Thomas Aquinas's proofs-Multiple Gods?

[SeekingCatholic]

plato.stanford.edu/entries/immutability/
Boethius actually followed his reasoning about divine perfection to the conclusion that God exists outside time by his very nature – that God can’t be temporal. For whatever has neither past nor future is not located in time. But change requires existence in time. Suppose that a turnip, aging, goes from fresh to spoiled. It also then goes from fresh to not-fresh. So first “the turnip is fresh” is true, then “it is not the case that the turnip is fresh” is true. The two cannot be true at once. So things change only if they exist at at least two distinct times. Hence, if God is necessarily atemporal – via necessary divine perfection – God is necessarily changeless, i.e. immutable.

Well sure, if you’re going to define time that way, then of course it’s a tautology that an atemporal being is incapable of change. You’ve simply defined time (“past” and “future”) as the metric which differentiates a changed entity from its former state, and stated, tautologically, that that metric must be inapplicable to an unchangeable being.

Of course what I mean by “time” is “time” as we experience it in the physical universe. The existence of such a universe and the time in it is not necessary for change. A being that exists outside our universe could yet be capable of change, and yet not measurable in terms of our time; it would exist outside our time. (Relativity has put the kabosh on the idea of “absolute time” anyway.)

“Before” can be defined in a metaphysical, not only a temporal sense. It is nonsense to say God existed “before” our universe in a temporal sense - there is no “before” our universe in a temporal sense. There is in a metaphysical sense - has to be, for the expression “God created the universe from nothing” to make any sense. There had to be “nothing” metaphysically “before” the universe.

No, I don’t. Angels are created and incorporeal.

And as such, they exist outside of our physical universe, and thus outside of our spacetime, and thus outside of our time.

As previously noted, Angels are created, and as such, cannot exist atemporally.

Obviously not, by your definition of the term. They do however by my definition of the term.

 

[holy_wood]

Hello people, sorry for interrupting your debate. I read all post and I’m embarrassed to say that a lot of it was over my head. For this reason I ask if one of you could “post” the answers to my following questions, not give me a link to find the answer from another author.

I want you to “post” it, either in the thread or a private message, because:

1. I may not understand them.
2. I want the answer to be succinct and simple enough so that when friends ask me…

• Why must God must be all powerful (not just powerful enough to create the universe)?
• Why must God be infinite and eternal?
• Why must there only be one God and not many?
• How does the Trinity fit in?
• (I know the Mormons in this thread don’t necessarily agree but I want to here from those who do)
• Why God must be personal in nature?
  I can give them quick “sound-bite” answers. This way I can show that I actually thought about these questions, have “reasonable answers” for them (thus showing I have not just been conditioned to believe) as well as leave room to expand on these questions later.

Thank you for taking the time to help me out.

 

[punkforchrist]

Hi holy_wood,

holy_wood:

Hello people, sorry for interrupting your debate. I read all post and I’m embarrassed to say that a lot of it was over my head.

Don’t feel embarrassed by that. There’s still so much about philosophy that I have to learn, and I have a B.A. in philosophy.

For some background, when we speak of ‘God’, we’re initially speaking of an unchanging being, an ‘unmoved mover’, or ‘first cause’ of the created order. We begin our apologetic by asking two fundamental questions: 1) does something unchanging exist?; and 2) is this being the God of classical theism?

In support of (1), I (and others on this thread) have argued that the regularity with which we observe change is itself an indication of something unchanging. ‘Regularity’ itself is a description of something unchanging. If it were to change, it would not be regular to begin with. So, something unchanging exists.

Secondly, we have been using words like ‘actuality’ and ‘potentiality’. Here’s what we mean. At one point in time, you were a fetus (in actuality) and an adult (in potentiality). Changing beings are composed of both actuality and potentiality, since they are one thing, but can possibly change into something else.

Now, something unchanging has no potentiality to change whatsoever. Hence, it must be purely actual. This will be key as we explore your questions.

*]Why must God must be all powerful (not just powerful enough to create the universe)?

If we understand the ‘universe’ as entailing every being that possesses some potentiality (we live in a changing universe, after all), then God must be fully actual in every respect. To illustrate this further, you and I are partly actual and partly potential. We have only some power because we are partly actual. A purely actual being, then, must possess every power there is to have.

