It’s Pope StJPII in Evangelium Vitae…
#27 …Among the signs of hope we should also count the spread, at many levels of public opinion, of a new sensitivity ever more opposed to war as an instrument for the resolution of conflicts between peoples, and increasingly oriented to finding effective but “non-violent” means to counter the armed aggressor. In the same perspective there is evidence of a growing public opposition to the death penalty, even when such a penalty is seen as a kind of “legitimate defence” on the part of society. Modern society in fact has the means of effectively suppressing crime by rendering criminals harmless without definitively denying them the chance to reform.
Another welcome sign is the growing attention being paid to the quality of life and to ecology, especially in more developed societies, where people’s expectations are no longer concentrated so much on problems of survival as on the search for an overall improvement of living conditions. Especially significant is the reawakening of an ethical reflection on issues affecting life. The emergence and ever more widespread development of bioethics is promoting more reflection and dialogue—between believers and non-believers, as well as between followers of different religions— on ethical problems, including fundamental issues pertaining to human life.
- This situation, with its lights and shadows, ought to make us all fully aware that we are facing an enormous and dramatic clash between good and evil, death and life, the “culture of death” and the “culture of life”. We find ourselves not only “faced with” but necessarily “in the midst of” this conflict: we are all involved and we all share in it, with the inescapable responsibility of choosing to be unconditionally pro-life.
Ok. I see “unconditionally pro-life.” And on that point there’s no disagreement. What I don’t see in your statement I quoted before was “on every level.” Nor do I see that implied. For if we are to be pro-life “on every level” than lethal self-defense or just war would be improper.
Indeed, JPII makes it clear that efforts to eliminate capital punishment are conditional upon current society. That is “[m]odern society in fact has the means of effectively suppressing crime by rendering criminals harmless…” JPII even acknowledges in #55 the right of the state to utilized capital punishment (emphasis mine):
Moreover, “legitimate defence can be not only a right
but a grave duty for someone responsible for another’s life, the common good of the family or of the State”. Unfortunately it happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of causing harm sometimes involves taking his life. In this case,
the fatal outcome is attributable to the aggressor whose action brought it about, even though he may not be morally responsible because of a lack of the use of reason.
Note too his acknowledgement that it is the aggressor that forfeits his life. It is not the taking of a life by another in defense of one’s life, the common good of the family, or of the State.
And he goes on in #56 (emphasis mine):
This is the context in which to place the problem of the death penalty. On this matter there is a growing tendency, both in the Church and in civil society, to demand that it be applied in a very limited way or even that it be abolished completely. The problem must be viewed in the context of a system of penal justice ever more in line with human dignity and thus, in the end, with God’s plan for man and society.
The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is “to redress the disorder caused by the offence”. Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way authority also fulfils the purpose of defending public order and ensuring people’s safety, while at the same time offering the offender an incentive and help to change his or her behaviour and be rehabilitated.
It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society.
Today however, as a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent.
In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church remains valid: “If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person”.
Two points. First, JPII recognizes that the ‘primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is "to redress the disorder caused by the offence’." Second, the opposition to the use of capital punishment is dependent upon “stead improvements in the organization of the penal system.” Both of which are exactly Ender’s point.
The use of capital punishment is one of prudential judgement, not morality. Of course, one’s judgement can be wrong. But like any other act, culpability is tempered by knowledge and cooperation. If one sincerely believes that capital punishment serves the common good of the family or of the State, and one acts in good faith, I suspect standing before God at the day of judgement will not be one to fear. Being mistaken is not the same thing as being evil.
