Where is the efficient cause in Aristotle's natural motion?

  • Thread starter Thread starter Blue_Horizon
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
I don’t think Descartes would say that “the body has a tiger” or “the tiger has a body” but that there are existing beasts of nature which **we call **tigers, and they have “such and such” biology. So in that sense I would agree that Descartes started the philosophical leaning towards a more scientifically worded view of the world. In Descartes famous “Reply to Fourth Objection” puts this scientific position contrary to the scholastic position that things are perceives by the “intervention of ‘intentional forms’”. Elsewhere in his writings he calls the scholastic intentional forms fantasies of their imaginations. I am not sure if there is really any substance to this disagreement between the scholastic and new Cartesian position, or if they were just jousting. As with the soul as well, so long as we do not ascribe a simple intellectual soul-form to an animal, if someone says the animal has feelings, then that means he believes that animal has a soul in the sense that we say it does
 
Aquinas also speaks of existence as it was a quality, instead of merely a word we use to speak of something that is real.
You kind of have this partly right, but not exactly. For Aquinas, existence is not technically a quality because quality is in the category of accident, but existence is not an accident of a thing. Rather, existence or better yet, the act-of-being, is the foremost or first principle of a thing by which a thing is made an actual being or by which it has actual existence. The substance or essence of a thing stands in relation to the act-of-being as potency to act. The act-of-being actuates the substance or essence and the substance in turn actuates the thing’s accidents. Aquinas refers to the act-of-being as a formal principle. So yes, existence or the act-of-being is a real component of us and it is that by which we actually are or exist or have being.

God is the act-of-being itself. His essence or nature is simply to be, the act-of-being. Creatures are kinds of beings but not being or the act-of-being itself. The created act-of-being in creatures is limited by their essence or nature, for example, we are human beings. We participate in existence or the act-of-being through God creating us.
 
If someone were to say that things don’t have existence, but rather simply exist, the doctrine that God IS His existence would simply mean that He is necessary and not contingent as we are. That’s acceptable to me, but something else may make more sense to you.
 
For Descartes, size was more accidental than extension and I think that’s correct. When you say "Wood is the form, the substantial form, and the material or ‘stuff’ the wood is made

of is the matter" shows that Thomist are saying something MORE than what people usually mean by matter and the different forms it takes. For most people a piece of wood IS what it is, and it also has a certain shape. They don’t have the philosophical thought of a principle of potentiality united to an unseen form to make matter. This is purely Aquinas’s thought, and like the idea that existence is an actual quality, it could be beautifully said but I don’t know if it has reality to it…

Just because we don’t see something, doesn’t mean it is not real or doesn’t exist or doesn’t have any reality to it. A case in point, we don’t see God but we believe he exists. We don’t see the angels but we believe they exist. We don’t see even our own souls but we believe that our spiritual soul which possesses the spiritual powers of intellect and will is the form of our body, i.e., our spiritual soul animates our bodies and thus we are living beings. Accordingly, being that we don’t even see our own souls and our intellect and will, I don’t think it should come as to much of a surprise if we don’t see the substantial forms of things. Or, that we have knowledge of immaterial concepts such as human nature, the nature of wood, or justice.

Now, I don’t think anybody who is a sensible and reasonable person would deny that man exists. However, there is no part of man that is man or that we call man. For example, the hand is not man but a part of man. The point is universal concepts such as man are like this, they are immaterial and not sense observable. If no part of man is man or called man and yet we agree that man exists, then where does the idea of man come from? We may also consider that before we can identify the parts of a man, we must first have a man to identify the parts from.

It seems it was Socrates who was the first or one of the first who noticed the immateriality of universal concepts. Plato expounded on it and thus we have his theory of ideas or forms. For Plato, the immaterial ideas are more real than the things of the material world that participate in them. In a sense he is right, for God who is an immaterial being is reality itself. In the world, we find that things are constantly changing but the universal ideas do not change. Plato thought that if we are to have any scientific knowledge at all, our universal ideas and concepts must have objective reality to them. For if everything was just in a state of change but nothing permanent in them, we could not have any stable or scientific knowledge. Now Plato held that the ideas or forms have a separate immaterial existence apart from the material things of this world that participate in the ideas. Aristotle, on the other hand, placed the ideas or forms of Plato as a substantial element of material things. Thus, we have Aristotle’s doctrine of hylemorphism, i.e., form and matter as the substantial principles of material substances. We should also take note that Plato taught the immateriality of the intellect or reason due to our knowledge of immaterial ideas and concepts.

