Who are you? What makes you "you"?

[Thinker_Doer]

Fair enough. So, we’re agreed, then, that your ‘method’ is merely heuristic at best.

No problem. Every new concept starts with a “what if”. The more we test it, and the better the method describes reality, tho more reliable the “assumption” becomes. Yet, we need to be ready to abandon or modify the starting hypothesis, if an actual counter example warrants it.

Umm… there are plenty of theoretical physicists and mathematicians who would disagree with you.

Is this something you consider an argument? Based on unspecified authority? Not particularly “convincing”. Did you ever contemplate the “mystery” of the Moebius strip? Or the question of "what exists to the north from the North Pole?

I’m not ready to assent to that claim. (Nor, at the moment, to delve into it.)

Too bad. Because it is a fundamental question. But I am already accustomed to this kind of non-argument. When the other party has no argument, they simply declare a non-interest. Which is obviously their prerogative.

 

[Thinker_Doer]

Yes we do these things and the material in our brains is in no way congruent with an external reality.

But it is, just like any abstraction is congruent to its referent. The word “father” is “congruent” with your physical father - in that there is a one-to-one reference between them. The reference is still there, if you use a different word “papa” - as long as you both agree that you refer to the same object. If you and I decide that from now on we shall use a different word (encryption), say “puyenti” to describe this person, then we created a brand new encryption (or language). We can understand each other, but no one else will have any idea what we are talking about.

You have not reached knowing, only a causal relationship and correlation.

And what is “knowledge” if not a model, that can be relied upon? That IS knowledge. Please explain what is “knowledge” in your vocabulary?

The neural patterns in the brain don’t have any meaning in themselves as matter qua matter.

Nothing has “meaning” in and of themselves. The meaning comes from our agreement. Let me clarify: We deal with information exchange. In every instance there is a “sender”, a “recipient” and a channel, though which the information is transmitted. The information is encrypted according to the nature of the channel.

That we can speak to different languages and reach agreement is in fact actually evidence of the realism of universals (or at minimum Idealism) , by the way, as you’re right that nothing in the actual matter itself between the two brains are congruent with each other.

Except our understanding and our action based upon the meaning.

Edit : I will work on a brief explanation of the Thomist resolution and post it at a later time, which may help clarify for you what I’m saying the problem is. I’m not an Idealist, but I’ll comment on both their agreement and disagreement with Thomists.

Please do so. But take into consideration that I am NOT a Thomist. And I find these labels like “realist” and “idealist” useless and unnecessary. Of course you can use them, if you want to. There are people who speak of “abstract OBJECTS”, and I find that phrase nonsensical, as well.

I use the languages and their encryption to show that the “meaning” and “knowledge” come from our understanding, and the understanding is verified by our actions to those categories.

 

[Gorgias]

Is this something you consider an argument?

Nope. Counter-example.

When the other party has no argument, they simply declare a non-interest.

Sometimes, “non-interest” doesn’t mean “I have no argument”. Sometimes, it means “I don’t have the energy to dive into this argument right now”, or even “I don’t feel that entering into this discussion will be productive.” Don’t pat yourself on the back that you alone have the valid arguments, brother…

 

[Thinker_Doer]

Nope. Counter-example.

Of what? That problems with so solution (in principle!) are not worthy to ponder?

Sometimes, “non-interest” doesn’t mean “I have no argument”. Sometimes, it means “I don’t have the energy to dive into this argument right now”, or even “I don’t feel that entering into this discussion will be productive.” Don’t pat yourself on the back that you alone have the valid arguments, brother…

Possible. Though the concept is simplicity itself. Namely that problems with so solution (in principle!) are not worthy to ponder?

 

[Wesrock]

I have enough content for four posts but can only post three in a row.

I don’t know if I’m in the mood to write this, but I have the time. So attempt it I shall.

Descartes introduced the critical problem in philosophy with the “immanence of thought.” If the objects of our thoughts are only thoughts, how can we know if those thoughts (as so-called models) are really congruent to objects external to our minds? Two major schools followed, the sensists and idealists.

