Where does Aristotle go wrong?

[Betterave]

Similarly, I think Hamlet does not exist. So he has no being at all. He doesn’t “subsist,” in some Meinongian fashion as an abstract idea, simply because Hamlet is not an idea. He is purportedly a person. And ideas are not persons.

Alot of this older way of talking seems to confuse matter rather quickly and has many unpalatable consequences for one’s ontology and for quantificational logic. For instance, it introduces variety of different meanings of “Ex” in existentially quantified statements, so that saying “Hamlet exists” is just as plausible as saying “Obama exists.” So we quickly get into alot of trouble if we don’t have a **univocal **meaning of “to exist.”

But don’t we run into trouble with a univocal meaning too? For example, we have to say Hamlet is not a person. But Hamlet is a person. Just read Hamlet - he’s a person, not a dog, or even an idea; he’s a person. We can have more or less correct ideas about him, just as we can with Obama.

 

[Syntax]

But don’t we run into trouble with a univocal meaning too? For example, we have to say Hamlet is not a person. But Hamlet is a person. Just read Hamlet - he’s a person, not a dog, or even an idea; he’s a person. We can have more or less correct ideas about him, just as we can with Obama.

I think this is a common blunder, because he is not a “real” person at all. Take the following statements:

(1) Everything referred to must exist.
(2) “Hamlet” refers to Hamlet.
(3) Hamlet exists.

These three statements are incompatible with,

(4) Hamlet does not exist.

I would presume you would think (3) is false and (4) is true, yes? To resolve this inconsistency, it seems you are proposing that we reject (1) because (3) is false. I am proposing, along with many other philosophers of language, that we keep (1) and reject (2) because (3) is false, otherwise we have no reason to think our language attaches to the world at all.

Further, the truth-maker for any statements made about “Hamlet” is not the person, but the concept of that person since, similar to Frege, I take names purportedly referring to objects to be mediated by a sense. So statements allegedly about Hamlet are actually statements about community-accepted descriptions of a fictional character dubbed “Hamlet,” and they can be true or false.

 

[Betterave]

I think this is a common blunder, because he is not a “real” person at all. Take the following statements:

(1) Everything referred to must exist.
(2) “Hamlet” refers to Hamlet.
(3) Hamlet exists.

These three statements are incompatible with,

(4) Hamlet does not exist.

I would presume you would think (3) is false and (4) is true, yes? To resolve this inconsistency, it seems you are proposing that we reject (1) because (3) is false. I am proposing, along with many other philosophers of language, that we keep (1) and reject (2) because (3) is false, otherwise we have no reason to think our language attaches to the world at all. ?]

Forcing the choice between (3) and (4) presupposes we have settled on the univocity of ‘existence.’

Further, the truth-maker for any statements made about “Hamlet” is not the person, but the concept of that person…

Right, that person Hamlet. And this is true of any person, right?

…since, similar to Frege, I take names purportedly referring to objects to be mediated by a sense. So statements allegedly about Hamlet are actually statements about community-accepted descriptions of a fictional character dubbed “Hamlet,” and they can be true or false.

I think it would be more correct to say: “statements -]allegedly/-] about Hamlet are actually statements about Hamlet, which happen to include -]community-accepted descriptions of/-] the notion that Hamlet is a fictional character -]dubbed “Hamlet,”/-] and -]they/-] this statement, just like any other about the real world, can be true or false.”

I don’t know whether King Arthur is purely fictional or not, but we can still talk about just King Arthur. We don’t need to know.

 

[Syntax]

Forcing the choice between (3) and (4) presupposes we have settled on the univocity of ‘existence.’

Right. So you are proposing that both statements are true because “to exist” means something different in each statement? That will confuse matters rather quickly. It seems quite duplicitous to assert that when I say that “Hamlet exists” I am not *really *saying that he exists, and when I say “Hamlet doesn’t exist” I am not really saying he doesn’t exist. So how would you define the two different meanings of “to exist” in each case?

Right, that person Hamlet. And this is true of any person, right?

No. There is no person. “Hamlet exists” does not have a truth-value because nothing satisfies the description “Hamlet,” so it is vacuous because it says nothing. “Hamlet is the King of Denmark” can either be true or truth-valueless, it depends on what one takes to be truth-makers. So one way the statement can be true is because:

(1) the concept of Hamlet exists, not because Hamlet exists
(2) and because the concept of *King of Denmark *exists and is part of the existent concept Hamlet.

So one way of saying “Hamlet is the King of Denmark” is true is that the concept designated by the empty name “Hamlet” has as part of its meaning the associated descriptive content being-the-King-of-France.

So the proposition expressed by “Hamlet is the King of Denmark” is actually the same proposition expressed by “the concept of Hamlet has as part of its conceptual meaning the concept King of Denmark.”

I don’t see anything problematic here.

