Thomas Aquinas's proofs-Multiple Gods?

[SeekingCatholic]

The ‘First Way’ begins by demonstrating the existence of an unmoved mover, and then proceeds to infer a number of attributes that are typically associated with the God of classical theism: immutability, pure actuality, oneness, eternality, omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. Let’s start with the first proof. Consider this version of the argument from motion:

I don’t like your version, but I’ll let that go for now. Let’s assume the existence of an unmoved mover. Here is where the problems start - attempting to show that the (only) unmoved mover is the God of classical theism.

Now, if something is unmoved (or immutable), then there is no potentiality in it to change.

That something is unmoved does not imply that it is, of its nature, immutable (immovable). And the First Way does not show the existence of an immovable mover, but only a mover, in point of fact, unmoved. There can, in fact, be very many unmoved “first movers” - they are unmoved, not because they are of their nature immutable, but because there simply does not exist any entity capable of moving them.

The unmoved mover must also be eternal, since only potential (or changing) beings can come into and out of existence. Hence, the unmoved mover must exist at all times.

True, but there can be more than one eternally existing being.

As for omniscience, et al, let’s think of ourselves first. Being potential (or partly actual), we possess some knowledge. Now, if a partly actual being possesses some knowledge, it follows logically that a purely actual being would know everything there is to know (i.e. the unmoved mover is omniscient).

Yes, but again, an unmoved mover need not be a purely actual being.

 

[packermann]

No, it is just something I regular hear from believers when I say that an omni-anything being is logically impossible.
So if one logically impossible god can exist in their opinion, why can’t many logically impossible gods exist although that is logically impossible?

Because of logic. You cannot have two or more infinite beings, because there would be no way to distinguish between two infinite beings. It is not like you can point to your left and say “There is infinite being A” and then point to your right and say “There is infinite veing B”. An infinite being by definition has no boundaries. Since an infinte being has no boundaries, you cannot have one infinite being on your left separated from an infinite being on your right.

Here is an example. Paint an entire wall yellow. Then color the wall with another coating of the same yellow paint. You would not be able to distinguish the first coating from the second costing, since both coatings color the entire wall and are the same color. It is the same with an infinite being. Two infinite beings would both be everywhere with the same infinitely perfect attributes. There would be no way for us to distinguish the two. They would completely overlap each other. So you can cannot have two or more distinguishable infinite beings.

Now, you may argue that although you cannot have two distinguishable infinite beings, I have not proven that you cannot have two indistinguishable infinite beings. You can have two or more infinte beings sharing the exact same space, and are indistinguishable except to each other. And if you said this, I would have to concede that you right. But this is exactly what the Christian faith is saying. If you have two or more indistinguishable beings, isn’t this what traditional Christianity calls the Trinity? If there are two or more beings that are indistinuishable, then that would mean that they share the same essence, just as two coats of yellow sharing the same essence - the yellow paint.

So logic clearly shows that you cannot have two or more distinguishable beings but logic cannot show that you cannot have two or more indistinguishable beings that completely overlap in time and space, sharing the same essence, which is the doctrine of the Trinity - Three Persons sharing one Essence.

 

[punkforchrist]

Hello SeekingCatholic!

SeekingCatholic:

That something is unmoved does not imply that it is, of its nature, immutable (immovable).

We should be careful to read Aquinas’ fine points on the matter. When he says ‘unmoved’, he is referring to something neither moved by something else or self-moved. The only other option is something absolutely unmoved, or immutable. In any case, the way I was using the term ‘unmoved mover’ strictly is in the sense of immutable, since that’s what regularity would have to correspond to in order to be regular in the first place.

The above is the key point. If there is something immutable, then it must be purely actual, and so forth.

Blessings

 

[SeekingCatholic]

We should be careful to read Aquinas’ fine points on the matter. When he says ‘unmoved’, he is referring to something neither moved by something else or self-moved.

Obviously.

The only other option is something absolutely unmoved, or immutable.

No, it isn’t. It is also possible for there to exist an entity relatively immutable; mutable strictly speaking in its nature, but immutable in the sense that no other entity exists with the capability of moving it. IOW, it just so happens to be unmoved.

In any case, the way I was using the term ‘unmoved mover’ strictly is in the sense of immutable, since that’s what regularity would have to correspond to in order to be regular in the first place.

But not absolutely immutable, only relatively so.

The above is the key point. If there is something immutable, then it must be purely actual, and so forth.

