The three

[lmelahn]

Dear Imelahn

Thanks, But Relations do not solve my problem. Anyway God the father is not God the son, so While father is identical to the Divine Essence and Son is not the father, how can we say that son is identical to the Divine Essence?

Well, I have an answer, but it involves some subtle metaphysics. (My source for this is Ia q. 28Summa Theologiae.)

Just for review, Aristotle observed that the realities we observe and deal with each day are what he calls substances: beings with an independent existence, like trees, fish, stones, and men. These substances have various characteristics—their color, size, shape, and so on—which he calls accidents. (I assume that most of my readers know that, but just so we are clear: for Aristotle, the accidents are, so to speak, only second-class citizens. There is no such thing as “redness” in the abstract, only red apples, and red roses, and so on. They don’t exactly “exist,” tout court, but only “exist in something else.”)

I think Aristotle’s analysis of reality (assumed by Thomas Aquinas)—which resolves beings into “substance” and “accident” like that—is fundamentally sound, and can be useful for answering this question.

The distinction between substance and accident (I think it is clear that the apple is not the same as its redness) is evidence of a metaphysical composition: even the most seemingly simple realities turn out to have a kind of internal “division.” Substance-and-accident is the easiest one for us to grasp, but there are others (notably matter-and-form, essence-and-being), which it is not necessary to get into here.

What concerns us here is a particular “genus” of accident that Aristotle calls the “pros ti,” the “towards which.” Substances are frequently observed to have a certain reference to another substance: for example, the earth to the moon, a father to a son, and even (although they are not technically substances) the right hand to the left hand. We usually call that reference “relation.”

“Relation” is an interesting category. For all other genera of accidents, we understand what they are by comparing them to the substance in which they inhere. (Color, for example, is a quality of a substance; size is a property of a substance, and so on.) Relation, however, is different, because we understand what it is by comparing one thing to something else. (We compare a father to his son, and vice versa; the moon with the earth; and so on.) The very notion of relation contains comparison with something else.

Therefore, in a creature, relation can be considered in two ways: inasmuch as it is a characteristic that “inheres” in a substance, or else according to its notion, which entails a comparison with something else.

When we talk about God, however, we must always keep in mind that He is very different from His creatures, while at the same time being the source of all perfections in those creatures. Hence, when we see a perfection in a creature, we must recognize God as its source. He must, therefore, also possess that perfection, but in a much more eminent way than in His creatures. (We are assuming that the perfection in question is not intrinsically tied to some kind of potential principle; for example, size is tied to matter, and so it cannot be attributed to God.)

Take goodness, for example. Many beings are good to different degrees, especially some human beings we know. That goodness must come from God as its source; therefore God must be good. But God isn’t just “good,” not “good” in the human or creaturely sense; if He is the source of all goodness, it would be better to say that He is Goodness Itself.

One of these perfections is unity. As has been mentioned already in this thread, God must be utterly simple, because there is nothing prior to Him with which He could be “composed.” So all those kinds of composition I mentioned—essence-and-being, matter-and-form, substance-and-accident—are to be excluded entirely from God.

Now, the ability to make relations is indeed a perfection that could be attributed to God. Such a relation could not, however, be an “accident” that inheres in God, because that would imply a composition in God. Just as in God, the Essence is the same as His Being, his Relations are the same as his Substance. In God, the very relations are subsistent.

But, as we saw, the very notion of relation entails a comparison with something else. Now, God cannot (properly speaking) have a “relation” with one of HIs creatures (because that would imply that one of His creatures is “prior” to Him in some way). But there is nothing stopping one (subsistent) Relation from being related to another (subsistent) Relation. And inasmuch as they are relative to each other, they are really distinct.

In summary: the Divine Persons are actually identical to the Relations themselves. Since relations in God can’t be accidents, but have to be identical to His very Substance, it is therefore possible for the Persons to be related to each other (hence really distinct), but still be identical to the Divine Essence.

Sorry for the length of the answer, but you asked .

 

[javid]

Dear JReed

Thank you. But it is not on Modalism.

