philsophy 203 at Princeton, I don’t know if they are current:

princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/Syllabus.html
princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/phi203/lecturenotes.html

You appear to have got interrupted in your reading. The notes give two possibilities for what Thomas meant by his “for nothing can be moved except” sub-argument. One possibility is dismissed for the reasons you give, the other is described as “uninteresting”, since it places no constraints on anything, which is more or less my objection that potentiality is a duff (vacuous) concept.

A more detailed response to the analysis of the author would be a little difficult here, at least for the moment, for it goes on for seven pages. And his closing " alternative " treatment was not clear to me. I didn’t understand it. It didn’t make sense. Whether that is due to my dullness or the author’s inability to make his idea clear I don’t know.

As this is what students are/were taught at Princeton, I think the six objections summarized at the bottom each need a careful response, they can’t just be dismissed.

Have a happy Thanksgiving. Will you have turkey in Spain?

Thanks, have a good time, but our holidays are Día de la Constitución on Dec 6 (anniversary of the referendum which approved our glorious constitution in 1978) and Día Concepción Inmaculada on Dec 8, a proper Catholic feast day. We care naught for your pale Protestant imitations.

 

[inocente]

I have read both links. There is no confirmation that " gravity waves " exist. Perhaps some day but not yet. And even if confirmed, what would it mean? As far as I can see, it would only mean that there was a cause for the fact that ponderable bodies move toward each other. I don’t know if that would confirm the dreaded " attraction " that Newton claimed had no physical cause but was rather the direct causality of God.

As I said the evidence confirms with great accuracy a prediction of the theory which also predicts gravity waves. Ask yourself who has more cause for skepticism: (a) your refusal to believe GR without confirmation, or (b) a non-Christian who denies that Christ was born of a virgin.

As to the " explanation " of the first way, I noticed right away that the author agreed with me that the " motion " Thomas speaks of covers every type of change and was not limited to local motion. I noticed a couple of erroneous aspects of the analysis. One was that one aspect would have to be rejected. Thomas does not mean that the mover would have to actually have to be " F " before it could move the moved to " F. " Thomas’ view is that it would only have to have the power to impart " F " This power would have to be either imminent or virtual. Example, the arm of the artist does not cause the the statue to be formed from the block of clay. The arm is the immediate ( instrumental ) cause of the form of the statue and it has the power to make the form by virtue of the power it receives from the artist, who in turn has his power from the Actuality of the First Cause, Who is in Actuality with respect to all possible Acts that it can impart by means of its Will.

The notes are for Philsophy 203 at Princeton, I don’t know if they are current:

princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/Syllabus.html
princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/phi203/lecturenotes.html

You appear to have got interrupted in your reading. The notes give two possibilities for what Thomas meant by his “for nothing can be moved except” sub-argument. One possibility is dismissed for the reasons you give, the other is described as “uninteresting”, since it places no constraints on anything, which is more or less my objection that potentiality is a duff (vacuous) concept.

A more detailed response to the analysis of the author would be a little difficult here, at least for the moment, for it goes on for seven pages. And his closing " alternative " treatment was not clear to me. I didn’t understand it. It didn’t make sense. Whether that is due to my dullness or the author’s inability to make his idea clear I don’t know.

As this is what students are/were taught at Princeton, I think the six objections summarized at the bottom each need a careful response, they can’t just be dismissed.

Have a happy Thanksgiving. Will you have turkey in Spain?

Our holidays are Día de la Constitución on Dec 6 (anniversary of the referendum which approved our glorious constitution in 1978) and Día Concepción Inmaculada on Dec 8, a proper Catholic feast day. We care not for your pale Protestant imitations.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

As I said the evidence confirms with great accuracy a prediction of the theory which also predicts gravity waves. Ask yourself who has more cause for skepticism: (a) your refusal to believe GR without further confirmation, or (b) a non-Christian who denies that Christ was born of a virgin.

The first of course would be based on whether or not one thought the theory and the conclusion were reasonable. The second is based strictly on Faith.

The notes are for Philsophy 203 at Princeton, I don’t know if they are current:

princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/Syllabus.html
princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/phi203/lecturenotes.html

Only the second link is open.