And that’s of course the very point of contention. It’s possible for there to be an unmoved entity with both potency and act, if no other entity exists with the capacity of raising its potency to act. And, while there can only be one being purely actual, there can be many such beings such as I have described, and thus a multitude of unmoved movers. This is a refutation of the First Way.

 

[1holycatholic]

And that’s of course the very point of contention. It’s possible for there to be an unmoved entity with both potency and act, if no other entity exists with the capacity of raising its potency to act. And, while there can only be one being purely actual, there can be many such beings such as I have described, and thus a multitude of unmoved movers. This is a refutation of the First Way.

:ehh:

Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Originally Posted by Summa Theologica: First Part, Question 3, Article 1
Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality.

Not proved, no matter how many “thumbs up” signs you wish to give.

For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality.

True, but does not prove the first being(s) must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. The first being(s) in my hypothetical scenario never passed from potentiality to actuality. They are unmoved.

Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being.

Well not here it hasn’t.

 

[1holycatholic]

Not proved, no matter how many “thumbs up” signs you wish to give.

True, but does not prove the first being(s) must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. The first being(s) in my hypothetical scenario never passed from potentiality to actuality. They are unmoved.

Well not here it hasn’t.

Care to explain how the atemporal can have potential?

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Care to explain how the atemporal can have potential?

The burden of proof is on you to show it can’t.

 

[1holycatholic]

The burden of proof is on you to show it can’t.

That has already been established in this thread. You are making counter to what has been established, therefore the burden of proof is yours.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

That has already been established in this thread.

No, it hasn’t. Not anywhere. And I read each and every post.

You are making counter to what has been established, therefore the burden of proof is yours.

Nope. You’re the one claiming proof, not me.

 

[1holycatholic]

No, it hasn’t. Not anywhere. And I read each and every post.

Nope. You’re the one claiming proof, not me.

Reread post #24.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Reread post #24.

I did and it didn’t establish what you claim. I already showed the logical fallacy.

Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality.

That actuality is prior to potentiality does not entail that the first being must of necessity be in act and in no way in potentiality. To show this I need but give a counter-example. This I did. I hypothesized a first being, or a number of first beings, in both act and potentiality. They never passed from potentiality to actuality in those things in which they are in act.

To then attempt to claim that this is impossible because the first being must of necessity be purely actual is begging the question - assuming what needs to be proved.

 

[punkforchrist]

SeekingCatholic:

No, it isn’t. It is also possible for there to exist an entity relatively immutable; mutable strictly speaking in its nature, but immutable in the sense that no other entity exists with the capability of moving it. IOW, it just so happens to be unmoved.

If no other entity has the ability to move this being, then the latter must be purely actual by virtue of the fact that it truly has no potentiality to change. A being can only have potentiality insofar as some being can change it. Hence, if there’s nothing to change it, there is no potentiality.

To put the argument succinctly: Being cannot arise from non-being. Therefore, if there is no pure being (or pure actuality), then nothing would be in motion from non-being to being.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

If no other entity has the ability to move this being, then the latter must be purely actual by virtue of the fact that it truly has no potentiality to change.

Sorry, I don’t follow the logic. You’re still confusing necessary immovability with merely contingent immovability.

I would agree with you if by “no other entity has the ability to move this being” is meant “there is no possibly existent entity which could possibly have the ability to move this being in any circumstance”. Since a being in potentiality could possibly be moved by another in act in that respect, (assuming the accidental circumstances are such that such motion would in fact occur), an absolutely unmovable entity must be purely actual.

But what I mean by “no other entity has the ability to move this being” is not an absolute, but a contingent impossibility. I am hypothesizing that there is a possible world, with (at least one) unmoved mover that is not purely actual. In this world, in the collection of actually existing entities there is either 1) no entity in act in the same respect in which the unmoved entity is in potentiality or else 2) the set of accidental circumstances (conditions) necessary to actualize the motion are impossible and never in fact occur.

Put another way, merely because object A can be moved does not entail that it will be. Since the First Way only shows an (in point of fact) unmoved mover, not an absolutely immovable mover, I conclude that it fails.

A being can only have potentiality insofar as some being can change it.

Yes, a hypothetical being in a hypothetical set of circumstances. It does not follow from this that that “some being” must actually exist in the world or that the accidental circumstances will be such that that “some being” actually does change it. There are many potentialities which remain unactualized.

Hence, if there’s nothing to change it, there is no potentiality.