 

[javid]

Dear Imelhan

Thanks for your answer,

There is no such thing as “redness” in the abstract, only red apples, and red roses, and so on. They don’t exactly “exist,” tout court, but only “exist in something else.”)

Yes for you example, we must imagine an one-color apple that is a red apple and is a yellow apple and is a green apple! Or an one-colour apple which is red, green and yellow. Is it possible?

If the apple has several colors, so it can be a example for the simple God.

What concerns us here is a particular “genus” of accident that Aristotle calls the “pros ti,” the “towards which.” Substances are frequently observed to have a certain reference to another substance: for example, the earth to the moon, a father to a son, and even (although they are not technically substances) the right hand to the left hand. We usually call that reference “relation.”

O.K but in all of your examples, there are two beings! Now if this beings be the God, can we say two beings are one God? And if they are in God’s Essence, Can we claim that such God is simple?

When we talk about God, however, we must always keep in mind that He is very different from His creatures, while at the same time being the source of all perfections in those creatures. Hence, when we see a perfection in a creature, we must recognize God as its source. He must, therefore, also possess that perfection, but in a much more eminent way than in His creatures. (We are assuming that the perfection in question is not intrinsically tied to some kind of potential principle; for example, size is tied to matter, and so it cannot be attributed to God.)

Yes Greater than the creatures but my problems do not depend on Godness and humanity! My problem is one Unity and Simplicity.

One of these perfections is unity. As has been mentioned already in this thread, God must be utterly simple, because there is nothing prior to Him with which He could be “composed.” So all those kinds of composition I mentioned—essence-and-being, matter-and-form, substance-and-accident—are to be excluded entirely from God.

Yes, But we must explain things on God that it be possible to say God is simple and one. For example we can believe in two Gods but say we have only one God because God is one!

But, as we saw, the very notion of relation entails a comparison with something else. Now, God cannot (properly speaking) have a “relation” with one of HIs creatures (because that would imply that one of His creatures is “prior” to Him in some way). But there is nothing stopping one (subsistent) Relation from being related to another (subsistent) Relation. And inasmuch as they are relative to each other, they are really distinct.

In summary: the Divine Persons are actually identical to the Relations themselves. Since relations in God can’t be accidents, but have to be identical to His very Substance, it is therefore possible for the Persons to be related to each other (hence really distinct), but still be identical to the Divine Essence.

I think, this part is not clear. But Are they really “they”?(real several persons) And Where are they? In Essence or out of it? Persons are not abstract beings and so they are really three beings. Whether they have relation to each other or not, they are really three beings. So where are they in Essence or out of it? If they are in Essence, so Divine contains three persons and it is hard to say, it is simple. If they are out of Essence, So we have four Gods!

But as a third way, you said each person is identical to the Divine Essence, And I asked: Anyway God the father is not God the son, so While father is identical to the Divine Essence and Son is not the father, how can we say that son is identical to the Divine Essence?

You explain all these to answer it, but I got no answer yet. My problem is not on relations and I don’t think relations can explain it.

Thanks

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Well, I have an answer, but it involves some subtle metaphysics. (My source for this is Summa Theologiae Ia q. 28.)

Just for review, Aristotle observed that the realities we observe and deal with each day are what he calls substances: beings with an independent existence, like trees, fish, stones, and men. These substances have various characteristics—their color, size, shape, and so on—which he calls accidents. (I assume that most of my readers know that, but just so we are clear: for Aristotle, the accidents are, so to speak, only second-class citizens. There is no such thing as “redness” in the abstract, only red apples, and red roses, and so on. They don’t exactly “exist,” tout court, but only “exist in something else.”)

I think Aristotle’s analysis of reality (assumed by Thomas Aquinas)—which resolves beings into “substance” and “accident” like that—is fundamentally sound, and can be useful for answering this question.

The distinction between substance and accident (I think it is clear that the apple is not the same as its redness) is evidence of a metaphysical composition: even the most seemingly simple realities turn out to have a kind of internal “division.” Substance-and-accident is the easiest one for us to grasp, but there are others (notably matter-and-form, essence-and-being), which it is not necessary to get into here.

