Where does Aristotle go wrong?

[itinerant1]

Golly… :banghead:

Let me try to make this as simple as possible: A person can make a controversial (or outright dubious) statement, such as, say, “Plants have souls.” I don’t have a problem with that. But whenever the same person who writes that doesn’t propose any substantiating evidence, yet still touts it about as though it is fact, that upsets me. This is especially the case when the person in question is an influential figure amidst gullible people.

To put that into the context of this thread: Aristotle could voice his opinion (or guesswork) all he wanted, but that didn’t grant him the right to parade it around as a fact with absolutely no substantiating evidence supporting it.

You are criticize Aristotle’s statement that plants have soul’s, saying that he presents no substantiating evidence. Apparently, you have not read much Aristotle. Have you studied his work on the soul, De Anima?

Do you know what Aristotle even means by the “vegetative soul”, the “sensitive soul”, or the “intellective soul?”

Aristotle’s theory of soul is an application of his doctrine of hyle-morphism (matter and form) to living things. The soul is the form of a living thing. It is its organizing principle and principle of life. There is more to a living organism than just the sum of its parts.

Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul is spot on. One must first understand what he taught. A common mistake for those unfamiliar with Aristotle is to think of the term “soul” in the modern sense of the word, in which it generally means that spiritual part of man which survives death. This is not at all what Aristotle means by the vegetative or plant soul.

 

[Oreoracle]

Hey, Areo. I’ll do my best to keep up with your posts. I don’t have much time at the moment.

Interesting. Isn’t this true for any kind of logic … not just modal logic?

Maybe I should have been clearer. Yes, it is true that the work of all logics takes place in the mind. What I meant to say was that ideas such as “necessity,” “contingency,” and the like are mental constructs; they may or may not be the case in reality (yes, I am aware of the irony in that statement ). For example, if a coin lands on heads in a coin flip, I might say, “For all I know, it is possible that the coin could have landed on heads,” but it would be a mistake to suppose that that is the reality of the situation. Probabilities, after all, are measurements of our own ignorance. I mean, if I knew how the coin would be affected by physical laws throughout the flip, I would contend instead that the coin must have landed on tails. But since I am ignorant of precisely how each flip will occur, I classify the event as a contingency in my mind.

In short, for any future event used in an argument under modal logic, we are making huge assumptions about the nature of the event. It is true that if something is not possibly the case, it is necessarily not the case, and we can symbolize that logically. But we have no way of knowing which events are “necessarily not the case.”

…there does seem to be different kinds of existence that can be distinguished from each other (and thus, in some way, defined).

Certainly. I would posit two sorts which I feel are necessary to explain my experiences: physical and conceptual.

When you say, for example, “existence applies to all items” … what do you mean by “item”? Is a unicorn an item? And, thus, does a unicorn exist? We can say things like, “A unicorn is a mythical horse with a horn” (which would be true) … and since we said “A unicorn IS something” does that imply that it exists in some way? What about a square circle? Is that an item? Does that exist in some way?

These are good questions, but I’m not sure that I can explain well enough without complicating matters.

By “item” I mean “entity” or even “thing.” I would define such terms as “compilations of qualities/properties/characteristics.” For my convenience, I’ll just say they consist of qualities, and you may substitute “qualities” for any synonym you prefer. Assuming that we agree on this definition of “thing,” we can propose a rule: contradictory qualities may not coexist (as Aristotle would call it, the Law of Noncontradiction). This effectively disqualifies “squared circles” as things, because squareness and circularity are contradictory in that they cannot compose the same thing.

As I stated earlier, I consider concepts to have existence (under the broadest notion of “existence”), and so I would say that unicorns exist conceptually. I suppose I would say that anything logically possible exists in some way, i.e., if it consists of qualities that do not contradict each other, it exists.

Lastly, what about “nothing” … does “nothing” exist?

No. Nothingness is devoid of qualities by definition. It serves only as a mental construct. Now I guess you could say that nothingness has the quality of lacking qualities, but this is a meaningless assessment, wouldn’t you agree?

Aristotle was the first and only philosopher who made sense of the different ways we use the word “existence” and it was then when I believed rational discourse was finally possible.

I’m not so certain. Existence only seems to be hotly debated in theological matters. (Other times, it occurs in matters of little significance.) That being said, God is described as a transcendent being that encompasses all realms of existence. If that is the case, then his existence in the physical “realm” ought to be demonstrable with evidence, which I never fail to ask for. Most arguments for his existence are attempts to conflate conceptual existence with physical existence. (As you can see, these are the only two sorts of existence I need to posit. Different people have different preferences, though, so I won’t judge you for using more than two. )

I’ll have to break this into two posts, so I’ll also have to re-type some of my response. Be patient!

 

[Syntax]

You might have heard me bash him for dabbling in modal logic, and I do so for all philosophers because I don’t think modal logic is useful for anything other than organizing our thoughts.

You are right that the study of the semantics of modal logic in terms of possible worlds talk is a theoretical device for cashing out differences in natural, metaphysical, and logical possibility and necessity. And most philosophers don’t construe “counterfactual possible worlds” talk Lewis-style as actually existent worlds such that the actual world is merely an indexical term designating our own world.

Using modal terms, the only description of the observable world we can give is that events which have occurred are possible.

Not exactly. Events that have already occured are more appropriately labeled “actual,” not merely just “possible.” “Possible” is a modal notion; “actual” is not (strictly) a non-modal notion, though it does function as a place-holder in building counterfactual scenarios.

That’s really all we know. We can’t prove that any event is “necessary” or demonstrate that any event which hasn’t yet occurred is possible. I don’t even know how we’d go about collecting evidence to suggest such things.

…But why do modal truths have to be empirically demonstrated? Not all truths are a posteriori demonstrable. A great many others are a priori, especially modal truths. Surely, you know this, yes? I’m curious, is there a difference, and if there is, which truths are a priori and which are a posteriori?

As for the bit about modal logic: Let’s say I flip a coin and it lands on heads. How might a modal logician demonstrate that it was ever possible for the coin to have landed on tails under identical circumstances? Most metaphysicians would say that the result of the coin flip was contingent, but I don’t buy it. How do you demonstrate the possibility of the coin landing on tails? (Hint: You cannot.)

No. You need many other premises to support your argumet. You are elicitly mixing the following distinct notions together in order to demonstrate the non-existence of modal truths, which *prima facie *can’t be done. :

(1) empirical vs. logical probability
(2) possibility vs. contingency vs. natural necessity
(3) a priori vs. a posteriori truths

First, a modal logician does not have to empirically demonstrate the possibility of a coin landing on tails, because “possibility” talk merely expresses an *a priori *counterfactual truth, not an a posteriori truth.

