Thomas Aquinas's proofs-Multiple Gods?

[punkforchrist]

SeekingCatholic:

No, it isn’t. The definition of ‘unmoved mover’ is not ‘God’. Aquinas has to go beyond the First Way to attempt to show the unmoved mover is in fact God.

Aquinas does immediately state after the First Way, “this everyone understands to be God.” I’m not sure I would have taken the same approach, but in any case, I wasn’t saying that the definition of ‘unmoved mover’ has to be God (at least not prima facie). However, he was saying that the unmoved mover is completely unmoved, and therefore, purely actual.

OK, so if these beings exist from eternity in act with respect to a particular aspect, then what? Then you have a multitude of “unmoved movers” with respect to their particular aspects.

Each of these hypothetical beings still participate in the act-of-being, where they find unity. It is this act-of-being that is purely actual.

Non sequitur. It does not follow from the fact that a being is not purely actual that it must be “actualized potentiality” - e.g., it was once in potency, in those respects in which it is in act.

That’s not what I meant, although I can understand why it sounded that way. I’m simply making a distinction between what is purely actual (i.e. with respect to all actualities), and what is fully actualized potentiality (whether it was once in potentiality or not).

How can this be? A never moved from potency to act with respect to F. It’s not “actualized potentiality”. It’s act, period. What is the definition of “actualized potentiality” but a being in act which was formerly potency?

That is normally how the term is used, so you’re correct about that. What we need to look for is a way to talk about your idea of these separate beings. How about this: we can speak of the one God as purely actual, and these other hypothetical beings as fully actual. On the other hand, this might cause some confusion for others reading. We might just have to continue saying that these hypothetical beings are fully actual with respect to X.

Your premise is, every being in act is “actualized potentiality” in the respect in which it is in act, even if it never passed from potency to act, except for a being in act in every respect which is “pure act”. This is what you need to prove.

As I stated above, each of these hypothetical beings participate in the act-of-being. The latter is what needs to be addressed.

What exactly do you mean by “regularity” in motion?

There’s really no hidden meaning. I simply mean that our observation of change (or even possible change) in the world in constant. We can predict that hot things make things hot, and cold things make things cold, and so forth. The uniformity of our experience is what needs to be accounted for.

Blessings

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Aquinas does immediately state after the First Way, “this everyone understands to be God.”

Which is of course hand-waving.

However, he was saying that the unmoved mover is completely unmoved, and therefore, purely actual.

Saying and proving are two different things.

Each of these hypothetical beings still participate in the act-of-being, where they find unity. It is this act-of-being that is purely actual.

By all means please expound on this further.

I would just like to note that now the point to be proved is “if there is any being in act in any respect, there must be a being who is pure act”, completely irrespective of motion. Thus, this is no longer an argument from motion. Motion is irrelevant. If my hypothetical beings are possible then a being who is purely actual is not necessary to explain motion. If my hypothetical beings are impossible they are impossible not because their existence cannot be explained without recourse to an infinite regress of motion (because they were not placed in act by something else in act) but due to some sort of intrinsic impossibility.

That’s not what I meant, although I can understand why it sounded that way. I’m simply making a distinction between what is purely actual (i.e. with respect to all actualities), and what is fully actualized potentiality (whether it was once in potentiality or not).

But how can it be “fully actualized potentiality” if it never was in potentiality?

That is normally how the term is used, so you’re correct about that. What we need to look for is a way to talk about your idea of these separate beings. How about this: we can speak of the one God as purely actual, and these other hypothetical beings as fully actual. On the other hand, this might cause some confusion for others reading. We might just have to continue saying that these hypothetical beings are fully actual with respect to X.

Fine by me. By “fully actual with respect to X” I presume we mean “having always been in act with respect to X, and never in potency”.

As I stated above, each of these hypothetical beings participate in the act-of-being. The latter is what needs to be addressed.

Then by all means please address it. First please clearly define “act-of-being”.

There’s really no hidden meaning. I simply mean that our observation of change (or even possible change) in the world in constant. We can predict that hot things make things hot, and cold things make things cold, and so forth. The uniformity of our experience is what needs to be accounted for.

But when you restrict it to our sense experience then physical laws do come into play. They are what is responsible for the uniformity of our experience. These laws are logically necessary for there to an objective reality observable by our senses.

 

[mfbukowski]

Hi!