You appear to have got interrupted in your reading. The notes give two possibilities for what Thomas meant by his “for nothing can be moved except” sub-argument. One possibility is dismissed for the reasons you give, the other is described as “uninteresting”, since it places no constraints on anything, which is more or less my objection that potentiality is a duff (vacuous) concept.

I tried to explain the second. Actually, the second covers all bases. The First Cause moves things that are moved either directly or through the instrumentaly of secondary causes which receive their causal power from the First Cause, who acts by will. Some secondary causes, man, act through both will and force. Some are actually in act in respect to the specific effect, i.e. fire causes wood to catch fire. But the fire of this efficient cause is due to other unspecified efficienty causes, which ultimately are traced back to the First Cause. And since all the seconday causes are themselves being moved from potentiality to actuality, only the existence of an Unmoved Mover, who is Pure act, and acts by Will, can end the series.

Rather than get off on a tangent by going through the Professors analysis step by step I would rather present the First Way as I see it. There are seven pages of it after all. I hope no one expects me to answer all the spurious objections made throughout history?

I did not understand the end of the analysis, didn’t make sense to me.

As this is what students are/were taught at Princeton, I think the six objections summarized at the bottom each need a careful response, they can’t just be dismissed.

Just answered.

Thanks, have a good time, but our holidays are Día de la Constitución on Dec 6 (anniversary of the referendum which approved our glorious constitution in 1978) and Día Concepción Inmaculada on Dec 8, a proper Catholic feast day. We care naught for your pale Protestant imitations.

This may be all from me until the New Year.

Linus2nd

 

[polytropos]

If motion is to be read as “the act of changing” rather than “the act of changing position” then the verb is to change, not to move.

“Motion” and “to move” have the same root. If someone means “change” by “motion,” then it stands to reasons that he means “to change” by “to move.”

Can someone give an academically unambiguous English rendering of the First Way, replete with technical definitions if necessary? otherwise we’ll be here forever trying to grab hold a ferret.

1. That the actualization of potency is a real feature of the world follows from the occurrence of the events we know of via sensory experience.
2. The occurrence of any event E presupposes the operation of a substance.
3. The existence of any natural substance S at any given moment presupposes the concurrent actualization of a potency.
4. No mere potency can actualize a potency; only something actual can do so.
5. So any actualizer A of S’s current existence must itself be actual.
6. A’s own existence at the moment it actualizes S itself presupposes either (a) the concurrent actualization of a further potency or (b) A’s being purely actual.
7. If A’s existence at the moment it actualizes S presupposes the concurrent actualization of a further potency, then there exists a regress of concurrent actualizers that is either infinite or terminates in a purely actual actualizer.
8. But such a regress of concurrent actualizers would constitute an essentially ordered causal series, and such a series cannot regress infinitely.
9. So either A itself is purely actual or there is a purely actual actualizer which terminates the regress of concurrent actualizers.
10. So the occurrence of E and thus the existence of S at any given moment presupposes the existence of a purely actual actualizer.

(A treatment given by Feser, who has removed “motion” so there is no need to get caught up in exegetical disputes.)

I misled you. I mean that if the change of velocity would not happen without the presence of the other bodies, then the change depends on their prior existence and so is not fundamental.

Still, “no one said it needs to be ‘fundamental.’” I’m not even sure how to translate that requirement into terms of anyone who has defended the argument.

But yes, I agree that the change depends on other bodies’ existence. That’s the point of the principle that changes requires causes. I seem to be repeating myself here so please explain where I’ve misunderstood, if I have.

Never sure about this use of semantics, as if how is not enough, and why is somehow part of objective reality, and it sounds like you’re saying that the unmoved mover explains because otherwise the unmoved mover wouldn’t explain.

How might be enough, depending on how much one equivocates. Kepler’s laws explain “how” the planets move; any physicist worth his salt wouldn’t claim that they are sufficient explanations, or that it’s not the business of reasonable inquiry to ask why it is that they move in the way described by the laws. (It seems unnecessary to state that science would cease to progress if it stopped at any apparently descriptive theory and accepted it as complete.)

I am not saying that the unmoved mover needs to explain to satisfy my pitiful Catholic philosophical biases. I’m just saying that no one is saying that it needs to add to the predictive power of Newtonian or Einsteinian motion. The argument is arguing for its existence; not to explain the behavior of baseballs that I throw in the air. Saying it doesn’t add to such explanations is true and trivial.