I think it would be more correct to say: “statements -]allegedly/-] about Hamlet are actually statements about Hamlet, which happen to include -]community-accepted descriptions of/-] the notion that Hamlet is a fictional character -]dubbed “Hamlet,”/-] and -]they/-] this statement, just like any other about the real world, can be true or false.”

No, I would not say these statements are about Hamlet at all. You may find it reprehensible that I think fictional statements are not the same kinds of statements as statements about the world. But I see this as much less reprehensible than offering two distinct meanings of “to exist” simply because having a univocal meaning of “to exist” is required to make sense of all quantificational logic. And I think this *should *disturb us because “to exist” is not some unimportant notion one can do anything he wants with, since whichever way you choose to construe it will have an immediate impact on your ontology.

 

[Betterave]

Right. So you are proposing that both statements are true because “to exist” means something different in each statement? That will confuse matters rather quickly. It seems quite duplicitous to assert that when I say that “Hamlet exists” I am not *really *saying that he exists, and when I say “Hamlet doesn’t exist” I am not really saying he doesn’t exist. So how would you define the two different meanings of “to exist” in each case?

I think the point is quite a simple one and I’ll substitute King Arthur for Hamlet: Arthur is not nothing. We can not talk about nothing. We can talk about Arthur and when we talk about him we refer to a person - that is the kind of being that Arthur is. We can also refer to and talk about the concept of Arthur, but that is a different discussion. At the same time Arthur may not be a real flesh-and-blood person. But we can talk about the person Arthur all the same, even if we say he is ‘not real.’

No. There is no person. “Hamlet exists” does not have a truth-value because nothing satisfies the description “Hamlet”…

What about the character in Shakespeare’s play?

No, I would not say these statements are about Hamlet at all. You may find it reprehensible that I think fictional statements are not the same kinds of statements as statements about the world.

But I think it is quite clear that the vast majority of statements about Hamlet are not fictional. They are about a fictional character, but the statements themselves are not fictional.

But I see this as much less reprehensible than offering two distinct meanings of “to exist” simply because having a univocal meaning of “to exist” is required to make sense of all quantificational logic. And I think this *should *disturb us because “to exist” is not some unimportant notion one can do anything he wants with, since whichever way you choose to construe it will have an immediate impact on your ontology.

I agree it’s important, but I don’t see the immediacy of ontological impact. I think the person who wants to insist that the existence of a person named Hamlet is null, just as null as the existence of a person named Bzzzzzzzzzzzz, is being disingenuous. He knows that Hamlet exists and that we can learn about Hamlet, and about wider realities from learning about Hamlet, and he knows that no one is really confused in their ontological commitments by the fact that Hamlet is not an historically flesh-and-blood real person.

 

[Syntax]

I think the point is quite a simple one and I’ll substitute King Arthur for Hamlet: Arthur is not nothing. We can not talk about nothing. We can talk about Arthur and when we talk about him we refer to a person - that is the kind of being that Arthur is. We can also refer to and talk about the concept of Arthur, but that is a different discussion. At the same time Arthur may not be a real flesh-and-blood person. But we can talk about the person Arthur all the same, even if we say he is ‘not real.’

I think we are talking past eachother. You are saying we can talk about Arthur because Arthur exists. I am saying that we can’t talk about Arthur because Arthur does not exist, since there is no person satisfying that name about which we can talk. Can you please explain the difference between “existent” and “real,” and in what sense Arthur is existent but not-real?

I agree it’s important, but I don’t see the immediacy of ontological impact. I think the person who wants to insist that the existence of a person named Hamlet is null, just as null as the existence of a person named Bzzzzzzzzzzzz, is being disingenuous.He knows that Hamlet exists and that we can learn about Hamlet, and about wider realities from learning about Hamlet, and he knows that no one is really confused in their ontological commitments by the fact that Hamlet is not an historically flesh-and-blood real person.

“Disengenuous”? It may have that affect. But I find the alternative way of speaking completely nonsensical, and that there is more reason to prefer the former consequence than the latter consequence. So Arthur, Hamlet, Zeus, and Peter Pan are all things that exist, but none of them are “real”? What does that even mean and how do you qualify these existent entities? If they are not ideas, not concepts, not words, not flesh-and-blood persons, not spiritual entities–what kinds of things are they? Fictional entities? But fictional entites, are non-real entities. And if existent=being real, then fictional entites don’t exist. Please illuminate.

 

[Oreoracle]

Of course this previously assumes some criteria for “adequate explanation” does it not? What makes one thing “an adequate explanation” compared to another?

An adequate explanation, in my understanding, is a series of references to certain things, conditions, events, etc., that account for our perceptions of things, conditions, events, etc. What “account” means depends on the subject at hand.

You would agree though that matter and energy aren’t the only “things”, right?

Yes and no. We can both agree that physical objects are all entirely composed of matter and energy, right? If so, we have a hierarchy to go by: matter and energy occupy the bottom rung while each consequent rung consists of them. Think of it like a hierarchy you would hear of in a biology class. We start with cells, tissues are made from the cells, organs are made from the tissues, systems are made from the organs, and organisms are made from the systems. Without cells, none of the organism is left, so we can say that an organism is made entirely of cells and that it’s made of other things…but those things are made from the cells. That’s how hierarchies work.