What concerns us here is a particular “genus” of accident that Aristotle calls the “pros ti,” the “towards which.” Substances are frequently observed to have a certain reference to another substance: for example, the earth to the moon, a father to a son, and even (although they are not technically substances) the right hand to the left hand. We usually call that reference “relation.”

“Relation” is an interesting category. For all other genera of accidents, we understand what they are by comparing them to the substance in which they inhere. (Color, for example, is a quality of a substance; size is a property of a substance, and so on.) Relation, however, is different, because we understand what it is by comparing one thing to something else. (We compare a father to his son, and vice versa; the moon with the earth; and so on.) The very notion of relation contains comparison with something else.

Therefore, in a creature, relation can be considered in two ways: inasmuch as it is a characteristic that “inheres” in a substance, or else according to its notion, which entails a comparison with something else.

When we talk about God, however, we must always keep in mind that He is very different from His creatures, while at the same time being the source of all perfections in those creatures. Hence, when we see a perfection in a creature, we must recognize God as its source. He must, therefore, also possess that perfection, but in a much more eminent way than in His creatures. (We are assuming that the perfection in question is not intrinsically tied to some kind of potential principle; for example, size is tied to matter, and so it cannot be attributed to God.)

Take goodness, for example. Many beings are good to different degrees, especially some human beings we know. That goodness must come from God as its source; therefore God must be good. But God isn’t just “good,” not “good” in the human or creaturely sense; if He is the source of all goodness, it would be better to say that He is Goodness Itself.

One of these perfections is unity. As has been mentioned already in this thread, God must be utterly simple, because there is nothing prior to Him with which He could be “composed.” So all those kinds of composition I mentioned—essence-and-being, matter-and-form, substance-and-accident—are to be excluded entirely from God.

Now, the ability to make relations is indeed a perfection that could be attributed to God. Such a relation could not, however, be an “accident” that inheres in God, because that would imply a composition in God. Just as in God, the Essence is the same as His Being, his Relations are the same as his Substance. In God, the very relations are subsistent.

But, as we saw, the very notion of relation entails a comparison with something else. Now, God cannot (properly speaking) have a “relation” with one of HIs creatures (because that would imply that one of His creatures is “prior” to Him in some way). But there is nothing stopping one (subsistent) Relation from being related to another (subsistent) Relation. And inasmuch as they are relative to each other, they are really distinct.

In summary: the Divine Persons are actually identical to the Relations themselves. Since relations in God can’t be accidents, but have to be identical to His very Substance, it is therefore possible for the Persons to be related to each other (hence really distinct), but still be identical to the Divine Essence.

Sorry for the length of the answer, but you asked .

Very good. Yes, very good.

God Bless
Linus2nd

 

[javid]

I know it a little difficult, but I’ll have a great faith after it! My Language is not English(& my English is not Good:shrug But I got very Good answers on this Forum and I’m trying to get more!

God Bless You

Each Person is God, So we can’t say the person constrained by time! And We can say God must take one role! God himself has three roles as you said, So each person as a perfect God can do it.

Why think that “they cannot experience the totality of love in the same instance”?

I cannot love as a father the moment I am born, because I am a human, but what about God?

Yes, at that moment in time, I am limited to loving as a father, But Can we say, a Divine Person, as God, is “limited”? Can we imagine any limitation to/for God? I do not think so.

And you said: “He is three perfect and complete persons”, My main Problem is “where are this three persons?” In Essence or out of it or each person is the Essence?

God can do every/any Possible job, And I don’t think it is be impossible for God to have several roles, as he has! So each person as a perfect God, is so and can has several roles.

I am a human, But a Divine person is God. We can’t say it about God.

Yes, But your explanation shows three roles and gives them to three persons. We must find a way to show that The Simple God, has three persons.

Parents and child are, three living being, not only three persons! My parents are two persons, but they are two humans. Divine Persons are one God.