There can only be one God if God is an absolutely perfect Being. Part of perfection would mean having no potential / unchanging. If more than one God existed as being equally perfect and Supreme, then each of them would have potential—namely, to be greater than the others. Because of this, none of them would actually be Supreme. Anything that has potential for improvement could not be the Supreme Being.

Therefore, if there is a God (separate question, you might note), there is only one.

I must admit it has been a long time since I have read my Aquinas, but let me throw out a VERY speculative question. Suppose the “supreme being” does in fact change. Let me be frank. As a Mormon, I believe that God can change, yet He is always “more supreme” than any other beings.

I would be interested in your feedback on why this concept is logically invalid, if it can be shown to be.

Another interesting question is the big bang question. Can we in principle know about anything which occurred “before” the big bang? I see this as problematic. Partially I think the problem becomes, if time started with the big bang, was there any time “before time?” Is this knowable?

Further, suppose there were “other Gods” which, unknowable to us, existed “before” the big bang?

Just asking!?

 

[1holycatholic]

I must admit it has been a long time since I have read my Aquinas, but let me throw out a VERY speculative question. Suppose the “supreme being” does in fact change. Let me be frank. As a Mormon, I believe that God can change, yet He is always “more supreme” than any other beings.

I would be interested in your feedback on why this concept is logically invalid, if it can be shown to be.

Another interesting question is the big bang question. Can we in principle know about anything which occurred “before” the big bang? I see this as problematic. Partially I think the problem becomes, if time started with the big bang, was there any time “before time?” Is this knowable?

Further, suppose there were “other Gods” which, unknowable to us, existed “before” the big bang?

Just asking!?

1. 
   *]For something to be able to change it must exist in time.
   *]Things that existing atemporally have no potential for change and, by necessity, must be fully actual (with no potential.)
   *]It is not possible for two things to be fully actual. They would be indistinguishable and would be, in fact, the same thing.
   *]Time (and the possibility of things existing with potential) is created by a prime mover.
   *]Therefor a prime mover must exist atemporally, singularly and fully actual.

 

[punkforchrist]

SeekingCatholic:

Then by all means please address it. First please clearly define “act-of-being”.

The act-of-being is existence itself. Any real attribute, whether it involves power, knowledge, etc., will always be intertwined with the act-of-being, if the attribute is in fact real.

But when you restrict it to our sense experience then physical laws do come into play. They are what is responsible for the uniformity of our experience. These laws are logically necessary for there to an objective reality observable by our senses.

There’s a lot to be addressed with that. However, I agree that physical laws play a part in the uniformity (re: regularity) of our experience, and in motion in particular. At the same time, though, physical laws are only part of what’s at issue. Even if the physical laws, as we know them, were completely different, potential beings would still be changing. This is primarily a metaphysical problem of trying to understand how diverse characteristics are each intelligible in their motion from potency to act. If there is no unity between diverse objects, then we wouldn’t be able to observe any such regularities; and ‘unity’ is a principle of oneness rather than plurality.

 

[punkforchrist]

Hi mfb,

I think holycatholic has put it quite well. If there were more than one immutable substance, that would mean there could be more than one purely actual being (only potential beings can change). Yet, if there were more than one, then there would be distinctions between them. But since distinctions entail limitations, and hence potentiality, there can be no distinctions between what is purely actual. Therefore, God (who is pure actuality) is one.

mfbukowski:

Another interesting question is the big bang question. Can we in principle know about anything which occurred “before” the big bang? I see this as problematic. Partially I think the problem becomes, if time started with the big bang, was there any time “before time?” Is this knowable?

This is an important question, but notice that St. Thomas does not argue against the notion of an infinite regress in time. He is only saying that there must be some unmoved mover for each moment of time to be sustained.

To answer your question, however, if one adopts a Newtonian model of “absolute time”, then theoretically there would be a time before the Big Bang. Nevertheless, most physicists reject this view and conclude that time itself began with the Big Bang. God, however, being the timeless creator, was able to bring this event about even without existing “before” the Big Bang.

Blessings

 

[SeekingCatholic]

The act-of-being is existence itself. Any real attribute, whether it involves power, knowledge, etc., will always be intertwined with the act-of-being, if the attribute is in fact real.

All this says is that any real attribute is “intertwined with existence”, which is to say it exists.

I think what you’re trying to get at here, even though you haven’t stated so explicitly, is an argument about cause of existence (like the Second Way).