Or more simply: Some physical objects satisfy the definition of “organism” but all physical objects satisfy either the definitions of “matter” or “energy.” So in that sense, matter and energy are all that physically exist.

What do you mean by “object”? Would that be … any conglomeration of matter/energy?

That would be how I would define a physical object, yes.

So … what are “labels”? Are labels “things”? Are they physical things or conceptual things? It would seem to be, according to you, conceptual things, right? Hence, no deers physically exist, right? They are all in our head. Or no?

“Deer” exists in your head. The thing that is being referenced by that label physically exists.

So … abilities aren’t physical things (but conceptual things). However, isn’t it true that a physical thing’s ability is rooted in the physical reality of the thing … and not merely what we conceptually think of it?

Yes, the possibility of an event occurring (ability) is based on physical conditions. The possibility itself is only an object of speculation, however.

Also, what about actions? Can we say “Oh, there’s an action!” even though technically an action isn’t a “physical object” … unless you disagree.

I would say that an action is a sequence of events during which some physical change occurs.

Aristotle would agree that matter isn’t lost during the annihilation of a deer.

Splendid.

However, when you say that only the label is lost … you nonetheless say that the label “deer” may become inapplicable to a particular object … what on earth does that mean?

Language has limits, you know. I can’t be expected to explain every little thing.

I’m saying that an object may change in such a way that its stature no longer corresponds to a given label, e.g., if a table is defined as a wooden surface attached to four and only four legs, then an object that was once a table but has lost a leg since then no longer corresponds with the definition of “table.” I honestly don’t know how I can make it any more basic.

 

[Syntax]

I’m saying that an object may change in such a way that its stature no longer corresponds to a given label, e.g., if a table is defined as a wooden surface attached to four and only four legs, then an object that was once a table but has lost a leg since then no longer corresponds with the definition of “table.” I honestly don’t know how I can make it any more basic.

I don’t think Aristotle would disagree with this at all. The problem concerns the object, not our labels of the object. Was the object a table before it lost its leg? Or was it never a table?

Surely if the table is nothing but its parts, when you remove the leg, the leg along with the other matter is still a table; part of the table just exists in another location.

By the same token, if the deer is nothing but its matter and energy, when the deer dies, then the deer would still exist because its matter and energy still exist. Or did the deer never exist? So at what point in the existence of this basic matter and energy is this matter and energy no longer a deer? When its matter an energy is eaten by another living entity? So if I use the same matter and energy to fertilize my crops, are my crops that same deer because they have the same identical matter and energy? Or was this matter and energy never a deer to begin with?

 

[Oreoracle]

I’m a little confused, perhaps, about what you mean by “dead-end” here. Does this mean that you think metaphysics is worthless … or should not be discussed … or what?

Without any rules to begin with, metaphysics is all babble until we assume a theory of sorts. Telling someone to “do” metaphysics isn’t the same as telling them to do math. Mathematics is defined with its rules; without the rules, you don’t have math. Metaphysics does not begin with rules. As you say later, anything addressing “existence” or the lack thereof qualifies as metaphysics.

I don’t think you would agree … because you keep making metaphysical distinctions to back up many of your views. So what does “dead-end” mean here?

I make distinctions based on theories that are considered metaphysical, yes. I can only do so because I assume the rules that are included in those theories.

Perhaps I’m also confused about what you mean by “official axioms” … does “official” mean that an x-number of people agrees about them? If I found enough people to agree on a certain number of axioms would they become official? Does there have to be a majority? And hence if a majority happened to be reached … can certain axioms be “officialized”? What is this word “official”?

By “official” I mean “defined as possessing.”

No, I think there can be “metaphysical views” that nonetheless contradict the necessary metaphysical first principles.

That’s like saying we can have mathematical theorems that contradict the postulates used to formulate the theorems. If an equation would violate any axioms of math, like 5=4, we don’t call it a mathematical equation, we call it nonsense. It doesn’t make sense to think of metaphysics any differently. If a metaphysical theory would violate the metaphysical principles used to formulate the theory, why should we call it a work of metaphysics? It makes more sense to think of metaphysics as a field that begins with no axioms, only subject-matter (existence).

Similarly for the term “mathematics.” While it is true that mathematics has certain axioms, we can nevertheless talk about “mathematical errors”, even though such errors ultimately contradict mathematical axioms and yet are still called “mathematical.”

I disagree. My math teachers would never call “5=4” an erroneous equation–they would call it a series of symbols that don’t make sense in the context of mathematics. They may even call it a “failed attempt at doing math,” but they wouldn’t deem it a product of mathematics.

So, you can show inconsistencies in certain metaphysical systems and/or show how normal human thinking conflicts with it. Obviously, so I say, a true metaphysical system will not be self-contradictory nor will it betray common sense.

