The Soul and the Brain

[itinerant1]

Actually, the cerebral underpinnings of mathematics are being closely zeroed in on; (pun intended) see the recent issue of DISCOVER magazine. Not only do infants and even some apes seem to have an innate sense of number and the ability to learn number symbols, but 2 brain regions have been identified via MRI as being involved in these operations (at the front and the top of the cerebral cortex; sorry, haven’t committed the names to my mind).

No doubt the cerebral activity in mental arithmetic is now or will soon be studied in the same manner. As to making mistakes, well, that will probably take longer. It will be hard to experimentally control the making of mathematical errors

ICXC NIKA.

I think you are making some logical leaps here. Post # 236 explains matters clearly.

In regard to what you call “the innate sense of number”, I find that to be a rather vague expression. What precisely is a “sense of number” and what about it makes it supposedly innate? This needs to be articulated.

What is the ability to “learn number symbols?” Humans create language, which is symbol manipulation. We attach meanings to symbols. Apes can learn to visually recognize the symbol “2” and be taught to associate that symbol with two things. However, this associative learning which takes place on the perceptual level, and which I will call here perceptual thinking, is radically different than conceptual thinking.

Conceptual thinking involves the abstract notion of “twoness”, which is the meaning we attach to the symbol “2”. No non-human animal possess this conceptual ability and awareness, either innately or in a rudimentary way. Hence, your statement does not show any recognition of the radical difference between human and non-human thinking. In fact, they appear conflated in your post.

Brain regions may be involved as a necessary condition for conceptual thinking, but the brain and its functions do not constitute a sufficient condition. Another one of your logical leaps is to conflate necessary and sufficient conditions. This does not make for good science.

 

[Geremia]

I am curious about the Catholic Church’s position on the relation of the brain and the soul. There have been many different views on this, by Catholics and scientists, throughout history, ranging from that there is no soul, just the brain, to the brain is essentially irrelevant and all psychological functions are based in the soul. What view does the Church espouse regarding this topic, and/or what is your personal opinion on it?

Firstly, the human soul—which is one in number—is equivalent to the “mind” or intellect. It is the form of the body, so it is present everywhere whole and entire in the whole and each part of the body. Numbers XVII. to XIX. of the 25 Thomistic Theses, a set of instructions which Pope St. Pius X promulgated for all seminarians and Catholic theologians and philosophers, say:

XVII. From the human soul there emanate by natural result the faculties of this twofold order, organic and inorganic: the prior ones, to which the senses pertain, are subjected in the composite, the posterior ones (are such) in the soul alone. Therefore, the faculty of the intellect is intrinsically independent from an organ.
XVIII. Intellectuality necessarily follows immateriality, and thus, indeed, that that grades of intellectuality are also according to the grades of elongation from matter. The adequate object of intellection is commonly being itself [communiter ipsum ens]; but in the present state of union (of body/soul) the proper (object) of the human intellect is contained in the quiddities abstracted from material conditions.
XIX. We accept cognition from sensible things. But since a sensible (thing) is not intelligible in act, besides the intellect, formally understanding, there must be admitted an active power in the soul, which abstracts intelligible species from phantasms.

The first thesis above says that the intellect is not in the brain. The brain, like the five physical senses, is a sense organ—internal sense. Sense organs provide the intellect—the soul or “mind”—with knowledge from which it can reason to universals, a distinctly human trait. Since all knowledge originates from the senses*, as the third thesis here says, reasoning to universals begins with matter. The intellect ends in “elongation from matter,” whose proper object “is contained in the quiddities [essences] abstracted from material conditions.” Also, “phantasms” are one of the “internal senses.”

I suggest reading the other Thomistic Theses for more context. I know it is somewhat dense, so try reading the St. Thomas Aquinas, too. It is fascinating. The intellect—the soul—is one of a human’s greatest gifts from God.

• Thus the necessity of the Sacraments, the physical signs of an invisible reality

Read this and this for more information.