Even if the physical laws, as we know them, were completely different, potential beings would still be changing.

That we don’t know. The physical laws may be a necessary condition for movement from potency to act for physical objects.

This is primarily a metaphysical problem of trying to understand how diverse characteristics are each intelligible in their motion from potency to act. If there is no unity between diverse objects, then we wouldn’t be able to observe any such regularities; and ‘unity’ is a principle of oneness rather than plurality.

Is the question why there is regularity, or why we are able to understand such regularity.

 

[Contarini]

I must admit it has been a long time since I have read my Aquinas, but let me throw out a VERY speculative question. Suppose the “supreme being” does in fact change. Let me be frank. As a Mormon, I believe that God can change, yet He is always “more supreme” than any other beings.

I would be interested in your feedback on why this concept is logically invalid, if it can be shown to be.

Well, for one thing I’m at a loss as to why, philosophically, you believe in God at all in that case. What are your reasons for thinking that there is a changing “supreme being”? My reasons for believing in God are primarily that it seems to me that what is changing must depend on something unchanging, what is finite on something infinite, etc. Or at least this is far more likely than that the changing and finite exists eternally (and certainly more likely than that it randomly emerged from nothing for no reason whatever). But if the changing and finite does exist eternally, I see no particular reason to label one part of that changing and finite universe “God” in anything remotely like the traditional monotheistic sense. There may of course be all sorts of beings more powerful than ourselves floating around the universe. One or more of them may even have had a hand into bringing us or the physical universe we perceive into existence. But that would not entitle such a being or beings to worship in the strict and proper sense.

In plain words, I find your version of theism philosophically superfluous and theologically idolatrous.

I admit that I understand Mormonism imperfectly. I just can’t get my head around what you think the origins of your “God” are. Are you one of those Mormons who thinks that God was once a man, or one of those who denies that that’s binding doctrine for Mormons? If the Supreme Being was once a man, who created the universe in which that man lived? Did that man have a God? Who was the God of that God? What happened to that God? If you don’t believe that the Supreme Being was once a man, then from what did He change? Has he always existed in a state of continual change? Did He exist from all eternity with no other beings to keep Him company? Is it coherent to attribute a single act of temporal creation to a being existing in time with no beginning? (In other words, why didn’t God create “before”?) Or has God created an infinite number of times? Does God coexist with matter? (Perhaps I ought to know what Mormons believe on this!) In that case, where did matter come from? And the same set of questions as above can be asked, but this time concerning God’s shaping of matter into universes rather than God’s ex nihilo creation.

I know these are a lot of questions. Answer as many of them as you reasonably can in the time you have. I’m genuinely curious as to what you think, because Mormonism makes no sense at all to me philosophically and this may just be because I don’t understand it.

Edwin

Another interesting question is the big bang question. Can we in principle know about anything which occurred “before” the big bang? I see this as problematic. Partially I think the problem becomes, if time started with the big bang, was there any time “before time?” Is this knowable?

Further, suppose there were “other Gods” which, unknowable to us, existed “before” the big bang?

Just asking!?

 

[mfbukowski]

1. 
   *]For something to be able to change it must exist in time.
   *]Things that existing atemporally have no potential for change and, by necessity, must be fully actual (with no potential.)
   *]It is not possible for two things to be fully actual. They would be indistinguishable and would be, in fact, the same thing.
   *]Time (and the possibility of things existing with potential) is created by a prime mover.
   *]Therefor a prime mover must exist atemporally, singularly and fully actual.

1. 
   One of my worries in discussing this here is that I think we are speaking different languages, almost literally.
   
   You are speaking Thomism, understandably, especially with the title of the thread!
   
   I would consider myself a “post Wittgensteinian Pragmatist” a la Henry James and John Dewey.
   
   But with that said, if there is any basis for communication here whatsoever, I think I would question your first premise. Not surprising considering where I am “coming from”! Following my roots, I would answer that it depends on what you mean by “time”.
   
   Has there “always been” time? Or was time itself a creation?
   
   If it was a creation, there must have been some change which brought time itself into existence.
   
   If time always was, I would question your second premise:
   
   “Things that existing atemporally have no potential for change and, by necessity, must be fully actual (with no potential.)”
   
   Why do things which are atemporal have no potential for change?
   
   Again, we have a problem with “things which are atemporal”. Not totally sure what that means. “Things” like “courage”, or “virtue”?
   