Yes, we are made in God’s image, But we are creature, we are mortal, we are needy, we are limited and there are many facts in us that we can’t imagine them for God.

Do we must imagine a father and a son in God’s Essence who love each other but in different types? Ok so How can we think he is simple?

No, I do not try to introduce another person, but as I said, these are roles and a Divine person can have several roles.

 

[lmelahn]

Yes for you example, we must imagine an one-color apple that is a red apple and is a yellow apple and is a green apple! Or an one-colour apple which is red, green and yellow. Is it possible?
…
But a color an quality, an accident
…
If the apple has several colors, so it can be a example for the simple God.
…
O.K but in all of your examples, there are two beings! Now if this beings be the God, can we say two beings are one God? And if they are in God’s Essence, Can we claim that such God is simple?

I think you may have missed my point. I was saying that God cannot have accidents of this type (or of any kind), because He is utterly simple.

Yes Greater than the creatures but my problems do not depend on Godness and humanity! My problem is one Unity and Simplicity.

Keep in mind that God’s unity and simplicity are of a superior kind to the unity and simplicity we have experience of. The unity we experience is always of parts unified into a whole. God, however, does not have any parts whatsoever. (The Relations are not parts, but, perfectly identical with the substance, as I mentioned.)

Yes, But we must explain things on God that it be possible to say God is simple and one. For example we can believe in two Gods but say we have only one God because God is one!

Two “gods” would, in technical theological language, be two “divine essences.” We are not saying that. There is only one (and there can only be one) Divine Essence.

I think, this part is not clear. But Are they really “they”?(real several persons) And Where are they? In Essence or out of it? Persons are not abstract beings and so they are really three beings. Whether they have relation to each other or not, they are really three beings. So where are they in Essence or out of it? If they are in Essence, so Divine contains three persons and it is hard to say, it is simple. If they are out of Essence, So we have four Gods!

This has been said before in history . I think here there is an unspoken assumption here that the only way to have multiplicity in unity is by the unification of parts into a whole. But that is not the case in the Trinity.

The difficult term here is “being.” The Persons are not three Substances, that is clear. But nothing stopping them from being three Relations.

But as a third way, you said each person is identical to the Divine Essence, And I asked: Anyway God the father is not God the son, so While father is identical to the Divine Essence and Son is not the father, how can we say that son is identical to the Divine Essence?
…
You explain all these to answer it, but I got no answer yet. My problem is not on relations and I don’t think relations can explain it.

I think you are implicitly assuming here that “being” can only mean “substance.” Look at it this way: inasmuch as the Father is Father He is really distinct from Son and Spirit. Inasmuch as the Father is God, He is perfectly identical to Son and Spirit. And so on for all the Persons.

 

[javid]

I think you may have missed my point. I was saying that God cannot have accidents of this type (or of any kind), because He is utterly simple.

Dear Imelahn

My problem is on persons. Do you think that persons are accidents? If no, it does not help.

Keep in mind that God’s unity and simplicity are of a superior kind to the unity and simplicity we have experience of. The unity we experience is always of parts unified into a whole. God, however, does not have any parts whatsoever. (The Relations are not parts, but, perfectly identical with the substance, as I mentioned.)

Two “gods” would, in technical theological language, be two “divine essences.” We are not saying that. There is only one (and there can only be one) Divine Essence.

Yes, but where are the persons? In Essence or out of it?

This has been said before in history . I think here there is an unspoken assumption here that the only way to have multiplicity in unity is by the unification of parts into a whole. But that is not the case in the Trinity.

So anyway there are three parts, but in unity! So God can’t be simple!

It said before in history but on Polytheism! It works to show there is one God, but does not work to show the God is simple.

The difficult term here is “being.” The Persons are not three Substances, that is clear. But nothing stopping them from being three Relations.

Again it shows one God, but not simple! These persons are three relatians and These relations are three distinct beings; and where are these beings? in God’s Essence, So How can we say that He is simple, while He has three distinct beings in his essence?