To get back to the piece of wood. Yes, for most people a piece of wood is what it is and the idea or concept of wood answers to the formal cause. For the formal cause is that which makes a thing what it is and from which is derived the specific nature of some thing. Much like if I were to carve a statue out of a piece of wood, the piece of wood is no longer just a piece of wood but a statue of wood. The statue is an accidental form of the wood though, figure and shape are accidents of a material substance.

Most people probably do not have the philosophical thought that the substance of a piece of wood is composed of an unseen substantial form from which is derived the idea of wood and matter. However, unconsciously they are affirming in a sense the reality of the substantial form as understood by Aristotle/Aquinas. Like the idea of man, wood is a universal immaterial concept. As in the case of man, if we were to identify or name the sensible parts of wood, biology or chemistry would probably tell us that wood is composed of several elements, for example, 2 atoms of oxygen and 4 atoms of carbon. Now, wood is neither oxygen or carbon, for these are parts of wood just as hand is a part of man. The idea of wood is not found in any of the sensible parts of wood and yet we call it wood. So yes, most reasonable people call a piece of wood, wood. But, the very idea of wood is immaterial and if wood is wood then there is something about wood it appears that we do not observe with the senses. This something is according to Aristotle/Aquinas the substantial form by which wood is wood. Accordingly, if we were to analyze a piece of wood as a philosopher might who is interested in finding the ultimate principles and causes of things, the very idea of wood turns out to be a universal immaterial concept, probably unbeknownst to your average person who nevertheless understands that when they see a piece of wood, it is wood and they call it wood.

By the way, the doctrine of hylemorphism is not purely Aquinas’ thought. This doctrine is derived from Aristotle who in a way synthesized the philosophy of Plato, Socrates, and the earlier greek philosophers.
 
You are equivocating on two words, substance and form. The white of the accidents of the bread after consecration are still in something, because that is what accidents do. As you said “And the substance is the subject of the accidents.” If the substance is something that is not seen, that is, not the matter which is subject accidents, than you are positing something which is invisible. Also with form: nobody denies that “figure and shape are accidents of a material substance” but Aquinas is saying that that material substance, apart from “the figure and shape” has two principles (prime matter and form), and since there is still the matter of bread after consecration there must still be a certain prime matter and form (in a certain sense) since they are required for matter according to Aquinas, unless you are to say with the Cartesians that the bread after consecration is an illusion.

Concepts of “man” are sense observable. That’s what biology is. We have an idea of a gun, but what if a gun without bullets was found by a latter generation and they didn’t know what it was made for and used it to keep paper from fly of a desk? Is it a gun or a paper holder? There are two things here: its physical components and how its used at different times.

“it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another.” Are you saying that the matter (which was the subject of the white BEFORE consecration) alone was its substance, and after consecration this matter has changed into an accident?
 
You are equivocating on two words, substance and form. The white of the accidents of the bread after consecration are still in something, because that is what accidents do. As you said “And the substance is the subject of the accidents.”

Yes, but I also said that the accidents of the bread after consecration do not inhere in any substance because the substance they formally inhered in is no longer there. The accidents of the bread, including the white color, after consecration are not in anything. This is part of the miracle of the eucharist. God sustains the accidents in being without a substance to inhere in. Transubstantiation is a supernatural work and miracle of God totally beyond anything we naturally and normally observe in the world.
If the substance is something that is not seen, that is, not the matter which is subject accidents, than you are positing something which is invisible.
 
Matter in a certain sense remains after consecration. Otherwise how can it be handled?

Anyway, I have three questions here:
  1. Do you think that the principle “extension is an accident of substance” is necessary to the defense of the Eucharest
  2. name a quality that comes more from the form than from the matter
  3. Where are you getting the information that “For Descartes, the sensible qualities are subjective”
I get what you’re saying though
 
Descartes believed that we simply see the outside of the host as bread and that it is really has no depth and therefore it is illusionary that there is any bread there at all. You also say there is no matter there but Jesus’s body. So the only difference is that you believe the “nothing matter” or accidents of bread go beyond the outer surface. That does make more sense.

I also wanted to point out that when I said that concepts of “man” are sense observable, if we assume there are not innate ideas, than this is what Aristotle and Aquinas say when they said that we get all our ideas through the senses, no?

Anyway, I am interesting in you answer to my questions of my previous post
 
Matter in a certain sense remains after consecration. Otherwise how can it be handled?
No matter remains at all in the bread or wine after consecration. Matter is a part of the substance of the bread and wine and the whole substances of the bread and wine are changed into the whole substances of Christ’s body and blood. The host can be handled because God keeps and supports the accidents in being just as keeps everything else in being at all times.
 
Matter in a certain sense remains after consecration. Otherwise how can it be handled?