“Common sense” is quite a loaded term. Assuming that you’re talking about “a way of understanding that is commonly used,” I must say that you’ve made knowledge out to be a thing determined by democratic vote.

That’s the best we can do.

Indeed. I think I’m growing tired of this discussion, really. All we’ve done so far is play word games. No understandings have been increased in this process, so I think I’ll take my leave. It’s been nice chatting with you, though.

 

[Oreoracle]

I don’t think Aristotle would disagree with this at all. The problem concerns the object, not our labels of the object. Was the object a table before it lost its leg? Or was it never a table?

Surely if the table is nothing but its parts, when you remove the leg, the leg along with the other matter is still a table; part of the table just exists in another location.

By the same token, if the deer is nothing but its matter and energy, when the deer dies, then the deer would still exist because its matter and energy still exist. Or did the deer never exist? So at what point in the existence of this basic matter and energy is this matter and energy no longer a deer? When its matter an energy is eaten by another living entity? So if I use the same matter and energy to fertilize my crops, are my crops that same deer because they have the same identical matter and energy? Or was this matter and energy never a deer to begin with?

Oh look, more word games!

I’m not interested in these games, personally. It doesn’t help me to understand my environment, my word usage, or my logic any more than I already do, nor do I see it helping others. Utility-wise, this is a colossal waste of time.

 

[Betterave]

I think we are talking past eachother. You are saying we can talk about Arthur because Arthur exists. I am saying that we can’t talk about Arthur because Arthur does not exist, since there is no person satisfying that name about which we can talk. Can you please explain the difference between “existent” and “real,” and in what sense Arthur is existent but not-real?

But are you saying that we really can’t talk about Arthur, or that we are mistaken when we take ourselves to be talking about Arthur? I wouldn’t be happy with either of those choices. What if Arthur was real in the flesh-and-blood sense of the term? We don’t know that he wasn’t, and this ignorance has no bearing on our grasp of the concept ‘Arthur’ which mediates our discussions of him.

“Disengenuous”? It may have that affect. But I find the alternative way of speaking completely nonsensical, and that there is more reason to prefer the former consequence than the latter consequence. So Arthur, Hamlet, Zeus, and Peter Pan are all things that exist, but none of them are “real”? What does that even mean and how do you qualify these existent entities? If they are not ideas, not concepts, not words, not flesh-and-blood persons, not spiritual entities–what kinds of things are they? Fictional entities? But fictional entites, are non-real entities. And if existent=being real, then fictional entites don’t exist. Please illuminate.

I think the most important sense of ‘reality’ is Wirklichkeit - effectiveness, that which is effective. I would qualify Hamlet as a fictional entity, but I don’t think it follows that he is not ‘real’ - do you have reason to think that ‘real fictional entity’ is an oxymoron, is nonsensical? Such entities are not substances and substances are preeminent in being, but for a rational substance, such as man, fictional entities are centrally important elements of reality. Almost everything that is significant is the result of conceptual ficta, which is not to say that they are disconnected from reality, but that their reality, their ex-istence (standing-out-into-being) has arisen historically and has been essentially mediated by the movement of concepts.

 

[Syntax]

Oh look, more word games!

You are totally inconsistent with your activities. No one is convinced, especially me, since you’ve been using metaphysical terminology all along, too, such as “matter, energy, deer, object, change.” Isn’t your use of these same words also a word game then? What are we doing that’s different? I ask you questions you just simply don’t want to answer because you’ve already made up your mind that “objects are just matter and energy.” But this is a metaphysical position, Sherlock!

I’m not interested in these games, personally. It doesn’t help me to understand my environment, my word usage, or my logic any more than I already do, nor do I see it helping others. Utility-wise, this is a colossal waste of time.

If using these words doesn’t help you, then quit using them and get off this thread.

 

[Syntax]

But are you saying that we really can’t talk about Arthur, or that we are mistaken when we take ourselves to be talking about Arthur? I wouldn’t be happy with either of those choices. What if Arthur was real in the flesh-and-blood sense of the term? We don’t know that he wasn’t, and this ignorance has no bearing on our grasp of the concept ‘Arthur’ which mediates our discussions of him.

I wouldn’t disagree with this epistemic possibility, that we could be mistaken that Arthur doesn’t exist. If this were the case then, after all, we* would *be talking about Arthur when we use the word “Arthur,” just as we are talking about Obama when we use the word “Obama.” If we thought we weren’t talking about Arthur, when in fact we were, then we would have just been wrong. But if Arthur does not exist, then “Arthur” is not about Arthur. I don’t see why our epistemic situation should influence our introducing different meanings for “to exist” just because we are not sure whether some entity does, in fact, exist.

I think the most important sense of ‘reality’ is Wirklichkeit - effectiveness, that which is effective. I would qualify Hamlet as a fictional entity, but I don’t think it follows that he is not ‘real’ - do you have reason to think that ‘real fictional entity’ is an oxymoron, is nonsensical?