I’m thinking that if you didn’t understand then you didn’t learn calculus at school. Calculus is the language of change, so if you guys, even unto Fesser, can’t speak calculus, that would explain a lot.

But OK, try this. The First Way is about change over time. Velocity is the rate of change of position over time. Acceleration is rate of change of velocity over time, in other words the rate of change of the rate of change of position.

Now, if you discount constant velocity to avoid any issues with inertia, then to be logically consistent you must also discount every other type of change of the “rate of change of x” type, and only include those of the “rate of change of rate of change of x” type.

But you can’t do that without doing great violence to Thomas’ argument. Ergo you cannot discount inertial velocity.

(btw this would also apply to instantaneous change, since that’s what calculus is about).

I understand that acceleration is the second derivative of position and the first derivative of velocity. It doesn’t follow that I need to reject anything that is a rate of change of something else; it’s hard to express how plainly such a commitment just doesn’t follow. I’m not appealing to equations. I’m appealing to the physical interpretation of Newton’s law: “When viewed in an inertial reference frame, an object either is at rest or moves at a constant velocity, unless acted upon by an external force.” If we construe states of constant velocity as non-change (which I’ll concede for the sake of argument), then there is no issue with construing changes from one velocity to another (ie. accelerations which must have external causes) as changes. Sure, velocity is a derivative and acceleration is a derivative of a derivative. But considering acceleration as “velocity of velocity” in more than a seriously attenuated and analogical sense is just further than the physical interpretation could ever take you.

 

[polytropos]

You misunderstood. Temperature is only a statistical measure, by which we measure average kinetic motion. It’s like a Pointillist painting, from a distance you see shades, close up the shades don’t exist, there are just colored points. Neither the shades nor temperature are fundamental, they are about how we see the world at a distance, not how the world is close up.

And even if one could reduce temperature to to changes in average kinetic motion, there would still be changes in velocity.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Polytrospos,

Even Newton himself felt that motion had a cause. His laws were intended to be used as predictive tools. They were never intended to explain reality as it actually exists. Wallace discusses Newton’s view of the physical causes of the " forces " which are at work in the universe with respect of his three Laws in From a Realist Point of View ( Willaim A Wallace, 1979 ed,). Contrary to what is commonly accepted in regard to these Laws, Newton was convinced that these " forces " had real seats, whether in nature or by Divine intervention, he expressed ignorance of their precise nature but that the causes were real he had no doubt. He expressed these feelings in the Second edition of Principia and again in his Optics.

At the end of Optics he says, in regard to gravitational attraction, " How these attractions may be performed I do not here consider. What I call attraction may be performed by impulse, or by some other means unknown to me. I use the word here to signify only in a general any force by which bodies tend towards one another, whatsoever be the cause. " ( ibid, pg 337-338). space limits additional supporting quotations]

Wallace goes on to explain that the principle of inertia must have similar causes. ( ibid. 362 ). This view is upheld and explained in detail by James A. Weisheipl in Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages, in " Natural and Compulsory Movement ( pgs 25- 48 ) , where he discusses the possibility of the imposition of impetus by an external agent ( an efficient cause, either instrumental and secondary or via a Divine prime mover ) upon the nature of a moved body. This modification to the body’s nature thus maintains the impetus supplied by the agent cause, but naturally, as being from a modification of its nature. So once the impetus has modified the body’s nature, continuous motion at a constant velocity is maintained as a natural outflowing of the body’s nature. This natural activity would then be no different that any other natural activity of any other natural body, animate or inanimate.

Wallace goes on to explain that Newton, in Optics, expressed, at the end, the view that there was indeed some cause to inertal motion. " The vis inertiae is a passive principle by which bodies persist in their motion or rest, receive motion in proportion to the forces impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted. By this principle alone there never could be any motion in the world. Some other principle was necessary for putting the bodies into motion; and now they are in motion, some other principle is necessary for conserving the motion. " ( From a Realist Point of View, 1979, pgs 362-363). Wallace goes on to say, " A clearer statement could not be made about the necessity of an extrinsic mover, not only at the beginning of inertial motion, but also at every instant throughout the motion. The evidence is thus indisputable that Newton would not have rejected the fundamental principle, " whatever is moved is moved by another, " on the basis of the law he was first to enunciate. " ( ibid, pg 363 ). The unfortunate thing is that both cosmologists and scientists, sense then, have neglected Newtons’s convictions on these matters.

