For a thread that is about the scientific method, I found it surprising that “Feyerabend” and only a few mentions of “falsification” or “falsifiability”. Or “instrumentalism” or “antirealism” Regarding Feyerabend, I do not like any philosophy of science that can be used to endorse the view that astrology is a legitimate scientific discipline (in contemporary times) or that the term “scientific” cannot denote anything substantial about a body of knowledge.
Isn’t the OP begging the question when he/she asks about finding out what is true about external reality? It assumes scientific realism, which, admitted, is the common sense position. However, there are other viable epistemological alternatives to scientific realism, such as scientific instrumentalism, which I avidly subscribe to. There does not seem to be any necessary reason why “successful” scientific theories/hypotheses must refer to ontologically real entities, nor do I believe that science must make ontological claims.
Also, I am not sympathetic to the idea that “falsifiability” for a specific body of knowledge to be considered “scientific” or that "falsifiability’ is the distinguishing quality of science.
One major reason is the difficulty of identifying what precisely has been “falsified” if a particular test has not yielded the predicted result. (This is just a manifestation of the Duhem-Quine thesis.) If one says that “our current scientific knowledge is incorrect or incomplete” when an experiment does not give the expected result, then it is trivial to say that a given hypothesis or body of knowledge has been “falsified” because one’s cannot every completely understand a phenomenon. If one makes predictions and formulate hypotheses based on one’s understanding of a scientific theory and phenomenon, then it is inevitable that some experiments testing these predictions will deviate from the predicted result. Roughly, I think a scientific body of knowledge or hypothesis must be potentially* and feasibly be subjected to rigorous and systemic empirical testing, instead of just being conceptually fecund (as there are many papers published on string theory), consistent, or elegant. “String theory” can accommodate many parameters and experimental results, and can be easily reformulated to fit any experimental result.
- “potentially” is tricky, since it may be possible but not practical to test certain hypothesis. String theory, for instance, may be clear predictions or at least allow one to distinguish between a precise version of string theory, if one can run experiments using a particle accelerator that can go reach the grand unification scale, which is many magnitudes too high for the Large Hadron Collider. But this seems to be a physical limitation of testing string theory. Would financial or ethical limitations prevent certain hypotheses from being “scientific”.
Due to the religious nature of this forum, pretty much most of the discussion has focused on naturalism (as opposed to supernaturalism). (Come on, there is more to the philosophy of science than issues directly related to theology!) This is difficulty to address with brevity because “naturalism” or a “natural process” must first be rigorously defined. A quick and dirty aspect (and not the only facet) of naturalism is that its entities and processes must be restricted and limited in some way. For example, in particle physics, nothing cannot be faster than the speed of light; fermions cannot occupy the same quantum state, and free energy is conserved. This aspect of naturalism imposes some limitations of what can possibly happen within a theoretical framework and the behavior of theoretical entities and the phenomenon that is subsumed by the theoretical framework. Importantly, this would almost always exclude “supernatural” entities, particularly, the deities of monotheistic religions as those religions often emphasize the ineffability and mystery of God and that God is not constrained by anything.
The success of scientific theories that (perhaps by definition) only purport the existence of “natural” theoretical entities that have certain properties and limitations would support the position that these entities only exist and that only natural processes mediated by these theoretical entities are all there are to any phenomenon. It is an ontological view supported by the apparent success of science, but it does not exclude supernaturalism.