It does not follow that even if there is some actually existent being which can effect the change that the change necessarily occurs.

To put the argument succinctly: Being cannot arise from non-being. Therefore, if there is no pure being (or pure actuality), then nothing would be in motion from non-being to being.

This whole argument sounds like affirming the consequent:

If there is pure actuality (or being), then there could be things in motion from non-being to being.

There are things in motion from non-being to being.

Therefore, there is pure actuality.

It seems you’ve made quite a logical leap.

Please explain why, logically,

1. There is no pure being, although there are entities with both potency and act;
2. There are things in motion from non-being to being

entails

1. Being arises from non-being.

 

[punkforchrist]

SeekingCatholic:

I am hypothesizing that there is a possible world, with (at least one) unmoved mover that is not purely actual.

Here we have a distinction between God’s metaphysical necessity and His logical necessity. Granting that there is a possible world in which some being is more actual than this unmoved (but not immutable) mover is not pertinent. The argument from motion isn’t a modal proof.

It does not follow that even if there is some actually existent being which can effect the change that the change necessarily occurs.

I wasn’t claiming there necessarily would be a change. Rather, an actually existent being X with the capacity to make the change is a necessary precondition of Y’s existing in some form of potentiality.

1. There is no pure being, although there are entities with both potency and act;
2. There are things in motion from non-being to being

entails

1. Being arises from non-being.

Here’s how Geisler formulates the argument:

1. Changing beings exist.
2. All changing beings are composed of act and potency.
3. No potency can actualize itself.
4. Only Pure Act can actualize being.
5. So, all finite beings are actualized by Pure Act.

The key premise, as you implicitly point out, is (4). The reason why (4) is true is because every being composed of both actuality and potentiality has its potentiality actualized. But since it cannot actualize its own potentiality, there must be something purely in actuality.

This leads us to an important question that I’d like to get back to: would you say that the regularity we constantly experience is itself capable of change?

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Here we have a distinction between God’s metaphysical necessity and His logical necessity.

I don’t see how. I’m still talking about metaphysical necessity.

Granting that there is a possible world in which some being is more actual than this unmoved (but not immutable) mover is not pertinent. The argument from motion isn’t a modal proof.

Then what is the argument from motion then? A mere evidential argument?

If you grant a metaphysically possible world with no immutable mover but only an unmoved mover who is not pure actuality then the argument from motion fails as a proof. It fails to prove the metaphysical necessity of God. If God is metaphysically necessary then He must exist in all metaphysically possible worlds.

I wasn’t claiming there necessarily would be a change.

Then you concede there could be an unmoved though mutable mover. And, as I will show later, the “unmoved” mover need not be unmoved in all respects.

Rather, an actually existent being X with the capacity to make the change is a necessary precondition of Y’s existing in some form of potentiality.

That’s not the standard definition of potentiality, I don’t think. A block of marble would still have the potency of becoming a sculpture even if no sculptor is around.

Here’s how Geisler formulates the argument:

1. Changing beings exist.
2. All changing beings are composed of act and potency.
3. No potency can actualize itself.
4. Only Pure Act can actualize being.
5. So, all finite beings are actualized by Pure Act.

The key premise, as you implicitly point out, is (4). The reason why (4) is true is because every being composed of both actuality and potentiality has its potentiality actualized.

Prove it. You’re claiming it was once only complete being-in-potentiality. But no argumentation whatsoever is brought forth in support of the claim. I’m claiming it could always been in actuality in at least one of the respects it is in act.

But since it cannot actualize its own potentiality, there must be something purely in actuality.

No, there only must be something else in actuality in the respect in which it was in potentiality. Which allows me another way to state the problem.

A is in act with respect to quality F. A moves B to act in respect F, which was formerly only in potentiality. B can then move C, C can move D, and so on. So, tracing it backwards, if an infinite regress is not admitted then the chain must stop someplace - so let’s say A is the starting point, the “unmoved mover” - A was always in act with respect to F - but this is only with respect to quality F. A could in fact have been moved to act from potentiality by another mover with respect to quality G. You get a different unmoved mover depending on which chain of motion you choose to trace back.

This leads us to an important question that I’d like to get back to: would you say that the regularity we constantly experience is itself capable of change?

I don’t think so. The laws of physics appear to be logically necessary for there to be an observable objective reality.

 

[punkforchrist]

SeekingCatholic:

Then what is the argument from motion then? A mere evidential argument?