 

[itinerant1]

Firstly, the human soul—which is one in number—is equivalent to the “mind” or intellect.

The intellect is not equivalent or synonymous with soul. Intellect, rather, is a power of the human soul.

 

[Geremia]

The intellect is not equivalent or synonymous with soul. Intellect, rather, is a power of the human soul.

I think you are right. Apparently in God only is this true, where “the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul.” Because “the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body” and the body can have only one form, how is it not synonymous with the soul? Maybe I am confusing some terms that in the Latin original would be clearer.

 

[itinerant1]

I think you are right. Apparently in God only is this true, where “the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul.” Because “the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body” and the body can have only one form, how is it not synonymous with the soul? Maybe I am confusing some terms that in the Latin original would be clearer.

It’s good to see someone interested like this. The Latin is clearer, but you are on the right course. The intellectual soul is the form of the human body. Perhaps viewing soul in the hierarchial classification may help. Plants possess vegetative souls, which have the powers of reproduction and growth. Animals possess sensitive souls which have the vegetative powers, and in addition have the powers associated with sense knowledge, sense perception, memory, estimation; plus the power of locomotion. Man has an intellectual or rational soul which has all the powers of the lower forms or souls: the vegetative powers and sensitive powers. In addition, the intellectual soul posseses the power of reason and will.

 

[Geremia]

I should have been clearer when I wrote

Apparently in God only is this true, where “the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul.”

I meant to say

Apparently in God only is this true [that the essence is the intellect], unlike in man where “the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul.”

It’s good to see someone interested like this. The Latin is clearer, but you are on the right course.

In Iª q. 79 a. 1 co., Aquinas uses intellectus: “intellectus sit aliqua potentia animae.” Again, in Iª q. 76 a. 1 co. he uses intellectus: “intellectus, qui est intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma.” Later on he basically says that the intellect (intellectus) and intellectual soul (anima intellectiva) are synonymous: “Hoc ergo principium quo primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus sive anima intellectiva, est forma corporis..” Nowhere does he use animus, which I thought meant “intellectual soul.”

The intellectual soul is the form of the human body. Perhaps viewing soul in the hierarchial classification may help. Plants possess vegetative souls, which have the powers of reproduction and growth. Animals possess sensitive souls which have the vegetative powers, and in addition have the powers associated with sense knowledge, sense perception, memory, estimation; plus the power of locomotion. Man has an intellectual or rational soul which has all the powers of the lower forms or souls: the vegetative powers and sensitive powers. In addition, the intellectual soul posseses the power of reason and will.

Yes, thank you. This helps. You basically rephrase St. Thomas’s relatively long corpus in Iª q. 79 a. 1.

 

[itinerant1]

I should have been clearer when I wrote I meant to sayIn Iª q. 79 a. 1 co., Aquinas uses intellectus: “intellectus sit aliqua potentia animae.” Again, in Iª q. 76 a. 1 co. he uses intellectus: “intellectus, qui est intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma.” Later on he basically says that the intellect (intellectus) and intellectual soul (anima intellectiva) are synonymous: “Hoc ergo principium quo primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus sive anima intellectiva, est forma corporis..” Nowhere does he use animus, which I thought meant "intellectual soul."Yes, thank you. This helps. You basically rephrase St. Thomas’s relatively long corpus in Iª q. 79 a. 1.

I’m usually concerned about my own paraphrases or re-statements of Aquinas’ thought because his language is so precise. It’s too easy to make an unintended error when explaining Thomistic ideas. I am always learning something more about Thomistic philosophy every day.

 

[NowAgnostic]

Locating areas of cortical specialisation still does not tell us how consciousness (including processes such as carrying out mathematical procedures) occurs.

Not to every detail, because the technology is too crude as yet. Yet we do know these processes are associated with increased neuronal activity (for math mostly areas in the parietal lobe).

