Vico, I thought “hypostasis” means “essence”
How can St.Thomas state:
“since it sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis”???
This gets more and more complex…
Besides, this does not clarify what the difference is between a “Being” and a “Person” for which Peter Plato nearly bit my head off (jokes!) for confusing the two.
Can you answer this simply in a way that resembles “a Being is…” and “a Person is…”
Thank you
.
Being is the real, and corresponds to essence or thing.
Person is every individual intellectual substance which is complete in itself, uncommunicable and existing for itself.
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q29, Article 2. Whether “person” is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence? “The Philosopher” is Aristotle]
I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance is twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the Greeks ousia, what we may call “essence.” In another sense substance means a subject or “suppositum,” which subsists in the genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it is called “suppositum.” It is also called by three names signifying a reality–that is, “a thing of nature,” “subsistence,” and “hypostasis,” according to a threefold consideration of the substance thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is called “subsistence”; as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, it is called “a thing of nature”; as, for instance, this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is called “hypostasis,” or “substance.” What these three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this name “person” signifies in the genus of rational substances.
newadvent.org/summa/1029.htm#article2
For Ousia, Hypostasis, here is some of St. Basil, Letter 236 to Amphilochius:
- The distinction between οὐσία and ὑ πόστασις is the same as that between the general and the particular; as, for instance, between the animal and the particular man. Wherefore, in the case of the Godhead, we confess one essence or substance so as not to give a variant definition of existence, but we confess a particular hypostasis, in order that our conception of Father, Son and Holy Spirit may be without confusion and clear. If we have no distinct perception of the separate characteristics, namely, fatherhood, sonship, and sanctification, but form our conception of God from the general idea of existence, we cannot possibly give a sound account of our faith. We must, therefore, confess the faith by adding the particular to the common. The Godhead is common; the fatherhood particular. We must therefore combine the two and say, I believe in God the Father. The like course must be pursued in the confession of the Son; we must combine the particular with the common and say I believe in God the Son, so in the case of the Holy Ghost we must make our utterance conform to the appellation and say in God the Holy Ghost. Hence it results that there is a satisfactory preservation of the unity by the confession of the one Godhead, while in the distinction of the individual properties regarded in each there is the confession of the peculiar properties of the Persons. On the other hand those who identify essence or substance and hypostasis are compelled to confess only three Persons, and, in their hesitation to speak of three hypostases, are convicted of failure to avoid the error of Sabellius, for even Sabellius himself, who in many places confuses the conception, yet, by asserting that the same hypostasis changed its form to meet the needs of the moment, does endeavour to distinguish persons.
newadvent.org/fathers/3202236.htm