Again, let me ask you: how do you define “to be real” as opposed to “to exist”? And further, how do you evaluate truth-value of these statements?

Hamlet exists.
Hamlet does not exist.

Does “exist” mean different things here?

Such entities are not substances and substances are preeminent in being, but for a rational substance, such as man, fictional entities are centrally important elements of reality. Almost everything that is significant is the result of conceptual ficta, which is not to say that they are disconnected from reality, but that their reality, their ex-istence (standing-out-into-being) has arisen historically and has been essentially mediated by the movement of concepts.

Is your area of focus in continental philosophy by chance? My focus is in the analytic tradition. I just ask because the more I’ve tried to analyze and makes sense of concepts like “standing-out-into-being” and “being-in-itself” or “being-for-itself” they all evaporated in my hands. I could not make further sense of them, nor could I put them to much use because I found myself talking in circles when I employed them in my reasoning. Above all, they got me stuck in huge logical difficulties. I have a firm conviction there are more clear-cut and articulated ways to express what one is trying to say with the above concepts.

 

[Areopagite]

Thank you, Syntax, for your comments. I’m glad you didn’t withhold your views on this matter … especially since Oreoracle has quit on us (for now).

Though I have a deep respect for Aristotle, this way of talking about “being” above has always disturbed me greatly since I take “being” to mean nothing but “existence.” For this reason I disagree that there are “degrees” or even “kinds” of being. Existence and being I take to be a 1 or 0 kind of notion. So I have a question: do you take the meaning of “being” as completely overlapping the meaning of “existence” as I do, or are their meanings partly non-overlapping?

“Being” can be defined as “that which can exist” (which includes both actually existing and potentially existing things).

There are many different ways one can make distinctions in being. One of Aquinas’ distinctions was essence and existence. Essence and existence both fall under being … and since essence is a different distinction than existence, and if both fall under being, then it follows that existence and being are not the same thing.

Though Aristotle didn’t make this distinction in an obvious way, he more or less still did in my opinion.

In direct disagreement with existentialism and some Greek philosopy, I simply can’t understand the meanings of “different ways of being” or having “more rather than less being” at all.

Do you accept the distinction between actual existence vs. potential existence? Do you not also agree that actual existence is a more complete kind of existence?

If one object takes up a greater spatial extent than another object, it doesn’t exist more than the other. It simply occupies a greater number of spatial points; the object doesn’t have more existence than the other object.

Both objects have actual existence, but one of them is more actualized than another … and hence one has more actual existence than another. If a thing isn’t present at a certain location, then that thing isn’t actualized there. But when it is there, then it gains a an actual existence that it did not previously have. The more actual existences a thing has by being actualized in more locations, the more actual existence it gains. Since actual existence can come different degrees, then it proves that existence comes in varying degrees.

If I have more knowledge than my friend, my knowledge doesn’t exist any more than my friend’s knowledge exists. I may have more knowledge than my friend, but the knowledge that I do have does not exist “more” than the existence of the knowledge that my friend has.

How do you explain that you have “more” knowledge than your friend? Doesn’t that mean you have more knowledge in existence … thus entailing more existence of knowledge?

Likewise, a locomotive train may have more power than a baseball in trajectory, but the power that the train does have does not exist more than the the existence of the power of the baseball. A greater power “exists” no more than a lesser power, even though both powers are of different degrees.

The power of the baseball exists less than the power of the locomotive train because it is less … and so compared to the greater power, the lesser power is closer to nothing … and if it is closer to nothing then it is closer to non-existence (but don’t worry, it hangs on to some still).

Similarly, I take the behavior of running to be different way of locomotion than walking, not a different way of being.

Well, obviously running and walking are different, and if they are not different in being, then they are not different in any way. Remember, being includes essence (or nature), and the action of running has a different nature than walking. Hence, they are different in being.

 

[Areopagite]

And tables, and concepts, and words don’t “exist in different ways” from eachother.

Well then what makes them different? “Essence” simply means “a way of existing” (unless someone can correct me on that).

They either exist or don’t exist.

Well, they either have some actual existence or no actual existence. But if they have3 some actual existence, it can be to varying degrees.

Similarly, I think Hamlet does not exist. So he has no being at all.

If Hamlet doesn’t exist at all then he is completely meaningless, and we couldn’t even talk about him. Hamlet has an essence, even though he doesn’t have actual existence … but since he has an essence, he thus has being.

He doesn’t “subsist,” in some Meinongian fashion as an abstract idea, simply because Hamlet is not an idea. He is purportedly a person. And ideas are not persons.

I don’t think so. I can have “the idea of Hamlet.” So Hamlet can be an idea.

Alot of this older way of talking seems to confuse matter rather quickly and has many unpalatable consequences for one’s ontology and for quantificational logic.

I used to think so until I worked out the kinks in my mind and found that Aristotle’s metaphysical language was a pretty much seamless garment. I also found that it was the newer way of talking that had more inconsistencies and pitfalls in it.