For example, neuroscientists can confidently state that visual processes are associated with activity in the visual cortex (hence its name!). However, they are unable to explain how the conscious experience of ‘seeing’ colour, shape, movement, and distance occurs.

Yes we can. We can say that photons are incident on the retina, we can show how that produces a signal in the optic nerve, how that goes up the brainstem and into the thalamus and into the visual cortex, and then what areas of the brain are associated with perception of these things (shape, movement, etc.)

This does explain HOW the conscious experience occurs. We can’t explain WHY activity in these areas are correlated with the conscious experience.

In addition, all we are doing when looking at fMRI scans and the like is seeing areas of relatively increased activity. This does not mean that this is where the function takes place.

Yes it does, if the experiment is properly designed.

We can only say that there appears to be an association between an increase in glucose use in that area and the function we are interested in.

That is not what is measured by fMRI. There appears to be an association between increased neuronal activity and the function of interest.

The real test is deliberate destruction of particular areas, and even then we can only say that area is involved, as other areas of the brain can and sometimes do take over the function of that region.

Well you just admitted that region has a function! Moreover, there are plenty of lesion and stroke studies to give you the evidence you want.

Neuroscience is a fascinating area.

It is, and it completely refutes the old Thomist idea of the operation of the intellect. Surely we should not need the physical brain anymore once the mind has “abstracted” the concept of 2 and the concept of addition to do 2 + 2 = 4. Yet we do.

 

[itinerant1]

It is, and it completely refutes the old Thomist idea of the operation of the intellect. Surely we should not need the physical brain anymore once the mind has “abstracted” the concept of 2 and the concept of addition to do 2 + 2 = 4. Yet we do.

That’s a fairly audacious claim by one who does not exhibit any understanding of either hylomorphism or the process of abstraction.

 

[NowAgnostic]

I think you are making some logical leaps here. Post # 236 explains matters clearly.

Well I’m not the one you responded to, but anyway.

Post #236 explains nothing, it’s just someone ducking and weaving in an attempt to deny what the evidence clearly shows. The old Thomist idea of the “immaterial intellect” which only needs the body for sense information is dead in scientific circles, regardless of the status of the mind-brain problem, and has the same credence as a 6,000 year old universe. It’s absolutely clear that higher-order mental functions (performed after the mind has done its alleged function of “abstraction”) are correlated with brain activity.

In regard to what you call “the innate sense of number”, I find that to be a rather vague expression. What precisely is a “sense of number” and what about it makes it supposedly innate? This needs to be articulated.

Yes, there’s a been a lot of work in this area by Stanislas Dehaene and others. He’s found single neurons tuned to log-gaussian functions. He (and others) have shown activation in the intraparietal sulcus to be used for approximate math problems (using an “internal number line”). Even infants and animals have a basic sense of number. Animals can do some simple operations without training.

I recommend Dehaene’s “The Number Sense” or www.unicog.org/publications/Dehaene_PrecisNumberSense.pdf for a synopsis (not that short).

I heard Dehaene speak last summer. He is truly a first-rate scientist.

What is the ability to “learn number symbols?” Humans create language, which is symbol manipulation. We attach meanings to symbols. Apes can learn to visually recognize the symbol “2” and be taught to associate that symbol with two things.

Humans have to be taught what that symbol means also.

However, this associative learning which takes place on the perceptual level, and which I will call here perceptual thinking, is radically different than conceptual thinking. Conceptual thinking involves the abstract notion of “twoness”, which is the meaning we attach to the symbol “2”.

And what precisely is the abstract notion of “twoness”? Can you define it in a non-circular way?

No non-human animal possess this conceptual ability and awareness, either innately or in a rudimentary way.

This is just argument by assertion. Where’s the evidence or proof? How can an ape associate the symbol “2” with two things if it doesn’t have some rudimentary concept about what two is. How does a dog recognize a human, or another dog? A dog has no concept of “humanness” or “dogness”? If a dog cannot “abstract” how does it recognize other humans as such?