Based on your responses, I think you’d actually find yourself in some agreement with Thomists against the Idealists and the extreme of solipsism. I’m not going to go on about how we can’t know if we’re brains in vats or bodiless consciousnesses under the influence of a demon experimenting on us, and how we’re stuck never knowing there’s an outside world. That line of thought is silly for Thomists, though it is important to note that Thomists since Descartes and Kant and Locke and Hegel have responded to the critical problem, since it wasn’t a “problem” among thinkers of Aquinas’ day, though he did give details on his epistemology in his commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima and his own De Veritae.

For Thomists, we have senses precisely because there is an outside world. Furthermore, we only come to and develop knowledge through the outside world acting on us (through our senses). In fact, Thomists hold that because of this we come to know things outside ourselves first, and later after developing knowledge learn to be able to reflect on it. It may be a bit anachronistic, but Aquinas’ epistemology is considered to be empiricist for just this reason.

While most modern philosophy has embraced the immanence of thought, that we only have thoughts as the o jects of thoughts, Aquinas held that the external object being known is the object of thought. We know things as they are. (This doesn’t mean we know things exhaustively or specifically, things can be general, and we can result in errors in knowledge. But I’m conserving space.)

I am going to do what I can to write in general terms. That may be difficult, as Thomists have a number of terms used for precision and clarity, and Thomas’ philosophy of the mind overlaps with his philosophy of nature and metaphysical principles, but I’ll do what I can to avoid it as much as possible. Wow, that was a long intro.

 

[Wesrock]

Thomas would generally agree with the statement of knowledge we came up with earlier: that in the knower there is information (a concept) that is congruent to the object being known. It must be understood that in order for there to be knowledge of a concept and not just blind causality, the object known must in some way be in the knower. What I’ve been explaining in prior responses is that matter as a vehicle for the object being in the knower does not resolve this. The matter in the brain doesn’t change itself to become a model of the object known. Neural patterns are not a model of or congruent with the object known, nor are they informational in themselves as matter qua matter. Just as the symbols for the word “cat” are not congruent to the concept of a cat, but only used conventionally among English speakers as a pointer to the concept of cat, neural patterns as matter qua matter are also nothing more (as information) than the symbols of “cat” inscribed to any medium. On reflection, it should be apparent that no material explanation for the object being known being in the knower is possible. But if there can be no material explanation we have a conundrum, either (a) we don’t have any concepts congruent to the object being known, and thus no knowledge, no thoughts, no concepts, and no mind at all, or (b) there is no material explanation but there is an explanation. (A) seems an absurd proposition, given that it is contradictory to even entertain such a proposition if it is true (though there are some “eliminative materialists” who go this route) . That leaves us with (B), an explanation that is not a material explanation. An explanation which is immaterial.

Point of clarification: immaterial is not a ghost, or a ethereal substance or ether. It is not like in a movie of a ghost wandering about and having some type of substance and location. We simply mean something more like a principle, something intelligible, something real and true but not material.

Aquinas’ hylemorphism, or matter-form duality comes into play here. Every material thing exists by two necessary co-principles, it’s “form” and its matter. These are distinctions which don’t reduce to each other. Things that share the same form are the same type of thing (you and I are both humans, two carbon atoms are both carbon atoms), and the distinction is being made up of matter that is different in space and time. By form (I’ll use the word pattern also) we do not mean shape. We mean the principle by which it is formally this type thing instead of that type of thing.

 

[Wesrock]

The external world acts on us, and our senses detect it. Through this we come to know the objects external to us. But we only know an object if we have the object in us in some way, and the matter of the object does not enter us (nor could it) nor does the matter in our brain change to be a model of the object in some way congruent to the object. What must be impressed upon us by the object through our senses is then the form or pattern of a thing. What-it-is becomes present in us and to us in a way that is not a material explanation (this isn’t denying everything our brain does in this process, but I am speaking of the actual knowing or value content).

