Excellent question Linus - just noticed.
The problem is, I suppose, is that most wouldn’t know the philosophic history of the word.
Does that matter is another interesting question.
Who is the judge as to what a word “should mean”?
Unlike substances words evolve over time and by reason of translation and jumps into other cultures.
Good questions. I had two objectives. First I wanted to see just were some of our posters were. Secondly, I wanted to eventually get to the meaning of the word in Aristotelian/Thomistic philosophy, since that is the philosophy I am most interested in and the one I regard as essential to a true understanding of metaphysics.
Does “substance” (English) have to mean the same as “substantia” (Latin) or any other allegedly equivalent word in any otgher language preceding or postceding Greek?
I’m sure it does but I am just assuming that.
What right did the Philosophers of Greece (who disagreed amongst themselves) have to take a relatively vague everyday word from the common Greek people and give it a much narrower and very specific meaning anyway?
I don’t think that idea entered into their thinking. They were attempting to understand the world they lived in in a scientific way and for that they needed a " scientific " vocabulary so each teacher and each student would understand exactly what they were talking about. The same as science today. Science today wouldn’t have gotten where it is if there was not a uniform understanding of what terms stood for.
But to answer your question…
For me as a colonial English speaker trained in ancient and modern Philosophy, who prefers to speak philosophy in modern everday terms … I think “substance” refers to “something” that has an enduring, recognisable identity.
I agree.
Usually I would also mean that it stands in its own right (hence “red” is not really a substance because it only exists in something else as a quality). But people don’t always hold fast to that bit in practise.
Yes, as used in daily communication among the people its usage is flexible.
That opens a whole can of worms.
How do we know when that identity, through time and outward change, is no longer there?
That is the far more difficult question.
We could look at dictionaries from different periods. Or we could just ask the speaker how they meant the word to be understood.
But the really hard question I think is the practical applicability of such a concept:
…if we can only have an abstract “definition” of “substance” like I defined above … and never with certainty be able to apply it to any particular changing sensible thing … what is the real point of having such a precise word in our toolbox?
To be able to understand the science of Scholastic philosophy - if one is interested in that. Thomas and Aristotle faced the same problem. That is why they spent so much time explaining what certain terms meant - so everyone interested in the discipline could be on the same page.
Sure, it is mostly obvious when complex living creatures (which we would rightly call a substance) are no longer there (ie death). Though its hard to tell sometimes as a person on life support may not actually be human any longer (just a warm corpse artificially kept from corrupting).
Aristotle and Thomaa ( and other philosophers following their brand ) were not so much interested in analyzing each specific example of all possible substances or accidents. They were interested in explaining and passing on the principles of their philosophy which was directed at discovering the metaphysical structure and causes of reality. And for this they needed only a few examples and they tended to use the same ones over and over again, but in the context of different philosophical topics and questions.
But inanimate objects … its hard to know on what basis we might say water and clouds are the same substance, have the same identity.
Yes, but we don’t need many examples to establish the principles. But most of the Thomistic philosophers I’ve read ( in English ) for the last hundred years tend to use that specific example. Whereas, the more modern Thomistic writers, like Feser, are more adventurous.
O2 behaves differently from O … yet chemists tell us there is an abiding identity so they must be the same substance.
The writers I mentioned above tried to avoid questionable examples for the reasons I have given.
H2O and D2O are pretty much the same - yet chemists aren’t convinced we can say there is an abiding identity between the two because D2 is not really H2 at the atomic level.
Isotopes are problematic when it comes to defining identity even for Chemists.
As I said, there are always questionable cases. The point is to establish the principles and not to explicate each possible example. That would be more in the line of the hard sciences. The philosophical point is that every true substance stands on its own and is the foundation or platform for " accidents " which cannot stand on their own. From a philosophical point of view the universe is composed of substances and their " accidents. "
Over time we learn that our concepts of the real world always fall short of what the “real world” actually does as we learn more about it by observation and experiment.
Yes, science can help philosophy and philosophy can help science.
Linus2nd