Second, we can certainly emprically demonstrate in a series of trials the ratio of heads/tails by flipping the coin and indefinite number of times in order to determine the empirical likelihood of one outcome over the other. So we will gather a non-modal a posteriori truth about the coin, namely, its disposition to come up one way rather than another way.

Third, when we say that empirical truths are contingent, we mean to say that they could have been otherwise because there is nothing logically contradictory about their contraries. So surely, the coin could have come up heads rather than tails. If you insist that this is indeterminate, then you need to tell us why you think purportedly counterfactual truths are all a posteriori, since I don’t see any reason why we should think this since all counterfactual circumstances are principally unobservable as they stand. So the question you need to answer is this: **why do counterfactuals have to be observable in order to be true? **

 

[Syntax]

You might have heard me bash him for dabbling in modal logic, and I do so for all philosophers because I don’t think modal logic is useful for anything other than organizing our thoughts.

You are right that the study of the semantics of modal logic in terms of possible worlds talk is a theoretical device for cashing out differences in natural, metaphysical, and logical possibility and necessity. And most philosophers don’t construe “counterfactual possible worlds” talk Lewis-style as actually existent worlds such that the actual world is merely an indexical term designating our own world.

Using modal terms, the only description of the observable world we can give is that events which have occurred are possible.

Not exactly. Events that have already occured are more appropriately labeled “actual,” *in addition to *being “possible.” “Possible” is a modal notion; “actual” is not (strictly) a modal notion, though it does function as a place-holder in building counterfactual scenarios.

That’s really all we know. We can’t prove that any event is “necessary” or demonstrate that any event which hasn’t yet occurred is possible. I don’t even know how we’d go about collecting evidence to suggest such things.

…But why do modal truths have to be empirically demonstrated? Not all truths are a posteriori demonstrable. A great many others are a priori, especially modal truths. Surely, you know this, yes? I’m curious, is there a difference, and if there is, which truths are a priori and which are a posteriori?

As for the bit about modal logic: Let’s say I flip a coin and it lands on heads. How might a modal logician demonstrate that it was ever possible for the coin to have landed on tails under identical circumstances? Most metaphysicians would say that the result of the coin flip was contingent, but I don’t buy it. How do you demonstrate the possibility of the coin landing on tails? (Hint: You cannot.)

No. You need many other premises to support your argument. You are elicitly mixing the following distinct categories together in order to demonstrate the non-existence of modal truths, which *prima facie *can’t be done. :

(1) empirical vs. logical probability
(2) possibility vs. contingency vs. necessity
(3) a priori vs. a posteriori truths

First, a modal logician does not have to empirically demonstrate the possibility of a coin landing on tails, because “possibility” talk merely expresses *a priori *counterfactual truths, not a posteriori truths.

Second, we can certainly emprically demonstrate in a series of trials the ratio of heads/tails by flipping the coin and indefinite number of times in order to determine the empirical likelihood of one outcome over the other. So we will gather a non-modal a posteriori truth about the coin, namely, its disposition to come up one way rather than another way.

Third, when we say that empirical truths are contingent, we mean to say that they could have been otherwise because there is nothing logically contradictory about their contraries. So surely, the coin *could have *come up heads rather than tails. If you insist that this is indeterminate, then you need to tell us why you think purportedly counterfactual truths are all a posteriori, since I don’t see any reason why we should think this since all counterfactual circumstances are principally unobservable as they stand. So the question you need to answer is this: **why do counterfactuals have to be observable in order to be true? **

 

[Syntax]

Yes, it is true that the work of all logics takes place in the mind. What I meant to say was that ideas such as “necessity,” “contingency,” and the like are mental constructs; they may or may not be the case in reality (yes, I am aware of the irony in that statement ). For example, if a coin lands on heads in a coin flip, I might say, "For all I know, it is possible that the coin could have landed on heads," but it would be a mistake to suppose that that is the reality of the situation. Probabilities, after all, are measurements of our own ignorance.

Not all probabilities are measures of our own ignorance (that’s epistemic/subjective probability). Empirical probability makes no assumptions about natural laws. It merely records the frequency of an event occuring given that conditions are the same in every trial.
Emprirical probabilities are a poseriori truths about the world which we can continue to verify.

I mean, if I knew how the coin would be affected by physical laws throughout the flip, I would contend instead that the coin must have landed on tails. But since I am ignorant of precisely how each flip will occur, I classify the event as a contingency in my mind!

Contingency is strictly a modal/semantic notion, not an epistemic notion, so it doesn’t makes sense that something is “contingent on your mind.” And statments expressing contigent truths cannot be derived from your lack of evidence for something since this is a fallacy of ignorance.

In short, for any future event used in an argument under modal logic, we are making huge assumptions about the nature of the event.

Modal logic doesn’t make any assumptions about empirical events. It merely says that those which are not logically contraditory are possible.

But we have no way of knowing which events are “necessarily not the case.”

Yes we do. ~(P and not-P) is necessarily not the case–an *a priori *necessary truth.

 

[Oreoracle]

So, we are to assume you’ve read all Aristotle’s works.

Of course not. You’re saying that I have to read all of a person’s works just to object to a few of their beliefs? That’s an insane standard you have there, or is it a standard you reserve only for Aristotle?

If that truly is your standard, then I must ask that you read every post I’ve written on this site before you respond.

Oh, Oreoracle, this is very incriminating. Aristotle is famous for defining human as a “rational animal” (he never said that humans were not animals). Also he defined animal as “a living being with senses.” He defined “living being” as a being that has reproductive, nutritive, and augmentative (i.e. pertaining to growth) powers.

Sorry, the “souls” hierarchy seemed to suggest that our rationality somehow made us superior to animals according to some arbitrary standard. Or maybe Aristotle is suggesting the classic “all animals are equal, but some are more equal than others.”

Personally, I dropped a lot of objects at the same time and one often falls faster than the other. That’s because some things experience air resistance (usually lighter things too). This may be the thing that screwed up Aristotle’s experiments. Just saying.

Surely a genius such as Aristotle isn’t prone to such errors. Would he not notice that the falling speed is directly affected by the air? Even children notice this–have you ever tried to throw a sheet of paper at someone?

Perhaps, what exactly are you talking about? What astronomical errors did he make? (I’m not denying he made some)

The “error” lies in making a claim without the means of verifying it.

Are you saying that EVERYTHING he said about these were wrong? Quite a claim. Even modern scientists still make mistakes in these fields … should we throw all their claims away therefore?

At the beginning of the thread, you ask “where does Aristotle go wrong?” You didn’t ask “why should all of Aristotle’s beliefs be dumped into a trash bin?”