Don’t want to interfer more at this point - since I am supposed to be taking a break. But I thought this important. And in a month or so I may have more to say on this.

Linus2nd

 

[polytropos]

I agree, Linus. The position I am taking is that even if one could construe inertial motion as stasis, the first way would still have a starting point. But I don’t concede the hypothesis, that inertial motion is stasis. Someday I’ll take a look at Wallace’s work.

 

[inocente]

The first of course would be based on whether or not one thought the theory and the conclusion were reasonable. The second is based strictly on Faith.

So hang on. If GR can only be accepted on reason but the virgin birth can be accepted on faith, why the difference, why are you requiring tighter constraints for GR?

And why do you expect the First Way to be accepted on reason yet not hold it to the same standards as GR?

Only the second link is open.

Same page, they must have moved it. It’s still Princeton, still course Philosophy 203.

I tried to explain the second. Actually, the second covers all bases. The First Cause moves things that are moved either directly or through the instrumentaly of secondary causes which receive their causal power from the First Cause, who acts by will. Some secondary causes, man, act through both will and force. Some are actually in act in respect to the specific effect, i.e. fire causes wood to catch fire. But the fire of this efficient cause is due to other unspecified efficienty causes, which ultimately are traced back to the First Cause. And since all the seconday causes are themselves being moved from potentiality to actuality, only the existence of an Unmoved Mover, who is Pure act, and acts by Will, can end the series.

You seem to have invented your own argument, as Thomas says nothing of secondary causes acting through both will and force.

Rather than get off on a tangent by going through the Professors analysis step by step I would rather present the First Way as I see it. There are seven pages of it after all. I hope no one expects me to answer all the spurious objections made throughout history?

There are six objections covering one and a half pages, and they are part of a course at Princeton University. They are therefore probably the six most important objections throughout history.

Dismissing them out of hand as spurious appears to indicate you’re not interested in whether the First Way is any good as an argument and just want to take it on faith. Fine by me.

This may be all from me until the New Year.

Merry Unmoved-mover-mas. :christmastree1:

 

[inocente]

“Motion” and “to move” have the same root. If someone means “change” by “motion,” then it stands to reasons that he means “to change” by “to move.”

(A treatment given by Feser, who has removed “motion” so there is no need to get caught up in exegetical disputes.)

This could be most helpful if you can make two additions. The first are the technical definitions of what he means by actualization, actual, potency and substance (I think that would be enough). The second is an analysis by which the two formulations are compared, so as to show they are logically equivalent.

Still, “no one said it needs to be ‘fundamental.’” I’m not even sure how to translate that requirement into terms of anyone who has defended the argument.

The unmoved mover is out of a job if it isn’t in some sense the first piece on the board.

How might be enough, depending on how much one equivocates. Kepler’s laws explain “how” the planets move; any physicist worth his salt wouldn’t claim that they are sufficient explanations, or that it’s not the business of reasonable inquiry to ask why it is that they move in the way described by the laws. (It seems unnecessary to state that science would cease to progress if it stopped at any apparently descriptive theory and accepted it as complete.)

I’m saying it’s semantics: “to ask -]why it is/-] how it can be that they move in the way described by the laws”

I am not saying that the unmoved mover needs to explain to satisfy my pitiful Catholic philosophical biases. I’m just saying that no one is saying that it needs to add to the predictive power of Newtonian or Einsteinian motion. The argument is arguing for its existence; not to explain the behavior of baseballs that I throw in the air. Saying it doesn’t add to such explanations is true and trivial.

It still sounds as if you’re saying that the unmoved mover explains because otherwise the unmoved mover wouldn’t explain. I mean if your “pitiful Catholic philosophical biases” (a lovely turn of phrase) say there’s such a thing as an unmoved mover, yet the said unmoved mover explains only its own existence, then we can delete it forthwith and all that is damaged are your Catholic philosophical biases.