*]Why must God be infinite and eternal?

Given that God is pure actuality, there could never be a time in which He was not. If He ever came into or out of being, then He wouldn’t be purely actual, since only potential beings can change from being to non-being, or vice-versa.

*]Why must there only be one God and not many?

If there were more than one purely actual being, then there would be distinctions between them. We can only know that A and B are different if they can be distinguished–that is, if one has some attribute the other hasn’t. Since these distinctions entail limitations, and only potential beings are limited, then what is purely actual cannot have any distinctions between “other” pure actualities. Hence, what is purely actual (God) must be one.

*]How does the Trinity fit in?

The doctrine of the Trinity cannot be proven by the use of natural reason. It is revealed to us in Sacred Scripture and Tradition. However, despite the fact that natural reason cannot prove the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, neither is the doctrine opposed to natural reason. There is no contradiction in saying that there is one God in three persons. Norman Geisler puts it this way: there is one what (God, the being of God) and three who’s (persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit).

*]Why God must be personal in nature?

Let’s take the example of knowledge. Partly actual beings have some knowledge. It therefore logically follows that a purely actual being would know everything there is to know; God must be omniscient, or all-knowing. However, only persons have knowledge. Therefore, it follows that God is personal.

One might respond by saying that ignorance is an actuality, but God cannot be ignorant. However, this misconstrues the nature of ignorance, which is a privation (a lack of an actuality). God is the fullness of what is actual, not of what is lacking.

Thank you for taking the time to help me out.

I hope this is helpful. There are some great resources out there. You might check out Norman Geisler’s Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal. I recommended the book early on the thread. It’s a wonderful introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas that is helpful in understanding some of these issues.

Blessings

 

[HelenaMT]

I must admit it has been a long time since I have read my Aquinas, but let me throw out a VERY speculative question. Suppose the “supreme being” does in fact change. Let me be frank. As a Mormon, I believe that God can change, yet He is always “more supreme” than any other beings.

I would be interested in your feedback on why this concept is logically invalid, if it can be shown to be.

Another interesting question is the big bang question. Can we in principle know about anything which occurred “before” the big bang? I see this as problematic. Partially I think the problem becomes, if time started with the big bang, was there any time “before time?” Is this knowable?

Further, suppose there were “other Gods” which, unknowable to us, existed “before” the big bang?

Just asking!?

Most of this thread is over my head as I’ve never studied philosophy but I am interested to know why you as a Mormon believe that God is a changeable being where other denominations do not.

I have a hard time imagining God as unchangable too but it may be that I’m not understanding what that is supposed to mean.

For instance, when God brought the universe into existence, wouldn’t that have changed Him, in that He was no longer the only thing in existence and now had something other than Himself to relate to? And wouldn’t the act of deciding to bring the universe into existence be a change in God’s state of mind, from not doing so to deciding to do so?

Are these the sorts of questions that make you come to those conclusions? Or are they more theologically based?

 

[holy_wood]

Thanks those answers were very helpful.

So my next line of questions relates to the God of the Bible.

It appears to me that God is changing all the time. He gets pleased, angry, sad, vengeful, ect. Are these not changes in a purely actual being? I mean he moved from one state of mind to another.

Furthermore, what about animal sacrifices. Why was that a sign of repentance in the OT but was replaced by Christ sacrifice in the NT?

Also, why did he only reveal himself to the Jews and not everyone else?

Again, I don’t expect blow away answers. Just “sound-bite” answers that will appease my atheist and agnostic friends when they bring up these issues.

I kind of reasoned that God’s will is that all be saved but in order for people to be saved people must exercise there free-will and choose God. This means acknowledgment of ones offenses against God and repenting. From reading verses like Malachi 1:1-11 I get the impression that the repentance shown to God was a hallow one. And since we changed God for our benefit revealed a better way for our salvation.

I am on the right track or not?

 

[Contarini]

This is an interesting juxtoposition of statements, to say the least.

That’s fair! Although my point was that what you’ve said so far strikes me in this way, and I’m willing to have my negative impressions removed by further explanation.

Since this was my first post, I am interested in wondering what part of “my theism” you find “superfluous and theologically idolatrous”? Perhaps you read my mind?