It’s getting a bit silly at this point. You all are going to extraordinary lengths to defend Aristotle. From Magnanimity, I hear that any concurrence with Aristotle makes me an Aristotelian. From you, I hear that I must read all of his works to offer criticisms (Magnanimity would likely have me do the same). From others, there is constant grasping onto the few things he might have gotten right. I’m not trying to destroy the man’s worldview, I’m just pointing out his errors and the points where he offered nothing new to philosophy. In other words, I view him as an un-essential character among philosophers. You all act like I’m resurrecting him and then slaughtering him for giggles.

So, what were all these numerous errors? Are you even referring to his metaphysics (which, I remind you, is the topic of this thread)? If you think his errors regarding nature caused errors in his metaphysics, please prove.

Again, the thread topic was presented as “where did Aristotle go wrong?” not “where did Aristotle go wrong in metaphysics?” If you wish to talk only about metaphysics, I have nothing to say, as metaphysics is a dead-end pursuit (you’ll never know if you’re right or not). I wish to argue under the sane man’s standard of empirical evidence.

So, are you saying these virtues are wrong?

Wrong as in “evil” or wrong as in “incorrect?” There’s no such thing as a correct or incorrect ethic.

Well, you said that if something happened in the past, then it means that event is possible in the future. I have seen coins flip heads sometimes and tails other times … hence, by your own logic, it is possible for coins to flip heads or tails … hence contingency exists.

It’s not quite that easy, I’m afraid. I said it is possible under IDENTICAL circumstances (identical even on the atomic level). The air conditions have to be the same, the way you flip the coin has to be the same, the surface the coin lands on has to be the same, etc. Every imaginable thing affecting the scenario must be identical, and you aren’t likely to see that happen. Even if you did, how would you know it? Ohhh…there’s another one: since your thoughts influence the way you will flip the coin, make your thoughts identical, too.

I think this single point has modality beaten. While we can, as another poster has said, contend that contradictions are necessarily not the case, we have no way of determining the possibility of events that seem to possess no contradictions, like the results of this coin flip. If a coin lands on heads under a set of circumstances, we have no way of knowing that it was possible for the coin to have landed on tails under those circumstances. We cannot prove the contingency. And supposing that we happen to be wrong about contingency, then all talk of probability is merely used as a tool for predictions, but does not reflect the reality of the situation, i.e., despite the probabilities, there was no chance for the coin flip to result in any other way.

 

[Syntax]

It’s not quite that easy, I’m afraid. I said it is possible under IDENTICAL circumstances (identical even on the atomic level). The air conditions have to be the same, the way you flip the coin has to be the same, the surface the coin lands on has to be the same, etc. Every imaginable thing affecting the scenario must be identical, and you aren’t likely to see that happen. Even if you did, how would you know it? Ohhh…there’s another one: since your thoughts influence the way you will flip the coin, make your thoughts identical, too.

I think this single point has modality beaten. While we can, as another poster has said, contend that contradictions are necessarily not the case, we have no way of determining the possibility of events that seem to possess no contradictions, like the results of this coin flip.

If a coin lands on heads under a set of circumstances, we have no way of knowing that it was possible for the coin to have landed on tails under those circumstances.

How is this an objection to modal truths? No modal logician would disagree with you. Acccording to your example, no one would ever say that the alternative of landing on tails is possible at all if, given the same set of initial conditions and natural laws, it is necesary that the event occurs. If you fix the background conditions to be identical for any event, then given natural laws, the event must necessarily follow. But this is merely an explication of natural necessity, and if you’re a determinist, you should have no problem with this.

And when we say colloquially that “it is possible for the coin to land on tails instead of heads”, we are merely saying that if the conditions were different to make it possible that tails would necessarily follow, then the result of tails would follow. But this just a *counterfactual truth *about what could have happened if the conditions were sufficient for necessitating an alternative result, not about what *did *happen. Counterfactuals have false antecedents as in “If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, then someone else did.” This statement is true, but it is vacuously true in our world since the anctecedent is false.

Now of course, if each event is caused by a preceding state of affairs such that every event is necessitated, then, yes, these very condtions themselves would be necessitated making alternative possibilities impossible.

So there is nothing objectionable about modal logic here that I can see.

And modal counterfactual talk doesn’t deal that much with natural necessity anyway. Most discussions involving modal truths consists of talk about worlds in which the natural laws are different from what they, in fact, are–and in which, for instance, “flying telephones” or the non-existence of space and time are possible…or in which, instead of eating that cake, you decide not to eat it.

The contingency in the world is introduced by the notion of free will. So those future events for which human beings have the power to influence or change, are therefore, contingent events since human beings could have done otherwise than they, in fact, do.

But all of this depends on your view of natural necessity and free-will. Quantum mechanics, for instance, suggests the motions of particles are contingent. Of course this view could be merely a function of our ignorance, but if it wasn’t, then yes, the motions of subatomic particles would be, in fact, contingent.

So I don’t see what the problem with modality is. It sounds like you are just misapplying the notions of necessity, contingency, and possibility to situations for which they might not apply.

 

[Syntax]

And when we say colloquially that “it is possible for the coin to land on tails instead of heads”, we are merely saying that if the conditions were different to make it possible that tails would necessarily follow, then the result of tails would follow. **But this just a *counterfactual truth ***about what could have happened if the conditions were sufficient for necessitating an alternative result, not about what *did *happen.

I made a small blunder. the bold-faced above should say, “…this is a counterfactual truth about what would have happened if the conditions were sufficient for necessitating an alternative result.”…not “could.”

 

[Areopagite]

For example, if a coin lands on heads in a coin flip, I might say, “For all I know, it is possible that the coin could have landed on heads,” but it would be a mistake to suppose that that is the reality of the situation. Probabilities, after all, are measurements of our own ignorance. I mean, if I knew how the coin would be affected by physical laws throughout the flip, I would contend instead that the coin must have landed on tails. But since I am ignorant of precisely how each flip will occur, I classify the event as a contingency in my mind.

Are you assuming determinism here? Because, for example, if our free will is one factor in the outcome, then you would have to agree that the outcome is a contingency through and through.

But even if you assume determinism (and maybe you’re not), necessity and contingency still apply in other ways (unless someone can correct me).

For example, you could say that the result of this particular coin-toss is contingent upon such-and-such conditions. Right? Whether something is necessarily going to happen via inevitable deterministic fate or not, that something doesn’t cause itself to happen by itself but only because of something else … because it is contingent upon something else, as we say.