For instance, it introduces variety of different meanings of “Ex” in existentially quantified statements, so that saying “Hamlet exists” is just as plausible as saying “Obama exists.” So we quickly get into alot of trouble if we don’t have a **univocal **meaning of “to exist.”

I would have to disagree. I see that if one doesn’t make the distinction between actual and potential existence that inconsistencies in language and thinking start to arise. The closest philosophy besides this that makes any sense on this issue would be Platonism … but that’s not my cup of tea.

You may find it reprehensible that I think fictional statements are not the same kinds of statements as statements about the world. But I see this as much less reprehensible than offering two distinct meanings of “to exist” simply because having a univocal meaning of “to exist” is required to make sense of all quantificational logic. And I think this *should *disturb us because “to exist” is not some unimportant notion one can do anything he wants with, since whichever way you choose to construe it will have an immediate impact on your ontology.

Once again, if we don’t make distinctions in the concept of “existence” or “being” or “reality” then we end up with even more incoherence.

I think we are talking past eachother. You are saying we can talk about Arthur because Arthur exists. I am saying that we can’t talk about Arthur because Arthur does not exist, since there is no person satisfying that name about which we can talk. Can you please explain the difference between “existent” and “real,” and in what sense Arthur is existent but not-real?

Being can be subdivided into “Real Being,” “Ideal Being,” and “Logical Being.”

“Real Being” (i.e. Reality) can be subdivided into “Actual Being” and “Possible Being.”

“Ideal Being” (i.e. Ideas) can be subdivided into “Subjective Being” and “Objective Being.”

In short, Possible Being and Objective Being are exactly the same … except the former is considered as being outside the mind, whereas the latter is considered as being understood by the mind.

Also, very oftentimes, we speak of “existing things” and “real things” when we are specifically only referring to “actual things” (though possible things are also real as well … and of course Real, Ideal, and Logical Being all exist in some sense).

If you want to know more about this, I elaborated on this previous post:
forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=6013684&postcount=38

 

[Areopagite]

An adequate explanation, in my understanding, is a series of references to certain things, conditions, events, etc., that account for our perceptions of things, conditions, events, etc. What “account” means depends on the subject at hand.

Well, the subject at hand is empiricism. I asked why does the empirical method automatically gain epistemological favor prior to anything else. You responded that it gives an adequate account of your experiences. So, now that we know the subject at hand … please define “account.”

Yes and no. We can both agree that physical objects are all entirely composed of matter and energy, right?

There are two definitions for “composed.” One is “made out of” … and in that sense, I would agree with you. The other definition is “makes up what something is” then I would have to disagree.

I believe that physical objects differ from one another. If the entirety of what they are was energy and matter, then there would be nothing to distinguish them … they would be exactly the same. Hence, there must be something else about them that gives them their uniqueness from one another … what do you think that is?

Here we have struck at the root of the problem which your philosophy suffers from (the belief that things are just matter and energy … and that’s it!). Obviously, there are differences between a chair and an apple … but if matter and energy are the only things that make them what they are … there is no difference between the two … the chair and the apple are exactly the same …

Aristotle resolves this issue … and it’s pretty obvious (though, I confess, I never figured it out by myself).

Think of it like a hierarchy you would hear of in a biology class.

How is there a hierarchy if everything is exactly the same … everything would just be matter and energy. Period.

Or more simply: Some physical objects satisfy the definition of “organism” but all physical objects satisfy either the definitions of “matter” or “energy.”

I would agree all physical objects are made out of matter and energy … but according to your thinking, there shouldn’t be any organisms … just matter and energy.

So in that sense, matter and energy are all that physically exist.

In fact, in every sense according to you. There is no real difference between any physical objects. Right?

“Deer” exists in your head. The thing that is being referenced by that label physically exists.

The “thing” that is being referenced, according to you, is just matter and energy. Hence everything can be labelled as “deer” since everything is matter and energy. Any label you give anything must also apply to everything else, since everything is the same thing … unless, of course, there is something else that really distinguishes them … and that can’t be matter and energy (because we both agree they share that in common, thus it obviously doesn’t distinguish them). What could it be?

I would say that an action is a sequence of events during which some physical change occurs.

Can you say that “events” and “changes” actually exist though? Are they physical objects?

I’m saying that an object may change in such a way that its stature no longer corresponds to a given label, e.g., if a table is defined as a wooden surface attached to four and only four legs, then an object that was once a table but has lost a leg since then no longer corresponds with the definition of “table.” I honestly don’t know how I can make it any more basic.

Ultimately, you need to explain why physical objects aren’t all exactly the same … because otherwise we would have to give the exact same label to everything because we wouldn’t be able to distinguish one physical object from another. There is more than just matter/energy going on in the physical universe. Why are we able to recognize differences between different chunks of matter/energy?

 

[Areopagite]

Without any rules to begin with, metaphysics is all babble until we assume a theory of sorts.