The external object acts on us, impresses its form on us through our senses, which moves our passive intellect/abstraction from potential to actuality. The formal cause of the known object thus becomes the formal cause of our intellect, and as we know the object we take on in an intelligible way the form of the external object. The form existing in the object in what Thomists call a natural way, the form existing in us not as the formal cause of ourselves but only in an intelligible way. This process is called intellection. And thus our intellect and the object have the same form, and in so doing we know the object as it is.

Again, this isn’t arbitrary, it’s due to there being no possible material explanation for the object known to be in the knower or for the knower to have a concept congruent to the object known.

Idealists agree with Thomists somewhat, but they also differ. Instead of the human intellect taking on the form of the object, they deny that forms exist outside the mind (they don’t agree with you, though). To idealists, the object acts on the person, and the person by virtue of being human comes prepackaged with concepts called ideals. The objects acts on us, and causes us to understand it by activating the ideals in our mind, such that we only know the ideals directly and not the object. (An Idealist could fairly accuse me of butchering their precise terminology here, full disclosure).

Other than that, our learning experiences as you described? Yes, I agree with all that. That’s how we learn, improve our understanding, resolve errors, all through observing and interacting with the world.

If someone could post anything real quick so I can add the last part, that would be appreciated.

 

[Thinker_Doer]

I have enough content for four posts but can only post three in a row.

I know about this limitation, so I make this “empty” post as a place-holder. Keep on going!

 

[Wesrock]

Thanks!!!

As a tangent, I wanted to speak to distinctions between the senses, phantasms, and intellection. This isn’t the heart of my post, but I do think it helpful.

The senses are our detection system for external objects acting on us. They are receptive. I don’t think there’s anything you’ll question there.

Phantasm is a word that sounds mystical and archaic, but I think an explanation will bring it down to earth. They are related to senses. For example, take the sense of sight. Our senses detect light and pass that on electro chemically. What is caused by that but also distinct is the image your brain creates from that. The visual experience your brain creates. That image or visual experience is the phantasm. The visual perception. Sight is the easiest example, but it’s true for any of the senses. Compressed air rocks your ear drums and nerve endings in the cochlea which get passed on by your nerves, and your brain creates an auditory perceptual experience from it. Taste experiences, olfactory experiences, even touch experiences. The perceptual experiences are what are meant by phantasm.

Last is intellection, which was the main subject of this series of posts, by which we abstract from the senses and phantasm the concept, and by which the object known becomes in some way present in us. Intellection is what Thomists hold is unique to humans as rational animals. Other animals are seen as sensing and having phantasm and otherwise performing complex operations, but they don’t abstract to having knowledge in the manner described above, in which we take on the pattern of a thing in an intelligible way. By way we abstract from the particular to the universal.

I know some of this is gibberish to you, and I know you’ll be immediately skeptical, and I doubt you are convinced. Still, I hope it has illuminated the problem I have been trying to explain, and one which I say you haven’t really addressed.

 

[Wesrock]

I use the languages and their encryption to show that the “meaning” and “knowledge” come from our understanding, and the understanding is verified by our actions to those categories.

It’s the understanding that is precisely at issue. Yes, we do do it. That’s the point.

 

[Thinker_Doer]

I know some of this is gibberish to you, and I know you’ll be immediately skeptical, and I doubt you are convinced. Still, I hope it has illuminated the problem I have been trying to explain, and one which I say you haven’t really addressed.

Before I could make any evaluation, I will have to read what you posted. I will start right away, but since you said an “earful”, I will have to take my time.

 

[Wesrock]

Thanks in advance for reading. I hope it’s clear I haven’t exhaustively treated the notion of “the concept” in Thomism or other topics which I had to introduce briefly. I’d be happy to go into more specifics as they come up, as much as I can, anyway.

 

[Wesrock]

I rushed through hylemorohism earlier, and we can speak to that further, but even if one objected to some universal commonality between objects we consider to be the same type, we are still left with the material problem I elaborated upon. An alternative, not one I’d agree with, but an alternative would be that while there are no universal patterns the particular patterns would still be impressed upon the knower via the senses. But something must be impressed if we’re to know at all, and a material explanation for that is not possible.