No. I read your one post. Admittedly I did so in the light of previous discussions I’ve had with Mormons, and my fairly limited study of Mormon theology. (I am quite aware of the ease with which orthodox Christians misrepresent Mormonism, and am on my guard against trusting “outsider” accounts of Mormon belief. But in the past when I have discussed these issues with Mormons, the result has confirmed my impression that there are serious problems with the Mormon version of theism.)

My reasons for believing in God are primarily that it seems to me that what is changing must depend on something unchanging, what is finite on something infinite, etc. Or at least this is far more likely than that the changing and finite exists eternally (and certainly more likely than that it randomly emerged from nothing for no reason whatever). But if the changing and finite does exist eternally, I see no particular reason to label one part of that changing and finite universe “God” in anything remotely like the traditional monotheistic sense.

The notion that “what is changing depends on something unchanging” is of course rather Thomist or Aristotilian. I would prescribe more to a Heraclitan view that change and experience are primary. I have no problem with the notion of eternal change or that eternal things can be changing things.

If by “eternal” you mean “endless extension in time” then yes, of course an eternal thing can be a changing thing. If, however, you take “eternal” to imply “infinity” in an ontological and not simply a chronological sense, then I think the case is very different. (By “ontological infinity” I mean “the absence of any limitations on being”–this assumes the Platonic doctrine that evil is a privation of being and not a being itself, so that infinite being is incapable of evil).

And yes, the early Church made a considered choice that the Platonic/Aristotelian complex of philosophical ideas was more compatible with Christian doctrine than the available alternatives. I am unpersuaded by modern attempts (whether Mormon or other) to reverse that decision. Of course, Christians radically modified this set of ideas in a number of ways, such as by introducing the concept of infinity.

I would say that it is linguistically interesting that to even formulate the idea of “unchanging” we first have to have the idea of “change” and then make it a negative, in effect.

Of course. Because language derives from sensory experience, and sensory experience by definition relates to changing things. I do not believe that this means that nothing outside sensory experience can exist.

I would find this matter issue as analogous to the notion of an eternal, but changing God.

Fair enough. But I remain puzzled as to how you understand God’s relationship with the universe. Do you see God as part of the universe? If not, why not? To me it’s easy to say why God is not part of the universe, because God lacks the limitations that characterize the observable universe (of which change is one–change is a limitation because it implies that one is actually one thing and potentially some other thing, whereas the God of classical theism eternally is whatever it is possible for Him to be). I don’t see how one makes this case from the point of view of Mormonism, or process theism, or for that matter open theism.

My belief in God is experiential. I believe in God because I have had experiences that are just as real to me as sensory experience which show me that He exists. If we postulate some kind of “6th sense” which is the “God communication sense” I would even say perhaps we could call His existance “observable”.

I’m tempted to tackle this concept of direct experience of God, but that would lead us into deep waters and I’m not sure I’m ready for that. And it would be a digression no doubt.

I think the more relevant question here is: just what do you mean when you call what you experience “God”?

While I’m unwilling to give up on the concept of proving God’s existence entirely, I think Aquinas’s famous “five proofs” function within the Summa primarily as a starting point for naming God–what is it that we mean when we use the word? I don’t know of a better account of this than Part I of the Summa, and when I say “God” I mean basically the being that Aquinas describes there. What do you mean?

Edwin

 

[1holycatholic]

No. I read your one post. Admittedly I did so in the light of previous discussions I’ve had with Mormons, and my fairly limited study of Mormon theology. (I am quite aware of the ease with which orthodox Christians misrepresent Mormonism, and am on my guard against trusting “outsider” accounts of Mormon belief. But in the past when I have discussed these issues with Mormons, the result has confirmed my impression that there are serious problems with the Mormon version of theism.)

If you want to know about the LDS they put what they believe online at lds.org.

Example:
D&C 132: 37 Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are gods, not angels.
This is obviously inconsistent with Natural Theology.

 

[mfbukowski]

If there were more than one purely actual being, then there would be distinctions between them. We can only know that A and B are different if they can be distinguished–that is, if one has some attribute the other hasn’t. Since these distinctions entail limitations, and only potential beings are limited, then what is purely actual cannot have any distinctions between “other” pure actualities. Hence, what is purely actual (God) must be one.