Also, even if determinism is true, necessity and contingency definitely apply in general statements. For example, I can say, “A coin toss could land on tails” and this is true in reality, not just in our heads. I’m not referring to any particular coin toss in the past, present, or even future … I’m speaking generally. To deny the general statement that “A coin toss could land on tails” … then what do you replace it with and still maintain a general statement? Do you say, “A coin toss will land on tails” or “A coin toss will not land on tails.” (no, because that depends on particular conditions and on some tosses it’ll be true and other it won’t). But we know that the general statement “A coin toss could land on tails” is true and that it reflects reality and is not based on our ignorance because we have seen that sometimes the coin toss does, in fact, land on tails.

Or are you against general statements in some way?

In short, for any future event used in an argument under modal logic, we are making huge assumptions about the nature of the event. It is true that if something is not possibly the case, it is necessarily not the case, and we can symbolize that logically. But we have no way of knowing which events are “necessarily not the case.”

Could one day someone invent a square circle because metaphysical laws are capricious? Also, we know past events and can therefore use the idea of necessity to talk about them. So there are at least some things we know that are necessarily the case and as well as not the case too.

Certainly. I would posit two sorts which I feel are necessary to explain my experiences: physical and conceptual.

Not bad.

By “item” I mean “entity” or even “thing.” I would define such terms as “compilations of qualities/properties/characteristics.” For my convenience, I’ll just say they consist of qualities, and you may substitute “qualities” for any synonym you prefer.

Interesting. Forgive me, but this definition may run into problems if you do the logic.

Would you say, since “things” are “compilations of qualities,” that qualities are not things? Or would you say that qualities* are* things, and that qualities are thus compilations of other qualities? And perhaps, then, things are compilations of things? Right?

This is somewhat important because if you don’t think a “quality” is a thing (but merely “that which defines a thing” or something) then qualities don’t exist. That is because you said that only “things” exist. And if “things” are compilations of non-existence, then it would seem things don’t exist either.

On the other hand, if qualities ARE things, then you simply have “things are compilations of other things.” They would have to be infinitely subdivided because we can’t get to a thing that is NOT a compilation of other things, because then that thing wouldn’t fulfill the definition of what a thing is.

So do you agree that “a thing is a compilation of infinitely subdivided other things”? Or would you change the definition slightly?

Assuming that we agree on this definition of “thing,” we can propose a rule: contradictory qualities may not coexist (as Aristotle would call it, the Law of Noncontradiction). This effectively disqualifies “squared circles” as things, because squareness and circularity are contradictory in that they cannot compose the same thing.

As I stated earlier, I consider concepts to have existence (under the broadest notion of “existence”), and so I would say that unicorns exist conceptually. I suppose I would say that anything logically possible exists in some way, i.e., if it consists of qualities that do not contradict each other, it exists.

… Nothingness is devoid of qualities by definition. It serves only as a mental construct. Now I guess you could say that nothingness has the quality of lacking qualities, but this is a meaningless assessment, wouldn’t you agree?

Your reasoning is not too bad, and I would completely agree with you fully if you qualified a few things. Don’t square circles exist conceptually in some way? Also, if “nothing” is a mental construct, doesn’t that exist conceptually in some way too?

I’m not so certain. Existence only seems to be hotly debated in theological matters.

Well, it’s pretty important in epistemology too.

 

[DomusAurea]

Great thread!
I won’t get involved since I’ve only read the Nicomachean Ethics (is that the way to spell it in English?). Just wanted to say I’m reading and keen to learn.
I have gathered that Aristotle is a difficult one for us catholics. A great teacher with some crucial faults – I’ve just never found the faults (except for obvious ones having to do with culture and times).
Could you people please stop bickering with Oreo and get to the real discussion!

 

[Areopagite]

Of course not. You’re saying that I have to read all of a person’s works just to object to a few of their beliefs? That’s an insane standard you have there, or is it a standard you reserve only for Aristotle?

You weren’t objecting to a “few of his beliefs,” you were objecting to “what he didn’t write.” I’m just curious how you know “what he didn’t write” … unless you have read everything he did write … or else you were told by some learned authority (in which case, who would that be?).

Sorry, the “souls” hierarchy seemed to suggest that our rationality somehow made us superior to animals according to some arbitrary standard. Or maybe Aristotle is suggesting the classic “all animals are equal, but some are more equal than others.”

The hierarchy you speak of, in itself, is merely meant to show distinctions in different kinds of being. You can make a different hierarchy if you want, where things are distinguished between whether something is green or not, and then subdivide green things into round things and non-round things, and then subdivide round things into soft things and hard things, etc. That’s not a particularly useful or interesting hierarchy of being, though. But different hierarchies could be useful in different circumstances.

The question of what is more superior to another is a different question (though it can be closely related). It is true, though, that animals have senses, whereas non-sensate living things do not, so in that way it makes animals superior to plants, for they have some positive being that the others do not.

Likewise, it is true that rationality does make human superior to the rest of animals at least in regard to ability for conceptual knowledge (obviously), and other things that flow from that.

Many atheistic evolutionists, of course, have also said that our rationality makes us superior to other animals. But there can be superiority in different ways (a Cheetah would be superior to a human with regard to speed) … and perhaps some kinds are more meaningful then others … I suppose we can go more in depth about this if you want.

Surely a genius such as Aristotle isn’t prone to such errors. Would he not notice that the falling speed is directly affected by the air? Even children notice this–have you ever tried to throw a sheet of paper at someone?

Oh, I’m not excusing him, it was a legit mistake. Surely, this was not one of Aristotle’s more “careful” experiments … perhaps one of the objects didn’t seem like it would be affected by air resistance but it actually was … who knows … he didn’t have vacuum-sealed environments. But there’s no need to burn him as a heretic as some people seem to suggest. Einstein wasn’t perfect either … he made a lot of simple arithmetic mistakes, for example. In any case, this dodge avoids the issue at hand, which is … where does Aristotle go wrong in his metaphysics … please point out where his reasoning takes too many liberties … don’t try to disprove his metaphysics just because he made an error somewhere else because that is not a valid disproof.

The “error” lies in making a claim without the means of verifying it.

Can you go into specifics on what he said that he had no business saying.

From you, I hear that I must read all of his works to offer criticisms (Magnanimity would likely have me do the same).

No, you simply need to read all his works to know for sure what Aristotle’s didn’t say.

From others, there is constant grasping onto the few things he might have gotten right.

How do you know the number of things that he got right? You seem to have read little or nothing of him. Obviously, you’re getting your alleged info about Aristotle from somewhere? Pray tell, what are your sources?

I’m not trying to destroy the man’s worldview, I’m just pointing out his errors and the points where he offered nothing new to philosophy.

You haven’t pointed them out at all. If you pointed them out we would have something to talk about.