 

[Thinker_Doer]

For Thomists, we have senses precisely because there is an outside world. Furthermore, we only come to and develop knowledge through the outside world acting on us (through our senses). In fact, Thomists hold that because of this we come to know things outside ourselves first, and later after developing knowledge learn to be able to reflect on it. It may be a bit anachronistic, but Aquinas’ epistemology is considered to be empiricist for just this reason.

I think we shall have to take this one step at a time. So far I agree with all your said here. Pretty encouraging, huh?

The matter in the brain doesn’t change itself to become a model of the object known.

First disagreement. The neural network changes every time a signal is processed.

Let’s use your example of a “cat”. It describes a neural configuration we associate with the concept of a “cat”. I don’t know how familiar are you with autism. There are several levels of autism. For some, the “generic concept” called a “cat” simply does not exist. When they hear the word, or see it written down, in their mind starts an internal “movie”, which “rolls” and displays every cat they have ever encountered.

Some simple tribes have no concept of larger numbers. For them there is only “one”, “two” and “many”. They simply cannot comprehend the difference between “three” and “four”. Many animals can, however.

Some other tribes have no concept of past and present and future. For them everything is present. Their language reflects this “disability”.

An explanation which is immaterial.

That is not a problem. There are many “things” that are not composed of particles, and that is not a problem for the materialist. A material object has many “immaterial” aspects of it, and none of them are composed of particles, IOW, they are immaterial. These are attributes, relationships and activities.

1. The attribute of “heavy” vs. “light” is not composed of particles, even though the object itself is. Moreover, the adjectives of “heavy” and “light” also presuppose a “someone”, who attempts to lift the object.
2. The relationship of “in front of” or “behind” are not composed of particles, even though the objects themselves are. Moreover, the concept of “behind” or (next to) also require a third party, and its viewpoint, which is not composed of particles either.
3. The “activity” of walking is not composed of particles, even though it needs a material thing called “legs”.

So the immaterial aspect of the material objects is not a problem. But you need to realize that these immaterial aspects cannot exist without the material “underpinning”.

Let’s stop here. There are many things we need to discuss, but it is better mark out points of agreement. I will wait for your response.

 

[Thinker_Doer]

Must add, since the edit would go over the character limit:

I need to ask what you mean by the adjectives “material” and “immaterial”, since I am not sure what these are for you. For me, “material” is something that is composed of particles, which have a physical interaction with other material objects. Any interaction is the exchange of elementary particles. There are four forces: the strong interaction, the weak interaction, the electromagnetic force and gravity. All can be measured and all interact with other material objects. I hope we can agree on that.

 

[Gorgias]

Nope. Counter-example.

Yep. You asserted that questions without resolution are “meaningless”. I pointed out examples of folks who make them their life’s work, and therefore, they aren’t “meaningless”.

 

[Thinker_Doer]

I pointed out examples of folks who make them their life’s work, and therefore, they aren’t “meaningless”.

No, you did not. You merely talked about some unspecified someones, who allegedly contemplated some unspecified problems which have no (and cannot have) solutions. Let me see: do you have an example of a mathematician who contemplates the difference between “1” and “0,999999999…”? How abut some names and examples?

 

[Gorgias]

Let me see: do you have an example of a mathematician who contemplates the difference between “1” and “0,999999999…”?

Nice straw man. Elegantly constructed. Still a straw man, though.

We’re talking about theoretical physicists and mathematicians, who deal in what you were talking about – the class of problems without solutions. If you want to try to caricature this class of people, you’re on your own.

 

[Thinker_Doer]

We’re talking about theoretical physicists and mathematicians, who deal in what you were talking about – the class of problems without solutions.

Present the name of one of these people, who contemplates a problem, while knowing that is has no solution. Name of the person and the description of the problem. For example someone who contemplates the difference between two identical objects.

 

[Gorgias]

Present the name of one of these people

One gets the feeling that you think you’re being clever.

You’re mistaken. Have a lovely evening.