The doctrine of the Trinity cannot be proven by the use of natural reason. It is revealed to us in Sacred Scripture and Tradition. However, despite the fact that natural reason cannot prove the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, neither is the doctrine opposed to natural reason. There is no contradiction in saying that there is one God in three persons. Norman Geisler puts it this way: there is one what (God, the being of God) and three who’s (persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit).

I am curious how paragraph one squares with paragraph two.

Catholics also believe that Christ is now a resurrected being with a body.

Does this then give Him characteristics which distinguish Him from his Father? Do these distinctions then create “limitations”?

And how does this square with the idea that both the father and son are “one” even though distinguishable?

 

[mfbukowski]

I’m tempted to tackle this concept of direct experience of God, but that would lead us into deep waters and I’m not sure I’m ready for that. And it would be a digression no doubt.

I think the more relevant question here is: just what do you mean when you call what you experience “God”?

I’m a bit short on time tonight but wanted to get something back on your side of the the net, so I am going for the quick and easy one first.

What I am speaking of is not a “direct experience of God” but a communication FROM God. It can be the “still small voice” mentioned in the scriptures or a more direct experience consisting of a tangible feeling of peace, knowledge, and ineffible love. But it is clear that it is not a psychological reaction; it is a sensation as clearly from “outside” as suddenly hearing a trumpet or catching a sudden reflection of sunlight while driving. All who have experienced it describe it similarly; it is typically described as a “burning of the bosom”

More to come soon, thanks for your reply

 

[holy_wood]

I am curious how paragraph one squares with paragraph two.

Catholics also believe that Christ is now a resurrected being with a body.

Does this then give Him characteristics which distinguish Him from his Father? Do these distinctions then create “limitations”?

And how does this square with the idea that both the father and son are “one” even though distinguishable?

Nice question.

 

[1holycatholic]

I am curious how paragraph one squares with paragraph two.

Catholics also believe that Christ is now a resurrected being with a body.

Does this then give Him characteristics which distinguish Him from his Father? Do these distinctions then create “limitations”?

And how does this square with the idea that both the father and son are “one” even though distinguishable?

newadvent.org/summa/1.htm
Read 27 through 43.

 

[mfbukowski]

…If by “eternal” you mean “endless extension in time” then yes, of course an eternal thing can be a changing thing. If, however, you take “eternal” to imply “infinity” in an ontological and not simply a chronological sense, then I think the case is very different. (By “ontological infinity” I mean “the absence of any limitations on being”–this assumes the Platonic doctrine that evil is a privation of being and not a being itself, so that infinite being is incapable of evil).

… Do you see God as part of the universe? If not, why not? To me it’s easy to say why God is not part of the universe, because God lacks the limitations that characterize the observable universe (of which change is one–change is a limitation because it implies that one is actually one thing and potentially some other thing, whereas the God of classical theism eternally is whatever it is possible for Him to be). I don’t see how one makes this case from the point of view of Mormonism, or process theism, or for that matter open theism.

…While I’m unwilling to give up on the concept of proving God’s existence entirely, I think Aquinas’s famous “five proofs” function within the Summa primarily as a starting point for naming God–what is it that we mean when we use the word? I don’t know of a better account of this than Part I of the Summa, and when I say “God” I mean basically the being that Aquinas describes there. What do you mean?

I am not sure it is possible for a Thomist Catholic and a Wittgensteinian Mormon to understand each other’s language well enough to carry on a meaningful dialogue, but I think the attempt might be a good exercise.

I think my main problem is with the idea that change is a “limitation”, quoting you

“change is a limitation because it implies that one is actually one thing and potentially some other thing,”

Tied into it is the notion of “potentiality”, and “actuality” which I think are buzzwords in Thomism, bringing with them tons of pre-conceived notions which are not found in the way we ordinarily use the words. Of course you don’t hear “potentiality” on the street every day either!!

I am not putting a value judgement on that; it is just that it makes communication difficult.

I do not see change as a limitation. I see it as an inevitablity. Entropy is a law of physics. In personal matters, the potentiality to change is called “freedom”, which is usually seen as a “good thing” to quote the great philosopher Martha Stewart.