   Surely these “things” are atemporal and I guess have no potential for change, but it would be hard to imagine courage or virtue as being “fully actual”.
   
   As I said, if I am speaking Chinese in an English room, I had better find the Chinese room. But if we have anything to discuss please respond! Thanks!

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Didn’t see this one.

1. 
   *]For something to be able to change it must exist in time.

1. 
   Prove it.
   
   And, if you do, then you also prove it must exist in space.
   

   *]Things that existing atemporally have no potential for change and, by necessity, must be fully actual (with no potential.)

   Angels, who exist atemporally and aspatially, must be fully actual then.

 

[mfbukowski]

Hi mfb,

I think holycatholic has put it quite well. If there were more than one immutable substance, that would mean there could be more than one purely actual being (only potential beings can change). Yet, if there were more than one, then there would be distinctions between them. But since distinctions entail limitations, and hence potentiality, there can be no distinctions between what is purely actual. Therefore, God (who is pure actuality) is one.

This is an important question, but notice that St. Thomas does not argue against the notion of an infinite regress in time. He is only saying that there must be some unmoved mover for each moment of time to be sustained.

To answer your question, however, if one adopts a Newtonian model of “absolute time”, then theoretically there would be a time before the Big Bang. Nevertheless, most physicists reject this view and conclude that time itself began with the Big Bang. God, however, being the timeless creator, was able to bring this event about even without existing “before” the Big Bang.

Blessings

I think we may have a linguistic problem here since I am post Wittgensteinian, which may be beyond the scope of this thread to deal with.

But you raise an interesting point regarding what most physicists believe about the big bang. I think that anything that happened before the big bang would be unknowable scientifically in principle. How could we measure it? How could we “see” it?

Yet faith allows us to believe unknowable things. The question becomes are there any logical contradictions in the idea that God existed before the big bang.

Quoting you:
“God, however, being the timeless creator, was able to bring this event about even without existing “before” the Big Bang.”

I am not sure if you are speaking of time or God?

 

[punkforchrist]

SeekingCatholic:

I think what you’re trying to get at here, even though you haven’t stated so explicitly, is an argument about cause of existence (like the Second Way).

I agree with modern Thomists, like Geisler, in saying that the first and second ways actually supplement each other.

That we don’t know. The physical laws may be a necessary condition for movement from potency to act for physical objects.

Why? If gravity did the opposite, then physical objects would still be changing. If there are any physical laws and constants, then there would still be movement from potency to act.

Is the question why there is regularity, or why we are able to understand such regularity.

The former.

 

[punkforchrist]

mfbukowski:

Quoting you:
“God, however, being the timeless creator, was able to bring this event about even without existing “before” the Big Bang.”

I am not sure if you are speaking of time or God?

I’m saying that God is timeless.

 

[punkforchrist]

SeekingCatholic:

Angels, who exist atemporally and aspatially, must be fully actual then.

I just wanted to quickly note, angels are composed of ‘subtle matter’, so they’re not atemporal and aspatial.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

I just wanted to quickly note, angels are composed of ‘subtle matter’, so they’re not atemporal and aspatial.

Huh? The leaps of logic you use are just breathtaking at times. What is “subtle matter” - angels are incorporeal and have no matter as such. How is an incorporeal being “spatial”? And how do you prove angels are composed of “subtle matter”, and how does that imply temporal and spatial existence?

 

[mfbukowski]

In plain words, I find your version of theism philosophically superfluous and theologically idolatrous.

I admit that I understand Mormonism imperfectly.

This is an interesting juxtoposition of statements, to say the least.

Hi, pleased to meet you too!

Since this was my first post, I am interested in wondering what part of “my theism” you find “superfluous and theologically idolatrous”? Perhaps you read my mind?

Nevertheless I don’t want to get off on the wrong foot, because I think you raise some interesting points.

I also would like to carry this forward, but as you point out, there are many questions and our time is limited.

Perhaps we can take them one by one, and then agree to skip some or raise others?

Quoting you:

My reasons for believing in God are primarily that it seems to me that what is changing must depend on something unchanging, what is finite on something infinite, etc. Or at least this is far more likely than that the changing and finite exists eternally (and certainly more likely than that it randomly emerged from nothing for no reason whatever). But if the changing and finite does exist eternally, I see no particular reason to label one part of that changing and finite universe “God” in anything remotely like the traditional monotheistic sense.