I agree.

Telling someone to “do” metaphysics isn’t the same as telling them to do math.

I agree they are distinct sciences.

Mathematics is defined with its rules; without the rules, you don’t have math.

Depends how you define math. All the definitions of math I’ve found in the dictionary do not define math by any of the commonly accepted axioms of math. They merely define it as “the study of number and space” or something along those lines. Hence, any thought pertaining to number and space can be considered math, regardless of axioms. Just like any thought pertaining to being can be considered metaphysics.

Metaphysics does not begin with rules.

Aristotle’s metaphysics begin with rules.

I make distinctions based on theories that are considered metaphysical, yes. I can only do so because I assume the rules that are included in those theories.

So … metaphysics shouldn’t be thrown out the window then, right? Otherwise, those theories you believe in would also have to go. Hence, metaphysics is a keeper, right?

By “official” I mean “defined as possessing.”

Once again, math isn’t defined by its axioms. Also … what if someone has a system that deals with numbers that deny the commonly accept axioms … but he nonetheless still calls that system math? It may be a worthless system, and an illogical system, but it can still be called a mathematical system … albeit a flawed mathematical system.

That’s like saying we can have mathematical theorems that contradict the postulates used to formulate the theorems.

Well, Fermat’s theorem, before it was proved, might have been wrong for all we knew. Nonetheless it was considered a mathematical theorem, even though we thought it might have ultimately contradicted the commonly accepted mathematical axioms.

If an equation would violate any axioms of math, like 5=4, we don’t call it a mathematical equation, we call it nonsense.

I would disagree … 5=4 is a false mathematical equation. Just like there are false metaphysical theories … and yet we still grant them the adjective of “metaphysical.”

It makes more sense to think of metaphysics as a field that begins with no axioms, only subject-matter (existence).

No, it doesn’t make sense to consider it a field that begins with no axioms … because then nothing makes sense. No axioms = no sense.

I disagree. My math teachers would never call “5=4” an erroneous equation–they would call it a series of symbols that don’t make sense in the context of mathematics. They may even call it a “failed attempt at doing math,” but they wouldn’t deem it a product of mathematics.

Just like I would call some metaphysical theories a failed attempt at doing metaphysics.

“Common sense” is quite a loaded term. Assuming that you’re talking about “a way of understanding that is commonly used,” I must say that you’ve made knowledge out to be a thing determined by democratic vote.

No, it’s not democratic. I’m claiming common sense is in all of us, even in those who deny it. Part of convincing someone of unprovable axioms is to tap into their latent common sense … and to do that … is tricky.

Indeed. I think I’m growing tired of this discussion, really. All we’ve done so far is play word games. No understandings have been increased in this process, so I think I’ll take my leave. It’s been nice chatting with you, though.

You too.

 

[Syntax]

Well then what makes them different? “Essence” simply means “a way of existing” (unless someone can correct me on that).

Does it? I thought “essence” was a term strictly applicable only to the substance’s property or to the substance’s possession of a property, not to the bare existence of that substance itself, such that, when the property ceases to exist for the substance, the substance is no longer the same *kind *of substance (or no substance at all). So is “essence” really a way of existing, or simply the way that John has that property, namely, **de re **necessarily, that is, having that property in all worlds in which John exists?

Well, they either have some actual existence or no actual existence. But if they have3 some actual existence, it can be to varying degrees.

Is not “actual existence” redundant? Doesn’t “existent” just mean actual?

If Hamlet doesn’t exist at all then he is completely meaningless, and we couldn’t even talk about him. Hamlet has an essence, even though he doesn’t have actual existence … but since he has an essence, he thus has being.

Not so. Existence is not a necessary condtion for a concept to have meaning. Santa Claus doesn’t exist, but I can still make sense of the description indicated by the term “Santa Claus”-- a jolly fat man in a red coat who delivers presents to children. But there is no Santa Claus who delivers presents to children. See next.

Once again, if we don’t make distinctions in the concept of “existence” or “being” or “reality” then we end up with even more incoherence.

Are you positively sure about that? Can you define the distinctions for me between these terms and why the distinction is so important? Please tell me this: if you think Santa Claus or Hamlet exists, the important question concerns how you are going to evaluate the truth-value of the following two propositions and on what set of distinctions you are going to evaluate them:

Hamlet exists
Hamlet does not exist.

Does “existence” have two meanings here? Does Hamlet kind of exist, and kind of not exist?

I don’t think so. I can have “the idea of Hamlet.” So Hamlet can be an idea.

Sure, but Hamlet is not identical to the idea of Hamlet. Moreover, Hamlet does not exist.

I used to think so until I worked out the kinks in my mind and found that Aristotle’s metaphysical language was a pretty much seamless garment. I also found that it was the newer way of talking that had more inconsistencies and pitfalls in it.

How so? Can you give examples?