It is directly my purpose to question the dualist assumptions required by Thomism, acquired I suppose from Plato. If you need a quick proxy to characterize my position, you can dust off the arguments you might give to a follower of Teilhard de Chardin. I don’t agree with him on many things, but I think he was definitely in the right ballpark.

So to get more directly to your points, though I understand your distinction between ontological and chronological infinity, for me, I am not sure it is an issue. I believe I can see how it bears on your question about God being IN or OUT of the universe. I believe that God operates within natural laws which he created, and the violation of which would cause him to cease to be God, because he would no longer be following his own “commandments” in a sense. So is He in or out? I would say he is “voluntarily in”. I am sure you can understand this concept; as a catholic you have certain requirements which you have voluntarily taken upon yourself which do not apply to non-catholics.

For you, not making your “easter duty” would (I think) be a mortal sin. For me, it would not be because I have not taken on this obligation. I have taken on the obligation to abstain from alchohol, so for me drinking wine would be a sin, but for you it would not. God cannot violate natural laws. (Miracles are within natural laws that we simply do not yet understand. If you had a radio a thousand years ago and produced voices out of the air, it would have been considered a “miracle”)

So is making your easter duty a “limitation” on you? You have the choice not to, but you will not accept the consequences of not doing so. Same with me and wine. Consider someone who attends AA meetings, and abstains for non-religious reasons. He has accepted the limitation voluntarily as well, because he knows the consequences.

Quoting you:

the God of classical theism eternally is whatever it is possible for Him to be

Is it possible for God to sin? Is that a limitation?

Quoting you again:

I don’t know of a better account of this than Part I of the Summa, and when I say “God” I mean basically the being that Aquinas describes there. What do you mean?

Jesus is a resurrected being with a body, and that does not limit him.

His father is also a resurrected being with a body. He also is unlimited, except for the limits which he places on himself, as discussed above.

Does Jesus’ body occupy space, so does this limit where he can be? Whatever your answer for that, it would also apply to the father.

 

[1holycatholic]

Tied into it is the notion of “potentiality”, and “actuality” which I think are buzzwords in Thomism, bringing with them tons of pre-conceived notions which are not found in the way we ordinarily use the words. Of course you don’t hear “potentiality” on the street every day either!!

Yes, you do.

Actually, I speak English and Castilian. Potentially, I could become a speaker of another language, like Euskara.

You didn’t read the explanation of the Trinity in the Summa, did you?

 

[mfbukowski]

Yes, you do.

Actually, I speak English and Castilian. Potentially, I could become a speaker of another language, like Euskara.

You didn’t read the explanation of the Trinity in the Summa, did you?

I think I would have to re-read the entire Summa, because I didn’t understand how he was using the words. I just asked a question, and could not find the relevant section. My initial take was that he was defining everything in a way to make it all come out. I think his goal was to create a logical framework for Christianity, which he did, but I really don’t want to become a Thomist.

Maybe it is me who is wrong, or again as I said earlier maybe I am the one who is speaking Chinese in an English room

Maybe you can explain it? You are so good at languages!

 

[fishstick]

There can never be two, much less, multiple gods:

If there are two or more gods, one can be distinguished from the other.

1. There can never be two, much less three or more infinites.
2. Because if there are two infinites, one can be distinguished from the other.
3. If one can be distinguished from the other, there are characteristics of one which the other may not have.
4. If there are characteristics of one which the other may not have, therefore, the other has limitation.
5. If the other has limitation, therefore, it is not infinite.

You’re assuming the gods follow mathematical law. If these gods will it, there can be more then one infinity.

 

[holy_wood]

You’re assuming the gods follow mathematical law. If these gods will it, there can be more then one infinity.

If there were two or more gods (i.e. more than one purely actual being), then there would be distinctions between them. We can only know that A and B are different if they can be distinguished–that is, if one has some attribute the other hasn’t this would mean that it is not infinite. Since these distinctions entail limitations, and only potential beings are limited, then what is purely actual cannot have any distinctions between “other” pure actualities. Hence, what is purely actual (God) must be one.
Here is an example. Pour water into a cup and then pur some more. You would not be able to distinguish the water poured in initially from the water poured in the second time, since the water is indistinguishable.
or
Paint an entire wall yellow. Then color the wall with another coating of the same yellow paint. You would not be able to distinguish the first coating from the second costing, since both coatings color the entire wall and are the same color. It is the same with an infinite being. Two infinite beings would both be everywhere with the same infinitely perfect attributes. There would be no way for us to distinguish the two. They would completely overlap each other. So you can cannot have two or more distinguishable infinite beings.