Hence, your statement does not show any recognition of the radical difference between human and non-human thinking. In fact, they appear conflated in your post.

There may not in fact be such a radical difference between human and non-human thinking, insofar as the cognitive tasks animals are able to perform are concerned. You have in fact provided nothing except argument by assertion. But how is it relevant anyway to the claim that arithmetic processing occurs in human brains?

Brain regions may be involved as a necessary condition for conceptual thinking…

A notion completely opposed to the Thomistic idea.

…but the brain and its functions do not constitute a sufficient condition. Another one of your logical leaps is to conflate necessary and sufficient conditions. This does not make for good science.

No, you’re the one making a logical leap. It would be OK if you said the fact that brain regions are involved as a necessary condition does not necessarily imply their involvement as a sufficient condition. But you are just stating flat out that they are not a sufficient condition. And the science refutes you. If the brain activity was not a sufficient condition, then we should see instances of brain activity without the corresponding mental activity. But we don’t.

 

[NowAgnostic]

That’s a fairly audacious claim by one who does not exhibit any understanding of either hylomorphism or the process of abstraction.

Uh-huh. If you don’t agree with Thomism it’s because you don’t understand it, and we have all the answers. Who are these audacious scientists to be questioning US? Evidence? We don’t need no stinkin’ evidence! We’re Thomists! Everything must be fit upon our Procrustean bed, because we are right.

(Now we all know of course that if the neuroscientific data had turned up the opposite, of no neuronal correlates with mental calculation, then the Thomists would be all joyous saying how their idea of the intellect was confirmed by modern science, and how vindicated ancient wisdom was against modern pretenders.)

 

[itinerant1]

It’s absolutely clear that higher-order mental functions (performed after the mind has done its alleged function of “abstraction”) are correlated with brain activity.

That’s what a Thomist would assert, as well. And it was asserted long before modern brain studies. Time to catch up with the past.

This is just argument by assertion. Where’s the evidence or proof? How can an ape associate the symbol “2” with two things if it doesn’t have some rudimentary concept about what two is. How does a dog recognize a human, or another dog? A dog has no concept of “humanness” or “dogness”? If a dog cannot “abstract” how does it recognize other humans as such?

Perceptual thinking is sufficient to explain all of the obeserved behaviors of apes and dogs. To invoke conceptual thinking as explanatory is to violate Lloyd Morgan’s canon. Occam’s razor would cut you as well.

If the brain activity was not a sufficient condition, then we should see instances of brain activity without the corresponding mental activity. But we don’t.

The assumption here is just that, an assumption with no basis. That is, the brain activity observed is not the conceptual thinking itself. That brain activity occurs with perceptual and conceptual activity merely indicates a correlation and interaction between mind and brain. Something can be a necessary condition and occurr in every instance of the event in question without it constituting a sufficient condition as well. Hence, you conflate necessary and sufficient conditions. It’s just not good science, no matter how many scientists you find that are willing to commit that same logical fallacy.

 

[Fran65]

Something can be a necessary condition and occurr in every instance of the event in question without it constituting a sufficient condition as well. Hence, you conflate necessary and sufficient conditions. It’s just not good science, no matter how many scientists you find that are willing to commit that same logical fallacy.

Well said.

 

[NowAgnostic]

That’s what a Thomist would assert, as well. And it was asserted long before modern brain studies. Time to catch up with the past.

How does this mesh with the idea that the intellect is a power intrinsically independent of any bodily organ.

Perceptual thinking is sufficient to explain all of the obeserved behaviors of apes and dogs. To invoke conceptual thinking as explanatory is to violate Lloyd Morgan’s canon. Occam’s razor would cut you as well.

So it’s an inductive inference, OK. How is conceptual thinking then necessary to explain the observed behaviors of humans? What is that humans do that animals don’t that makes it necessary? Dehaene claims animals have internal representations of number. Would that qualify as conceptual thinking, or are you going to say Dehaene is wrong.