In other words, I view him as an un-essential character among philosophers.

And who DO you consider an essential philosopher? What philosopher at Aristotle’s time (or before) out-did him? Who was more original and helpful than him? Anyone?

Again, the thread topic was presented as “where did Aristotle go wrong?” not “where did Aristotle go wrong in metaphysics?” If you wish to talk only about metaphysics, I have nothing to say, as metaphysics is a dead-end pursuit (you’ll never know if you’re right or not). I wish to argue under the sane man’s standard of empirical evidence.

If you read the first post, I specify that I want to know where Aristotle goes wrong in his metaphysics (or epistemology at least). You may bring up his errors regarding physics but only if it helps to disprove his metaphysics … otherwise, it’s not very helpful to the topic of this thread.

Now, if you think metaphysics is intrinsically dead-ended, then please prove why. Because, I claim, if metaphysics is a dead-end, then all fields of knowledge is a dead-end (because metaphysics touches every possible subject). If you don’t think so, please show me a logical demonstration.

Also, if you think you cannot know anything about metaphysics, then you must throw out your distinction between physical and conceptual knowledge, since that is a metaphysical distinction. Are you comfortable with that?

 

[Betterave]

You weren’t objecting to a “few of his beliefs,” you were objecting to “what he didn’t write.” I’m just curious how you know “what he didn’t write” … unless you have read everything he did write … or else you were told by some learned authority (in which case, who would that be?).

lol…nicely put!

I wonder where the other Aristotle-bashers are… You ask them to say something with substance and they go into hiding? Oh well! Maybe they’re off reading Aristotle for the first time, trying to figure out an answer - maybe Oreo should do the same.

 

[JP2Admirer]

I’m a huge fan of Aristotle, but I can tell you where I think he went wrong in metaphysics…he didn’t make the essence/existence distinction like Aquinas.

I’m glad this post was made, as I have often wondered whether I had been duped by Aristotle. Is there something in his physics that would make him fundamentally wrong in his metaphysics?

I say this as someone who wonders, because I consider myself a full fledged Thomist.

As I see it, Aristotle provided us with a categorical system for intepreting the world. We can build all kinds of knowledge from that system because he categorized being in a way that we can use to define/interpret it. The question is, are his categories wrong?

I am yet to find where they are not good tools for interpreting the world. Although I am intrigued by what some semioticians are saying – the really philosophical ones, not the new-agey unphilosophic ones – about the category of relation. Indeed, Pope Benedict as Cardinal Ratzinger wrote about the need for the elevation of relation. Anyway, that’s my two cents.

 

[Oreoracle]

Areo,

I suppose I’ll just respond to your questions about metaphysics. As you said, no matter which of us is right, other subjects are considered irrelevant to this thread. (Isn’t it a tad inconsistent for you to demand that I stick to discussing metaphysics and then drag me back into discussing astronomy? I think so.)

You weren’t objecting to a “few of his beliefs,” you were objecting to “what he didn’t write.” I’m just curious how you know “what he didn’t write” … unless you have read everything he did write … or else you were told by some learned authority (in which case, who would that be?).

It’s true that I read a few wiki sources in addition to his actual works, yes. Does that make me a terrible, misinformed person?

The hierarchy you speak of, in itself, is merely meant to show distinctions in different kinds of being.

The differences between a plant and an animal have nothing to do with souls or types of existence. It boils down to physical and chemical properties.

The question of what is more superior to another is a different question (though it can be closely related). It is true, though, that animals have senses, whereas non-sensate living things do not, so in that way it makes animals superior to plants, for they have some positive being that the others do not.

How do you conclude that sensory perception is positive? Do you mean that it’s good? What is it good for?

Likewise, it is true that rationality does make human superior to the rest of animals at least in regard to ability for conceptual knowledge (obviously), and other things that flow from that.

Yes, and this is assuming that the capacity for knowledge is the arbiter of quality. Of course, humans think of rationality as a worthy trait because we have rationality. If we were as the animals living outside of civilization, we might think that having huge claws makes one superior, because that would be something we could use to survive.

I think it’s dangerous to project your idea of “positive” or “good” onto the world of objects as though it were objective. It clearly isn’t once we consider other perspectives (thus revealing that “positivity” is a matter of perspective). I don’t think such labels have a place in metaphysics.

Many atheistic evolutionists, of course, have also said that our rationality makes us superior to other animals. But there can be superiority in different ways (a Cheetah would be superior to a human with regard to speed) … and perhaps some kinds are more meaningful then others … I suppose we can go more in depth about this if you want.

I don’t feel that there’s a need to go further with this. We both agree that any idea of “good,” “positive,” or any quality referring to a thing’s worth or usefulness assumes a goal of some short, i.e., a cheetah’s stature is “better” than a human’s if speed is the goal. There is no objective good because there is no objective goal.

And who DO you consider an essential philosopher? What philosopher at Aristotle’s time (or before) out-did him? Who was more original and helpful than him? Anyone?

Regarding metaphysics specifically? I don’t think any philosopher from any era has helped us out there. All of the old metaphysical questions still remain unanswered, or, if they have been answered, there is no consensus as to what the answers might be.

But I think it’s curious that you don’t allow me to reference any philosophers after him. What’s with your fixation on ancient philosophers?

If you read the first post, I specify that I want to know where Aristotle goes wrong in his metaphysics (or epistemology at least). You may bring up his errors regarding physics but only if it helps to disprove his metaphysics … otherwise, it’s not very helpful to the topic of this thread.

Now, if you think metaphysics is intrinsically dead-ended, then please prove why. Because, I claim, if metaphysics is a dead-end, then all fields of knowledge is a dead-end (because metaphysics touches every possible subject). If you don’t think so, please show me a logical demonstration.

Metaphysics is a dead-end because it begins with no rules, axioms, bare facts, etc. Everything can be questioned. I know that sounds so great and liberating to everyone, but such liberality also comes with a steep price: we have no rationale for rejecting anyone’s claims. For example, a person can even deny the inconsistency of contradictions, posit multiple universes, etc., and still not break any of metaphysics’s rules, because metaphysics has no rules.

I’ve had a discussion with someone about this recently, and they insist that there are two ways to refute someone in metaphysics: 1) catch the person saying something contradictory, or 2) catch them saying something incoherent. I disagree with him, because not everyone may share our core assumptions. If there exist some people who question whether language can meaningfully express aspects of reality, they may not take issue with contradictory statements, because they are, after all, only statements. If this is the case, then all statements may be held to be incoherent, so even those standards for refutation collapse.