Now, you may argue that although you cannot have two distinguishable infinite beings, I have not proven that you cannot have two indistinguishable infinite beings. You can have two or more infinte beings sharing the exact same space, and are indistinguishable except to each other. And if you said this, I would have to concede that you right.

But this is exactly what the Christian faith is saying. The doctrine of the Trinity cannot be proven by the use of natural reason. It is revealed to us in Sacred Scripture and Tradition.
However, despite the fact that natural reason cannot prove the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, neither is the doctrine opposed to natural reason. There is no contradiction in saying that there is one God in three persons. Norman Geisler puts it this way: there is one what (God, the being of God) and three who’s (persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit).
If you have two or more indistinguishable beings, isn’t this what traditional Christianity calls the Trinity? If there are two or more beings that are indistinguishable, then that would mean that they share the same essence, just as two coats of yellow sharing the same essence - the yellow paint.

So logic clearly shows that you cannot have two or more distinguishable beings but logic cannot show that you cannot have two or more indistinguishable beings that completely overlap in the same state of existence, sharing the same essence, which is the doctrine of the Trinity - Three Persons sharing one Essence.

In summary:

To tell one from the other means one has characteristics the other lacks, meaning not infinite, therefore not a true god.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

For some background, when we speak of ‘God’, we’re initially speaking of an unchanging being, an ‘unmoved mover’, or ‘first cause’ of the created order. We begin our apologetic by asking two fundamental questions: 1) does something unchanging exist?; and 2) is this being the God of classical theism?

In support of (1), I (and others on this thread) have argued that the regularity with which we observe change is itself an indication of something unchanging. ‘Regularity’ itself is a description of something unchanging. If it were to change, it would not be regular to begin with. So, something unchanging exists…

Now, something unchanging has no potentiality to change whatsoever. Hence, it must be purely actual. This will be key as we explore your questions.

This a logical fallacy. To put it in the terms of modal logic, you proceed from

Necessarily, there exists some being which is unchanging to

Necessarily, there exists a being which is **necessarily **unchanging

without any logical justification whatsoever. This entails the proposition

Necessarily, any being capable of change (not **necessarily **unchanging) has in fact changed

which you have not proved, despite my having asked you several times for it.

 

[fishstick]

If there were two or more gods (i.e. more than one purely actual being), then there would be distinctions between them. We can only know that A and B are different if they can be distinguished–that is, if one has some attribute the other hasn’t this would mean that it is not infinite. Since these distinctions entail limitations, and only potential beings are limited, then what is purely actual cannot have any distinctions between “other” pure actualities. Hence, what is purely actual (God) must be one.
Here is an example. Pour water into a cup and then pur some more. You would not be able to distinguish the water poured in initially from the water poured in the second time, since the water is indistinguishable.
or
Paint an entire wall yellow. Then color the wall with another coating of the same yellow paint. You would not be able to distinguish the first coating from the second costing, since both coatings color the entire wall and are the same color. It is the same with an infinite being. Two infinite beings would both be everywhere with the same infinitely perfect attributes. There would be no way for us to distinguish the two. They would completely overlap each other. So you can cannot have two or more distinguishable infinite beings.

Now, you may argue that although you cannot have two distinguishable infinite beings, I have not proven that you cannot have two indistinguishable infinite beings. You can have two or more infinte beings sharing the exact same space, and are indistinguishable except to each other. And if you said this, I would have to concede that you right.

But this is exactly what the Christian faith is saying. The doctrine of the Trinity cannot be proven by the use of natural reason. It is revealed to us in Sacred Scripture and Tradition.
However, despite the fact that natural reason cannot prove the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, neither is the doctrine opposed to natural reason. There is no contradiction in saying that there is one God in three persons. Norman Geisler puts it this way: there is one what (God, the being of God) and three who’s (persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit).
If you have two or more indistinguishable beings, isn’t this what traditional Christianity calls the Trinity? If there are two or more beings that are indistinguishable, then that would mean that they share the same essence, just as two coats of yellow sharing the same essence - the yellow paint.