I think you are implicitly assuming here that “being” can only mean “substance.” Look at it this way: inasmuch as the Father is Father He is really distinct from Son and Spirit. Inasmuch as the Father is God, He is perfectly identical to Son and Spirit. And so on for all the Persons

No, Sir. Being is being! As you said, there are three distinct persons in God, So how is his Essence is simple?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Javid

Let me jump in here, since I know Imelahn is very busy. Here is something I posted on another thread. See if it helps.

" Keep in mind that we are discussing things about which we know almost nothing, we are stretching our minds and using human language to describe the Divine Nature. Thus we can never say anything perfectly satisfying. We simply cannot understand it. We reach for comparisons from a human perspective.

We know that each of the Divine Persons possses the essence or nature of the godhead completely. Yet we know that the Son is begotten by the Father eternally. That makes them different persons but the same God.

We also know that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son eternally at equally and at the same time. ( you should read the catechism and follow the footnotes for an exact description.) Yet they are distinct persons in one God. This implies a real relationship. The Catechism describes this in para. 254, explaining that " …They are distinct in their relations of origin: ’ It is the Father who generates, the Son who is begotten, and the Holy Spirit who proceeds.’ ( i.e. the Holy Spirit proceeds from both at the same time as his origin by way of spiration, para 246 ) " So the distinction in Persons lies in their relations of origin. In opposition to the definition of category of " relation " as an accident in the philosophy of Aristotle, " relation " in God is not an accident. It is not an " accident " that the Son has a " relation " with the Father or that the Holy Spirit has a " relation " with both the Father and the Son or that the three have a relationship with each other. This " relation " is not a substance, but the end of the " relation, " is a Person whose substance and nature is the same as the Father. Or, speaking of the Holy Sirit, this " relation " is a Person which has the same substance and nature as the Father, but through the Son.

So when you say, " isn’t it like saying that there is NO Essence in God other than the Persons/Relations? But then wouldn’t it lead to the fallacy that there are 3-Gods?, " this would not be true. By order of nature, but not in time, the essence, nature, and substance ( using these as univical tems in this instance ) of God come first and this nature has traditionally been held to reside in the Father since he is the origin of the other two Persons. So there is only one God because, by order of nature, it is the nature and essence and substance of the godhead which is prime or the principle of origin. Thus the essence of each Person is God himself.

We really can’t say much more than that. And this we hold by faith, that the three Persons are one and the same God. "

Pax
Linus2nd

---

 

[Tomdstone]

We also know that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son eternally at equally and at the same time._

Eastern Orthodox disagree and will point to the Nicene Creed as formulated at the Council of Constantinople.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Eastern Orthodox disagree and will point to the Nicene Creed as formulated at the Council of Constantinople.

The Nicene Creed is De Fide as well. I can’t help what the Eastern Orthodox agree with or disagree with. It seems like much a-doo about me but then I an a Roman Catholic and I have not devoted any time to why they disagree - and I intend never to do so since it has been going on for centuries. Nothing I could say would change anything.

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[javid]

Javid

Let me jump in here, since I know Imelahn is very busy. Here is something I posted on another thread. See if it helps.

" Keep in mind that we are discussing things about which we know almost nothing, we are stretching our minds and using human language to describe the Divine Nature. Thus we can never say anything perfectly satisfying. We simply cannot understand it. We reach for comparisons from a human perspective.

Dear Linusthe2nd

Yes, but reaching a reasonable faith, needs understanding God by human mind. I know we can’t limit God in our Minds but some times it is hard to accept some parts of Faith. So we need try to find a way to explain it in human language.

We know that each of the Divine Persons possses the essence or nature of the godhead completely. Yet we know that the Son is begotten by the Father eternally. That makes them different persons but the same God…We really can’t say much more than that. And this we hold by faith, that the three Persons are one and the same God.

Yes, But remember, We have two problems: Uniqueness and Simplicity.

If relations make three distinct persons in the God, So how can God be simple?

 

[Tomdstone]

The Nicene Creed is De Fide as well. I can’t help what the Eastern Orthodox agree with or disagree with. It seems like much a-doo about me but then I an a Roman Catholic and I have not devoted any time to why they disagree - and I intend never to do so since it has been going on for centuries. Nothing I could say would change anything.