The assumption here is just that, an assumption with no basis. That is, the brain activity observed is not the conceptual thinking itself.

Did I say it was? A red herring.

That brain activity occurs with perceptual and conceptual activity merely indicates a correlation and interaction between mind and brain.

Yes that’s all I’m saying.

Something can be a necessary condition and occurr in every instance of the event in question without it constituting a sufficient condition as well. Hence, you conflate necessary and sufficient conditions.

No, I don’t. Merely repeating the same claim in the face of its rebuttal does not strengthen your argument in the slightest. Neuroscience claims, via evidence, that brain activity is both a necessary and sufficient condition for mental activity.

If A is a necessary condition for B, then A is present every time B is. It doesn’t mean B is present every time A is. But if A is a sufficient condition for B, then B is present every time A is.

Now, the evidence from neuroscience is that brain activity is present when mental activity is, and that mental activity is present when brain activity is. If brain activity were only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition, for mental activity then we should see instances of brain activity without corresponding mental activity. But we don’t, and thus we conclude brain activity is both necessary and sufficient.

It’s just not good science, no matter how many scientists you find that are willing to commit that same logical fallacy.

Yes it is good science, and there’s no fallacy. It’s what the evidence shows.

 

[itinerant1]

How does this mesh with the idea that the intellect is a power intrinsically independent of any bodily organ.

The intellect is not an act of a bodily organ but it’s relation to the phantasm produced by the sensus communis, or lets just say the brain generically, is that it uses the phantasm. The intellect abstracts from the particular notes of the phantasm and forms the concept with universal designation of the particular thing perceived or imagined. Thus we understand the particular tree perceived with the senses by the universal “treeness”.

So it’s an inductive inference, OK. How is conceptual thinking then necessary to explain the observed behaviors of humans? What is that humans do that animals don’t that makes it necessary? Dehaene claims animals have internal representations of number. Would that qualify as conceptual thinking, or are you going to say Dehaene is wrong.

Animal perceptual thinking is limited to the particulars perceived by their senses. They do not “understand” what is universal in the particular thing perceived. Higher animals are capable of perceptual generalizations, which is different than understanding the essence of things, what a thing is essentially. Any internal representation of number by an animal is limited to particular representation. Animals cannot form the universal concept of “twoness” and so on. I have never seen any evidence for this.

A close look at all animal cognitive and language studies shows that their behavior can be sufficiently explained by perceptual thinking. There is no justification for resorting to higher order cognitive abilities of abstract, universal concept formation as an explanation.

No, I don’t. Merely repeating the same claim in the face of its rebuttal does not strengthen your argument in the slightest. Neuroscience claims, via evidence, that brain activity is both a necessary and sufficient condition for mental activity.

If A is a necessary condition for B, then A is present every time B is. It doesn’t mean B is present every time A is. But if A is a sufficient condition for B, then B is present every time A is.

Now, the evidence from neuroscience is that brain activity is present when mental activity is, and that mental activity is present when brain activity is. If brain activity were only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition, for mental activity then we should see instances of brain activity without corresponding mental activity. But we don’t, and thus we conclude brain activity is both necessary and sufficient.

Since the intellect uses the brain, its percepts and phantasms, you should have brain activity whenever you have mental activity. So, “brain activity” is incapable of resolving any disputed questions regarding the nature of intellect and abstract concepts. We never think conceptually without reverting to the phantasm. Hence, I would be surprised if we should have specifically human thinking without brain activity.

 

[severntofall]

The assumption here is just that, an assumption with no basis. That is, the brain activity observed is not the conceptual thinking itself. That brain activity occurs with perceptual and conceptual activity merely indicates a correlation and interaction between mind and brain. Something can be a necessary condition and occurr in every instance of the event in question without it constituting a sufficient condition as well. Hence, you conflate necessary and sufficient conditions. It’s just not good science, no matter how many scientists you find that are willing to commit that same logical fallacy.