No matter remains at all in the bread or wine after consecration. Matter is a part of the substance of the bread and wine and the whole substances of the bread and wine are changed into the whole substances of Christ’s body and blood. The host can be handled because God keeps and supports the accidents in being just as keeps everything else in being at all times.
 
Descartes believed that we simply see the outside of the host as bread and that it is really has no depth and therefore it is illusionary that there is any bread there at all. You also say there is no matter there but Jesus’s body. So the only difference is that you believe the “nothing matter” or accidents of bread go beyond the outer surface. That does make more sense.

Well, from my understanding, Descartes came up with three different opinions using his new philosophy to try explain in some manner the Church’s doctrine of transubstantiation. None of these three are satisfactory using the principles of his new philosophy whether his metaphysics or physics. One of his disciples said that it is just best to say it is inexplicable.

The outside of the host your talking about concerns Descartes’ theory of a “middle” surface. A Surface he postulated that lies between two bodies, for example, the body of the bread or host and surrounding bodies such as the air. However, he said that this surface has no objective reality but only a modal one, that is, it is purely conceptual, it exists only in our minds. At the same time, this conceptual surface is suppose to have some causal relation to the appearances of the bread after the consecration. If this conceptual surface has no objective reality in what kind of way can it be related to the thing outside our minds? If we broke the bread in two, how would we know there are two pieces now?

The accidents of the bread that remain without matter do not actually go “beyond” the surface. Surface is one of the accidents that follows quantity, for example, the surface of a body or the bread. So quantity or dimensions underlie the surface and surface underlies color. Descartes understanding of surface is not that of Aquinas. Descartes postulated a sort of like middle surface between the surfaces or space of two bodies. The surface of the bread for Aquinas is an accident of the bread, that is, it inheres in the bread.
I also wanted to point out that when I said that concepts of “man” are sense observable, if we assume there are not innate ideas, than this is what Aristotle and Aquinas say when they said that we get all our ideas through the senses, no?
 
An interesting observation on the First Way …
The First Way allows for the possibility that we will always be able to find some natural explanation for some fact of nature, but every explanation will involve something that falls outside the account of nature we give to explain the fact. Aristotle could give no account of the power that moved the planets in orbits and thought that they were in need of a spiritual mover; Newton then accounted for this power as gravitational action on an inertially moving body, but this left him in need of some mover to impart this inertial motion and so accounted for this with a spiritual mover. Laplace and Kant did away with Newton’s spiritual mover through the nebular hypothesis, but nebular formation ended up reducing to the laws of matter which in turn involve fine tuning – and so here we are again with some arguing that the fine tuning is caused by God while others insist we’ll find a natural explanation. The Naturalists are right that we’ll eventually discover some natural explanation of the fine tuning, but it will have its own undetermined values that will again give rise to the God vs. Natural explanation debate.
thomism.wordpress.com/2015/08/28/the-first-way-and-nature-as-infinitely-subtle/
 
No matter remains at all in the bread or wine after consecration. Matter is a part of the substance of the bread and wine and the whole substances of the bread and wine are changed into the whole substances of Christ’s body and blood. The host can be handled because God keeps and supports the accidents in being just as keeps everything else in being at all times.
 
Richca;13200935:
How would you explain this to a non-Catholic who claims, upon sensing the Eucharist, that to him it has all the matter that any other object in the world has? I’ve been wondering what to say to that claim
The doctrine of transubstantiation is just a fancy way of saying that the Eucharist is truly the body and blood of Christ despite having all the appearances of bread and wine. Its an article of faith. We believe it because Jesus said it and it has been the constant teaching of the church. Transubstantiation is the only instance that we know of (through faith) where the accidents of a substance do not give us accurate information about the actual substance.

God bless,
Ut
 
We believe in the Real Presence of the corporeal body and blood of Christ in the eucharist on the word of Christ who is God. And just as by his Word God brought the universe into existence from nothing, so by Christ’s word the bread and wine are changed into his body and blood. Our defence then, is simply Christ’s word whose word has the power to bring that which doesn’t exist into existence unlike our word which at times doesn’t mean a whole lot.
 
I’ve read that Plato said that the smallest particles of fire are tetrahedrons, and even the medieval idea of a quintessence means that there are 5 elements that create the limitless variety in our universe. Modern science has around 50 elements, and has even created new elements. So I don’t think Descartes was alone in his statements on this. Descartes could interpreted, in most of what he said, in line with scholasticism. If a modern physicist explained to Descartes how colors work in modern theory, I can see him saying “yes, they are modes!”. Many books like to make the demarcation between “good philosophy” and “modern philosophy” with Descartes, but he was a Catholic, and I remember a footnote in Dietrich von Hildebrand’s book The Devastated Vineyard that said there is nothing orthodox in Descartes. Anyway, I’d be interested in reading the three different perspectives of Descartes on this question. I’ve only read what he said in his Replies.