*I understand that acceleration is the second derivative of position and the first derivative of velocity. It doesn’t follow that I need to reject anything that is a rate of change of something else; it’s hard to express how plainly such a commitment just doesn’t follow. *

I’m not appealing to equations. I’m appealing to the physical interpretation of Newton’s law: “When viewed in an inertial reference frame, an object either is at rest or moves at a constant velocity, unless acted upon by an external force.” If we construe states of constant velocity as non-change (which I’ll concede for the sake of argument), then there is no issue with construing changes from one velocity to another (ie. accelerations which must have external causes) as changes. Sure, velocity is a derivative and acceleration is a derivative of a derivative. But considering acceleration as "velocity of velocity" in more than a seriously attenuated and analogical sense is just further than the physical interpretation could ever take you.

What’s with the bit I highlighted? Wha’cha talking about?

What I mean is that if, indeed, the argument is about all types of change, then it is about every type of change which can be described by a first derivative, or second derivative, or third derivative, etc. All such changes must be included or the argument is not about all types of change.

Yet you are trying, for the sake of argument, to discount the first derivative of position with respect to time where it is constant. No others, just that one. I am saying no can do, it’s arbitrary. I am invoking the first derivative of the Three Musketeers Injunction - one out, all out.

 

[inocente]

And even if one could reduce temperature to to changes in average kinetic motion, there would still be changes in velocity.

Que? You began this with “Why would the fixed, static temperature need to be absolute zero? It could just be some temperature x[sub]0[/sub], which increases to x[sub]1[/sub]. Certainly at any non-absolute zero there is molecular motion occurring, but there is still a change in temperature from one state to another.”

So you just answered your own question - there would be kinetic motion so as I said we cannot claim it was not in motion, which is where we came in (post #130).

 

[inocente]

Even Newton himself felt that motion had a cause. His laws were intended to be used as predictive tools. They were never intended to explain reality as it actually exists.

You are getting completely the wrong ideas from somewhere. Newton was interested in truth, and that requires that ideas can be tested against observation.

For example, Newton proved that white light, which at the time was thought to be pure, was actually made up of light of different colors, and so is the opposite of what had previously been argued.

To do that he need to make a prediction which could be tested (in what is one of the most beautiful and elegant experiments ever). But his aim was not to make a tool, it was to explain reality as it actually exists.

He had a major argument with Descartes about how to explain reality as it actually exists - an argument which he won. See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Scholium#Scientific_method_argument

 

[Linusthe2nd]

You are getting completely the wrong ideas from somewhere. Newton was interested in truth, and that requires that ideas can be tested against observation.

For example, Newton proved that white light, which at the time was thought to be pure, was actually made up of light of different colors, and so is the opposite of what had previously been argued.

To do that he need to make a prediction which could be tested (in what is one of the most beautiful and elegant experiments ever). But his aim was not to make a tool, it was to explain reality as it actually exists.

He had a major argument with Descartes about how to explain reality as it actually exists - an argument which he won. See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Scholium#Scientific_method_argument

On vacation until after end of year. But a short response. You were the one ( but not the only one ) who said Newton’s Laws disproved the First Way of Thomas. Both Weisheipl and Wallace have shown that this is not true and that Newton himself was convinced that all local motion described by his Laws had real causes, natural or Divine. But this last point was overlooked immediately by those who studied his Laws, and overlooked again by those who followed later. Thus the myth that the motions he described mathematically had no causes.

Happy Thanksgiving, a Blessed Christmas, and a Prosperous New Year.

Linus2nd

 

[polytropos]

This could be most helpful if you can make two additions. The first are the technical definitions of what he means by actualization, actual, potency and substance (I think that would be enough). The second is an analysis by which the two formulations are compared, so as to show they are logically equivalent.

I’ll provide some definitions over the next few days, when I have a spare moment.

I don’t think it’s necessary to show that the two formulations are logically equivalent. IMO someone who is familiar with Aquinas’s metaphysics should find each of Feser’s steps in Aquinas’s text. But whether they match up precisely shouldn’t matter, since finding some departure obviously would refute neither Feser nor Aquinas.

The unmoved mover is out of a job if it isn’t in some sense the first piece on the board.

I’m not sure what you mean. You were saying that changes in velocity are not fundamental because they are caused by other bodies. But the argument is not that all changes are proximately caused by the unmoved mover, just that they are ultimately caused by the unmoved mover.