So when did inserting an unobserved and unnecessary explaination become good science? Fact is, via physical alterations to the brain one can reduce or remove all intellect from the individual and drugs can predictably alter a persons personality (for good or bad). Introducing a concept such as the soul to explain phenomena which has essentially been conclusively explained via scientific observation and experimentation is silly.

 

[itinerant1]

So when did inserting an unobserved and unnecessary explaination become good science? Fact is, via physical alterations to the brain one can reduce or remove all intellect from the individual and drugs can predictably alter a persons personality (for good or bad). Introducing a concept such as the soul to explain phenomena which has essentially been conclusively explained via scientific observation and experimentation is silly.

Obviously you don’t understand the arguments here. Try to understand a position first before you belch up a post not worth anyone’s time responding to.

 

[GEddie]

If brain activity were only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition, for mental activity then we should see instances of brain activity without corresponding mental activity. But we don’t, and thus we conclude brain activity is both necessary and sufficient.

There can indeed be brain activity without mental activity. The brain does not go dormant when the the mind is in abeyance; i.e., in an unconscious state.

 

[severntofall]

Obviously you don’t understand the arguments here. Try to understand a position first before you belch up a post not worth anyone’s time responding to.

You were attempting to argue that “the mind” exists indepedant of the brain…it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out what you would (and did) offer as an explaination for this “mysterious” mental activity. Of course your claim that the mind operates indepedant of the brain is an assertion as previously suggested, and to my knowledge is completely unsupported by evidence.

The evidence that we do have is inexcapable, brain activity and mental activity are in fact the same. Eliminate the particular brain activity and you eliminate the mental activity.

 

[NowAgnostic]

The intellect is not an act of a bodily organ but it’s relation to the phantasm produced by the sensus communis, or lets just say the brain generically, is that it uses the phantasm. The intellect abstracts from the particular notes of the phantasm and forms the concept with universal designation of the particular thing perceived or imagined. Thus we understand the particular tree perceived with the senses by the universal “treeness”.

This means, there should be no brain activity associated with abstraction from the phantasm, nor with any intellectual activity after that point. The function of the brain is solely to produce the phantasm. Correct? Because the intellect proper is not the act of a bodily organ.

And yet, this is what neuroscience refutes. Aquinas was wrong.

Animal perceptual thinking is limited to the particulars perceived by their senses. They do not “understand” what is universal in the particular thing perceived. Higher animals are capable of perceptual generalizations, which is different than understanding the essence of things, what a thing is essentially. Any internal representation of number by an animal is limited to particular representation. Animals cannot form the universal concept of “twoness” and so on. I have never seen any evidence for this.

A close look at all animal cognitive and language studies shows that their behavior can be sufficiently explained by perceptual thinking. There is no justification for resorting to higher order cognitive abilities of abstract, universal concept formation as an explanation.

I’m not entirely convinced, but you may be right here. You didn’t answer why human behavior wasn’t sufficiently explained by perceptual thinking the way animal behavior is.

Since the intellect uses the brain, its percepts and phantasms, you should have brain activity whenever you have mental activity. So, “brain activity” is incapable of resolving any disputed questions regarding the nature of intellect and abstract concepts.

We can control for the percepts and phantasms in neuroscience experiments. And we do.

We never think conceptually without reverting to the phantasm. Hence, I would be surprised if we should have specifically human thinking without brain activity.

No, it is not an explanation that all brain activity is associated with the phantasm. Current neuroscientific research shows that higher-order cognitive function, when we control for the lower-order perceptual stuff, involves brain activity. It’s well-known, for instance, which areas of the brain are involved in semantic processing and integration - the brain has already abstracted the meaning of the word. Now how many references would you like me to cite showing this? The neuroscientific literature is simply overwhelming with such examples.