The notion that “what is changing depends on something unchanging” is of course rather Thomist or Aristotilian. I would prescribe more to a Heraclitan view that change and experience are primary. I have no problem with the notion of eternal change or that eternal things can be changing things.

I would say that it is linguistically interesting that to even formulate the idea of “unchanging” we first have to have the idea of “change” and then make it a negative, in effect.

We are so used to phenomena changing in this world that we only describe unchanging as “not changing”, but we have experience only with change.

This certainly coheres with a scientific point of view, insofar as science even looks at the question. I believe that the current theory is that the universe will at some point contract back into a black hole, just as it did “before” the big bang. It may then lead to another big bang, perhaps infinitum.

In this view, matter is in some sense eternal, yet always changing. I can understand this well, there is certainly no logical contradictions with this notion. It may be true or false, that is another issue, but I don’t think it is contradictory. I would find this matter issue as analogous to the notion of an eternal, but changing God

My belief in God is experiential. I believe in God because I have had experiences that are just as real to me as sensory experience which show me that He exists. If we postulate some kind of “6th sense” which is the “God communication sense” I would even say perhaps we could call His existance “observable”.

I do not believe one can “prove” the existance of God logically, so I might be rather lonely on this thread. Incidentally I think that is the fault of linguistic issues, not the fault of logic. I have found that all the “logical proofs” beg the question by building God into the premises.

Anyway, that’s about all I have time for today, but if you would like to carry it on, I am willing

 

[mfbukowski]

I’m saying that God is timeless.

You also said this:

“God, however, being the timeless creator, was able to bring this event about even without existing “before” the Big Bang.”

So if I am understanding your point correctly, to re-state your position fully in a single sentence, you would say

“God, however, being the timeless creator was able to bring this event (the creation of time??) about even without existing “before” the Big bang”

Not sure what you mean, still! I would agree that God is timeless, or “outside time”

 

[1holycatholic]

Prove it.

plato.stanford.edu/entries/immutability/
Boethius actually followed his reasoning about divine perfection to the conclusion that God exists outside time by his very nature – that God can’t be temporal. For whatever has neither past nor future is not located in time. But change requires existence in time. Suppose that a turnip, aging, goes from fresh to spoiled. It also then goes from fresh to not-fresh. So first “the turnip is fresh” is true, then “it is not the case that the turnip is fresh” is true. The two cannot be true at once. So things change only if they exist at at least two distinct times. Hence, if God is necessarily atemporal – via necessary divine perfection – God is necessarily changeless, i.e. immutable.

And, if you do, then you also prove it must exist in space.

No, I don’t. Angels are created and incorporeal.

Angels, who exist atemporally and aspatially, must be fully actual then.

As previously noted, Angels are created, and as such, cannot exist atemporally.

 

[punkforchrist]

What is “subtle matter” - angels are incorporeal and have no matter as such.

These are the words of Aquinas, not my own.

How is an incorporeal being “spatial”? And how do you prove angels are composed of “subtle matter”, and how does that imply temporal and spatial existence?

I don’t intend to prove anything about angels really. The reason they are composed of ‘subtle matter’ is because despite being incorporeal, they sometimes take on bodily form. Atemporal beings cannot change, since time is a measure of change.

 

[mfbukowski]

plato.stanford.edu/entries/immutability/
Boethius actually followed his reasoning about divine perfection to the conclusion that God exists outside time by his very nature – that God can’t be temporal. For whatever has neither past nor future is not located in time. But change requires existence in time. Suppose that a turnip, aging, goes from fresh to spoiled. It also then goes from fresh to not-fresh. So first “the turnip is fresh” is true, then “it is not the case that the turnip is fresh” is true. The two cannot be true at once. So things change only if they exist at at least two distinct times. Hence, if God is necessarily atemporal – via necessary divine perfection – God is necessarily changeless, i.e. immutable.

No, I don’t. Angels are created and incorporeal.

As previously noted, Angels are created, and as such, cannot exist atemporally.

Wow.

This is time 1. I am sitting on a hot day in my garage, and I am perspiring. God exists.

This is time 2. I am sweatier than I was at time 1. God exists.

God existed at both time one and time 2.

So how does this prove that God is atemporal and immutable?

I think this IS the Chinese room. Anyway, it is some language I don’t speak