So one’s metaphysic, along with the rules they may use to disprove others’ metaphysics, is based on core assumptions. Before you make those assumptions, you have nothing, not even a means of refutation or derivation (of the rules you assume). And by the time you’ve made your assumptions, it’s too late to test your own system with any of the metaphysical laws you’ve assumed.

 

[Syntax]

Metaphysics is a dead-end because it begins with no rules, axioms, bare facts, etc. Everything can be questioned. I know that sounds so great and liberating to everyone, but such liberality also comes with a steep price: we have no rationale for rejecting anyone’s claims. For example, a person can even deny the inconsistency of contradictions, posit multiple universes, etc., and still not break any of metaphysics’s rules, because metaphysics has no rules.

This is completely false. Metaphysics is no more suspect than any other philosophical field of study such as ethics, epistemology, or philosophy of mind. All of them, including metaphysics, have rules and axioms, and all of which can be questioned. For instance, metaphysics adopts all of the following very intuitive metaphysical principles essential for its field study.

Principle of Numerical Identity.
Principle of Cause and Effect.
Mereological Principles about Wholes/Parts
Principles about symmetrical/asymmetrical/reflexive/transitive relations.
The Identity of Indiscernibles
The Indiscernibility of Identity
The Principles of Subsistence and Inherence

These are all very intuitive principles, and all of which can be questioned.

As a corollary, science itself operates on most, if not all, of these very same principles.

 

[Areopagite]

I’m a huge fan of Aristotle, but I can tell you where I think he went wrong in metaphysics…he didn’t make the essence/existence distinction like Aquinas.

You know, I wasn’t aware that Aristotle didn’t distinguish the two very much. Although … didn’t he distinguish them a little bit? Didn’t he say they could be distinguished but not separated? Or am I totally off?

As I see it, Aristotle provided us with a categorical system for intepreting the world. We can build all kinds of knowledge from that system because he categorized being in a way that we can use to define/interpret it. The question is, are his categories wrong?

Are you aware of Aquinas’ defense of the categories?

I am yet to find where they are not good tools for interpreting the world. Although I am intrigued by what some semioticians are saying – the really philosophical ones, not the new-agey unphilosophic ones – about the category of relation. Indeed, Pope Benedict as Cardinal Ratzinger wrote about the need for the elevation of relation. Anyway, that’s my two cents.

Are you aware of the three different kinds of relation (real relation, logical relation, and divine relation)? Technically, only “real relation” is an accident (and hence the only one that refers to the “category of relation”) … the rest are nonetheless called “relations” by analogy. You might already know this. Do you know what I’m talking about?

I suppose I’ll just respond to your questions about metaphysics. As you said, no matter which of us is right, other subjects are considered irrelevant to this thread. (Isn’t it a tad inconsistent for you to demand that I stick to discussing metaphysics and then drag me back into discussing astronomy? I think so.)

My bad.

Although you are allowed to bring it up if it somehow relates to metaphysics.

It’s true that I read a few wiki sources in addition to his actual works, yes. Does that make me a terrible, misinformed person?

That’s definitely not enough to attack Aristotle for not writing enough about something … when in fact, for all you know, he did write about it. Attack what you have read of Aristotle … not what you haven’t.

The differences between a plant and an animal have nothing to do with souls or types of existence. It boils down to physical and chemical properties.

How are you defining “soul”? Aristotle defined it as “the form of a living thing.” Do you take objection to this?

How do you conclude that sensory perception is positive? Do you mean that it’s good? What is it good for?

It’s positive because it adds something to animals that plants do not have. If it was negative, then it would subtract from animals “something” that plants would have.

Sensory perception is good in various ways. Perhaps one of the more obvious ways is that it enables an animal to see food, which aids in actually getting the food. Food is good for animals because it maintains their existence.

Now, more abstractly, Aristotle would say that good is synonymous with being. Hence, the more being a thing has, the better the thing is. Sensory perception is a being (because it exists) and hence it is better for a thing to have it than to not.

I could explain this more in depth if you want.

Yes, and this is assuming that the capacity for knowledge is the arbiter of quality. Of course, humans think of rationality as a worthy trait because we have rationality. If we were as the animals living outside of civilization, we might think that having huge claws makes one superior, because that would be something we could use to survive.

Huge claws can make a thing superior in a certain way. This is undeniable. Hence, I am not denying it. Are you?

I think it’s dangerous to project your idea of “positive” or “good” onto the world of objects as though it were objective.

What do you mean by “dangerous” here? Does that simply mean “wrong”? What are the consequences if I do project this idea?

It clearly isn’t once we consider other perspectives (thus revealing that “positivity” is a matter of perspective). I don’t think such labels have a place in metaphysics.

It depends what you mean by “positivity.” If it merely means “preference” or something like that, then I suppose it would be completely subjective. But Aristotle and I (and a bunch of other people I’ve run into) think that it is also used to describe the presence of being. “Sight” for example is positive … while “blindness” is negative … for the former has (or is) a kind of being, while the other is a lack or absence of it.

 

[Areopagite]

I don’t feel that there’s a need to go further with this. We both agree that any idea of “good,” “positive,” or any quality referring to a thing’s worth or usefulness assumes a goal of some short, i.e., a cheetah’s stature is “better” than a human’s if speed is the goal. There is no objective good because there is no objective goal.

I don’t think so.

If you agree that there are such things as essences, then it’s quite reasonable to believe in goals … or perfection at least.

Do you agree that a cheetah isn’t in good shape if, for example, it has a broken leg? It would be in better shape if the cheetah had its bones in tact. This automatically acknowledges the truth that there is a goal … there is an ideal form of cheetah, which some cheetahs fall short of. It is objectively true that a cheetah isn’t in good shape if it has a broken leg. Hence, goodness can be spoken of as objective.

Regarding metaphysics specifically? I don’t think any philosopher from any era has helped us out there. All of the old metaphysical questions still remain unanswered, or, if they have been answered, there is no consensus as to what the answers might be.

I was asking who you thought was a more original and influential philosopher than Aristotle who was before or contemporary to him (because you seemed to suggest there were), not just in metaphysics … but any field of knowledge. But since this might go off topic, you don’t have to answer.

I do agree that there isn’t a consensus to the answers of metaphysical reality … but if you’re going to pull one of those, “Since there is no consensus on this matter, then it’s all subjective and/or unknowable” … please refrain. Unless, of course, you go on to PROVE that metaphysics is unknowable (and yet, I would then ask why you divided existence into physical vs. conceptual existence).

But I think it’s curious that you don’t allow me to reference any philosophers after him. What’s with your fixation on ancient philosophers?

You had made the comment that Aristotle was “unoriginal,” suggesting that there was some philosopher who came up with most of Aristotle’s ideas before him … and I was just wondering who that guy might be. Is there such a person?