The argument from motion is a posteriori.

If you grant a metaphysically possible world with no immutable mover but only an unmoved mover who is not pure actuality then the argument from motion fails as a proof.

By ‘metaphysically possible’, I assume you mean ‘logically possible’. The two are different. I also think you’re misusing the phrase ‘unmoved mover’. What you really mean is ‘unmoving mover’. It’s logically possible to conceive of a world where something is unchanging in one instant, and then changing later on. This, however, has nothing to do with the unmoved mover, who is absolutely unmoved.

That’s not the standard definition of potentiality, I don’t think. A block of marble would still have the potency of becoming a sculpture even if no sculptor is around.

A block of marble could only be potentially a sculpture if something in that world could logically instantiate that state of affairs.

Prove it.

I did offer an argument. No potentiality can actualize itself. Therefore, if every being exists in potentiality, there can be no actualization.

A is in act with respect to quality F. A moves B to act in respect F, which was formerly only in potentiality. B can then move C, C can move D, and so on.

I’m with you so far.

So, tracing it backwards, if an infinite regress is not admitted then the chain must stop someplace - so let’s say A is the starting point, the “unmoved mover” - A was always in act with respect to F - but this is only with respect to quality F. A could in fact have been moved to act from potentiality by another mover with respect to quality G.

If A is potential with respect to G, then A is possibly changeable. Thus, all things would be capable of change. This, however, does not take into account the problem of how any potentiality can move from potentiality to actuality. Even if A is always in act with respect to F, it is not purely actual.

I don’t think so. The laws of physics appear to be logically necessary for there to be an observable objective reality.

So it’s not possible for regularity to be non-regularity? All changing things move within this principle of regularity, correct?

 

[SeekingCatholic]

The argument from motion is a posteriori.

Then it is subject to the rules of modal logic. If there is a metaphysically possible world in which there is motion but no being of pure actuality then it fails as a metaphysical demonstration.

Now, it’s rather annoying when you assume I mean what I didn’t say.

By ‘metaphysically possible’, I assume you mean ‘logically possible’.

No, I don’t. If I meant ‘logically possible’ I would have said ‘logically possible’.

I also think you’re misusing the phrase ‘unmoved mover’. What you really mean is ‘unmoving mover’.

No, I don’t. If I meant ‘unmoving mover’ I would have said ‘unmoving mover’.

It’s logically possible to conceive of a world where something is unchanging in one instant, and then changing later on.

This is however NOT the world I am conceiving of, as you well know.

This, however, has nothing to do with the unmoved mover, who is absolutely unmoved.

No of course not. The REAL hypothetical world however I conceived of does have an unmoved mover who is NOT absolutely unmoved but only relatively (contingently) unmoved. You have yet to show why this world is metaphysically impossible. And you’re begging the question again, merely stating that the unmoved mover must be absolutely unmoved without proof.

A block of marble could only be potentially a sculpture if something in that world could logically instantiate that state of affairs.

Again, I don’t think this is a standard definition of potentiality, which refers to an intrinsic capacity for change rather than the extrinsic possibility. But it’s not really relevant to this discussion so I’ll let it go.

I did offer an argument. No potentiality can actualize itself. Therefore, if every being exists in potentiality, there can be no actualization.

And the argument is flawed. Your argument contains a hidden premise.

If every being exists in potentiality in every respect, there can be no actualization. But there can be actualization if different beings are in act in various respects, and in potency in others. Each entity can actualize according to the respect in which it is in act.

BTW according to your definition of potentiality if there can be no actualization there can also be nothing really existing in potentiality either, which means nothing exists at all, so your argument has morphed into an ontological one (if anything exists, God exists).

If A is potential with respect to G, then A is possibly changeable. Thus, all things would be capable of change. This, however, does not take into account the problem of how any potentiality can move from potentiality to actuality. Even if A is always in act with respect to F, it is not purely actual.

There is no problem of how a potentiality moved to actuality. F was always actual, never merely potential. A never moved from potentiality from actuality with respect to F.

Your hidden premise is that only a purely actual being is one not moved into act from potency; that every other being is moved into act from potency in those respects in which it is in act. I’m challenging the premise.

So it’s not possible for regularity to be non-regularity? All changing things move within this principle of regularity, correct?

I can’t go that far. The laws of physics only describe physical change, not metaphysical change.

 

[punkforchrist]

SeekingCatholic:

Now, it’s rather annoying when you assume I mean what I didn’t say.