I’m saying it’s semantics: “to ask -]why it is/-] how it can be that they move in the way described by the laws”

I’m not sure what you’re saying here, so bear with me if I’m getting you wrong. Are you saying that asking why and how are practically the same thing? If I ask you how the planets move, I could describe the way in which they move with reference to Kepler’s laws. To answer why I would have to refer to gravity, in that gravity causes the planets to move in the way they do (cause being used in a loose sense, ie. gravity constitutes an explanation for their moving one way rather than another). But a similar question can be asked with respect to gravity: there is a how and a why, which are not the same.

It still sounds as if you’re saying that the unmoved mover explains because otherwise the unmoved mover wouldn’t explain. I mean if your “pitiful Catholic philosophical biases” (a lovely turn of phrase) say there’s such a thing as an unmoved mover, yet the said unmoved mover explains only its own existence, then we can delete it forthwith and all that is damaged are your Catholic philosophical biases.

I mean that the intention of the argument isn’t to add to the mathematical predictive power of Newtonian mechanics. If the argument is successful, then of course motion (Aquinas’s sense) in the universe is reliant on the existence of an unmoved mover, so the unmoved mover explains motion in the universe, and without the unmoved mover we would have a less complete explanation of motion. But its explanatory power does not need to be reflected in some modification of Newton’s or Einstein’s theories or calculations.

It has nothing to do with the unmoved mover explaining because it otherwise wouldn’t explain, and Linus and I are just desperate to find it an explanatory position. If the argument is successful, then it exists and is relevant to anyone who wants to know more about the universe.

What’s with the bit I highlighted? Wha’cha talking about?

What I mean is that if, indeed, the argument is about all types of change, then it is about every type of change which can be described by a first derivative, or second derivative, or third derivative, etc. All such changes must be included or the argument is not about all types of change.

Yet you are trying, for the sake of argument, to discount the first derivative of position with respect to time where it is constant. No others, just that one. I am saying no can do, it’s arbitrary. I am invoking the first derivative of the Three Musketeers Injunction - one out, all out.

I think you’re being inconsistent here. First of all, the claim that one must take every derivative of something else to be an instance of change is absurdly strong. There is no equation that can’t be represented as a derivative of something else, since I can simply integrate and differentiate any given equation. The requirement is trivial. Suppose that the quantity of water in my glass is not changing; it is constant, so I can represent it with, say, f(x) = C. I can still say that f is the first derivative of Int(f); but of course without some physical account of what’s actually going on in the bottle, it’s absurd to call it change simply because it is represented by a first derivative. Second, I am not committed to defining all of my terms as mathematical abstractions, and the previous considerations seem to show that the requirement is nonsensical.

So I see no issue with taking Newton’s law on its physical interpretation, in which acceleration requires an external force.

Que? You began this with “Why would the fixed, static temperature need to be absolute zero? It could just be some temperature x[sub]0[/sub], which increases to x[sub]1[/sub]. Certainly at any non-absolute zero there is molecular motion occurring, but there is still a change in temperature from one state to another.”

So you just answered your own question - there would be kinetic motion so as I said we cannot claim it was not in motion, which is where we came in (post #130).

Well, the position I am arguing is that linear motion is non-change but changes in velocity are change. So changes in average kinetic motion are change. It doesn’t matter if the starting temperature is absolute zero. It just needs to be different from the initial temperature for a change to have occurred.

There are, of course, things going on in an object of static temperature, since the molecules are still moving and interacting and changing in velocity themselves. So there is some latent change. But the change in temperature is still of a different sort.

 

[inocente]

On vacation until after end of year. But a short response. You were the one ( but not the only one ) who said Newton’s Laws disproved the First Way of Thomas. Both Weisheipl and Wallace have shown that this is not true and that Newton himself was convinced that all local motion described by his Laws had real causes, natural or Divine. But this last point was overlooked immediately by those who studied his Laws, and overlooked again by those who followed later. Thus the myth that the motions he described mathematically had no causes.

I can’t make head nor tail of that.

Incidentally, I had a look at the Wallace course. To me his attempt to mix Aristotle’s way of looking at things with the modern way does no justice to either and makes for a very confused mess. Certainly not to be recommended.

Happy Thanksgiving, a Blessed Christmas, and a Prosperous New Year.

Y tu.

 

[inocente]

I’ll provide some definitions over the next few days, when I have a spare moment.

OK thanks, it will help others (see end of this post).