But, no, feel free to bring up modern philosophers if you want … provided it’s remotely on topic.

Metaphysics is a dead-end because it begins with no rules, axioms, bare facts, etc. Everything can be questioned. I know that sounds so great and liberating to everyone, but such liberality also comes with a steep price: we have no rationale for rejecting anyone’s claims. For example, a person can even deny the inconsistency of contradictions, posit multiple universes, etc., and still not break any of metaphysics’s rules, because metaphysics has no rules.

Well, if it’s any consolation, neither Aristotle nor I (nor the majority of people who will probably contribute to this thread) will agree with you that metaphysics does not begin with any rules, axioms, or bare facts. I’m not entirely sure why you assumed this. Here are some given truths that Aristotle starts with:

• The principle of non-contradiction
• The principle of sufficient reason
• The validity of logic (and hence all the rules of logic)
• The mind’s ability to grasp truth
• The existence of the physical world (for Aristotle says that we reason to metaphysical principles first from knowing physical things)

(if I have misrepresented Aristotle in some way, I invite someone to correct me)

Of course it would be silly if nothing was assumed. Aristotle didn’t do that though. I know Descartes did … and … well … cogito ergo sum really didn’t even cut it (because he even refused to accept logic at that point) … oh well.

I’ve had a discussion with someone about this recently, and they insist that there are two ways to refute someone in metaphysics: 1) catch the person saying something contradictory, or 2) catch them saying something incoherent. I disagree with him, because not everyone may share our core assumptions. If there exist some people who question whether language can meaningfully express aspects of reality, they may not take issue with contradictory statements, because they are, after all, only statements. If this is the case, then all statements may be held to be incoherent, so even those standards for refutation collapse.

Would you say this is true for any field of knowledge … not just metaphysics? By your logic, isn’t everything unknowable?

So one’s metaphysic, along with the rules they may use to disprove others’ metaphysics, is based on core assumptions. Before you make those assumptions, you have nothing, not even a means of refutation or derivation (of the rules you assume). And by the time you’ve made your assumptions, it’s too late to test your own system with any of the metaphysical laws you’ve assumed.

Once again, by your logic, isn’t that true for everything? Some may not approve mathematical axioms … hence you can’t prove anything in math to those people. Obviously, you need to start with certain principles that cannot be proven … that must be accepted on faith. Otherwise, if you demand that everything must be proved … nothing can be proved … and you enter into complete skepticism. I’ve been down that road … and it’s boring as heck. Maybe you’re not tired of it yet.

 

[Oreoracle]

I don’t think so.

If you agree that there are such things as essences, then it’s quite reasonable to believe in goals … or perfection at least.

It’s reasonable to believe that a thing is perfect…for what? You can go on and on about the cheetah with a broken leg being “worse” than cheetahs with healthy legs, but that’s only the case if you assume a goal like, say, “cheetahs should be capable of running X MPH,” or “cheetahs should be capable of catching any prey they select.” But those are arbitrary goals we (and likely the cheetah) assume; speed and fitness are valuable to animals because they are dependent on such, but the value isn’t objective. Now you could say, “But Oreo, isn’t it objectively the case that a creature ought to be capable of survival for his own good?” No, I don’t think so. Again, we assume that sort of thing because we are living things desiring life, but it all boils down to desire, not an object.

Unless, of course, you go on to PROVE that metaphysics is unknowable (and yet, I would then ask why you divided existence into physical vs. conceptual existence).

As you know, one’s metaphysical beliefs hold much sway over their epistemology. That means that a person could entertain metaphysical beliefs such that knowledge becomes impossible. Again, doing so violates no rules. Descartes’ works gave way to solipsism, yet no one denies that solipsism is a metaphysical theory. As such the rule about assuming the physical world that you mention further in your post is an assumption that not every metaphysician shares. Indeed, Plato disagreed as well, but no one accuses him of violating metaphysics.

• The principle of sufficient reason

This “rule” has been abused by theologians for a good deal of time. When they blather on about God being uncaused, what’s the “reason” for his existence?

• The validity of logic (and hence all the rules of logic)

Are you aware that the law of the excluded middle, for example, is dismissed for the sake of fuzzy logic?

• The mind’s ability to grasp truth

I suppose that someone might disagree, but then you would ask how they know it is the truth that your proclamation is incorrect.

• The existence of the physical world (for Aristotle says that we reason to metaphysical principles first from knowing physical things)

Solipsists and Platonists voice their disagreement. And yet, they’re still metaphysical theories.

(if I have misrepresented Aristotle in some way, I invite someone to correct me)

You’ve misrepresented metaphysics, as it is clear that not all metaphysicians concur with your assumptions. All mathematicians agree on postulates, axioms, properties, etc., and if they didn’t, we likely wouldn’t call them mathematicians. But yet, metaphysicians may freely disagree with what you believe to be the essentials of metaphysics, and we still call them metaphysicians.

Would you say this is true for any field of knowledge … not just metaphysics? By your logic, isn’t everything unknowable?

Obviously, I’m playing devil’s advocate here in an attempt to show the diversity of opinions of metaphysicians. It’s quite clear that they are allowed to distort the world as they please with their metaphysical beliefs, rendering the world according to their system “unknowable.”

Otherwise, if you demand that everything must be proved … nothing can be proved … and you enter into complete skepticism. I’ve been down that road … and it’s boring as heck. Maybe you’re not tired of it yet.

Oh, I assure you that I am. I’m sick of saying that I advocate the empirical standard of evidence and having Christians ask, “Well, how do you empirically prove empiricism?” sigh But metaphysics allows for this sort of nonsense.

 

[Areopagite]

It’s reasonable to believe that a thing is perfect…for what?

Things can be perfect for many different things. A cheetah with a broken leg would objectively not be very good at running, for example.

You can go on and on about the cheetah with a broken leg being “worse” than cheetahs with healthy legs, but that’s only the case if you assume a goal like, say, “cheetahs should be capable of running X MPH,” or “cheetahs should be capable of catching any prey they select.”

By the very fact that you said “broken leg” you already implicitly acknowledged that there is such a thing as objective goodness and perfection. The word “broken” is meaningless unless we already have an ideal standard of what a bone should be like. Hence, if there is no objective goodness, then there is no objective “brokenness” either.

If a cheetah is unable to get to a speed that we see other cheetahs capable of getting to, then we acknowledge that it is deficient as a cheetah in that way. That is because we have learned about the nature of cheetahs (by studying them) and can contrast it to this particular cheetah and find that it is not fulfilling a cheetah’s nature perfectly. Where do you disagree with this?