“The accidents of the bread that remain without matter do not actually go ‘beyond’ the surface. Surface is one of the accidents that follows quantity, for example, the surface of a body or the bread.”

I don’t see how the first sentence there can be reconciled with the next one. If you don’t believe the accidents after consecration have any extension, then you are in agreement with Descartes
 
I have **two **paragraphs from Werner Heisenberg’s book “Philosophy and Physics: The Revolution in Science” for you:

“Finally, in the nineteeth century, even the theory of heat could be reduced to mechanics by the assumption that heat really consists of a complicated statistical motion of the smallest parts of matter. By combining the concepts of the mathmatical theory of probability with the concepts of Newtonian mechanics Clausius, Gibbs and Boltzmann were able to show that the fundamental laws in the theory of heat could be interpreted as statistical laws following from Newton’s mechanics when applied to very complicated machanical systems.”

So the tendency to try to reduce phenomena as for “down” as possible is common in science; its not just Descartes who wanted to see things as simple as they can be.

“Plato compared the smallest parts of the element earth with the cube, of air with the octahedron, of fire with the tetrahedron, and of water with the icosahedron. There is no elelment that corresponds to the dodecahedron; here Plato only says ‘There was yet a fifth combination which God used in the delineation of the universe.’ If the regular solids, which represent the four elements, can be compared with the atoms at all, it is made clear by Plato that they are not indivisible. Plato constructs the regular solids from two basic triangles, the equilateral and the isoceles trinagles, which are put together to form the surface of the solids. Therefore, the elements can (at least partly) be transformed into each other. The regular solids can be taken apart into their traingles and new regular solids can be formed of them. For insteance, one tetrahedron and two octahedra can be taken apart insto twenty equialiateral trinagles, which can be recombined to give one icosahedron. That means: one atom of fire and two atoms of air can be combined to give one atom of water. But the fundamental triangles cannot be considered as matter, since they have no extension in space. It is only when the trianbles are put together to form a regular solid that a unit of matter is created. The smallest parts of matter are… mathematical forms. Here it is quite evident that the form is more important than the substance of which it is the form.”

As I’ve said, people often say “Plato said” but SELDOM quote him, so I will need to read Timaeus sometime. Anyway, Heisenberg’s take on Plato is that things has one principle (form) instead of two (prime matter and form). Be that as it may, these are very deep philosophical ideas. Descartes was trying to have a bridge between philosophy and the new science community, some of whom made agreements among themselves that they would not talk about religion. Descartes wanted to take clear common sense ideas only as the basis of his arguments towards the atheistic community (some of whom were scientists). So when he speaks of “res extensa” (as opposed to “res cogitans”), I don’t know if he is explicitly rejecting the Thomistic idea that extension is an accident; I don’t think he was addressing the question at that level. There are many rooms in the castle of Catholic thought, and I think he has one of them
 
How would you explain this to a non-Catholic who claims, upon sensing the Eucharist, that to him it has all the matter that any other object in the world has? I’ve been wondering what to say to that claim
What we see after the consecration of the bread and wine are the accidents of the bread and wine. Matter is a part of the substance of the bread and wine as well as the substantial forms of the bread and wine. And transubstantiation is a change of substance so the matter of the bread and wine is changed into the matter of Christ’s body and blood. This is how you explain it to a non-catholic whether they think the matter of the bread and wine remains or not after consecration. A person would need some understanding of Thomistic philosophy in order to understand what a change of substance involves in material substances. The eucharist is also a miracle so it is not like any kind of change of substance we observe in the natural order of things.
 
Richca;13200931:
I believe Plato had the same “darksome” idea of geometrical shapes of matter, and Aquinas liked him. Anyway, the only problem I have with this post is the often stated idea that Jesus is in every particle of “bread”. However, there must be a smallest piece of “bread”. He can’t be in every part of that, because its parts are not “bread”, the sum of its parts are
That Jesus is whole and entire in each particle of the bread and wine is not just “an often stated idea” but the doctrine of the Church (CCC#1377 and the Council of Trent). Jesus is whole and entire in the smallest particle that we can call bread or wine. Jesus would not be whole and entire in each of the parts of the smallest particle of bread and wine for the parts of bread and wine are not bread and wine but parts of it. Jesus is present as long as the appearances or accidents of bread and wine remain.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top