I don’t think it’s necessary to show that the two formulations are logically equivalent. IMO someone who is familiar with Aquinas’s metaphysics should find each of Feser’s steps in Aquinas’s text. But whether they match up precisely shouldn’t matter, since finding some departure obviously would refute neither Feser nor Aquinas.

Yes but the thread is about Thomas’ argument, not Feser’s.

I’m not sure what you mean. You were saying that changes in velocity are not fundamental because they are caused by other bodies. But the argument is not that all changes are proximately caused by the unmoved mover, just that they are ultimately caused by the unmoved mover.

Before there were many bodies the motion caused by other bodies was not present and the u.m. didn’t have a job.

I’m not sure what you’re saying here, so bear with me if I’m getting you wrong. Are you saying that asking why and how are practically the same thing? If I ask you how the planets move, I could describe the way in which they move with reference to Kepler’s laws. To answer why I would have to refer to gravity, in that gravity causes the planets to move in the way they do (cause being used in a loose sense, ie. gravity constitutes an explanation for their moving one way rather than another). But a similar question can be asked with respect to gravity: there is a how and a why, which are not the same.

No, I’m saying why and how can it be are the same thing. I mean sure Newton explains what Kepler describes, but in turn Newton only describes gravity, which Einstein then explains. But to go back to the original point, the first way neither describes nor explains anything other than itself.

*I mean that the intention of the argument isn’t to add to the mathematical predictive power of Newtonian mechanics. If the argument is successful, then of course motion (Aquinas’s sense) in the universe is reliant on the existence of an unmoved mover, so the unmoved mover explains motion in the universe, and without the unmoved mover we would have a less complete explanation of motion. But its explanatory power does not need to be reflected in some modification of Newton’s or Einstein’s theories or calculations.

It has nothing to do with the unmoved mover explaining because it otherwise wouldn’t explain, and Linus and I are just desperate to find it an explanatory position. If the argument is successful, then it exists and is relevant to anyone who wants to know more about the universe.*

It tells us nothing about the universe. If it did it would form part of explanations rather than being just a historical curiosity.

I think you’re being inconsistent here. First of all, the claim that one must take every derivative of something else to be an instance of change is absurdly strong. There is no equation that can’t be represented as a derivative of something else, since I can simply integrate and differentiate any given equation. The requirement is trivial. Suppose that the quantity of water in my glass is not changing; it is constant, so I can represent it with, say, f(x) = C. I can still say that f is the first derivative of Int(f); but of course without some physical account of what’s actually going on in the bottle, it’s absurd to call it change simply because it is represented by a first derivative. Second, I am not committed to defining all of my terms as mathematical abstractions, and the previous considerations seem to show that the requirement is nonsensical.

All I’m saying is first, list every possible type of change. Go on for as many pages as you wish. The first way should apply to all of them. Yet somewhere on the list there is “change of position” and you’ve added the rider “except where constant”. And the only reason you have for making that exception is because the first way fails unless you do!

*Well, the position I am arguing is that linear motion is non-change but changes in velocity are change. So changes in average kinetic motion are change. It doesn’t matter if the starting temperature is absolute zero. It just needs to be different from the initial temperature for a change to have occurred.

There are, of course, things going on in an object of static temperature, since the molecules are still moving and interacting and changing in velocity themselves. So there is some latent change. But the change in temperature is still of a different sort.*

But the molecules are jiggling back and forth all the time, so at every moment there is change in their motion!!! But hey presto it’s another type of change which is not the right type. Any change which disproves the first way gets ruled out as not being a real change! What a way to run a philosophy dept!

What with this and with Linus arguing that his feelings about the world are more real than the world, I think it’s time for me to unsubscribe. I’ll leave it a few days just in case, but it’s been a gas, thanks for the discussion.

In summary, the first way has more holes than a large fishing net.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

On vacation but not absent. The " holes " are in the heads of those who refuse to accept the reasonableness of the First Way or who expect it to prove or demonstrate the laws of physics. It is meant to lead us to God by examining the undrlying metaphysical reality of existing things. I.E. the underying reality of all physical things is composed of matter and form ( a nature ) requiring a " movement " from inherent potencies to the actuality of these potencies, in a new or modified form or nature, through the effecient causality of an efficient cause which has the power to actualize the latent potencies of a substance. This leads us eventually to God as the First Cause of all this. It is not a scientific demonstration but a metaphysical one.