So logic clearly shows that you cannot have two or more distinguishable beings but logic cannot show that you cannot have two or more indistinguishable beings that completely overlap in the same state of existence, sharing the same essence, which is the doctrine of the Trinity - Three Persons sharing one Essence.

In summary:

To tell one from the other means one has characteristics the other lacks, meaning not infinite, therefore not a true god.

Again you assume these gods follow mathematics or logic. The paint analogy doesn’t work because paint is not a divine figure. A god can do anything, and gods can do anything, there is no way of understanding them at all, and infinite and finite are human concepts. You can have these two beings with two essences, and those two essences being all encompassing. Or maybe one of the gods dominates our neighbor universe, and another god dominates this one, while in their own plane of existence they have their own god whom they worship, who is singular and all encompassing (or maybe it keeps going like a russian doll, for “infinity” as we humans call it).

 

[holy_wood]

This a logical fallacy. To put it in the terms of modal logic, you proceed from

Necessarily, there exists some being which is unchanging to

Necessarily, there exists a being which is **necessarily **unchanging

without any logical justification whatsoever. This entails the proposition

Necessarily, any being capable of change (not **necessarily **unchanging) has in fact changed

which you have not proved, despite my having asked you several times for it.

I kind of get what your saying but to me the first and second propositions are self-evident.

Existence began somewhere. An infinite regress is logically impossible. Nothing potential actualizes itself.

If Thomas Aquinus’ model is wrong then logic itself is an illusion developed by men.

 

[holy_wood]

Again you assume these gods follow mathematics or logic. The paint analogy doesn’t work because paint is not a divine figure. A god can do anything, and gods can do anything, there is no way of understanding them at all, and infinite and finite are human concepts. You can have these two beings with two essences, and those two essences being all encompassing. Or maybe one of the gods dominates our neighbor universe, and another god dominates this one, while in their own plane of existence they have their own god whom they worship, who is singular and all encompassing (or maybe it keeps going like a russian doll, for “infinity” as we humans call it).

Do you accept the premise that true god’s are pure actuality lacking no privation or potentiality?

If you don’t we are merely discussing a really powerful being and not the god of classical theism.

Can god’s make themselves not exist and the bring themselves back into existence?

Can gods be all-knowing and all-ignorant at the same time?

Can one all-powerful god destroy another all-powerful god without that gods consent?

Is god a purple spaghetti monster who made the world out of cheese?

Or if these gods are all powerful do they have equal dominion over this world? If one god wanted it to be hot and another cold whose will will be done. It cannot be through shere force because they are both equal in power.

Can a God force a free being to love Him? No, because that creature would not truley be free. I give you thousands of examples. ect.,ect.

We come to belief in God by natural reason.

You say gods can do anything. I would say a god can do anything logically possible.

You speak of God himself having a god well the God of classical theism is the first cause. An infinite regress is logically impossible. ***If you won’t except logic then this argument is pointless my friend and I might as well ignore your post.

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When we speak of God we speak of the origin of all existence. God is the self-existing, uncreated Being whose entire explanation must be in Himself, in Whom there can be no trace of chance; but it would be mere chance if God possessed only a finite degree of perfection, for however high that degree might be, everything in the uncreated Being – His perfections, His individuality, His personality – admit the possibility of His possessing a still higher degree of entirety.

From outside Himself, God cannot be limited, because, being uncreated, He is absolutely independent of external causes and conditions. Limitation would be chance; the more so because we can maintain not only that any given finite degree of perfection may be surpassed, but also, in a positive way, that an infinite being is possible.

Moreover, if God were finite, the existence of other gods, His equals or even His superiors in perfection would be possible, and it would be mere chance if they did not exist.

Of such gods, no trace can be found, while on the other hand, God’s infinity is suggested by various data of experience, and in particular by our unbounded longing after knowledge and happiness. The more man a man is, and the more he follows his best thoughts and impulses, the less he is satisfied with merely finite cognitions and pleasures. That the essential cravings of our nature are not deceptive, is demonstrated at once by experience and speculation.

newadvent.org/cathen/08004a.htm