I didn’t mean to offend…

No, I don’t. If I meant ‘logically possible’ I would have said ‘logically possible’.

Ok.

No, I don’t. If I meant ‘unmoving mover’ I would have said ‘unmoving mover’.

Your definition of ‘unmoved mover’ is a different one than that of Aristotle and Aquinas. That’s the only reason I was making the distinction.

No of course not. The REAL hypothetical world however I conceived of does have an unmoved mover who is NOT absolutely unmoved but only relatively (contingently) unmoved. You have yet to show why this world is metaphysically impossible.

I realize you believe I haven’t, but I’m afraid I disagree.

And you’re begging the question again, merely stating that the unmoved mover must be absolutely unmoved without proof.

That’s the definition of ‘unmoved mover’. In any case, I don’t want to get caught up in semantics.

If every being exists in potentiality in every respect, there can be no actualization. But there can be actualization if different beings are in act in various respects, and in potency in others. Each entity can actualize according to the respect in which it is in act.

I agree with that. However, none of these separate beings would be purely actual. They would be fully actualized potentiality, like the angels.

BTW according to your definition of potentiality if there can be no actualization there can also be nothing really existing in potentiality either, which means nothing exists at all, so your argument has morphed into an ontological one (if anything exists, God exists).

Potential beings still have some actuality. You and I are both potential in one respect and actual in another. The ontological argument does not begin with the observation of change; it is merely conceptual.

There is no problem of how a potentiality moved to actuality. F was always actual, never merely potential. A never moved from potentiality from actuality with respect to F.

Then A is merely fully actualized potentiality with respect to F, even if it were so from eternity.

Your hidden premise is that only a purely actual being is one not moved into act from potency; that every other being is moved into act from potency in those respects in which it is in act.

That’s not what I’m saying. Logically, the other beings you’re hypothesizing about can be fully actualized with respect to one attribute, but they are still potential with respect to other attributes. Notice, however, that each of these attributes participates in the act-of-being. It is the very act-of-being that is key in discussing what qualifies as purely actual and absolutely unmoved.

I can’t go that far. The laws of physics only describe physical change, not metaphysical change.

I never brought up the laws of physics. What I’m asking is, do we observe regularity in motion, and do you think this regularity could change?

 

[SeekingCatholic]

I didn’t mean to offend…

No offense taken.

Your definition of ‘unmoved mover’ is a different one than that of Aristotle and Aquinas. That’s the only reason I was making the distinction.

No, it isn’t. The definition of ‘unmoved mover’ is not ‘God’. Aquinas has to go beyond the First Way to attempt to show the unmoved mover is in fact God.

I realize you believe I haven’t, but I’m afraid I disagree.

Yes, I realize you disagree, but I’m waiting to see the logically laid-out proof. I have shown the fallacy in what you have said so far. Valid proofs contain no hidden premises.

I agree with that.

OK, so if these beings exist from eternity in act with respect to a particular aspect, then what? Then you have a multitude of “unmoved movers” with respect to their particular aspects. And yet the reality of all motion is explained without resort to an infinite regress.

However, none of these separate beings would be purely actual. They would be fully actualized potentiality, like the angels.

Non sequitur. It does not follow from the fact that a being is not purely actual that it must be “actualized potentiality” - e.g., it was once in potency, in those respects in which it is in act.

Then A is merely fully actualized potentiality with respect to F, even if it were so from eternity.

How can this be? A never moved from potency to act with respect to F. It’s not “actualized potentiality”. It’s act, period. What is the definition of “actualized potentiality” but a being in act which was formerly potency?

And why is God then not “fully actualized potentiality” in every respect?

Your premise is, every being in act is “actualized potentiality” in the respect in which it is in act, even if it never passed from potency to act, except for a being in act in every respect which is “pure act”. This is what you need to prove.

That’s not what I’m saying. Logically, the other beings you’re hypothesizing about can be fully actualized with respect to one attribute, but they are still potential with respect to other attributes. Notice, however, that each of these attributes participates in the act-of-being. It is the very act-of-being that is key in discussing what qualifies as purely actual and absolutely unmoved.

The point is not what “qualifies” as purely actual and absolutelyunmoved - I know about that - but showing such a being to be necessary to account for all motion.

I never brought up the laws of physics. What I’m asking is, do we observe regularity in motion, and do you think this regularity could change?

What exactly do you mean by “regularity” in motion?