Bye for now.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Lesson 4, Thomas’ Commentary on Physics

It has bee awhile since I last posted here. My purpose is to demonstrate that the First Way, even though it is not restricted to local motion ( as I have explained earlier ), certainly can demonstrate the existence of God through local motioin ( movement from place to place). But first it is necessary to understand the elements of the First Way. And since it begins by appealing to the general observation that it is a common experience to all that " some things are in motion." In fact, we know today that all things are in motion. Yet they are also the same or static in some important respects. And since the things which all agree ( in Aristotle’s and Thomas’ days ) are in motion are material beings, it would be good to take a look at Thomas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, and go from there. It begins as follows:

" .BOOK I
THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL THINGS
LECTURE 1 (184 a 9-b 14)
THE MATTER AND THE SUBJECT OF NATURAL SCIENCE AND OF THIS BOOK. WE MUST PROCEED FROM THE MORE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE BETTER KNOWN TO US

1. Because this book, The Physics, upon which we intend to comment here, is the first book of natural science, it is necessary in the beginning to decide what is the matter and the subject of natural science.

Since every science is in the intellect, it should be understood that something is rendered intelligible in act insofar as it is in some way abstracted from matter. And inasmuch as things are differently related to matter they pertain to different sciences.

Furthermore, since every science is established through demonstration, and since the definition is the middle term in a demonstration, it is necessary that sciences be distinguished according to the diverse modes of definition.

1. It must be understood, therefore, that there are some things whose existence depends upon matter, and which cannot be defined without matter. Further there are other things which, even though they cannot exist except in sensible matter, have no sensible matter in their definitions. And these differ from each other as the curved differs from the snub. For the snub exists in sensible matter, and it is necessary that sensible matter fall in its definition, for the snub is a curved nose. And the same is true of all natural things, such as man and stone. But sensible matter does not fall in the definition of the curved, even though the curved cannot exist except in sensible matter. And this is true of all the mathematicals, such as numbers, magnitudes and figures. Then, there are still other things which do not depend upon matter either according to their existence or according to their definitions. And this is either because they never exist in matter, such as God and the other separated substances, or because they do not universally exist in matter, such as substance, potency and act, and being itself.
2. Now metaphysics deals with things of this latter sort. Whereas mathematics deals with those things which depend upon sensible matter for their existence but not for their definitions. And natural science, which is called physics, deals with those things which depend upon matter not only for their existence, but also for their definition.

And because everything which has matter is mobile, it follows that mobile being is the subject of natural philosophy. For natural philosophy is about natural things, and natural things are those whose principle is nature. But nature is a principle of motion and rest in that in which it is. Therefore natural science deals with those things which have in them a principle of motion.

1. Furthermore those things which are consequent upon something common must be treated first and separately. Otherwise it becomes necessary to repeat such things many times while discussing each instance of that which is common. Therefore it was necessary that one book in natural science be set forth in which those things which are consequent upon mobile being in common are treated; just as first philosophy, in which those things which are common to being insofar as it is being, is set forth for all the sciences.

This, then, is the book, The Physics, which is also called On Physics, or Of the Natural to be Heard, because it was handed down to hearers by way of instruction. And its subject is mobile being simply.

I do not, however, say mobile body, because the fact that every mobile being is a body is proven in this book, and no science proves its own subject. And thus in the very beginning of the De Caelo, which follows this book, we begin with the notion of body.

Moreover, after The Physics there are other books of natural science in which the species of motion are treated. Thus in the De Caelo we treat the mobile according to local motion, which is the first species of motion. In the De Generatione, we treat of motion to form and of the first mobile things, i.e., the elements, with respect to the common aspects of their changes. Their special changes are considered in the book Meteororum. In the book, De Mineralibus, we consider the mobile mixed bodies which are non-living. Living bodies are considered in the book, De Anima and the books which follow it. "

I won’t post again for a week or so. In the mean time you may wish to take a look at the commentary. dhspriory.org/thomas/english/Physics1.htm .

Joseph Kenney O.P. has written a summary here : dhspriory.org/thomas/english/defaultNat.htm . I do not recommend reading Aristotle himself, since he is very, very difficult to read.

Those who are interested may review the following posts: 1,13, 16, 17, 18, 24, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57 ,62, 122, 133, 139, 157 ,158, 160. 163.

Linus2nd