I would have to disagree. I see that if one doesn’t make the distinction between actual and potential existence that inconsistencies in language and thinking start to arise. The closest philosophy besides this that makes any sense on this issue would be Platonism … but that’s not my cup of tea.

I happen to be a Neo-Platonist myself, with alot of refinements of his way of talking.

Being can be subdivided into “Real Being,” “Ideal Being,” and “Logical Being.”

“Real Being” (i.e. Reality) can be subdivided into “Actual Being” and “Possible Being.”

“Ideal Being” (i.e. Ideas) can be subdivided into “Subjective Being” and “Objective Being.”

In short, Possible Being and Objective Being are exactly the same … except the former is considered as being outside the mind, whereas the latter is considered as being understood by the mind.

I understand these distinctions, I just don’t agree with all of them. For one, I think being and non-being is only a 1 or 0 kind of distinction: either existence or non-existence. Question: do you think possible worlds exist? I can makes sense of the possibility of a “flying telephone” in a world that has a different set of natural laws. But I don’t think possible worlds exist. I take “possibile worlds” talk as a theoretical device for construing what *could have *happened, or what *must *happen, rather than what does or did or *will *happen. So *de dicto *propositions with a modal operater in front of them are modally true or false in virtue of that proposition (a really existent linguistic entity) having one or the other of the modal properties, not in virtue of that propostion referring to some possibly or necessarily existent being. A entity, however, can have a property “in all worlds in which it exists” such as “being human.” But I don’t think any other world exists other than this one. God, for instance, doesn’t “necessarily” exist; he just exists, or “actually” exists. Like I said possible worlds talk is a theoretical device for making sense of modal truths, not of “being.”

Also, very oftentimes, we speak of “existing things” and “real things” when we are specifically only referring to “actual things” (though possible things are also real as well … and of course Real, Ideal, and Logical Being all exist in some sense).

If you want to know more about this, I elaborated on this previous post:
forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=6013684&postcount=38

I will check that out. Thanks for reading my views and questions.

 

[Syntax]

Thank you, Syntax, for your comments. I’m glad you didn’t withhold your views on this matter … especially since Oreoracle has quit on us (for now)…

Oh no. I just now noticed this other post here. I will have to respond to this as well. So please give me a moment to respond

Yeah, oreoracle’s task was clearly misguided…I’m ot even sure what oreoracle’s point was.
I must say I didn’t want to interfere much because I thought you were doing a fine job:thumbsup:

FYI, I have no problem with metaphsyics whatsoever. You might call me a neo-platonist, actually. But I will say that though most of our ideas are the same, I construe them differently and this difference effects our different ontologies, such as the alleged existence of fictional entities or the metaphysics of “potential existence”…

 

[Betterave]

I wouldn’t disagree with this epistemic possibility, that we could be mistaken that Arthur doesn’t exist. If this were the case then, after all, we* would *be talking about Arthur when we use the word “Arthur,” just as we are talking about Obama when we use the word “Obama.” If we thought we weren’t talking about Arthur, when in fact we were, then we would have just been wrong. But if Arthur does not exist, then “Arthur” is not about Arthur. I don’t see why our epistemic situation should influence our introducing different meanings for “to exist” just because we are not sure whether some entity does, in fact, exist.

Okay, but I’m still not sure how you answer my question: Are you saying that we really can’t talk about Arthur, or that we are mistaken when we take ourselves to be talking about Arthur?

You claim: “But if Arthur does not exist, then ‘Arthur’ is not about Arthur.” Okay, so what is ‘Arthur’ about then? You seem forced to say: NOTHING. And that, I submit, is simply false.

Again, let me ask you: how do you define “to be real” as opposed to “to exist”? And further, how do you evaluate truth-value of these statements?

Hamlet exists.
Hamlet does not exist.

I’m not sure about definitions. I would evaluate the truth-value of such statements by inquiring what was meant in each case and deciding whether I thought that the meaning given was true. Both statements could be true and both could be false - but truth and falsity must be evaluated in context.

Does “exist” mean different things here?

It means effective/standing-out-into-being in each case, but there are obviously different ways of being effective/standing-out-into-being. It again depends on the context of the claim, the meaning that is intended.

Is your area of focus in continental philosophy by chance? My focus is in the analytic tradition. I just ask because the more I’ve tried to analyze and makes sense of concepts like “standing-out-into-being” and “being-in-itself” or “being-for-itself” they all evaporated in my hands. I could not make further sense of them, nor could I put them to much use because I found myself talking in circles when I employed them in my reasoning. Above all, they got me stuck in huge logical difficulties. I have a firm conviction there are more clear-cut and articulated ways to express what one is trying to say with the above concepts.

Yes, it’s Heidegger. At least it was. And Kant and Hegel - they fascinate me too. “The real is the rational; and the rational is the real.” They ruined me perhaps. I even think Nietzsche has interesting things to say. I find that analytic philosophers are often - not always - very analytical, but shallow and not very rigorous. That’s just been my experience. Continentals have plenty of problems too, of course.