Also, by knowing the nature of a cheetah, we know some of its limitations too. It is not a bad cheetah if it fails to catch a prey that its nature was not equipped to catch (e.g. it is not naturally well-equipped at catching birds flying three hundred feet in the air). Now, if it does manage to catch something that goes beyond what is in the normal powers of a cheetah, then it is an extraordinary cheetah … it goes beyond its nature. Is this in stark contrast to the obvious truth?

But those are arbitrary goals we (and likely the cheetah) assume; speed and fitness are valuable to animals because they are dependent on such, but the value isn’t objective.

If they depend on speed and fitness then obviously speed and fitness is good for the animals. It is obviously not good if you lack what you depend on. So if they objectively depend on speed and fitness, then speed and fitness are objectively good for them.

Now you could say, “But Oreo, isn’t it objectively the case that a creature ought to be capable of survival for his own good?” No, I don’t think so. Again, we assume that sort of thing because we are living things desiring life, but it all boils down to desire, not an object.

You can’t desire unless there’s an object of desire. So it also boils down to an object.

Another question to consider that will perhaps clear this up is … why do we desire?

As you know, one’s metaphysical beliefs hold much sway over their epistemology. That means that a person could entertain metaphysical beliefs such that knowledge becomes impossible. Again, doing so violates no rules.

I would disagree. It would obviously violate the necessary rule that one must believe their mind is capable of perceiving reality, for example.

They might not accept that rule … but that doesn’t stop it from being a rule. If you believe that your mind can’t understand truth … then you’re wrong. There’s no proof of that, however, but it’s a necessary first principle that I expect everyone to accept by natural human intuition. I’m sorry if you think that’s unreasonable.

Descartes’ works gave way to solipsism, yet no one denies that solipsism is a metaphysical theory.
Oreoracle;6308741:

I’m not sure what you’re implying here. I agree that solipsism is a metaphysical theory, but I believe it’s a wrong theory. Likewise, there are such things as scientific theories, but not all scientific theories are correct. That doesn’t mean science goes out of the window if some scientific theories are wrong. Likewise, there are even mathematical theories … certain proposed theorems that haven’t been proven yet … some of those propositions turn out to be false … but just because they were a theory to begin with does not mean mathematics is all … unknowable.
Oreoracle;6308741:

As such the rule about assuming the physical world that you mention further in your post is an assumption that not every metaphysician shares.

Believe it or not, not everyone accepts mathematical first principles either. Usually, those who don’t accept the basic metaphysical principles (which I mentioned) very naturally don’t accept any other principles (including mathematical ones). So, what’s your point?

Indeed, Plato disagreed as well, but no one accuses him of violating metaphysics.

Plato did acknowledge existence of the physical world and did acknowledge the mind’s ability to grasp truth.

Nonetheless, he did get some things wrong. So …

I am accusing him of violating metaphysics. Aristotle did too. And many other people as well.

 

[Areopagite]

This “rule” has been abused by theologians for a good deal of time. When they blather on about God being uncaused, what’s the “reason” for his existence?

Are you also attacking the principle of sufficient reason? Or do you accept it and are merely attacking the abuse of the principle? I’m not sure what you’re saying here.

In any case, if you want to talk about the proofs for God’s existence, use another thread (although … that subject might still be taboo).

Are you aware that the law of the excluded middle, for example, is dismissed for the sake of fuzzy logic?

I am aware that some people reject logical principles. But what is your larger point? Are you saying that since some people dismiss them … that therefore logic is unknowable and/or not objective. I honestly have no idea what your point is.

Solipsists and Platonists voice their disagreement. And yet, they’re still metaphysical theories.

Platonists do not deny the existence of the physical world. However, they do say that physical things exist in a less perfect way than the ideal immaterial forms which they imitate. It is the difference between being and becoming, but they say that both are kinds of existence.

You’ve misrepresented metaphysics, as it is clear that not all metaphysicians concur with your assumptions.

Those people you are referring to are metaphysicians insofar as they talk/believe things that are on the subject of “being” (or something) … but they are not metaphysicians insofar as they do not have a correct metaphysic.

Not all scientists assume the same things about science, either. In fact, there isn’t any one thing that everyone agrees on. That’s no reason to condemn all reality as unknowable.

All mathematicians agree on postulates, axioms, properties, etc., and if they didn’t, we likely wouldn’t call them mathematicians.

Depends how you define “mathematician.” Is a mathematician simply one who thinks about numbers and space? If anyone says something about quantity, do we call them a mathematician? What if they say A LOT about the relations of numbers … are they a mathematician then? If someone develops a complex system regarding the relations of numbers, space, and quantity, and yet completely defy the traditional postulates and axioms … are they a mathematician nonetheless?

Likewise, if you define “metaphysician” as someone who merely comments on the subject of “being” … then there you go. That doesn’t mean, however, that statements about “being” are unknowable, just as statements about “numbers” aren’t unknowable simply because there are people who talk about number without accepting traditional postulates and axioms. There are good and bad metaphysicians, just like there are good and bad mathematicians. Or, you could say, there are true metaphysicians and there are false ones … just as there are true mathematicians and false ones.

Obviously, I’m playing devil’s advocate here in an attempt to show the diversity of opinions of metaphysicians.

Oh, don’t worry … I already know that there is a diversity of opinion about metaphysics. If you could, stop playing devil’s advocate and actually start talking about what you actually believe. I don’t find it productive responding to things you obviously don’t believe.

It’s quite clear that they are allowed to distort the world as they please with their metaphysical beliefs, rendering the world according to their system “unknowable.”

What do you mean “they are allowed”? It would be more correct to say that it is people who reject metaphysics that are allowed to distort the world as they please, since they have no solid view of the nature of existence. The metaphysicians are the ones who claim that there are objective rules to be followed … at least the metaphysicians I know (e.g. Aristotle).

Oh, I assure you that I am. I’m sick of saying that I advocate the empirical standard of evidence and having Christians ask, “Well, how do you empirically prove empiricism?” sigh But metaphysics allows for this sort of nonsense.

Well, it’s a good question. You must have a reason to hold the empirical standard. So what is it? It’s a perfectly fair question. In fact, how do you know that the empirical standard is correct? Because, obviously, not everyone accepts it … hence, empiricism isn’t objective. Right? I’m using your logic … unless that was your Devil’s advocate logic and you didn’t mean any of it. Frankly, I have no idea what you believe.

If you could give a clear answer to these questions:

Do you think metaphysics is a dead-end pursuit merely because there are different beliefs about it? (because, I hope you know, that’s a very poor argument)

Also:

Do you still accept your distinction between physical existence and conceptual existence? (because if you do, then why are you throwing out metaphysics? … because that’s a metaphysical distinction)