Pax
Linus2nd

We also know that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son eternally at equally and at the same time.
_

The Nicene Creed as originally written states that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. The Eastern Orthodox agree with the Nicene Creed as formulated at the Council of Constantinople and do not accept the addition to the creed that came later saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

The Nicene Creed as originally written states that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. The Eastern Orthodox agree with the Nicene Creed as formulated at the Council of Constantinople and do not accept the addition to the creed that came later saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son.

As I said there is nothing that the Catholic Church can do about that, it is Defined teaching. It is the Orthodox who must accept the Defined teaching.

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Dear Linusthe2nd

Yes, but reaching a reasonable faith, needs understanding God by human mind. I know we can’t limit God in our Minds but some times it is hard to accept some parts of Faith. So we need try to find a way to explain it in human language.

Yes, But remember, We have two problems: Uniqueness and Simplicity.

 

[Tomdstone]

As I said there is nothing that the Catholic Church can do about that, it is Defined teaching. It is the Orthodox who must accept the Defined teaching.

Pax
Linus2nd

AFAIK, the Eastern Orthodox are not going to accept the filioque.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

AFAIK, the Eastern Orthodox are not going to accept the filioque.

Have no idea what " AFAIK " means, I don’t speak that language .

As I said, there is nothing the Catholic Church can do but pray for a conversion of hearts.

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[javid]

God is not like a family:

1.God is simple, but family is not simple, because it’s members make it.

2.God is not creature, but members of a family make it! So God is self-exist and family is not so.

3.Persons are God, but members of a family are not the family.

etc

And you are talking on roles, again.

In love and marriage, there are two humans, so there are two human Essences. We just have One GOD.

Again, Father and Son or Mother and Child, are not one human Essence, but two! But in Trinity, there are just one Divine Essence. Your example does not work, again.

In this example:

1.Javid is in time, But God is not in time and travel in time is meaningless to God, because God is not limited in time.

2.Trinity is eternal and not on one person in three times. Your Example, shows one person who travels in the time. Trinity is not Temporal. Trinity shows One God in three eternal persons

3.What happen if that one go back in time? Do we must imagine standing of a child and adult one In contrast to each other? So there are two human Essences on that time! because there are two humans. But in Trinity, There are one Divine Essence.

Thanks. But there some problems.

Best Regards.

 

[javid]

Sorry I didn’t see your older post:

Each person can do, What God does. But in this thread, problem is not the distinction. Problem is how we imagine a simple God in three persons. You just trying to show the distinction.

If you mean a person who is a father to his children, while he is a child to his parents, it is absolutely is modalism. But if you a family with several members, who love each other it can’t be said about God, because in Trinity there are one Essence but in family there are several Human Essences.

You accept that human being is limited, but example the humans again. As I said, it is modalism, and a divine person as a God, can have several roles. while I love my parents and my child, I am just one person.

Again, I am loved by parents like child and I am loved as a father by my child, But I am one Person.

God is timeless. And Trinity is not a fact in time.One of problems of Modalism, is that is Temporal.

The problem is not on several roles.

 

[Tomdstone]

1.God is simple,…

It has been argued that the One God of Judaism or of Islam is more simple than the Trinity. The Trinity involves the procession of the Holy Spirit. East and West cannot agree as to whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, or from the Father and from the Son. How would you counter the argument that the Trinity is not simple and not understood and is complex (as seen by the dispute on the filioque), but the one God with one Person of the Jews or of the Moslems is simple.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

It has been argued that the One God of Judaism or of Islam is more simple than the Trinity. The Trinity involves the procession of the Holy Spirit. East and West cannot agree as to whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, or from the Father and from the Son. How would you counter the argument that the Trinity is not simple and not understood and is complex (as seen by the dispute on the filioque), but the one God with one Person of the Jews or of the Moslems is simple.

By going through all the preceeding posts .

Linus2nd